

ATHENIAN POLITICS FROM THE VICTORY OF SALAMIS UNTIL
THE DISPATCH OF AID TO INAROS

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TO MY MOTHER
IN MEMORY OF
MY FATHER.

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PREFACE.

In this thesis I argue that an explanation of Themistokles' absence from the strategía of 479/8 can best be found in his desire to be in a position to create a situation in Hellas in which the Athenians themselves would choose to follow what would otherwise have been the unpopular policy of abandoning interest in Ionia. This policy was the necessary corollary of Themistokles' aim of striving for Athenian hegemony in Hellas. The devious methods he felt obliged to use illustrate the demos' independence of its leaders' opinions. This background explains the sources for the transfer of hegemony. It is held that Themistokles was influential in Athens until his ostracism in 470.

The success of leading politicians depended primarily on the intrinsic persuasiveness of their arguments, the reputation they could win from personal achievement, and on an attractive personality, and less on reputation deriving from family prestige and philoi connections.

The influence of Themistokles can perhaps be seen in the record of military activity in the 470s. Until 470/69 when the anti-Persian drive which culminated at Eurymedon (465) began, actions were undertaken only against Eion, Skyros and Karystos.

Conflict over foreign policy forms the background to, and immediate cause of the Ephialtic reforms, which were a practical attempt to secure the demos' sovereignty in the face of Kimon's unconstitutional behaviour and of his manipulation of existing controls on magistrates.

The decision to embark on a war on two fronts in 460 was a serious blunder. The failure of Athenian leaders to prevent this course of action requires the assumption either that they were unable to dissuade the demos from adopting a popular course of action, or, more probably, that they dared not oppose the demos' wishes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

I should like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, John F. Lazenby, and to acknowledge the debt I owe to his guidance. The many hours of enjoyable discussion with him have contributed substantially to the formation of my opinions on, and approach to the period and its problems; this remains true even though we usually disagreed in the end. While I was in Tübingen he responded in detail to my questions by letter. More recently he has improved this thesis by locating errors and making positive suggestions for improvements. Jerry J. Paterson did the same after reading sections of the manuscript, and throughout my research he has shown interest and encouragement. I am also grateful to Mr. B.J. Sims for instructing me in ancient Greek. In transferring my candidacy for the degree of M. Litt. to that of Ph.D. Professor Saunders was helpful and patient. Walter N.A. Bruce cheerfully checked the whole manuscript and saved me much time and embarrassment. That Monika Geyer helped me with the Bibliography and a few other chores can't be the reason why I know my debt to her is so great.

As well as being able to study in the library of the British School of Archaeology during two visits to Athens in summer 1975 and 1978, I have also been able to make regular use of the library facilities of the Eberhard-Karls-Universität, Tübingen, in particular those of the Abteilung für alte Geschichte in the Historische Seminar, and of the Philologische Seminar, but also of the Universitäts Bibliothek and of the Archäologische Institut. I should like to express here my gratitude to those institutions.

ABBREVIATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.

1) Ancient sources.

a) The following abbreviations used in the text and notes warrant explanation.

AP: Aristotle, *Athēnaion Politeia*;

Diod.: refers to Book Eleven of Diodoros Sikeliotes, unless otherwise specified;

H.: Herodotos;

Pl.: Plutarch; works abbreviated are Ar., Life of Aristeides; K., Life of Kimon; Th., Life of Themistokles; Thes., Life of Theseus; Per., Life of Perikles; Mor., *Moralia*. References to the 'Lives' are according to the system used in the Loeb series;

Thuc.: refers to Book One of Thucydides, unless otherwise specified.

b) The following ancient writers will be cited. Each author's number within F. Jacoby's collection (*Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin and Leyden, 1923 --) is listed only here. In the text and notes I cite the author's name and the number of the relevant fragment (fr.) of his work:

Diodoros Periegetes, 372

Ephoros, 70

Ion, 392

Kallisthenes, 124

Krateros, 342

Ktesias, 688

The Marmor Parium, 239

Philochoros, 328

Stesimbrotos, 107

Theopompos, 115

c) Only for those sources which might not be readily available do I cite a particular edition. (Most are, in fact, available in extract in Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes). Here are the details of editions to which reference will be made by editor's name:

Diels: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,

ed. by H. Diels, 9th. ed. by W. Kranz, Berlin, 1960.

Dindorf: Aelius Aristides, ed. by G. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1829.

Scholia Graeca in Aeschinem et Isocratem, ed. by G.

Dindorf, Oxford, 1852 (Nachdruck, Hildesheim, 1970).

Edmonds: Elegy and Iambus, ed. by J.M. Edmonds, London, 1954.

Lyra Graeca, ed. and translated by J.M. Edmonds, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1964.

Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes: Sources for Greek History, ed. by G.F.

Hill, new edition by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes, Oxford, 1951.

- Hude: Scholia in Thucydidem, ed. by C. Hude, Leipzig, 1927.
- Kock: Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. by T. Kock, Leipzig, 1880-84.
- Koster: Scholia in Aristophanem, ed. by W.J.W. Koster, Groningen, 1975-8.
- Müller and Kiessling: Theodorus Meteoohites, Miscellanea, ed. by M.C.G. Müller and M.T. Kiessling, Leipzig, 1821.

d) Other abbreviations relating to ancient sources are:

- IG: Inscriptiones Graecae, Berlin, 1873 --.
- ML: See Bibliography under R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis.
- POxy: The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ed. by B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt, London, 1898--.
- SEG: Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.

2) Miscellaneous.

- ATL: see the appropriate alphabetical position in the Bibliography.
- LSJ: A Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, revised by H.S. Jones, Oxford, 1968.
- R.E. Pauly, Wissowa, Kroll, Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1894 --.

- All dates are B.C. (except those in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).

- 478/7 designates the official Athenian year. 478/7 refers to the part before, 478/7 the part after January 1st. 478-7 refers to some point in the two Julian years 478 and 477.
- Words which should have been italicized are underlined with a broken line, thus.
- When no page reference to the work of a modern author is given in the notes it means the whole work is relevant.
- In the notes the expressions "see text above" and "see text below" should be understood from the point at which the number of the note is placed in the text. "Above" and "below" refer the reader only to points within the chapter in which the directions occur.
- Further abbreviations and explanations are given under "Bibliography".

INTRODUCTION.

In this thesis I seek to reconstruct and explain the course of Athenian politics in the period between the victory of Salamis (480) and the dispatch of aid to Inaros (460) and on this basis to characterize the relationship between the demos and its leaders.

In 508 Kleisthenes had won popular support for measures which made it easier for the 'average' Athenian citizen to dissent from the political opinions of men higher up the social scale whom he might otherwise have felt obliged to support. For the period 508 to 480 the sources are such that I despair of trying to analyse the effects this freedom may have had on the nature of politics. But after 480 we have sufficient information about the effects of Athenian policy and about the opinions and relationships of leading men to allow us to draw fairly reliable conclusions on the relationship between the demos and its leaders.

One of the remarkable features of fifth century Athenian society was the practical development of a system of government in which a large proportion of the population (relative to known earlier and later societies) took an active part in the decision-making process. The kernel of this system was the Assembly of adult males. The probouleutic functions of the Council of 500 (the Boule) rendered the system of mass Assembly practicable; selection by lot and other limitations on the powers and composition of the Boule make it certain that despite a higher proportion of wealthier citizens serving on it, the Boule's interests were those of the Assembly. Yet in the fifth century the Athenians continued to choose their leaders (almost) exclusively from the traditional ruling, aristocratic families. It is,

therefore, not impertinent to attempt to assess the extent to which these aristocratic leaders, apart from the restrictions imposed by rivalries among them, could still hope to influence the demos, and to assess how much advantage the 'average' Athenian had taken of the opportunities Kleisthenes had offered.

Our period forms a unity in two ways. It is with the strategic situation created by the Salamis victory that the possibility of aggressive actions against Persian interests in Asia emerged, and it was this possibility which posed the greatest problem for Themistokles' hopes of expanding Athenian influence in mainland Hellas. The tension created by these two directions in foreign policy was to provide the principal source of political conflict in Athens until, with the conclusion of the alliance with Megara, and the dispatch of aid to Inaros in 460, both directions were simultaneously and uncompromisingly followed, with disastrous consequences.

Our interpretation of the events of 460 attests an obsequiousness to popular opinion in Athenian leaders which seems to have been recognized by the demos as undesirable, and Perikles, at least, avoided this weakness in the years to come. The tendency is first discernible in Themistokles' attempts to execute his policies, in 479. Our period thus marks an identifiable stage in the development of the relationship between the demos and its leaders.

The sources are such that our conclusions on this relationship can only be based on a reconstruction of the course of Athenian politics. Scholarly disagreement on the broader questions of the nature of Athenian politics results from disagreement on very specific questions; if our understanding of the broader issues is to be advanced, then, it is necessary to concentrate our enquiries on those specific problems.

Before we can hope to explain how Athenian politics worked, and before we seek to explain the course of events, we must attempt to establish as firmly as possible what happened, and, in order to avoid circularity, it is methodologically important to keep this last aspect independent of the other two, as far as is possible. Thus the bulk of this study will be concerned with the prosaic tasks of trying to establish the policies of men, their relationships, the events, and the chronology of our period. It is to be hoped that, even if the overall structure which is built from these elements is rejected, some of the building blocks, so to speak, may be accepted and useable in other structures, or that the analyses of problems may serve to focus attention on more precise areas of disagreement. I have certainly often used the work of modern scholars in this way. For the parts of the reconstruction which are hypothetical I make no apologies, until it can be shown that a hypothesis is either superfluous or in conflict with evidence which has not been shown to be worthless. For the sake of clarity I give here an outline of my approach and of the main arguments and conclusions.

Any interpretation of Athenian politics in the 470s is to a large extent dependent on how we envisage Themistokles' position. After his presence at the Amphiktyonic council in (most probably) 478 the only securely attested mention of him before his ostracism (almost certainly) in 470, is his choregia for Phrynichos in 477/6. Perhaps more surprising is his absence from the record of military activity in 479. Scholars have tended to assume (few rely on Diodoros'

evidence) that Themistokles' influence declined very soon after Salamis, and various reasons are advanced to explain the assumed decline. I try to show (in chapter four) that none of these explanations are convincing and that, in fact, there is nothing beyond his absence from the strategia of 479/8 to suggest that Themistokles suffered a decline in influence. One of the explanations offered is that Themistokles disapproved of the strategy adopted for the 479 campaign. That Themistokles advocated facing the Barbarian on land is, however, shown by his speech to the Athenians at Andros, recorded by Herodotos. In chapter one I argue that we may take this speech as a true statement of his opinion, in particular, by showing that the earlier speech to the council of strategoi, also recorded by Herodotos, in which Themistokles advocates a quite different course of action, deserves no credence. But Themistokles' views on foreign policy do, indeed, provide the explanation of his absence from the 479/8 strategia.

The attempt to locate Themistokles' post-war policy occupies chapters two and three. It is suggested that his treatment in 480 of the islanders who were subjected to visits from the Greek fleet may be a foreshadowing of a purely imperialistic position which he envisaged for Athens in the Aegean in the near future (chapter two). In an outline of Themistokles' post-war policy (chapter three) I argue against the existence of a Themistoklean "Ionian policy" prior to 480, and accept the deduction that Themistokles cannot have wanted to pursue the war against Persian interests in Asia because this would be incompatible with his well-attested anti-Spartan stance in the 470s. However, in view of the silence of a hostile tradition as to any Themistoklean statement to the effect that the Athenians should abandon interest in their Ionian kinsmen in Asia, I consider it

impossible that he ever admitted publicly his views on this question. The evidence is sufficient to allow us to assert that Themistokles envisaged Athenian domination of the Aegean, and, through diplomacy and protection, friendship with powers in mainland and western Greece which were not friendly towards Sparta, with the aim of securing, ultimately, the hegemony of Hellas.

The intensity of Athenian feelings towards their Ionian kinsmen should not be doubted; but by a close analysis of the 479 naval campaign (chapter six) it can be shown that the Athenians had not given their generals with the fleet any guidelines on Athenian attitudes to a possible commitment to protection of any Asiatic Greeks. Thus it is fair to assume that the question had not been debated in winter 480/79, and it is argued that the question might be expected to arise after the end of the 479 campaign. Now, the failure of modern scholars to provide any convincing reason why Themistokles should have been barred from occupying the strategia in 479/8 invites the assumption that he chose not to stand for election. Since it was not out of protest at the strategy for 479, I suggest (still in chapter six) that such a choice becomes perfectly credible when explained as a desire to be present in Athens at the time of the Persian defeat, primarily in order to engineer a situation in Greece in which the Athenians themselves would consider it necessary to postpone any plans to make war in Asia. At any rate, this suggestion would help to explain Themistokles' alarmist reaction to the Spartan proposal concerning walled cities outside the Peloponnese, and his reaction to the presence of Peloponnesian ships at Pagasai. His behaviour might be hoped to have other effects which would contribute to the realization of his plans, and we can see a measure of success in some of the actions of the

Athenians in 479-8; in particular he seems to have achieved his primary aim by these devious and dangerous methods: in spring 478 no orders were given to the generals with the fleet concerning involvement in the Asiatic mainland.

If this interpretation is accepted then an important illustration of the nature of Athenian politics is won. Despite remarkable achievements and popularity, and despite the fact that his rivals for influence were cautious about criticizing him, Themistokles was not sufficiently confident of his sway with the demos to advocate a course of action - the abandonment of interest in mainland Asia - which he knew would be unpopular. The implication that the decisions of the demos were to a degree independent of the wishes of "influential" leaders, and that popular views influenced the policies of politicians, can be confirmed in different ways throughout our period.

Our interpretation also obviates the need to assume that Themistokles had lost any prestige by 478. In general the sources which can be seen to be referring to the mid-470s mention the names only of strategoi. The proper conclusion to be drawn from their silence about Themistokles is that he probably did not occupy the strategia. It would be a mistake to confuse tenure of office with influence. Themistokles' achievements had already won him a position of respect in the city. He had no need to absent himself for long periods from Athens, the place where decisions could be influenced.

It is, I submit in chapter seven, much easier to accept the best evidence for the transfer of hegemony against the background of Themistokles' attempts to execute his policy. Thucydides is unequivocal in stating that the Spartans were happy to transfer the hegemony, and other good sources support him. There is evidence that

Aristeides and Kimon made contact with officials at Sparta during the 478 campaign concerning Pausanias. By postulating that this contact also resulted in a private agreement between the two Athenians and influential men at Sparta, aimed at thwarting Themistokles' success, Spartan reaction to the transfer becomes intelligible. The positive and friendly attitude of the Spartans undermined the excuse Themistokles had created for not pursuing the war against the Persians. Yet the formation of the anti-Persian Athenian alliance did not represent a public defeat for him, since he had not opposed the idea publicly. He continues, I believe, to exercise a discernible influence on the direction of Athenian energies throughout the rest of the 470s.

(Chapter five justifies rejection of three points from the tradition dealing with the battle of Plataia, two of which, had they been accepted, would have required a different interpretation of events and policies, while the third (the "Temples clause" of the Oath of Plataia) would have deprived us of a subsidiary reason which helps explain the military inactivity of the Athenians in the 470s).

An interpretation of Themistokles' position in Athens, and of Athenian foreign policy, is substantially affected by the chronology we accept for the period 478/7 to 465/4. For example, were it possible to believe, as most scholars do, that the flight of Themistokles, which coincided with the siege of Naxos, was in 470, it would be possible to date Themistokles' ostracism in the mid-470s. The closeness in time to the formation in the early 470s of a "grand alliance" of the three most aristocratic families, and all enemies of Themistokles, would make it attractive to explain his ostracism primarily as a result of the concerted efforts of that alliance. Such success in removing a

highly successful man would testify to the immense strength and extensiveness of the political influence of aristocratic families with the broad mass of the demos. We should be forced to explain Themistokles' success in the 480s as the result of a series of changing alliances with aristocratic leaders, enabling him to divide them and have them ostracized one by one. Joining forces again in the early 470s these aristocratic leaders with their factions could then have had Themistokles removed by all directing their 'clientelae' to turn up on ostracism day and inscribe 'Themistokles' on the sherd. The picture of political life emerging from such a reconstruction would bear more resemblance to Attika in the first half of the sixth century, or to the later Roman Republic, than to the political ethos which emerges from the reconstruction we shall in fact be proposing. As it is, the fact that Themistokles fled past the besieged island of Naxos not earlier than 466 makes it virtually certain that he was not ostracized until 470. It is this fact which ultimately justifies the method and conclusions of the chapter (nine) on success in Athenian politics, to which I shall return in a moment.

That the siege of Naxos was still in progress in 466 also has important consequences for the history of the Athenian alliance. It means that in the period of about a decade between the capture of Eion and the siege of Naxos the only securely attested military operations were the capture of Skyros and the war against Karystos. Thus to assume, as most scholars do, that the alliance simply got on with the job it had set itself requires us to postulate disturbingly much activity of which we have no evidence.

I have set out the case for accepting this date for Themistokles' flight past Naxos, central to my thesis, in an article, and have not

repeated the arguments here. In chapter eight, though, I conclude that we may place greater confidence than is usually done in a fairly conventional chronology of the early years of the alliance. I accept Diodoros' 470/69 date for the beginning of preparations for an anti-Persian drive (and at the beginning of chapter twelve argue that we should accept it), relating to this other evidence of preparations and training, and reasons are cited against adding substantially to the record of military activity in the 470s.

In chapter nine it is shown that the first three main exploits of the Athenian alliance, against Eion, Skyros and Karystos, conform sufficiently closely to what we discerned of Themistokles' policies for it to be permissible to believe that they represent the results of his attempts to guide the decisions of the demos; I deny that they can be cited as evidence of a decline in his influence. In order to assess the relative importance of certain recognizable categories which contributed to political success I try to estimate the standing of Themistokles, Aristides, Kimon and Xanthippos in terms of these categories, namely, 1) the intrinsic persuasiveness of a man's arguments; 2) his good reputation, deriving from a) his family, b) his own achievements, c) an attractive personality; and 3) support from philoi. As we cannot determine precisely the degree of political success or failure experienced by these leaders in the period 478/7-475-4, and as some of the categories remain unknown quantities, the limitations of the approach are frankly admitted. The most important conclusion, though, that philoi connections cannot have been decisive in the success of leading politicians is assured by the remarkable fact that despite the formation^{of} the "grand alliance" Themistokles managed to escape ostracism until 470. This limited conclusion is

filled out (at the end of chapter eleven) after an interpretation of the period 475-4 - 470 to provide a characterization of Athenian politics in which success is dependent primarily on the intrinsic persuasiveness of a man's arguments, reputation deriving from personal achievement, and an attractive personality.

Having demonstrated in chapter ten the necessity of dating a high-handed security drive by Sparta within the Peloponnese to the late 470s (as well as considering the chronology and interpretation of events in the Peloponnese generally in the period 478/7-465/4), it is suggested in chapter eleven that Themistokles' reactions to Spartan behaviour helps to explain the military inactivity of the Athenians between Karystos and the beginning of preparations for the anti-Persian drive. It is argued that Themistokles' probable interpretation of Spartan ambitions caused a degree of suspicion of the Spartans, and that Themistokles would have advocated supporting the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese. His proposals were ultimately rejected but were not without appeal. Some indirect evidence can be found to support the view that aid to the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese was an issue at this time. Inference, and the evidence of Aischylos' Persai is used to account for the Athenian rejection of Themistokles' proposals, and the increasing popularity of those of his enemies.

The rejection of Themistokles' policies is not in itself an adequate explanation of his ostracism. The sources permit us to explain it as a response to his arrogance, and as a reaction to his refusal to drop his pressure once the considered opinion of the majority of the demos had been reached and (probably repeatedly) demonstrated. This reaction was prompted not only by the practical

desire to remove the focus of dissension for security reasons, but also by a sense of impropriety at the implied refusal to recognize the rule of the demos.

The period of Kimon's supremacy is not very interesting (chapter twelve). The evidence suggests the city was totally committed to the new anti-Persian offensive and that Kimon's supremacy was unchallenged. His exploitation of his position and of the nervous atmosphere in Athens reveals Kimon in an unpleasant light.

In chapter thirteen it is maintained that the debate in the Assembly in 464 in which Ephialtes spoke against, and Kimon in favour of sending aid to the Spartans sparked off a public debate on the precise spheres of influence which Sparta and Athens should enjoy. We have evidence that by 462 the Athenians had concluded that parts of Makedonia should be fair game for Athenian aggression without impinging on good relations with Sparta. Kimon disagreed. That the Athenians wished to maintain good relations with Sparta is proved by the dispatch of aid a second time, after the decision to invade Makedonia.

Kimon's refusal to obey the demos' orders to invade Makedonia was a revolutionary act challenging the sovereignty of the demos. The acquittal of Kimon by the Areopagos demonstrated the partiality of that council, and enabled Ephialtes to muster sufficient popular support to divest it of the powers which it had been using to promote politicians with a pro-Spartan policy who were friends of Kimon, and to penalize those who were his enemies and who were less concerned with preserving good relations with Sparta. Thus conflict over foreign policy explains the background to, and the immediate cause of the reforms in constitutional practice. The reforms of Ephialtes were a

practical attempt to ensure that the sovereignty of the demos was respected by magistrates, and the least partial judge of that was the demos, or a microcosm of it. There is no reason, therefore, to postulate, at this stage, a theoretical belief in the wisdom of expanding areas of popular participation in government.

The fact that the demos sent Kimon with aid to Sparta shortly after he had disgraced himself over Makedonia and the subsequent trial may be taken as evidence of the political maturity of the demos, in so far as it was discerning enough to accept an element in a man's policy even though the man himself was discredited. The evidence shows that Kimon was ostracized not only as a scapegoat for Athenian anger at the Spartan insult to the Athenians in 462, but also because he refused to accept the decisions of the demos.

In chapter fourteen I note the evidence which suggests that after the Spartan insult, the Athenians were envisaging going to war with Sparta and perhaps her allies, too. Although alternative chronologies are not impossible, an objective assessment of the evidence does suggest that the Athenians chose to support Inaros in 460, at a time when the alliance with Megara had made war with Korinth, and probably other Peloponnesian League members, virtually certain. There is every reason to see the acceptance of a war on two fronts as a serious blunder.

In order to explain the failure of Athenian leaders to prevent this course of action I argue that it is necessary to assume either that despite the prestige they had won as a result of the events of 462, those who advocated expansion in mainland Greece were incapable of deterring the demos from its desire to prosecute the war against Persian interests; or, that they shied away from opposing a course of action

that was obviously popular. For reasons given in the text I believe that the second alternative is nearer the truth. Two explanations of their timidity suggest themselves. Remembering the various assertions of the demos' dislike of men who refused to accept the judgement of the majority of citizens, they remained reticent. The implication of this, that the policies of leaders were to a degree determined by popular views, is also contained in the second explanation. Having learned from Themistokles' fate there is some reason to believe that a man who advocated expansion in mainland Greece had felt obliged to adopt an anti-Persian stance. Such men now lacked the courage to shift their positions as circumstances required. While Kimon's clumsy attempts to steer the state in the direction he considered best amounted^{to} a rejection of the traditional sovereignty of the Assembly and was, therefore, unacceptable, the lack of leadership in 460, and perhaps throughout the next six years, led to disaster. It was probably this experience which created a climate in which Perikles' peculiar relationship with the demos could flourish.

CHAPTER ONE. THE HALT AT ANDROS

Herodotos (8.109) preserves a speech made by Themistokles to the Athenian fleet at Andros. But before we can make use of it we must deal with the historical and historiographical difficulties presented by the section (8. 108-111) in which it is included.

The problem is that while we are in no position to doubt the historicity of Themistokles' speech to the Athenian sailors (see below), discouraging sailing to the Hellespont, Herodotos, by having Themistokles propose the opposite course in what must have been a closed council of strategoi¹, casts doubt on whether Themistokles' public speech represented what he in reality considered the best course open to the Greeks at this stage. We would have been bound to accept Herodotos' presentation of Themistokles' shift of opinion were it not for three interrelated elements which arouse suspicion. The most damaging to the integrity of his account is his comment on Themistokles' public speech, dissuading the Athenians from destroying the bridges, that *ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἀποθήκην μέλλων ποιήσασθαι εἰς τὸν Πέρσην, ἵνα ἥν ἄρα τί μιν κατακαμβάνη πρὸς Ἀθηναίων πάθος ἔχῃ ἀποστροφὴν· τὰ περ ὧν καὶ ἐγένετο* (H.8.109).

This at least establishes the probability that the tradition Herodotos is following at this point has been adulterated by a knowledge of subsequent events² and warns us to be on our guard. This is obvious and requires no further discussion. Themistokles then sends Sikinno, the man who had delivered the first message which had brought about Salamis, with a second message to the King. The presence of Sikinno, in particular, has led scholars to doubt the historicity of this

second message. By analysing the tradition of a second message we shall be able to show Herodotos' version to be so thoroughly manipulated with the intention of compromising Themistokles' role as to encourage us to interpret the third suspicious element, Themistokles' extensive plagiarism of Eurybiades' arguments, in a way which will allow us to locate with confidence Themistokles' real views on strategy, and perhaps on policy, in the wake of the victory of Salamis³.

It might have been possible to reject Herodotos' second message outright, had it not been for Thucydides' account of part of Themistokles' letter to Artaxerxes (137.4). The passage has caused some difficulty⁴ and the interpretation I offer is not the only one possible. Themistokles admits that he did Xerxes great harm so long as he, Themistokles, was forced to defend himself from Xerxes' attack. He claims, however, that while Xerxes was retreating, in danger, he did him an even greater service. But before he relates this new ἀγαθόν Themistokles adroitly prepares the ground psychologically by reminding Artaxerxes of the two Themistoklean services already known at court, for which, independent of the new claim, he deserves favour: *καί μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται (γράψας τήν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποίησατο, τότε δι' αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν).*

He thus wrote, I believe, of the warning he sent before Salamis that the Greeks intended to retreat, and also of the second warning he sent concerning the bridges. Themistokles reminded Artaxerxes of these two acts of friendship partly for the favour he might expect from them, but also to make more plausible his new claim⁵. The third service which Themistokles claims he rendered Xerxes while he was

actually in retreat was that the failure of the Greeks to destroy the bridges was due to Themistokles' own efforts; Thucydides rejects the truth of his claim⁶.

Some scholars have denied that the Greek should be taken as indicating that a message concerning the bridges was sent by Themistokles⁷. It is, however, safer to interpret Thucydides as indeed referring to some kind of second message⁸. And it is, in my view, beyond doubt that Thucydides believed this message, like the one *τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως*, was also sent from Salamis⁹.

There is no good reason to doubt the reliability of this section of Thucydides¹⁰. It is difficult to imagine that, if Themistokles really did send such a letter to Artaxerxes, he could hope to get away with referring to a non-existent message¹¹. Hignett said that Thucydides' reference to Salamis as the geographical origin of the second message "looks like a mere slip"¹². Before we consider this judgement let us look at the other important sources for the second message.

Plutarch (Th.16.1) has Themistokles, still at Salamis, propose sailing to the Hellespont and breaking the bridges to Aristides, but not, however, in earnest. Aristides uses the arguments of Herodotos' Eurybiades concerning the effect this would have on the King to counter the proposal. Themistokles then sends as messenger the captured eunuch Arnakes to tell the King that the Greeks had decided to sail to the Hellespont and break the bridges, and that he should depart in all haste, but that Themistokles *μέχρις αὐτὸς ἐμποιεῖ τινας διατριβὰς τοῖς συμμάχοις καὶ μελλήσεις πρὸς τὴν δῖωξιν* (Pl. Th. 16.4). The effect of this *φρόνησις* of Aristides and Themistokles was to reduce enemy numbers at Plataia and its motives

were patriotic (Th. 16.5). In the Life of Aristides (9.3 - 10.1) Plutarch gives substantially the same account, though the content of the message has become διπλὴν ἐπὶ τὰς γεφύρας ὤρμημένους τοὺς Ἕλληνας αὐτὸς ἀποστρέψει σωζέσθαι βασιλέα βουλόμενος (Pl. Ar. 9.4). It would be difficult and unwarranted to propose two distinctly different sources for the two Plutarch accounts. The 'Themistokles' should take precedence. Plutarch was most probably influenced unconsciously in the 'Aristides' by the Herodotean message (H.8.110), though meaning to follow here the obviously non-Herodotean source he used in the 'Themistokles'.

If Diodoros (19.5-6) preserves Ephoros accurately, the latter also interpreted Themistokles' second message as patriotically motivated (cf. 59.2). The context suggests that the message originated from Salamis. There are verbal similarities between Diodoros' and Plutarch's ('Themistokles') accounts. In Plutarch (Th. 16.4) the message to the King was that τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλησι δέδοκται τῷ ναυτικῷ κεκρατηκότας [1] ἀναπλεῖν εἰς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐπὶ τὸ ζεῦγμα καὶ λύειν τὴν γέφυραν [2], Θεμιστοκλῆς δὲ κηδόμενος βασιλέως παραινεῖ σπεύδειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θάλατταν καὶ περαιούσθαι... ταῦθ' ὁ βάρβαρος ἀκούσας καὶ γενόμενος περίφοβος [3] διὰ τάχους [4] ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀναχώρησιν.

In Diodoros (19.5-6) it is that μέλλουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες πλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τὸ ζεῦγμα λύειν τὴν γέφυραν [2]. διόπερ ὁ βασιλεὺς πιστεύσας τοῖς λόγοις διὰ τὴν πιθανότητα, περίφοβος ἐχένετο [3] μὴ τῆς εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπανόδου στερηθῇ, τῶν Ἑλλήνων θαλαττοκρατούντων [1], ἔχων δὲ τὴν ταχίστην [4] διαβαίνειν ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν.

Despite the close correspondence, Diodoros' account - let us assume

it is also Ephoros' - does differ from Plutarch's in two points of substance. In Ephoros Themistokles is alone in perceiving the advantages to be had from encouraging Xerxes' escape; and in Ephoros it is τὸν παιδαγωγὸν τῶν ἰδίων υἱῶν (i.e. Sikinnos: H. 8.75) whom Themistokles sends as messenger¹³. Nonetheless, Bauer rather surprisingly found Plutarch's use of Aristides 'looks most like Ephoros'¹⁴. Now Ktesias says φεύγει ἑρμηνεύου βουλὴ πάλιν καὶ τέχνη Ἀριστείδου καὶ Θερμοκυκλέους (fr. 13) and in the epitome of Photios there appears a few lines further a royal eunuch whose name in the manuscripts is corrupt (*Ματακάς*, *Μάτακας* (*Νατάκας*)) and suspiciously similar to 'Arnakes'. The complete text of Ktesias is likely to have mentioned, or meant, the eunuch Arnakes referred to by Plutarch¹⁵. Uxkull pointed to Plutarch's use of Aristides to draw the conclusion that he must have been drawing on Ktesias, and this is more logical than Bauer's deduction¹⁶. Recently Podlecki has found "the similarity of wording between Plutarch, Themistocles 16.6 and Ktesias" grounds for suggesting Plutarch was drawing on Ktesias¹⁷. The suggestion is acceptable, and with it the corollary that Ktesias most probably located the geographical origin of the message, like Plutarch, at Salamis.

There is good reason to deny that Plutarch was drawing on Ephoros¹⁸. And there seems equally good reason to deny that Ephoros was drawing on Ktesias here. The one has Themistokles working alone and sending Sikinnos, the other involves Aristides and has Themistokles send Arnakes. And yet the correspondences in setting, content, motive, in the effect of the message, and of language between Plutarch and Diodoros are striking and do require explanation.

The use of a common source by Ktesias and Ephoros would help to explain both the similarities and differences in their accounts, as preserved by Plutarch and Diodoros.

The putative source would have the geographical origin of the message as Salamis, its content directing the King to head for the Hellespont and warning him of the intention of the Greeks to destroy the bridges. The motive and effect would be to reduce the danger to the Hellenic forces on land. It needn't have mentioned the name of the messenger, but may have. It probably mentioned, like Plutarch, Themistokles' expression of goodwill to the King. The source could have been Hellanikos¹⁹. But whoever our postulated source might have been, the evidence argues against a mere tinkering with the Herodotean version. Take, for example, the introduction of Aristeides into the tradition, as we know it from Plutarch. This is usually excused as a 'substitution' of Eurybiades, and indeed it is clear that Aristeides' arguments are modelled on those of Eurybiades at Andros, recorded by Herodotos²⁰. But the fundamental differences between the two traditions are made all the more clear by the application of this episode to both. In the anti-Themistoklean, Herodotean account the implication is clear that Themistokles is not expressing his own opinion which has been previously set out in the council of strategoi, but is adopting the arguments of Eurybiades to win a (therefore undeserved) reputation for εὐβουλίη (see below). This device, however, when transplanted to the tradition favourable to Themistokles, loses its raison d'être, and the rather mechanical surgeon who is guilty of the operation is forced to provide the clumsy expedient of explaining that since Themistokles, as his main source made clear, was himself well aware of the

advantages of encouraging the King's retreat, Themistokles must have been 'just testing' Aristides when he suggested breaking the bridges. Ephoros has most probably reproduced our putative original source more accurately than Ktesias by having Themistokles alone perceive the advantages of the King's swift retreat.

The existence of two fundamentally different traditions concerning the second message is also detectable in the different geographical origins, Salamis and Andros, and this is connected with the content of the messages. From Salamis the Greek fleet sailed off north-east in the direction of the Hellespont (and Andros). Had this action followed a message to the King 'concerning the bridges' it is very difficult to imagine that it should have claimed that Themistokles *ἔσχε τοὺς Ἑλληνας τὰς νέας βουλομένους διώκειν καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ γεφύρας λύειν*

(H.8.110). Had he? It can't have looked like it! No, the content of the message as sent from Salamis was consistent with the actions of the Greeks: they intended to break the bridges. Consistent with both the geographical origin and with the content is, of course, the motive behind the message. From Salamis, and shortly before the Greek fleet began the pursuit, whatever else Themistokles may have been alleged to have hoped to gain by informing the King of the danger he was in, the effect can only have been to encourage his departure, and so to reduce the size of his land forces.

So it is reasonable to see behind Diodoros and Plutarch, ultimately, an internally consistent source which had Themistokles alone in perceiving the advantages to be had of making the King believe his line of communications and of retreat were in danger,

that he sent a message shortly after Salamis, before the Greek fleet began the pursuit, and that the main motive and effect were patriotic²¹. Onto this core accreted elements based on passages of Herodotos (the introduction of Aristoides, and perhaps Sikinnos) or simply invented (Arnakos as messenger)²².

In view of the evidence for a tradition locating the geographical origin of the message at Salamis it would seem best to accept Thucydides' apparent location of it there, too, rejecting, instead, Hignett's judgement that Thucydides has made a slip²³. Thucydides thus arguably supports the tradition of a patriotic message, for, as we saw, the Salamis origin was an integral element of that tradition²⁴. We must bring historical considerations to bear to decide which of the two traditions appears the more authentic.

Essentially, in deciding between the two traditions we are deciding whether the message was patriotically motivated or whether Themistokles was, as Herodotos says, coming to some private arrangement with the King, for some purpose to his own advantage. It is not necessary to argue that if we accept the historicity of a second message we should accept a patriotic motive behind it²⁵. But acceptance of this assumption carries with it a chain of further requirements. If the motivation was patriotic it is difficult to imagine what else it can have hoped to achieve other than a withdrawal of Xerxes' forces. The warning that the Greeks intended to break the bridges, along with a promise of attempted delays might have been hoped to achieve this aim. Conversely, a narrator who wished to exclude from the message any element which could be interpreted as having served the Greek cause had to exclude this element. Thus we find in the unpatriotically motivated Herodotean

message the news that the Greeks had decided not to break the bridges, thereby giving Xerxes no reason to hurry²⁶. Whether the Greeks "had decided not to destroy the bridges" or whether they "intended to" depended, to all appearances, on the geographical origin of the message, as we have seen.

Now, Herodotos (8.107) was well aware that the possibility of the Greeks breaking the bridges was haunting the King's mind. He was also aware that, despite the Persian fleet's withdrawal, it appeared that the King and his land forces might be preparing to remain (8.108). The emphasis which he gives to the immediacy with which the Greeks decided on pursuit - *ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐπύθοντο τὰς νέας οὐρακίας, αὐτίκα μετὰ ταῦτα ἐδόκεε ἐπιδύκειν* (8.108) - is striking. But it has long been recognized that between the awareness of the Persian fleet's withdrawal and the decision to pursue, Herodotos "has assuredly omitted to report a debate at Salamis"²⁷. Herodotos' very emphasis may, then, suggest that he or his sources were at pains to pass over this period, which would have been the time a patriotic message should have been sent, and, of course, in the other tradition was sent. The divergences between Herodotos' account of the second message and that discernible in the other tradition represented by Thucydides, Ktesias, Ephoros and Plutarch are not, then, incidental, but are determined by the motive which each tradition attributes to Themistokles. If we reject a selfish motivation we must reject the accompanying details of content and geographical origin which are determined by it. I suggest that Herodotos' account is based on the refusal of his sources to entertain the possibility of a message which could have had an effect (and so motive) beneficial to the Greek cause, and

that the other modifications consequent upon that shift of emphasis have been made.

But if this is so, what could the circumstances - and in view of Thucydides' evidence let us call them the historical circumstances²⁸ - of the patriotic message have been? An answer to this will also enable us to explain how, if our criticisms of Herodotos' account are valid, he was able to present such a false account to an Athenian audience composed in part of sailors who had served in the fleet in 480.

If, as suggested, a debate - presumably a council of strategoi - was held before the decision to pursue, and if a patriotic message was sent informing the King of the intention to break the bridges, we may deduce that the council, perhaps on Themistokles' proposals, decided on the message, and further, that it was understood by the strategoi that they should, of course, not in fact sail to the Hellespont²⁹. Burn comments that "if such a new deception was practised, it would be desirable to support it by letting the Greek fleet ... disappear from Xerxes' sight in an easterly direction; and if some of the men, in the elation of victory, indulged in loose talk on the theme 'on to the Hellespont' - and Herodotos says the Athenians did do so ... - there was no reason for the generals to 'play down' the idea until it had served its turn"³⁰. The sailors will have been led to believe that they were, eventually going to the Hellespont. I think we must accept Plutarch's notice (Th. 16.4) that the message contained a promise to the King that Themistokles would attempt to cause the Greek fleet delays in its pursuit, probably by carrying out operations in the Aegean in the form of descending upon the islands, for otherwise

the King would have no chance, anyway, of reaching the Hellespont before the Greek fleet³¹. The Persian land forces were on the move within *δλίγας ἡμέρας* of the battle (H. 8.113). Halting at Andros, the news of Xerxes' movements must have made the generals believe that the ruse had worked³². The halt at Andros will have corresponded to the promise of delays made by Themistokles in the message, as will his public speech dissuading the Athenians from sailing on, and as such needn't have given the King the impression that his line of retreat was finally out of danger.

During the 470's Themistokles laid claim to the credit due to him both for the first message and, to a lesser extent, this second one³³. He had reduced the numbers at Plataia and sent Xerxes scuttling off with all the panic described by Aischylos (Pers. 480-514)³⁴. Their delight in this may have made the sailors choose to ignore as unimportant the fact that in so doing Themistokles had had to trick them into believing for a few days, in the flush of victory, that they were in fact off to the Hellespont. But the charges of Medism brought against Themistokles in the 460s encouraged his enemies to put into a suspicious light whatever actions of his would sustain it. Salamis, of course, protected the first message from aspersion. But if the content of the second message, keeping the central 'Themistokles bids you leave', could be changed from "I'll try to stop the Greeks" to "I have stopped them" the message would be completely robbed of its patriotic motive, and only that of winning the King's favour remained. For a message bidding the King depart quickly to be patriotic, it presupposed that a decision not to break the bridges had been taken

before its dispatch³⁵. Now, as far as the sailors were concerned, and as far as they could remember, the decision not to sail on was in fact taken at Andros. It was thus particularly easy for Herodotos' sources to blur the distinction - vital to a correct understanding of the message - between the secret Salamis decision of the council of strategoi and the public "decision" at Andros. The secret decision and the duping of the sailors it implied will not have been dwelt upon by Themistokles or the sailors, and may have been quickly forgotten. So Themistokles' detractors sought to locate the message still 'after Salamis' but also after the speech to the Athenian sailors at Andros, a matter of days later. The shift was easy to make, and the inaccuracy it involved was in a matter which was veiled in the secrecy of the generals' council, but nonetheless one sufficient to put Themistokles' message in a completely different, discreditable, if not quite traitorous, light³⁶.

So it is easy to understand how Herodotos' version could be a corruption of a patriotic version which was plausible, internally consistent and whose essential framework is confirmed by Thucydides, Ktesias, Ephoros and Plutarch. But all these writers are post-Herodotos. Should we not assume that they represent a mere "Umformung einer originale Vorlage?"³⁷ That would be the proper conclusion if we were able to dismiss Herodotos' version as an invention. But Thucydides' evidence makes it unsafe to deny the existence of a second message. Herodotos' version of it is certainly not a historically correct account, not so much because

of its obviously prejudiced assumptions and its pointlessness but more because it could not have become known in the form he represents it. There is nothing in it which would make Themistokles or his aides boast of it³⁸. And so it is preferable to accept the version of the message found in the other tradition as being nearer historical reality, and as being the original form of the tradition, seeing Herodotos' version as a stage in a process of modification designed to discredit Themistokles³⁹.

The results we have obtained on the question of the tradition of a second message affect our approach to Herodotos' account of Themistokles' opinions as expressed at Andros. Most obviously we must deny that in the council of strategoi there was any discussion of breaking the bridges. But this does not explain why Herodotos' sources portrayed Themistokles in this putative debate as proposing breaking the bridges when his public position as expressed in the speech to the Athenian sailors must have been widely known to have been to take the opposite course. Our answer may seem less bold if Herodotos' sources' treatment of the second message, and of Mnesiphilos' role in the strategy of Salamis are borne in mind. The former shows how consistently they were prepared to follow through their manipulation of the tradition, and the latter provides a direct, though less subtle, precedent of a device which can be shown to be used here, namely implied plagiarism.

The arguments which Themistokles brought forward in dissuading the Athenians were considered to have proved him εὐβουλος (H. 8.110)⁴⁰. Like the credit for the strategic insight which won the Greeks Salamis, Themistokles could be robbed of the credit for this εὐβουλία by portraying him as having, in reality, been

opposed to this wise course of action, and as having adopted it under the necessity of circumstances. But not only was the wise course of action he proposed to the Athenians not an expression of his real opinion on what should be done, but the persuasive arguments he used to advocate this course were taken from someone else⁴¹. So, in conclusion, we may reject Themistokles' alleged proposals in the council of strategoi at Andros as an unhistorical, tendentious device, accepting though Themistokles' public speech as not only historical but in fact representing his true position.

Let us examine the two speeches, bearing in mind that "Eurybiades'" speech is a fabrication and that in it may be elements which were in fact part of Themistokles' historical, public speech. Generally here Herodotos (or his source(s)) seem to put into Themistokles' mouth only the bare conclusions of arguments set out more fully by "Eurybiades", and into "Eurybiades'" speech the conclusions of arguments to be stated fully by Themistokles. This may be because elements which Themistokles was allowed to elaborate were well known and prominent features of Themistokles' character and policy, or which would simply be inappropriate in a speech by Eurybiades. The two speeches fall into three parts which may be described as dealing with considerations of 'strategy', 'religion' and of 'foreign policy'. I set out the essentials in schematic form for ease of reference.

Reference	A: EURYBIADES	Ref.	B: THEMISTOKLES
I STRATEGY: DO NOT BREAK THE BRIDGES BECAUSE ...			
108	<p>... If Xerxes is forced to remain he will rally because otherwise</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) he will never get home, 2) his army will starve. <p>When he rallies</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3) many will go over to him, 4) he will live on the fruits of Hellas. 	109...	Beaten men will rally.
II RELIGION: LET XERXES FLEE BECAUSE ...			
	[see under III]	109...	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) We have been lucky to beat so many men. 2) The Gods and heroes won the victory because <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) Asia and Europe are not for one man, b) Xerxes was impious and hubristic by burning homes and temples and by fettering the sea.
III FOREIGN POLICY			
108	<p>... the Persians will not remain after the sea defeat.</p> <p>Let us fight Xerxes for his own land, not ours.</p>	109	<p>Since εἴ γάρ ἔχει ἔς τὸ κατεὸν ἡμῖν let us stay in Hellas in order to</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) take thought for ourselves and our families, 2) reshape a dwelling, 3) take care of the sowing, <p>once we have driven the enemy completely away.</p> <p>Thus let us sail to Ionia and the Hellespont next spring.</p>

It is obvious that most of these two speeches could come from one delivery with a logical internal development, thus: immediate and compelling strategical grounds against hindering the Barbarians' departure (I A and B), the general principle that fleeing men should not be pursued (II), followed by the religious grounds for allowing them to retreat unharmed (IIB). The statement of proposed alternative action (III) forms an exception to the correspondence of argument and conclusion in the "Eurybiades" - Themistokles speeches for they offer differing assessments of the situation.

Let us look at the possible specific propagandist aims this division may have had, at the same time considering points for and against the authenticity of the various elements. I obviously establishes the implication that Themistokles had not himself perceived the dangers involved in cutting off the retreat, forcefully underlined by his earlier (8. 108) proposal to cut the bridges. The arguments put forward against blocking the Barbarians' retreat seem to me wholly applicable to the strategic situation in late 480 and, as such, authentic. I am not sure why Macan thinks they ignore the naval superiority of the Greeks⁴². Indeed they seem to be based on the assumption that Xerxes' lines of communications and supply will be broken, which was surely the most important result of the Greek naval victory⁴³. A further sign of the authenticity of "Eurybiades'" strategic arguments is the fact that they do not seem to have been influenced by later, probably Themistoklean claims concerning the effect that Xerxes' unmolested retreat had on numbers at Plataia.

It is probable that Themistokles went into the specific effects

of what a rally by Xerxes would mean, in much the same way as "Eurybiades" does. The fact that Herodotos' sources do not have Themistokles repeat these arguments, as they did in the case of Mnesiphilos, is probably due to the fact that in the latter case it was necessary because most people in Athens would not have been familiar with the details of Themistokles' arguments in the council of strategoi at Salamis, whereas in our case it was unnecessary, since most of the audience will have known the strategic arguments Themistokles had put before the Athenian fleet at Andros.

The authenticity of IIB has been unwisely doubted. Bauer thought it evinced a "sonst nicht charakterisierenden Bescheidenheit" and that it looked Herodotean rather than Themistoklean⁴⁴. Schulte followed a similar approach⁴⁵. Themistokles' attention, at least publicly, to the role of the Gods in the war is, of course, well-attested⁴⁶. And so, while Herodotos may be expressing not the exact words of Themistokles⁴⁷ the only grounds for rejecting this element in Themistokles' speech would be to demonstrate that the "Denkformen"⁴⁸ are anachronistic, which passages in Aischylos' Persai prove to be not the case⁴⁹.

If Themistokles can be taken as minimizing his personal achievement in favour of thankful piety it is not difficult to understand this as both an attempt to minimize the φθόρος which might develop in response to the extraordinary ἐὶςδοξία the victory will have earned him, as well as an expression of sympathy for the outrage most Athenians were probably soon to feel on seeing the destruction to religious (and secular) constructions that awaited them in Attika.

One of the religious arguments put forward by Themistokles is that the Gods and heroes thought Asia and Europe too great for

one man. As we shall see, the suggestion that Europe and Asia should remain separate is a feeling which fits well with what we can glean of Themistokles' attitudes in the 470s.

Themistokles may have been expressing a genuine piety.

The religious arguments put into Themistokles' mouth by Herodotos were perhaps too firmly attributable to his own world view for Herodotos' sources to be able to deny his authorship of them on this occasion.

Nevertheless, the implication made in I is mildly reinforced, that Themistokles has drawn on elements of the plan he proposes from "Eurybiades"; this time, though, he does not merely repeat the conclusion of a series of arguments propounded by "Eurybiades" but takes the traditionally Spartan principle of non-pursuit (Pl. Lyk. 22.5) and adduces his own religious arguments in its favour.

In III Themistokles sets out the pressing tasks of reconstruction which lie ahead of the Athenians — those of reconstructing their city and of securing next year's crop. The actions of Themistokles in 479 testify to, and prohibit any doubt over the authenticity of these exhortations⁵⁰. This aspect, of course, could find no parallel in "Eurybiades'" speech. But Themistokles, the strategic genius, having discouraged pursuit of those Barbarians who are fleeing, is well aware that there is a good chance of some land forces remaining, and he implicitly warns the Athenians of this by exhorting them to reconstruction παντελέως ἀπελάσας τὸν βάρβαρον — "when we have driven the foreigner wholly away"⁵¹.

"Eurybiades", however, clearly does not take this possibility into account and believes that after Salamis οὐ μενέειν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ τὸν Πέρσῃν. This difference between the two assessments is perhaps best explained as an attempt to add verisimilitude to

this fictional speech by putting into "Eurybiades'" mouth what must have seemed to be the assumption upon which Spartan reluctance to engage Mardonios was based. Eurybiades' plea to fight the Persian when his land is at stake is also an attempt to add verisimilitude, reminiscent as it is of Herodotos' description of Pausanias' 478 campaign

(H. 8.3: περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἤδη τὸν ἀχῶνα ἐποιεῦντο.
cf. 8.108: περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ποιέεσθαι ἤδη τὸν ἀχῶνα)⁵².

Themistokles suggests to the Athenians that ἀμα δὲ τῷ ἔαρι καταπλέωμεν ἐπὶ Ἑλλησπόντου καὶ Ἰωνίης. While his proposals were certainly in part designed to encourage acceptance of his present non-aggressive policy by promising this campaign for next season, there is no reason to doubt that he was, in fact, hoping for the realization of these proposals⁵³. It can be shown that there is no evidence that Themistokles had ever been interested in Athens assuming the responsibility of liberating and protecting Ionian mainland states⁵⁴. Furthermore, his policies in the 470s exclude the possibility of a simultaneous involvement in mainland Ionia, of which the sources, in any case, have no indication. On the other hand, the idea that Themistokles' post-war policy included the aim of Athenian control over the Hellespont, Thrace and the Aegean makes good sense and conflicts with no evidence. In view of this we should understand Themistokles' promise to proceed to Ionia in the following spring as referring to operations in the Aegean, aiming at securing Greek control over the islands, but not over the mainland, too. Our analysis of operations in 479 will show that the question of dominating mainland Ionia was not seriously entertained. This is not to say, however, that at Andros many of the sailors did

not understand Themistokles to mean mainland Ionia, as well, nor that he did not deliberately use an ambiguous term.

This important statement by Themistokles must have been remembered at Athens. But one point, however, virtually assures its authenticity. As Stein pointed out⁵⁵, it is clear that in the speech Themistokles is envisaging the land battle which will finally drive the Persians away as being fought before the season is out, and that the Athenians will, having laid the foundations of their reconstruction, sail to the Hellespont and Ionia in spring 479. That the land battle was delayed is strong evidence that the speech was not composed with a knowledge of events subsequent to 480.

As a result of our analysis of the two speeches at Andros, especially against the background of Herodotos' tendentious account of the second message, we may not only accept Themistokles' public speech as authentic, which we should have had to do in any case, but also reject as fictional the debate in the council of strategoi at Andros, including Themistokles' proposals to sail to the Hellespont, and so take Themistokles' speech as reflecting his real views on the strategic situation. This is particularly valuable in that it enables us to accept with confidence the implication of the speech that Themistokles was preparing already for the necessity of a land battle. This conclusion will be ^{of} some significance in reconstructing Athenian politics in the forthcoming chapters. Furthermore, while Themistokles was no doubt forming his opinions in the face of the immediate problems facing the Athenians in late 480, his position may be taken as conforming to what will emerge as his post-war policy, namely an emphasis on Athenian security within Hellas and the aim of controlling the Aegean for in part defensive reasons as well as securing control of certain vital routes.

CHAPTER TWO THEMISTOKLES AND THE ISLANDS

Herodotos continues his narrative of events (8. 111-12) by telling us that "the Greeks" besieged Andros because the islanders *πρὸς Θέμιστοκλέος χρήματα οὐκ ἔδοσαν*. There follows the famous speech in which Themistokles holds out *πειθῶ ... καὶ ἀναγκάην*, to which the islanders retort with *πενίην...καὶ ἀμύχανίην*. In chapter 112 Herodotos says that for thus answering they were besieged, and he comments that Themistokles *οὐ γὰρ ἐπαύετο πλεονεκτέων*, going on to accuse him of sending "the same messengers as he used with the King" to other islands, threatening that he would bring the Greek fleet upon them if they failed to co-operate. Learning that the Andrians had been besieged for taking the Persian side and that Themistokles was *ἐν αἰνῇ* *μεγίστη* the Karystians and Parians sent money, and Herodotos believes other islands also paid, though he is unable to say with certainty. Nonetheless the Karystians, he says, were still besieged. Themistokles visited the other islands and took money unknown to the other generals.

It is clear enough that Herodotos is using sources here which were unfavourable to Themistokles. Accepting this, we must be careful not to reject more of Herodotos' account than the bias it reveals warrants. For example, it would be crude to reject the prominent role given to Themistokles in the extractions made by the Greek fleet¹. There is no contradiction in Herodotos' account. He makes it clear both that the use of force against Andros and Karystos was backed by the Greek fleet and that the threat of force used against Paros was also from the Greek fleet². There is, in

fact, reason to believe that the Athenians were the moving spirit behind these exactions. The Athenians will still have been eager for revenge (cf. H. 8.109). They had supplied the most ships at Salamis, many of which had been destroyed, and they alone of the allies had suffered the destruction of their territory. While feeling among the Peloponnesians may have been to return to the Peloponnese, later events show that they were willing to help the Athenians in the financial burden the war had imposed (H. 8.142), and so the exactions of 480 may well have been received by the Athenians alone. So there are insufficient grounds for rejecting Herodotos' broad outline that Themistokles, as the most influential general of the Athenians, was the prime mover behind the exactions and that the Hellenic fleet supported him in this³.

Rather, it is the details and interpretation of these operations in Herodotos which arouse suspicion. Most immediate in awakening our suspicion as to the impartiality of chapter 112 is the reference to Themistokles' *πλεονεξία*. Chapters 111 and 112 would seem to work on two levels. On the one, which we have already seen, it is tacitly recognized that the demands were officially made by, or at least supported by the Hellenic fleet, motivated primarily by the Athenians. On the other level there is an attempt to interpret these actions in conformity with traits of Themistokles' character which have already been drawn by the malignant tradition⁴, and thus the actions are attributed expressly to Themistokles' avarice⁵.

What of facts? Karystos and Paros are said to have sent money. The fact that Herodotos is prepared to mention the names of these two communities encourages the belief that their claims rested on a well attested (which does not mean reliable) tradition,

unlike the rumours of "other islanders" who were supposed to have been visited. Furthermore, earlier events at both places show that they were considered strategically important (H. 6.99, 133-5). The public facts were well-known. Karystos had been besieged, Paros hadn't. It would not be audacious to guess that Paros paid up and Karystos refused. The simple fact that Themistokles was never condemned for cupidity in connection with the events of 480 ensures that there was no case against him⁶.

If we are prepared to reject the truth of the accusations we should at least postulate a context in which they might have been levelled. They have often been associated with the charges of bribery made by Timokreon of Rhodes (fr. 1.) and since both refer to an alleged misuse of influence for personal gain it is logical to attempt to see both sets of accusations as the products of one period.

Timokreon's fragment 1 was most probably produced in the mid-470s, as we shall see below.

The accusations in Herodotos might have been made in late 480 but they will have fallen on deaf ears, for we shall see that the evidence, on balance, is in favour of believing that Themistokles was at the peak of his popularity in Athens and Hellas in 480/79. This, however, is not to deny that the accusations may have been made in 480 to be revived again later when circumstances were more favourable to the slanderers.

Of the early undertakings of the Athenian Alliance down to the dated Drabeskos disaster, the date of the war against Karystos recorded by Thucydides (98.3) and Herodotos (9.105) is the least secure. But it is defensible to proceed in the belief that it

occurred around 475-4⁷. The coincidence in time of Timokreon's fragment 1 and the war against Karystos encourages locating the origin of the Karystian (and other) charges in the same context. The Karystians could have levelled their charges against Themistokles towards the end of their war with Athens, in the hope of securing a milder settlement by claiming that they had already paid an indemnity for their Medism as well as suffered an injustice at Athenian hands. But it is more likely that the allegations were made as the Athenians began to turn their attention again to a job which had been left unfinished. In 480 they had only ravaged Karystian territory, and, as we saw, the implication is that Karystos failed, unlike Paros, to bow to allied demands, financial certainly, and perhaps political, too. We shall argue later that in the 470s Themistokles was exercising considerable influence on the direction of Athenian military actions. The Karystian accusations may have been intended to cast suspicion on and to discredit the man thought most responsible for the violent action against Karystos. If, as we shall suggest, the war against Karystos divided Athenian leaders and marked a turning point in Athenian policy, we would be entitled to wonder whether there was not collusion between the Karystians and Themistokles' enemies at Athens.

Whether other islanders who received 'invitations' to join the Athenian Alliance in the 470s made similar accusations remains doubtful. It is difficult to imagine that they should construct messengers from Themistokles when otherwise no contact between the allied fleet and the various islands was known to have existed in 480. I suspect that Herodotos' account has crystalized a fairly advanced stage of a growing tradition. It would be easy for the tradition to add 'other islands' once the important step had been

made of creating "secret messengers, the same he used with the King". This element derives from a stage in the tradition's development at least as advanced as the attempt to shift the geographical source of the second message from Salamis to Andros. The original Karystian charges, on the other hand, probably derived from the historical reception of Themistokles at Karystos to negotiate payments etc., before talks broke down.

It will be appropriate here to analyse Timokreon's fragment 1 because it has been held to provide evidence for events in the Aegean in 480. In a familiar format⁸ Timokreon mentions that while some might praise Leotychides, he would praise Aristides, the one best man to come from Athens since (ἐπεὶ) Lato "formed a hatred for" (ἤχθαιρε) Themistokles⁹. The antistrophe then accuses Themistokles of being a liar, of being unjust, and of being a traitor who, despite having a xenos relationship with Timokreon was persuaded by filthy lucre not to bring Timokreon back (οὐ κατὰρεν) to his native Ialysos, instead, taking 3T. and sailing off to Hell!¹⁰ Themistokles is further accused of having restored and exiled men unjustly, while others he killed, and Timokreon reminds us how, at the Isthmos he acted as "ridiculous host"¹¹ by presenting "cold meats, which the guests ate, and prayed that no good should come of them to Themistokles"¹².

The most important lines in fragment 1 are the accusations concerning Themistokles' acceptance of bribes and the influential position that presupposes, and his further activities concerning the exile, reinstatement and execution of men. Since Timokreon

was a contemporary of Themistokles we must believe that his accusations were at least plausible, though we are not obliged to accept them as true¹³. We would like to know to which stage of Themistokles' career Timokreon referred these alleged activities. Let us examine the elements of the poem to see if they shed any light on this problem.

We cannot be sure what event Timokreon is referring to in the last lines. The only account we have of Themistokles at the Isthmos is that given by Herodotos (8. 123-4) of the celebrations at which Themistokles was awarded only the second prize. The story of the voting sounds absurd, but the fact that no agreement could be reached on allocating the first prize should be accepted, and with it the fact that there probably were speeches in favour of the various candidates. If Themistokles behaved as though he would surely be awarded the first prize, i.e. that the celebrations were in his honour, we would have an explanation of the "ridiculous host". The curious phrase *ψυχρά κρέα* might then be explained by taking *ψυχρά* in the sense of "ineffectual, vain" (LSJ s.v. *ψυχρός* II.1) or "silly" (LSJ s.v. *ψυχρός* II.5) and *κρέα* in the sense of "body, person" (LSJ s.v. *κρέας*, 2) so as to give the phrase the double meaning of the host presenting poor food and of Themistokles as arranging for or presenting persons to argue his candidacy but who had only foolish arguments and who were ineffectual.

Most commentators in fact accept that Timokreon is referring to the 480 Isthmos celebrations¹⁴. But even if he is, the conclusion is not of much assistance in solving the problem of locating Themistokles' alleged deeds, for the temporal connection between them

and the Isthmos occasion is not clear; they could be after it as easily as before¹⁵.

The candidates for praise have been used as a means of determining a terminus ante quem for the poem's composition¹⁶. Scholars have wanted to date the poem before Pausania's final disgrace¹⁷. This is not very useful because recent research has shown that Pausanias did not finally lose all credit until his murder, which was most probably in the 460s¹⁸.

A little more helpful is the possibility of praising Leotychides. He fled to Tegea as a result of bribery charges most probably in 476/5¹⁹. The observation that either of these men could be praised after their disgrace does weaken the usefulness of this approach²⁰ and the point has perhaps greater weight in the case of Leotychides. But I still feel it is slightly safer to assume that the poem was composed before news of Leotychides' exile became widespread, let us say pre-474, for there are no reasons to date the poem later²¹.

Timokreon's accusations are themselves more helpful in dating the events which they allege, and the most informative word is *κατὰγεν* - bring back. At the time Timokreon made this appeal to Themistokles he was already in exile from Rhodes. No one has tried to maintain that he was exiled before Salamis as an anti-Persian activist, for he himself admitted his Medism (fr. 3)²². It is necessary, therefore, to assume that he was exiled and made his request to Themistokles after Persian power had been toppled in Ialysos.

Before Timokreon wrote his verses, that is, probably before 474, he had made his request to Themistokles and had witnessed the

latter's involvement in the banishment, reinstatement and execution of men in cities, resulting, we may presume, from the part they had played in the Persian war. The precise relationship between Timokreon's request and Themistokles' involvement in the fate of the leaders of Greek cities is not clear, but logically it would appear to be close. Some scholars have associated Timokreon's request and Themistokles involvement in the internal politics of cities mentioned by Timokreon with Themistokles' activities in the Aegean recorded by Herodotos (8.112)²³. Some have even gone so far as to postulate a naval expedition under Themistokles' command operating in Rhodian waters. Timokreon provides no evidence for such a Themistoklean expedition at any time²⁴. Beloch²⁵ argued against any association between the events recorded by Herodotos and the allegations of Timokreon, though not convincingly. The fact that Herodotos, unlike Timokreon, does not mention exiling and reinstatement activities is not enough to disprove that, for example, at Paros in 480 some political control was practised²⁶. Yet it is true, as Fornara says, that the sole contact between the two passages is the theme of Themistokles' cupidity²⁷. It is, indeed, virtually impossible to locate Timokreon's request to Themistokles, and so also the logically and it would appear, temporally connected exile and reinstatement activities of Themistokles, before the victory of Mykale. Herodotos' description of the situation between Salamis and Mykale in the Aegean creates the clear impression that the Greek fleet dominated only the Kyklades and that they expected an offensive by the Persian fleet in 479, and the impression he conveys of feelings in the Aegean is confirmed by the public facts he records²⁸. It therefore conflicts

with a probability based on Herodotos' evidence to suggest that the anti-Persian revolution which must have preceded Timokreon's exile, occurred before Mykale²⁹. The most plausible occasion for an anti-Persian revolution at Rhodes, in particular at Ialysos, is in connection with the show of strength in the eastern Mediterranean made by the Greek fleet under Pausanias' command in 478³⁰.

Timokreon's request to Themistokles, then, should be after 478, perhaps autumn-winter 478/7, and so probably made at Athens, where he or his messengers will have observed Themistokles' struggle for influence with Aristides. Plutarch (Th. 21.4) says that there was a tradition that had Themistokles concur in a vote to exile Timokreon for Medism. Its reliability has been questioned, and it is easy to imagine how such a tradition could grow up³¹. The failure of Themistokles to act upon his guest-friend's request may only have become apparent after some years. Intervention on Timokreon's behalf required positive action. Themistokles may even have told Timokreon or his messengers that he would do what he could³². At any rate, by the time the poet had given up hope and composed his verses he had had time to observe a pattern in Themistokles' sympathies towards ex-Medizers which appeared not to be dictated purely by justice. It is not impossible that Timokreon is merely referring to a series of interventions made by perhaps a contingent of the Greek or Athenian fleet, possibly led by Themistokles and occupying only one season, and perhaps parallel to other major operations. This is how most scholars envisage the factual basis of Timokreon's charges. But in this case we would have to assume either that there were no grounds whatsoever for

Timokreon's charges, or that Themistokles was in fact inconsistent in his dealings with the Medizing leaders in the Aegean. Neither is impossible, but there should be some basis to Timokreon's accusations, and it is difficult to imagine why Themistokles should have chosen to forgive such men, given that after 478 the patriotic cause enjoyed the greatest potential strength in the Aegean, and so there was no reason to compromise. But Timokreon's observation of inconsistency may admit of a more satisfactory explanation if we refer it to his comparison of the treatment leading Medizers like himself appeared to be receiving and the overt defence Themistokles had already made of certain powerful Medizing states at the Amphiktyonic council, most probably in spring 478, and perhaps of other states, too, on other occasions³³. Timokreon, of course, will have taken this defence of Medizing states as a defence of their leading citizens, which was, in effect, accurate. Themistokles' activities in influencing decisions on ex-Medizers will have been conducted in whatever framework was available, as instances arose. The Amphiktyonic council was one, Themistokles' channels of influence on Athenian decisions were applicable to states falling under Athenian orbit or control, and there may have been other procedures within the Hellenic League of which we have no knowledge, as well as ad hoc appeals to settle stasis within individual communities. Thus Timokreon's observation of partiality was of one aspect of Themistokles' post-war policy, namely that of gaining influence and friends in areas which were threatened by Sparta and which Athens had little hope of dominating herself.

So if Timokreon did not receive a categorical rejection from Themistokles he will have done well to wait patiently for a response.

As we said, it may have taken some time for a pattern of strict treatment of Aegean Medizers, in contrast to mainland and other states, to emerge sufficiently clearly, or simply for enough time to pass, before Timokreon finally gave up hope of Themistokles interceding on his behalf. His decision to level his metrical accusations should, in that case, have fallen nearer 474 than 478, which means about the same as we concluded was the most plausible date for the Karystian charges of corruption against Themistokles, that is, around 475-4. The public allegations of the Karystian community referred to a specific event in late 480 and must have carried more weight than the allegations of an individual. The latter offered an explanation of the continuing failure of Themistokles to act upon his guest-friend's request, and by that implication generalized the specific charge to explain Themistokles' inconsistent attitude to Medizers. Timokreon may have had the audacity to make his charges only against the background of the official Karystian complaints.

In order to establish the events of autumn 480 we have had to extend our enquiries into the mid-470s. Let us return to 480 and sum up our findings concerning Themistokles' ideas on the islands in the immediate aftermath of Salamis. As with his views on sailing to the Hellespont, Themistokles' position was first and foremost a reaction to the strategic position in late 480. The reaction of Andros and Karystos testifies to a feeling in the Aegean that Salamis had not decided the issue. Some show of strength was essential to create a favourable psychological situation for next year's naval campaign, and so they followed up their victory as far as possible. All the Greek commanders are likely to have recognized

the wisdom of this, as is shown by Herodotos' statement that the Greeks decided to besiege Andros and Karystos. However, it was one thing to show who was master but another to make reparation demands. The purely strategic position would have been better served by offering more congenial terms. It is here, I suspect, that Themistokles' influence can be detected in the Hellenic fleet's operations, as Herodotos suggests. The common explanation given is that these actions were in response to the financial burden imposed by the war. It is adequate, and so we are not justified in insisting that the actions reflect a longer-term Themistoklean policy. That said, it is fair to note that domination of the Aegean was to be the basis of Themistokles' defence against Persia (Thuc. 93.7) and the actions of autumn 480 also had the effect of demonstrating to the Athenians the material advantages which could accrue from such domination. The reasons which had led Themistokles to encourage the Athenians to relinquish their claims to naval hegemony at the beginning of the war would, if all went well, not obtain much longer. So, like his position over the Hellespont, Themistokles' attitude to the islands can be understood in terms of his later policy, and may represent an early foreshadowing of it.

CHAPTER THREE AN OUTLINE OF THEMISTOKLES' POST-WAR POLICY

Salamis had demonstrated Athenian naval power and had kindled great energy in the Athenians, as they had shown at Andros. The war was still in the balance, but Themistokles was already looking beyond the final expulsion of the Barbarians to the new situation which would be formed, as his Andros speech shows.

It is necessary to try to deduce Themistokles' post-war policy at this stage in our enquiry because it will enable us to understand more easily the events of the months between October 480 and spring 477.

Podlecki believes that the Athenian commitment to 'freeing' mainland Ionia implicit in the charter of the Athenian Alliance¹ can be traced to a Themistoklean policy dating from the late 490s². His theory of a Themistoklean "Ionian policy" is based on two facts. The first is that Phrynichos wrote a play called *Μιλήτου Ἀλωσις* which brought the audience to tears and which brought Phrynichos a fine of a thousand drachmas *ὥς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκῆα κακὰ* and a ban on further productions of the play (H. 6.21). The date of the production is not known. Miletos fell to the Persians in 494/3³. Herodotos makes it clear enough that the Athenian reaction to the play was an expression of fairly recent grief in that he compares it with the Milesian head-shaving demonstration at the grief they felt at the Sybarites' fate. It is, therefore, not safe to date the production over a decade and a half after the catastrophe, as some scholars have wanted to do⁴. But it is far from certain that the production was in 493/2. It could just as well be in 494/3 or in one of the years following 493/2⁵. It is, therefore, not

certain that Themistokles was the archon who granted Phrynichos a chorus⁶. The fact that Themistokles acted as choregos for Phrynichos in 477/6 (Pl. Th. 5.4) does not, in itself, make it "highly probable" that he "inspired and encouraged the dramatist" on this earlier occasion, too⁷. So there is nothing in the evidence which makes an association of the play's production with Themistokles a necessary inference. But let us assume, for argument's sake "that Themistocles was in sympathy with its theme"⁸. Who knows how it dealt with its theme? The fact that Herodotos records the Athenians' action of fining Phrynichos as an expression of their sympathy for the Milesians suggests that his handling of their fate was unsympathetic. At any rate, it is hard to imagine Themistokles was behind a rather futile finger-wagging exercise which the play becomes if we take it as a criticism of the Athenians for having abandoned the Milesians, for by 493/2 there could be no serious question of further aid to the defeated insurgents⁹. It could as well be guessed that the play criticized the Athenians for ever having encouraged Aristagoras, in the hope that they should keep their hands off mainland Ionia in future¹⁰. Podlecki quotes approvingly the opinion of How and Wells that the play may "have been intended to awaken the national spirit and inspire resistance to Persia, perhaps by sea"¹¹. This is another possible interpretation, and it does not imply any interest in the protection of Ionia¹².

Podlecki's assumption that the play represented an appeal to Athenian loyalty to their Ionian kinsmen by an implicit criticism of their withdrawal may be influenced by his belief in Themistokles' association with it, for he believes for another reason in an

"Ionian policy" of Themistokles in the 490s and 480s. This brings us to the second fact upon which Podlecki bases his theory.

Herodotos (8.22) records how Themistokles had an appeal to the Ionians engraved on the rocks near drinking water as the Greeks prepared their withdrawal from Artemision. He appealed to them on the basis of their kinship, reminding them (and the Karians) that Persian enmity towards the Athenians was ultimately their responsibility. Podlecki has both retrojected and projected this "attempt to play on the larger loyalties of the Ionians"¹³. He retrojects it by seeking to set Themistokles' appeal against a background in which Themistokles "seems to have been the leading proponent of Athenian assistance to the Ionians even after this policy had become unpopular" but the only justification for this claim is Podlecki's belief in the association between Themistokles and the production of Phrynichos' 'Capture of Miletos', which, as we have seen, even if accepted, provides no secure basis upon which to reconstruct Themistokles' views on the subject of Athenian protection of mainland Ionia¹⁴. We shall examine exactly how far this appeal to kinship should colour our view of Themistokles' policy once we have analysed its projection by Podlecki.

He thinks Themistokles' "Ionian policy" paid off fully only at Mykale with the Ionian defections which took place there¹⁵. Though the terminology is too grandiose the identity of the tactics at Artemision and Mykale is correctly recognized. However, there is no evidence for Podlecki's further statement that at the Samos conference Xanthippos "is seen to be supporting Themistocles' contention at Artemisium that Athens had a right to count on the loyalty of the Ionian Greeks and (by implication, at least) also

a corresponding obligation to look after their interests", in which he sees a foreshadowing of the charter of the Athenian Alliance¹⁶. We shall analyse in detail the evidence for the 479 naval campaign in chapter six, and conclude that not only did the Athenian generals at Samos give no assurance of protection to any mainland Ionians, but also that they had no brief concerning Ionian mainlanders when they left Piraeus.

The analogy between Themistokles' appeal at Artemision and Leotychides' before Mykale, drawn already by Herodotos (9.98), is very instructive. If Themistokles' appeal is evidence of a policy of protection of mainland Ionians then Leotychides' appeal should also saddle the Spartan King with such a policy. That he as one of the Peloponnesians expressly rejected such an idea (H. 9.106) excludes using Themistokles' appeal to prove he supported protection. Leotychides and Themistokles were facing battle against superior numbers. Both seized the possibility of softening their opponents' resolve by their appeals. It is wrong to generalize this into an "Ionian policy". Both were pragmatic tactical ploys and as the example of Leotychides warns, cannot be taken as reflecting either earlier or later policies¹⁷. So there is no evidence to support the theory that Themistokles, in the period before 479 was interested in Athenian protection of mainland Ionian independence.

No scholar has denied that one of the major tenets of Themistokles' post-war policy was its anti-Spartanism, and there is sufficient evidence to establish it as beyond justifiable doubt¹⁸. We shall examine the reasons for this side of Themistokles' ^{policy} later. But if, as the evidence strongly suggests, he was prepared to run the risk of a war with Sparta, we are forced to make a corollary

deduction. Themistokles cannot have envisaged Athens taking on a continuation of an aggressive war against Persia, for, as de Ste. Croix puts it, to attribute to him such an idea "makes Themistokles into an utter fool"¹⁹. The advantages to Athens of continuing hostilities can't have been clear, and the prospects discouraging²⁰. It is impossible to say with certainty how detailed Themistokles' ideas were at this stage but to judge from his words at Andros he would appear to have had his sights already fixed on re-establishing Athenian control of the Hellespontine route. The events which were to follow, however, and Themistokles' role in them, indicate a complete lack of interest in Athenian involvement in mainland Ionia.

Beyond this negative side of Themistokles' policy there is good evidence that he continued to believe in the need for a very powerful Athenian fleet (Thuc. 93. 3-7, especially 93.7; Diod. 43.3; Pl. Th. 4.3; 19.1-3). While the city's defence against the Persians and, indeed, as Themistokles claimed, against 'all enemies' could be ensured by a well-fortified Piraeus and a strong fleet we are entitled to look for more than a purely defensive intention in this aspect of Themistokles' policy. As well as the indications in the sources that Themistokles was aiming at using Athenian sea-power to exercise Athenian ἀρχή²¹ we would anyway be forced to assume that the cost of the fleet which would keep the Persians out of the Aegean would not willingly be borne by the Athenians alone²². The Athenians would take what they could get from those they could dominate. After the Persians had been driven from Hellas the use of κρείθω and ἀνάγκη could be given full rein²³.

Before we consider the geographical extent of the ἀρχή envisaged by Themistokles we must note the problem of status. The attempt made by the Athenians at gaining hegemony of the Hellenic League (H. 8.2-3; cf. Pl. Th. 7.3) was not significant. Her claim was one among others²⁴. She was, of course, bound to fall in line because of the immediate threat to her existence. However, once this threat was removed the Hellenic League itself, and, naturally, hegemony of it, would become irrelevant (H. 8.3). She would be able to ignore the existence of the Hellenic League in establishing her ἡγεμονία or, or ἀρχή over, other groups of Hellenes. The reaction of various Peloponnesian League states was perhaps predictable, and it would depend on Athens' areas of domination. With her fleet Athens would have no great difficulty in dominating the Aegean²⁵. This would certainly draw envious objection and probably confrontation from Aigina and perhaps Korinth, too, but the danger posed by these two states, independent of the Peloponnesian League, would not be formidable (see H. 8.42 on relative strength). Later events would lead us to believe that such a naval ἀρχή by Athens would be insufficient to stir Sparta to action since it needn't be a threat to her security. Yet in 480 this may have been less clear than it is with the benefit of hindsight. Attitudes in Sparta were volatile²⁶ and so her acquiescence could not be taken for granted. The solution to this problem was also a step towards achieving the second stage of Themistokles' plans for Athens' greatness, and brings us to the question of ^{the} geographical extent of Athenian ἀρχή envisaged by Themistokles.

The sources for Themistokles' post-war ambitions for Athens

have usually been correctly interpreted as evidence that he envisaged Athenian influence as eventually not remaining restricted to the Aegean²⁷. But that this must have been a long-term objective can be deduced by the fact that first Athens would have to secure her maritime ἀρχή as well as the fact that we have Thucydides' evidence (93.7-8) testifying to Themistokles' envisaging the possibility of having to face land powers by retiring to Piraeus and fighting only by sea. Athenian leadership of areas of mainland Hellas would be less simple to achieve than Aegean ἀρχή.

There were, after Plataia, large, important and powerful areas of Greece not under direct Spartan influence. They included the whole of northern and central Greece (Thebes was perhaps the least independent), Argos and the western powers. Themistokles' visit to Sparta in 480 may have acquainted him with Spartan plans to punish the Medizers of northern Greece which was soon to be attempted by Leotychides. A successful outcome of such an expedition would result in northern leaders owing allegiance to Sparta. The same aim of extending Spartan influence was behind her Amphiktyonic proposals in spring 478. Themistokles sought to thwart these aims. The most urgent and obvious motive behind his opposition was, of course, to leave the field open for Athenian influence by preventing Spartan expansion. But beyond this Themistokles' stance had a double-edged effect, and so, presumably intention. On the one hand, by defending those Medizing states which Sparta had turned against, Themistokles laid a basis of trust and gratitude between them and Athens, as well as encouraging their resistance to Spartan pressure, and in some cases (Argos) encouraged an already existing hostility. He thereby established Athens as the natural protector

of states threatened by Sparta. But, on the other hand, it was perhaps the effect Themistokles' stance was expected to have at Sparta that was to be of more immediate usefulness in furthering his aims for Athens. In the councils of war which he had been attending with Spartans since 481 Themistokles must have at least sensed the deep underlying fear which pervaded Spartan thinking at this period. To Spartan opinion generally the fact that expansion of influence outside the Peloponnese would prove more difficult than some had claimed, and so should be dropped, may not have been of such great significance in determining Spartan decisions. But the fact that Themistokles' stance had given encouragement to the hostility of Argos will have been a deep psychological blow to those signs of budding confidence that the Spartans had shown. Not that Argos herself at this stage would present a serious threat to Spartan security, but, as events were to show, she had her ear close to the ground, and was not slow to exploit those sounds of disaffection with Sparta within the Peloponnese which were potentially fatal to the Spartan system. By rekindling this deep-rooted Spartan fear, I suspect that Themistokles was hoping to encourage the tendency to isolationism which Sparta had shown and was to show. His most immediate concern in so doing was to discourage Spartan compliance in the demands which certain of her Peloponnesian League allies would be making to forcibly prevent the extension of Athenian ἀρχή in the Aegean which Themistokles was planning. Thus, as we said, the solution to the problem of facing opposition from the Peloponnesian League to Athenian naval ἀρχή also laid the foundations for Athenian influence on the mainland by establishing good relations with those states not recognizing Spartan hegemony.

CHAPTER FOUR THE ATHENIANS FROM SALAMIS TO LATE 479

An examination of Themistokles' position between Salamis and Plataia will enable us to take stock of the wider political constellation among the Athenians. Our results will provide a useful basis from which, after glancing at a few points from the battle of Plataia, we can go on to see how Themistokles attempted to put his policies into effect in the months after Plataia.

From Karystos the fleet returned to Salamis and divided the spoils (H. 8.121)¹. Then there was the meeting at the Isthmos to award the prizes (H. 8.123). Immediately afterwards Themistokles went to Sparta where he was honoured greatly (H. 8.124)². Reliable and direct statements on the relationship between leading men or between the demos and its leaders in these months are scanty in the sources. We shall note what there is in the course of examining the one fact which has assumed prominence in modern scholarly reconstructions, namely that Themistokles is not mentioned in any account of the two battles of 479, Plataia and Mykale. This "is a real crux"³ and requires explanation. Before we try to explain his absence we should make clear that there are no grounds for believing that he was on the board of generals for 479/8⁴. Firstly, his activity concerning the walls does not require his being strategos, since he could have been appointed as head of a special commission, and there is evidence, later, at least, of a separate office of *τειχοποιοίς* at Athens⁵. Secondly, Diodoros (27.3) claims that the Athenians stripped Themistokles of his generalship and gave it to Xanthippos. This has been widely recognized as nothing more than an Ephoran explanation of the information found

in Herodotos⁶. The report must be wrong because of the different tribal affiliations of the two men. But Diodoros' evidence is useful in showing that Ephoros found it necessary to offer an explanation of Themistokles' disappearance after 480, and this strongly suggests that he was unable to find any evidence at all of his tenure of a strategia in 479/8.

I take it as a principle of method that we should add to our sources only when the information they offer is so apparently incomplete as to make no sense. Let us examine the attempts made at explaining Themistokles' absence from the strategia. The most obvious deduction to be drawn from the failure of a man to be re-elected to the strategia is that he suffered a decline in popularity⁷. A variety of causes for this putative decline in popularity have been suggested, though none is persuasive. The most justifiable explanation is that the Athenians were angered by elements of Themistokles' character, for it has the backing of Herodotos' story of Timodemos' attack on Themistokles on his return from Sparta in late 480 (8.125). We have already noted that the elaboration of this notice and Herodotos' silence by Ephoros (Diod. 27.3) deserves no credit. Furthermore, Herodotos' account would appear to discourage any attempt to generalize this individual's anger at Themistokles. He strongly implies that Timodemos' attitude was not representative of the communis opinio of leading men when he says Timodemos was οὐ τῶν ἐκίφανεων ἀνδρῶν⁸.

Nor does the story in Herodotos give any grounds for believing that such a sentiment was widespread among the demos⁹. As a result of these difficulties this explanation has found little support in modern scholarship¹⁰.

More popular has been an explanation of Themistokles' absence from the sources which has absolutely no ancient testimony to support it, and relies on only a superficial plausibility. That the Athenians were angry with Themistokles for having abandoned Attika cannot be accepted since the decision was taken by the whole demos, and the price that would have to be paid for the sea victory was clear from the beginning¹¹.

Another approach has been to see his disappearance as the result of political and/or strategic disagreements. There is evidence of a difference of opinion between Sparta and Athens during the winter and spring of 480/79¹² though the belief that there was a fundamental division in Athens over strategy is nowhere suggested in the sources and is based partly on an erroneous interpretation of Themistokles' views as expressed at Andros. As we saw, he envisaged the necessity of a land battle¹³, and so there is no reason to doubt that he in fact fully supported the strategy which was eventually adopted for the 479 campaign. This impression of unity is confirmed if we examine the actions of other leading men in 480/79 whom we expect to be Themistokles' rivals.

There is no doubt that Kimon emerged during the 470s as a leading political and personal opponent of Themistokles, though it is not clear how influential he may have been in the first half of the decade (Pl. Th. 5.3; 20.4; Stesimbrotos fr. 3 ap. Pl. Th. 24.4; Pl. K. 5.4; 10.7; 16.2; Ar. 25.7). I do not believe that in 480/79 Kimon was sufficiently influential to pose any threat to Themistokles. In 489 he was *μειράκιον πάντας* (Pl. K. 4.3) which should mean under 21 (cf. Pl. Brutus 27.2) so in 480/79 he should have been 29 at most¹⁴. That he was under 30 in 480/79

is perhaps confirmed by the fact that there is no tradition linking him with any military command in the Persian war proper¹⁵, though Plutarch (K. 6.1; Ar. 23.1) clearly believed him to be strategos in 479/8¹⁶.

Plutarch (Ar. 10.8) mentions a tradition which claimed to know of a decree in which Kimon, Xanthippos and Myronides are to be sent to Sparta as envoys, on the motion of Aristides, and he refers to it as an alternative version of a story told by Idomeneus in which Aristides himself went to Sparta as envoy with bitter reproaches against the Spartans for allowing Attika to be invaded a second time. Plutarch does not mention his source¹⁷. The confirmation of the existence of a Xanthippos other than the son of Aripbron¹⁸ has relieved the most glaring chronological objection to seeing this as a genuine decree from the year 480/79¹⁹ but the fact that not only Kimon but also Myronides would be extremely young to be serving as *πρέσβεις* casts serious doubt on either the authenticity or the application to 480/79 of the decree²⁰. So it would seem best to omit the alleged decree in assessing Kimon's position. If it could have been used it too might have pointed to internal harmony²¹.

The Kerameikos ostraka perhaps indicate that Kimon was a candidate for ostracism at the same time as Megakles²². The obvious deduction to be drawn would be that these ostraka derive from the ostrakophoria of 486 in which Megakles was removed (AP.22.5). The presence of Kimon in his early twenties as a candidate for ostracism is not the only difficulty this reconstruction encounters. D.M. Lewis' recent article appeals only for a suspension of judgement, but in my view he presents a good case for viewing "the deposit as a unit" and believing "that it contains the bulk of the votes cast

at an ostracism in the 470's"²³. Substantially the same conclusion was reached independently by Bicknell²⁴. I take this view despite the defence of "current opinion" made by G.M.E. Williams.

Mattingly was prepared to see the deposit as deriving from more than one ostrakophoria²⁵ and he has been kind enough to set out his present views for me by letter²⁶. He still believes in "the 487/6 date for the Megakles ostraka". He believes only "that some Kimon ostraka can plausibly belong to the 487/6 context ... the great bulk ... from the Kerameikos, however," he would "put to 461"²⁷. So the new Kerameikos ostraka, in the present state of our knowledge of them, do not prove that Kimon was influential in the 480s, though their full publication may force a revision of this judgement.

Plutarch (K. 5. 2-3) tells a story of how Kimon symbolically dedicated his horse's bridle, lending support to Themistokles' arguments in favour of a sea defence against the Persian invasion. If the story could be taken seriously it would present a picture of the young Kimon, about to enter political life, giving public support to Themistokles²⁸.

Concerning Aristides we have a direct statement on his relationship with Themistokles. Herodotos (8.79) says he was, in 480, οὐ φίλον ἐχθρόν δὲ τὰ μάχιστα but that ὅπῃ δὲ μεγάθεος τῶν παρεόντων κακῶν λήθην ἐκείνων ποιούμενος ἐξεκαλέετο to Themistokles, in order to deliver him some strategic news. Even if we accept Hignett's attack on the historicity of this section of Herodotos²⁹, the tradition would seem to rest on the fact that, far from friction/^{existing} between Themistokles and Aristides, they co-operated during the Persian invasion.³⁰ Many scholars have doubted

that the speeches in response to Mardonios' message in the presence of Spartan envoys (H. 8. 143-4) were, as Plutarch (Ar. 10.4) asserts Ἀριστείδου ψήφισμα γράψαντος ... ³¹. Podlecki, who also doubts Plutarch's testimony, has, however, rightly noted that "the similarity of motif between these speeches and Themistocles' address on Andros ... suggest that the sentiments, if not dictated by Themistocles, were at least thoroughly consonant with his policy"³². Now I do not wish to try to defend Plutarch's claim as to Aristides' authorship of these sentiments, but again we are forced to the conclusion that for Plutarch there was no tradition of strategic or political differences between the two men during the Persian war to make the attribution of Aristides' name to such Themistoklean sentiments obviously suspect. None of the remaining incidents between Salamis and Plataia with which Aristides' name was associated provide grounds for suspecting friction with Themistokles.

So much for evidence³³, what of probability? We should work on the assumption that Aristides, Xanthippos and Kimon, and certainly others too, would have been very pleased to see a decline in Themistokles' influence. But it would be difficult to imagine Kimon, probably still too young to stand for the strategia, with the burden of his father's disgrace yet to be absolved by his own military exploits, criticizing or minimizing the successful strategy of Themistokles. Aristides and Xanthippos had been ostracized by the demos and their recall was an act of clemency, at least in part in the interests of unity³⁴. For either of them to have adopted an aggressively critical stance towards the so far successful strategy and policy favoured by Themistokles would have been out

of line with the intention of the recall and would have aroused suspicion and fear of that debilitating factionalism which had, perhaps, made a resort to ostracism necessary. Since we were able to find no evidence or probability of a broad-based dissatisfaction with Themistokles, such an attack would have been politically inept and probably counter-productive. Indeed, a priori, we should expect to find Themistokles' rivals behaving in precisely the way the skeletal facts we have about them in 480-79 suggest they were behaving: eagerly and conscientiously contributing to the war effort and actively cultivating an impression of co-operation³⁵.

So, to sum up, the evidence militates strongly against explaining Themistokles' disappearance from the strategia as the consequence of a loss of influence and popularity. Beloch, of course, was silly to go so far as to say "es kann also nicht der geringste Zweifel sein" that Themistokles was strategos in 479/8 on the basis of the purely a priori arguments he brought to bear, and he has been rightly criticized³⁶. Yet the a priori case for Themistokles' popularity remains. We should seek an explanation of Themistokles' disappearance which does not conflict with the probability of his high popularity and which adds as little as possible to the recorded facts. Therefore we should examine the possibility that Themistokles chose not to stand for election to the strategia of 479/8, (and perhaps throughout the decade). If viewed in the context of his attempts to execute his post-war policy, such a choice, I feel, becomes not only plausible but virtually inevitable. Firstly, however, we must glance at three points from the Plataia campaign³⁷.

CHAPTER FIVE THREE POINTS FROM PLATAIA

The three points we are to note in this chapter are the putative "temples clause" of the Oath of Plataia, the so-called "Covenant of Plataia" and the alleged subversive plot by Athenians before the battle.

The sources for the Oath of Plataia date from the fourth century (Diod. 29.2-4 (Ephoros); Lykourgos Leok. 80-81, and the inscription from Acharnai¹). Its authenticity has been widely rejected². The thorough stylistic and historical study of the inscription and its relationship to the literary versions by Siewert has, in my view, justified believing in the historicity of an oath sworn by the Greeks³ at Plataia before the battle⁴ which included the intention to punish all Medizers⁵. Only in Diodoros and Lykourgos is there a clause swearing to leave the temples in ruins as a reminder to later generations of the Barbarians' impiety. The omission of this clause by the inscription (and by Isokrates (4. 155-6) where we might expect mention of it) does not, in itself, rule out that such a clause was included in the historical oath⁶. But there are positive objections to its inclusion⁷. The most important objection is the increasing evidence of the fact that the Athenians, between 479 and mid-century, did undertake religious building activity to an extent which cannot be excused as merely exceptional to the rule⁸. This conclusion forces us to seek another explanation to account for the relative sparsity in religious building activity in the seventies. The most obvious is to see it as a reflection of more pressing needs in making Attika viable again. The pressures of reconstruction will contribute to an

explanation of certain tendencies discernible in the 470s⁹.

From Thucydides it is clear that after the battle of Plataia some kind of oath was sworn relating to the future position of Plataia (2. 71.2, 72.1, 74.2-3) though its exact nature is not certain¹⁰. However, by Plutarch's time (Ar. 21.1) the tradition had flowered into an elaborate "Covenant of Plataia" which established Eleutherian Games¹¹ and the sending of probouloi and theoroi, pronounced Plataia *αὐτὸν καὶ ξερὸν* and, most significantly, announced the intention to levy a Hellenic army to prosecute the war against the Persians, consisting of 10,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse and 100 ships. The reasons against accepting Plutarch's "Covenant of Plataia" as set out by many different scholars are, in my view, convincing¹².

Another of Plutarch's stories surrounding the battle of Plataia which cannot be accepted as it stands is his account (Ar. 13. 1-3) of a plot by certain men from prominent families, who, having been impoverished by the war, had experienced a decline in their influence,^{and} now met secretly intending *καταλύσειν τὸν δῆμον* or failing that, to betray the Greek cause. Then follows Aristides' solution to the crisis. Like so many passages in Plutarch, we really have no way of knowing his source. Beyond noting any similarities in the tendency of a notice to fit in with other elements of the tradition whose reliability we are in a position to judge, all we can use are historical arguments.

On both these counts the notice has nothing going for it. Plutarch claims that the conspirators' primary aim was *καταλύσειν τὸν δῆμον* and that only if this failed (*εἰ δὲ μὴ προχωροίη*) would they betray the Greek cause. It is difficult

to imagine how, given that the battle was imminent (cf. Ar. 14.1), these men intended to bring about revolution in Athens without betraying the Greek cause. Burn, who surprisingly accepts the historicity of the tale, thinks that the plot was in part the result of the fact that the stoning of Lykides (H. 9.5), whose suggestion "the conspirators ... had no doubt" supported, made rational discussion impossible. Presumably, then, the conspirators intended to enter into negotiations with Mardonios¹³. So since the intention to betray the Greek cause seems to be inevitable, it follows that a political revolution at Athens cannot have been the primary aim (though it may have been the intended result of Medizing). The political revolution looks like an accretion, based probably on the parallel which occurred some 23 years later at Tanagra (Thuc. 107.4), to a story of the final escape of some attempted deserters or troublemakers. The fact that there was no open investigation (Pl. Ar. 13.3) discourages accepting the imputed motives.

Were the story acceptable it would have provided useful evidence of an otherwise unattested socio-political conflict at Athens at this time. Burn considers this element an argument in favour of the story's historicity¹⁴. He thinks the question of negotiations could be raised at Plataia now because, unlike at Salamis some months earlier, the thetes were out of the way. The idea that the thetes were less horrified at seeing Attika and Athens destroyed has little to recommend it. Firstly the thetic class will not, like some of the zeugitai, have had long-term investment in agriculture destroyed by Persian pillage, yet what material possessions they did own will have been destroyed. The loss of agricultural produce which the

destruction will have caused presented the population with the immediate problem of securing sufficient nutrition. It would be the poorer elements who would suffer most from this, both because they lacked any of their own produce and because of the high prices imported food would fetch. Despite Peloponnesian charity (H. 8.142) further devastation would certainly aggravate the shortages. And beyond the economic level, the destruction of Attika aroused deep indignation on an emotional and religious level (see Aisch. Pers. 809-12) and this was not confined to the three upper census classes. So the socio-political differences within the Athenian community which this anecdote implies do not represent an argument in favour of its authenticity; and since such conflict is not discernible in better evidence for the period, it may, rather, be taken as militating against the story's historicity in the form Plutarch has preserved it¹⁵.

Historiographically the tale has nothing to recommend it either. While it does not fit into the pattern of anecdotes illustrating Aristides' justness, it does demonstrate his sagacity and diplomatic skill (cf. Pl. Ar. 3.2; 16. 1-3; 20. 1-3; 23. 1-5). Busolt and Hignett thought the unreliable Idomeneus was probably Plutarch's source¹⁶. But later in the same Life Theophrastos is adduced as the source for the opinion that in public matters Aristides did not always act according to his own standards of justice (Ar. 25.2). Our tale of the Plataean conspiracy would have been an appropriate example to illustrate Theophrastos' point, in so far as his solution to the crisis was based on expediency rather than justice (Pl. Ar. 13.2). The example repeated by Plutarch as illustrating this trait, concerning Aristides' association with the transfer of

the treasury from Delos, if this event occurred in 454 as is usually believed, does not inspire the hope that Theophrastos required historical accuracy from the examples he chose to illustrate his point¹⁷. Burn thinks Herodotos failed to hear of the plot because nothing came of it¹⁸. Yet Herodotos claims to be sufficiently well-informed about Aristides to be able to form his own judgement (8.79), and according to Plutarch the alleged plot was extensive (Ar. 13.2). Herodotos' silence confirms the internal historical difficulties of Plutarch's account and casts serious doubt on it. There might be a core of historical fact in the report of the two named men who went over to the Persians, obviously expecting a different outcome to the battle, but it is of no significance for our inquiry¹⁹.

CHAPTER SIX. THEMISTOKLES' ATTEMPTS TO EXECUTE HIS POLICY.

Let us take up the point we made at the end of chapter four that a decision by Themistokles not to stand for election to the strategia of 479/8 is not surprising if viewed in the context of his attempts to set the direction of post-war Athenian foreign policy. It was not obvious in early spring 479 that by the end of the campaign season the Persians would be decisively beaten in mainland Hellas and that the Aegean would be in the hands of a Greek fleet; not obvious, but by no means unimaginable. To suggest that Themistokles had this situation in mind in spring 479 does not require an improbable degree of prescience. At any rate, whenever such a situation should arise, the question of the status of the Asiatic cities would re-emerge.

As we noted in chapter three, extensive expansion of influence in mainland Hellas and in the Aegean would be incompatible with an aggressive war against Persian interests on the Asiatic mainland. The possibility of the Athenians wanting to embark on such a war after the defeat of the Persians was real indeed. Firstly, it must have been widely known that the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies would never take part in a sustained prosecution of the war at such a distance. The idea of involvement in Asia had been decisively rejected by Sparta in 498 (H. 5.50) and recent experience can have done nothing to diminish the belief in Spartan timorousness concerning extra-Peloponnesian military activities. Now there can be no doubt that the Athenians felt a genuine and deep emotional tie with their Ionian kinsmen, as the twenty ships sent in 498 most clearly illustrate (H. 5.97)¹. The performance of the Ionians at

Artemision (H. 8.11) and Salamis (H. 8.85)², however, must have caused disappointment and bitterness (cf. Thuc. 6. 82. 3-4)³. But there was another sea battle to be fought (or so Themistokles will have thought) and widespread defection on the part of the Ionians, made more likely now by the outcome of Salamis, might dispel that bitterness. And even if no such defection occurred, there is no reason to believe that the desire for vengeance expressed so vigorously by the Athenians at Andros (H. 8.109) would be dampened. If the Greeks were victorious in 479 the question of pursuing the war would arise in 479/8. Since, at first sight, we might have expected the Athenians in winter 480/79 to have debated on the attitude they should adopt towards the Asiatic Greeks in the event of victory we must, in order to show that this was not the case, analyse the events in the Aegean in 479, with special reference to the position the Asiatic Greeks occupied in the thinking of the Greek leaders of the Hellenic fleet⁴.

The Greek fleet mustered early in spring 479 at Aigina (H. 8.131). As Hignett emphasizes, since Herodotos implies that Mardonios was still in his winter-quarters in Thessaly when the fleet advanced to Delos (H. 8.133), the move must have taken place in early spring⁵. It follows that Aigina was only a mustering point, anyway, and the advance to Delos needn't be dependent on the six Chian exiles. They arrived just after the last Greek contingents arrived. They asked the Greeks κατακλῶσαι ἐς τὴν Ἰωνίην and, presumably, ἐλευθεροῦν τὴν Ἰωνίην, as they

had at Sparta (H. 8.132). The Greek leaders were obviously unimpressed with the pleas of these men, and their actions can and should be understood independently. It is true that Herodotos' account suggests that the move to Delos was made reluctantly, and was as far as the Chian exiles could persuade the admirals to go, but this may be merely to contribute to the humorous exaggeration of Greek fears at sea. We are not told exactly what the fleet was expected to achieve in 479, but Herodotos provides us with sufficient information for us to piece together both what Greek leaders of the fleet saw as their minimum task, as well as the most optimistic objectives which they had been assigned. In 480 the Greeks had been able to man a large fleet, but now that they were forced to fight on land, lack of manpower kept the fleet down to 110 ships (H. 8. 131)⁶. The most obvious and essential task which the fleet had was to defend the coasts of Hellas occupied by loyal Greeks. Furthermore, the move to Delos shows that it was expected to maintain the Greek naval superiority won at Salamis in the Kyklades. There can be no doubt that the Greeks expected the Persian fleet to return and attack the Greek fleet in the western Aegean. The stand taken by Andros and Karystos in 480 after Salamis testifies that it was a widespread feeling. Herodotos (8. 130) felt it necessary to explain at some length why the Persian fleet failed to take the offensive against Hellas. He also says that the Greeks did not advance boldly to Delos (*προήγαγον... μόχθις μέχρι Δήλου* (H.8.132)) no doubt because they expected to meet the Persian fleet. Having had no sign of it, and being sure they would meet it in the open waters beyond Delos if they proceeded (*στρατιῆς... πάντα πλέα ἔδοκεε εἶναι* (H.8.132)) they waited there, as it turned out,

the whole summer. It follows that the Greeks did not expect the situation in Ionia to require the Persian fleet to guard it.

The Greek fleet's move across the Aegean late in the season was strategically irrational. Speaking of Plataia and Mykale Herodotos says (9. 101) ὅτι δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι μὴνός τε τοῦ αὐτοῦ, χρόνῳ οὐ πολλῷ σφρὺστερον δῆλα ἀναμανθάνουσιν ἐγίνετο.

He also says (9. 100) that before the soldiers at Mykale engaged, a herald's wand was seen on the shore and a rumour spread that the Greeks νικῶεν ἐν Βοιωτοῖσι μαχόμενοι.

Unless we accept the miracle, with Herodotos, we have two alternatives: we can reject the synchronism, or offer some rationalization of the rumour. The common solution has been the first, and it has been linked with an attempted explanation of the Greek fleet's advance beyond Delos. Beloch, for example,⁷ argues that it is obvious that an offensive against Ionia could only have point if an uprising could be hoped for there, and there was no chance of this, he thinks, until Mardonios had been defeated, for the Ionians knew that until this was achieved they could expect no effective support from Hellas. This view does not explain the advance from Delos. If knowledge of Mardonios' defeat were so important it would have been better for the Greek fleet to have waited until next season when word would have spread throughout the Greek areas of the Asiatic mainland and the islands of the eastern Aegean. But in my opinion the decisive reason against believing that Plataia occurred before the Greek fleet left Delos is that Plataia would have put as many as necessary of the allied land forces in a position to man the available triremes, as they had in 480, and to augment the fleet to a considerable

extent. So for these two reasons Plataia not only fails to explain the advance but in fact would have given the Greeks grounds to postpone it until next season⁸. So I prefer to accept our second choice: some rationalization of the rumour recorded by Herodotos must be accepted. Indeed, Herodotos' quite specific assurances about research into the synchronism should command respect⁹. The report of the rumour is far more vague, and, unlike the synchronism, admits of several explanations. Hignett says that the "modern attempts to explain the supernatural element in the narrative are not much better than that of Ephoros", and he is prepared to reject outright the whole account of the rumour¹⁰. I confess to finding most of the explanations, including Ephoros', quite plausible. So the fact that Plataia and Mykale were fought on the same day forbids any attempt to explain the move from Delos as a result of Plataia, which, as we saw, would not in any case explain the advance.

An explanation should rather be sought in the effect that some five months of waiting at Delos had on the thinking of the Greek leaders. Apart from the eagerness for battle that such frustrating inactivity will have produced among the men with the fleet, the fact that the Persian fleet was obviously not planning on contesting the western Aegean in the season of 479 was a significant barometer of the confidence the enemy could put in his fleet. Herodotos (8. 132) does not say whether the Chian exiles had encouraged belief in support for the Hellenic fleet by Ionian contingents of the Persian fleet. They would surely have used such an argument if they could have hoped it would convince anyone. Perhaps the memory of Artemision and Salamis was too fresh, or perhaps Herodotos has simply failed to mention what the Chians said about the attitude

of the Ionians. If the latter is true, the promise of a revolt was not convincing enough to stimulate the Greek leaders to action. At any rate, the Samian messengers who came to Delos several months later certainly did hold out the prospect of widespread defection in Ionia (H. 9.90). The cautious stance taken by the Persian fleet perhaps lent some credence to this claim. But the information supplied by the Samians about the condition of the Persian fleet may have been at least as important a factor in determining the decision¹¹. But whatever it was that swung the balance of opinion in favour of advancing, two points remain clear. The advance was strategically irrational since it would have been better to await a decision on land, for the reasons we have noted¹². Secondly, if the prospect of Ionian desertions was ever taken seriously, it was only after the Persian fleet's defensive stance gave substance to the Samian (and possible Chian) claims, and so it is likely that in the discussions on strategy and policy which the Greek leaders in winter 480/79 must have had it will have been assumed that the Asiatic Greeks would remain loyal, as at Artemision and Salamis. This, of course, is not to say that defection was not hoped for, but there was no reason to rely on it or even to expect it, and so any discussion of the status of the Asiatic Greeks after a naval victory would have seemed premature.

This conclusion is confirmed by Herodotos' statement (9. 101) of what was almost certainly the ultimate objectives set to the Greek fleet for the campaign of 479. If the fleet should defeat the enemy fleet in the Aegean they would secure control of the islands and the Hellespont. If this interpretation of Herodotos' comment that αἱ νῆσοι καὶ ὁ Ἑλλήσποντος ἄεθλα πρόκειται

is correct, then it is clear that the Greeks neither expected a widespread revolt on the mainland (before, during or after the battle) nor ——— intended, in the event of victory, to make any attempt at dominating the mainland cities¹³.

When the Greeks learned that the Persian fleet had escaped to the mainland (H. 9.98) they considered two courses of action: either to return (to Samos, presumably, but perhaps to Hellas) or to proceed to the Hellespont. There is nothing in Herodotos to indicate which course the Athenians favoured at this point, but to judge from their attitude at Andros (H. 8.109) and the tenacity of their generals at Sestos later (H. 9.114, 117; Thuc. 89.2), we should, if anything, assume them to be the prime movers if not the actual proposers of the plan. In fact Herodotos (9. 117) has been persuasively interpreted as indicating that the Athenian generals had been specifically ordered by τὸ Ἀθηναίων κοινόν to capture Sestos, the key to control of the Chersonese and vital to control of the Hellespont¹⁴. That the Athenian objective of dominating the Hellespont may have been adopted by the council of strategoi of the Hellenic League, may be suggested by its intention to destroy the bridges (H. 9.114). If we could be sure that the Athenians advocated sailing on to the Hellespont it would not only confirm our impression that the position of the mainland was secondary in Athenian thinking in winter 480/79, but also it would imply that the Athenian generals had no brief concerning the mainland, and so that its position had probably not even been discussed¹⁵.

Denied their prey, their confidence heightened by their enemy's reluctance to fight, the Greeks made another strategically irrational

decision - to fight on land with the fleet's crews. That it was a snap decision, made in the excitement of the moment, is indicated by Herodotos' omission of this course of action as one of those seriously discussed, along with 'returning' and proceeding to the Hellespont. It would be wrong to interpret Leotychides' appeal to the Greeks in the enemy lines (H. 9.98) as anything more than an attempt to reduce the number and spirit of the opponents his men were about to confront¹⁶.

The victory at Mykale was over part of the Persian army, as well as the crews of the fleet. The Greeks, however, treated it purely as the naval victory for which they had been hoping the whole summer. It is probably significant that they chose not to set up a trophy (H. 9.106). That they chose to hold their council on Samos, not on the mainland, is perhaps also an indication of the scope of the victory as they viewed it. They had not been commissioned with the task of delivering a blow at Persian power on the mainland. They had done so only in pursuit of the objective of destroying the Persian fleet, and they made it clear that they had no intention of following up the potential implications of the defeat of the Persian army¹⁷.

Let us examine Herodotos' account (9. 106) of the Samos conference¹⁸. The Greeks sailed back to Samos and ἐβουλευόντο περὶ ἀναστάσιος τῆς ἰωνίης, καὶ ὅκη χρεὸν εἶη τῆς Ἑλλάδος κατοικίσαι τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐγκρατέες ἦσαν. It is clear from this statement that the conference was based on the assumption that there was no question of a military involvement in mainland Ionia, and the impression given is that discussion was intended to concentrate on the execution of the plan¹⁹. We have

seen that the possibility of some Asiatic Greeks joining the Greek cause seems only to have been entertained seriously at a fairly advanced stage in the season, perhaps shortly after the Samian messengers arrived at Delos. This possibility, remote though it nonetheless may have appeared, must have provoked discussion on what their fate would be. The idea of linking it with the fate of the Medizers of Old Greece may have had its genesis at Delos. But at that uncertain stage the leaders would hardly have entered into serious, detailed discussion. At any rate, Herodotos' account does not permit the assumption that the Athenian leaders — whose attitude, as events were to show, was decisive — had expressed serious reservations about the plan before the conference.

The resettlement plan has not gone down well with modern scholars. Some reject it as completely unhistorical²⁰ and others think it impracticable, and so probably not a genuine proposal²¹. But most scholars rightly respect Herodotos' clear implication that the proposal was made in all seriousness. It is noticeable that there is no hint in the account that the Athenian objections were based on practical grounds. The very readiness to take the proposal seriously in Herodotos' account may lead us to suspect one element of his narrative. It is true that the Greek intention δεκατεύειν the Medizers of north and central Greece would have made available sufficient land for the whole Ionian population²². But Herodotos says the plan proposed settling the Ionians in τὰ ἐμπορία²³ and there certainly were not enough of these in the Medizing areas to accommodate the bulk of the Greek population of the whole of Ionia. Obviously the Greeks were planning to settle only those

who chose to leave. If this represented not the majority of mainland Ionia, the apparent acceptance by the Greeks at the conference of the plan as a meaningful suggestion, and not a "fantastic impossibility"²⁴ would be explicable.

But this explanation conflicts with Herodotos' comment that the Greeks took counsel on the question ἀναστράτους τῆς ἰωνίας. The implication of this is that they envisaged removing the greater part of the Ionian population, yet we have a right, I suggest, to suspect Herodotos, or perhaps his sources²⁵ of attempting to over-emphasize the extent of the so-called "Second Ionian Revolt". The description of the mood in Ionia given by the Samian messengers at Delos (H. 9.90) cannot be taken as reliable, for obvious reasons. The fact that Xerxes left a fleet of 300 (including Ionian) ships (H. 8.130) and an army (H. 9.96) to guard Ionia may have been determined more by a reluctance to risk the demoralized fleet in western waters again, and by what was considered the necessity of protecting Persian interests in Asia against the possibility of a Greek offensive, than by any serious danger of unilateral revolt by the Ionians (or other Asiatic Greeks). But it is Herodotos' narrative of the battle and his commentary which give us the clearest grounds for suspecting his assessment of the "Second Ionian Revolt". He has specific information about the actions of only two groups of Ionians in Persian service at Mykale. The Samians, he says (9.99, 103), were disarmed because of Persian suspicions that they would assist the Greeks, and he explains the grounds for their suspicions (9.99). We should accept this. The Milesians, on the other hand, were posted on the tracks leading up to the heights of Mykale (H. 9.99), a position of trust and responsibility, as events were to show. The reason given by the Persians for their posting - that they knew

the ins and outs of the area - is quite adequate, and the alternative offered by Herodotos - that they feared Milesian loyalty - does not accord with the position entrusted to them, and is a transparent attempt to backdate Milesian collusion with the Greeks²⁶. Now even Herodotos (9.99) tacitly admits that the other Greeks in the Persian forces were under no suspicion of disloyalty. The account of the Ionian role in the battle also casts doubt on the extent of their loyalty to the Greek cause. Herodotos (9.103) says that it was the Samians who set the example to the other Ionians. Even though they were unarmed, they "did what they could" which couldn't have amounted to much more than cheering or at best stone-throwing. Even Herodotos seems to admit that the Ionians attacked the Barbarians only when the scales had turned²⁷. They, like the Milesians (H. 9.104) were, in reality, probably doing no more than saving their skins at the hands of the Greeks²⁸. This impression is confirmed by the fact that Herodotos does not seem to have been able to narrate specific incidents in the course of the battle in which the Ionians turned against the Barbarians, but tacks on the claim at the end of his account of the battle²⁹. How many contingents besides the Milesians actually attacked Barbarians in any meaningful way remains open to doubt, and although we have no secure way of knowing, the specific information which Herodotos is able to adduce in favour of his interpretation of the role of the Asiatic Greeks militates strongly against assuming it to be a large number³⁰. Herodotos' comment that the action of the Asiatic Greeks at Mykale represented τὸ δεύτερον ἰωνίη ἀπὸ Περσέων ἀκρότη is likely to be an exaggeration, and the exaggeration is maintained when he comes to describe the

plan to resettle the Milesians and some other cities as an ἀναστάσιος τῆς Ἰωνίης (9.106)³¹. So the conflict between the apparent seriousness with which the resettlement plan was taken and the implications of Herodotos' statement that it involved the ἀναστάσιος τῆς Ἰωνίης should be resolved by recognizing Herodotos' statement as an exaggeration. That we should reject what is almost a direct statement of the extensiveness of the planned operation in favour of an inference on the attitude of the Greek leaders based on Herodotos' account but not explicitly attested by him, has been justified by our demonstration of the tendentiousness of his direct statement on the intimately related question of the extent of the "Second Ionian Revolt"³².

The rest of Herodotos' account of the Samos conference is relatively free of difficulties. The information he provides is capable of a satisfactory explanation without resorting to the supplementary deductions which some historians have considered necessary. According to Herodotos it was οἱ Ἕλληνες to whom ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἑφαίνετό... εἶναι ἑαυτοὺς τε Ἰώνων προκατῆσθαι... φρουρέοντας τὸν πάντα χρόνον.

There is no indication here that the Athenians present differed in their assessment of the situation³³. Herodotos then gives notice of the divided response to the agreed assessment. The Peloponnesians wanted to solve the problem by adopting the original suggestion which had been accepted as a basis for discussion by all, and which had by now been refined to the point of specifying Medizing cities as those τῆς αὐτοῖ ἐγκρατέες which should

accommodate the Ionians. The Athenian representatives, on the other hand, made two points. They did not at all like (οὐκ ἔδοξε ἀρχὴν) the resettlement plan. Before we go on to their second point, let us analyse the situation thus arising, and note modern response to it. If, as they must have, the Athenians accepted the fact that those Ionians who had acted treasonably at Mykale would be punished by Persia, and if they also objected to the resettlement plan, the question naturally arises, and no doubt arose at Samos, what solution, then, did they have to offer to the Ionians' predicament? Herodotos does not say³⁴. Scholars have found it easy to fill the gap: the Athenians must have pleaded for the inclusion of the Asiatic Greeks in the Hellenic Alliance, thus committing the Greeks to their protection. This assumption is unacceptable on two counts. Firstly it adds to an account which (as we shall see) makes sense as it stands. Secondly, it conflicts with both the general context in Herodotos as well as with his specific account.

To take our weakest argument first, it will be remembered that our analysis of the naval campaign of 479 demonstrated that there is no evidence or likelihood of any of the Greek contingents having orders concerning, or interest in, engagements on the Asiatic mainland. Thus the suggestion that the Athenians were pursuing the cause of admitting mainland Greeks to the League conflicts with the general context.

The suggestion conflicts with Herodotos' specific account because, as we noted, his account does not admit the assumption that the Athenians disputed the Hellenic League's assessment of the strategic situation in Ionia which was that the mainland was

indefensible. Hammond recognizes that the structure which Herodotos has given the debate presupposes that no one had seriously considered accepting Asiatic Greeks into the alliance when he says "the primary matter for discussion by the Greeks at Samos ... was not whether to remove the Ionian mainlanders, as Herodotos suggests, but whether or not to admit the Ionian mainlanders into the alliance"³⁵. In other words, once we assume that there was a division over the question of admission of Asiatic Greeks from the beginning of the conference we clash with Herodotos. Diodoros (37. 1-3) and following him H.D. Meyer sought to avoid this clash by shifting a putative Athenian advocacy of the idea of providing defence for the Asiatic Greeks and the assurance that the Athenians would provide it alone, from the beginning of the conference, where it should logically be if it existed, to a later stage in the course of the conference³⁶, no doubt based on the two stages in the Herodotean version of Athenian response to the question of Ionia. The solution deserves scrutiny.

At least part of Diodoros' account is based on Ephoros³⁷. Ephoros had read Hellanikos³⁸. But it is far from certain that he drew his account of the Samos conference from Hellanikos, either at all, or uncontaminated by other sources, or his own tendentious inventions. Furthermore, we do not know whether Diodoros has reflected Ephoros' account accurately (see below). Historiographically, then, Diodoros' credentials on this episode are not beyond suspicion.

Scholars have learned to be wary of passages in Diodoros which lay emphasis on the heroic role played by the Asiatic Greeks (especially Aiolians) as probably deriving from Ephoros' tendency

to give prominence to the Greeks dwelling on the eastern shores of the Aegean. It is possible that Diodoros' claim that

οὐ δὲ περὶ Λεωτυχίδην καὶ Εὐανθίππου

'made allies of the Ionians and Aiolians' (37.1) should be seen in this light, for it may have been designed to remove any doubt about the wholeheartedness and decisiveness (cf. 36. 2-6) of the Asiatic Greeks' contribution to the Hellenic cause in the battle which might have arisen if, as in Herodotos, the Greeks had failed to include the mainlanders as allies at Samos. The notice is in conflict with Herodotos and must be rejected³⁹. This error casts doubt on the reliability of the whole of Diodoros' account. But there are further grounds against accepting the Diodoran solution to the conflict between the alleged Athenian support for Asiatic Greek membership and Herodotos' account. One of the differences between the accounts of Diodoros and Herodotos is that Diodoros suggests Xanthippos was joint proposer of the motion to resettle the Asiatic Greeks, while Herodotos suggests that the Athenians simply did not object to the discussion topic. The negative reaction of the Athenians to the proposal in the course of the debate in Herodotos thus presents no problem. But in Diodoros it represents a startling volte-face. The contradiction is so crass that the account does not make sense without an explanation⁴⁰. It is possible that Diodoros has omitted an explanation given by Ephoros. In his account of the Pentekontaetia it is usually safe to assume that Diodoros is drawing exclusively from Ephoros or Thucydides. This is not true of events which have been described by Herodotos. Before chapter 37 is finished Diodoros has referred to Herodotos' account of the battle of Mykale and the Sestos siege (37.6).

The contradiction in Diodoros is probably best explained by postulating an attempt by our none too skilful author to combine the differing accounts of Ephoros and Herodotos⁴¹. From Ephoros he has kept the admission of the Aiolians and Ionians immediately after Mykale. It may be that in Ephoros the suggestion to transplant the Asiatic Greeks was opposed by the Athenians from the start of the conference, where the promises of unilateral protection by Athens would, therefore, also be located. Such an account would at least make sense. But turning to Herodotos' account he found good evidence which unmistakably suggested that there was no opposition between the Athenians and Peloponnesians at the outset of the conference over the proposal - or discussion topic - to resettle the Ionians. Diodoros has accepted this and indeed interpreted it as Xanthippos and Leotychides making the proposal jointly. In the course of Herodotos' conference the Athenians do express their reluctance to vote in favour of the proposals. Diodoros may have hit upon this stage of the debate when differences emerge as the 'correct' point at which to locate Ephoros' descriptions of Athenian advocacy of defence of and promises of support for the Asiatic Greeks. By conflating his two sources in this way he leads his Athenians into the inexplicably inconsistent position of proposing the resettlement initially only to vehemently oppose it later. Diodoros gives a reason for their opposition to the plan which would have been as apparent at the beginning of the conference, where Ephoros probably had the Athenians perceive it. There is no convincing reason in Diodoros why the Athenians should have "changed their minds" (37.3)⁴². So Diodoros' location of the Athenian support for protection of the Asiatic Greeks should not

be accepted, and the objection we raised to the notion of Athenian support for inclusion of the Asiatic Greeks into the Hellenic League, based on the structure of the debate at Samos as presented by Herodotos, remains valid.

The argument from Herodotos' silence must also be mentioned.

Herodotos, who so often follows pre-Athenian traditions, would surely have made much of the alleged Athenian championship, in the face of Spartan opposition, of protection of Asiatic Greeks had he known of such a significant, and (in terms of later fifth century propaganda, at least) praiseworthy stand⁴³.

Herodotos, then, prohibits accepting the answer suggested by Diodoros and modern scholars, to the question of what to do with those Asiatic Greeks who would suffer punishment by the Persians, a question arising from the first Athenian point made in response to the resettlement solution. Part of the Athenian answer to this question is contained in the second point they made as recorded by Herodotos, and the rest is implied. They said (H. 9.106) ἔδοκε δὲ οὐδὲ Πελοποννησίοισι περὶ τῶν σφετερέων ἀποικιέων βουλεύειν.

In other words, they suggested that even though it was obvious that if it came to a vote the Peloponnesians would be able to carry the day with their advocacy of the proposals, the Athenian representatives would not be prepared to accept this as binding and would, therefore, not commit themselves to contributing to the execution of the scheme. They perhaps even refused to vote. So much is clear enough from Herodotos. But if the Peloponnesians, in the framework of the Hellenic League, were not competent to decide on a solution to the problem, who was? Surely not the Athenian generals. Athenian generals could take a stance on a matter of such "high policy"⁴⁴

only as representatives of the Athenian people. The same board of generals later in the year seems to have been particularly sensitive to not acting independently of orders from τὸ Ἀθηναίων Κοινόν (H. 9.117). When the fleet left Piraeus in spring 479, we argued Athenian feeling towards the Ionians was ambivalent. The Greeks appear not to have expected any substantial revolt in Ionia and had planned their strategy accordingly. The Athenian generals had not expected to find themselves at Samos with not only the Persian fleet defeated but also the Persian land forces. Their orders had covered what action to take if the Persian fleet were to be defeated: they should attempt to gain control of the Hellespont. So it is best to accept Herodotos' implications that the Athenians at Samos did no more than express their personal opinion concerning the resettlement plan, refusing to be drawn into allowing the discussion topic to be turned into a formal resolution of the council of generals of the Hellenic League, and responding, in answer to the demands for an alternative solution that it was a question which would have to be decided by the Athenian people. They had been willing to confer about the proposals to resettle the mainlanders perhaps in order to acquire a detailed knowledge of the Peloponnesian position(s) to be able to report back to Athens with. There is, of course, no contradiction between such a stance and their failure to dispute the assessment by "the Greeks" of the impossibility of defending Ionia.

Since the Athenians objected to the proposals in this way the Peloponnesians gladly gave way⁴⁵. This suggests that the Peloponnesians had supported the plan, which would have been difficult and expensive to execute however few the cities involved,

in part in deference to the known emotional ties between the Athenians and Ionians. The Athenian response will have appeared puzzling and perhaps contrary⁴⁶. And so (καὶ οὕτω δὲ) this matter being dropped, at least for the time being⁴⁷, the Greeks went on to the next point on the agenda, which required no discussion as all were agreed, which was that they should accept into the alliance the Samians, Chians and other islanders who ἔτιυχον συστρατεύόμενοι τοῖσι Ἑλλήσι⁴⁸, which they did forthwith.

I have deliberately postponed any discussion of Thucydides 89.2 because it and Herodotos 9.106 should be considered independently first, and then compared. Modern scholars have tended, influenced no doubt by the events of the next eighteen months, to look for evidence that the Athenian representatives at Samos championed the cause of the Asiatic Greeks. Unsatisfied with Herodotos' silence on such a stance they have been quick to seize upon Thucydides' remarks to supplement Herodotos, before, however, giving adequate consideration to the question of whether Herodotos' account could, in fact, sustain such an addition; and, as we have seen, it can not.

Thucydides begins his Pentekontaetia excursus by promising to describe how the Athenians ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ὑβρίσθησαν (89.1). It has long been recognized that his account takes up where Herodotos left off⁴⁹. Well, almost: he chooses to correct Herodotos' account of the Sestos campaign by

mentioning that not only the Athenians (as Herodotos 9.114 implies) but also οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου σύμμαχοι, ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως remained and besieged Sestos. This correction strongly suggests that Thucydides found nothing in Herodotos' account of the Samos conference which he felt needed modification. Had he known of any Athenian championship of Asiatic Greeks it would certainly have been sufficiently relevant to his theme to have warranted, indeed to have required, mention⁵⁰.

Thucydides' statement contains two ambiguities: what does he mean by οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας and what does he mean by σύμμαχοι? I don't think anyone has denied that for Thucydides the primary geographical area understood by 'Ionia' was the coastal area of Asia Minor (cf. e.g. 1.12.4, 2.9. 4-5, 8.56.4). Accepting the implications of this a minority of scholars have gone on to take σύμμαχοι in its technical sense and concluded that, according to Thucydides, mainland Ionians had at some stage between Samos and Sestos joined the Hellenic League⁵¹. Still accepting the reference as being to mainland Ionians, and taking σύμμαχοι formally, a few scholars have postulated the relationship as existing between the "allies from Ionia and the Hellespont", and the Athenians only⁵². The majority view, however, is to accept "from Ionia" as including mainland Ionians and to take σύμμαχοι informally⁵³. That this interpretation of σύμμαχοι is possible is made most clear by Thucydides' use of the verbal form at 4.44.1 where συμμαχόμενοι describes the relationship between Athenian cavalry and Athenian hoplite forces. Others have insisted that οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας could be a

designation of those Ionian islands which had joined the League at Samos⁵⁴. No matter what Thucydides' normal usage, 7.57.4 and 8.40.1 are decisive in showing that it is not impossible that Thucydides understood only Ionian islanders when he wrote 89.2⁵⁵.

We criticized scholars for interpreting Herodotos (9.106) too rashly in the light of what they drew from Thucydides 89.2. The stricture, however, does not hold so well the other way round, as we shall see. As we have just seen Thucydides can be interpreted as meaning that at Sestos there remained with the Athenians Ionian islanders (of whom some, at least, but not necessarily all, may have been admitted to the League at Samos) and another group of men from the Hellespont who had not been admitted to the League, but helped the Athenians nonetheless⁵⁶. This interpretation of Thucydides does not contradict any ancient evidence, and, in my view, does not require an improbable course of events. Since Thucydides' account is so flexible, it should be bent towards compliance with Herodotos' inflexible account, rather than away from it. Let us, then, attempt to give a narrative of events from Samos to Sestos which harmonizes the evidence of Herodotos and Thucydides as far as possible⁵⁷.

The Greek fleet, including the new island contingents, set out from Samos to break the bridges. They can not have known how much opposition awaited them for they had no knowledge of the situation in the north-east as their ignorance of the destruction of the bridges shows (H. 9.106). Their readiness to sail there and face the possibility of further military actions confirms our earlier conclusion that the Hellenic League had probably adopted as an objective for the campaign season the 'freeing' of the Hellespont.

Herodotos picks up his narrative at 9.114, telling us that the Greek fleet was forced to take shelter from bad weather by Lektos, ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ἀπίκοντο ἐς Ἀβυδον.

News of the fleet's arrival in the bay of Adramytteion must have spread swiftly through the Hellespontine region, and, ὥς ἤκουσαν παρεῖναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐς τὸν Ἑλλησπόντον, the Persians assembled at the fortifiable town of Sestos (H. 9.115). The Greek arrival had been a surprise and the retreat to Sestos hasty (H. 9.116). Now, on arrival at Abydos the Greeks saw that the bridges had been destroyed (H. 9.114). The Hellespont was then, arguably, in the hands of the Greek fleet, and Leotychides and the Peloponnesians decided to leave. We do not know how many days intervened between the anchoring of the Greek fleet off Lektos and the Peloponnesian departure; at least enough for the Persians from the surrounding cities to assemble at Sestos. The fact that the Persians abandoned a city made it clear to its inhabitants that the Greeks were probably planning a determined action in the Hellespont. Before leaving the Persians will have no doubt boasted of reinforcements from the king. Some cities might have doubted whether the Greeks would be able to secure permanent control of the Hellespont region, and have decided not to commit themselves to the Greek cause, which meant simply doing nothing for the moment. Others probably anticipated Greek control and were anxious to express loyalty. It will have been easy for a city to provide provisions for the Greeks and to offer the services of their forces to contribute to the tedious task, and it will have been a prudent insurance.

Herodotos implies Hellespontine fraternization with the Greeks. Abydos seems to have offered no resistance⁵⁸. Having fled,

Artayktes was caught by the Athenians and brought back to Sestos (H. 9.119). The Athenians considered some of the people of the Chersonese loyal enough to be entrusted with guarding this important prisoner (H. 9.120). It is also clear from Herodotos (9.120) that the Athenians had Elaians with them at the Sestos siege.

These notices in Herodotos are quite incidental and make it clear that he knew the Athenians had ἀπὸ... Ἑλλησπόντου ζύμμαχοι (Thuc. 89.2). It is possible that Herodotos chose to omit direct reference to them in order that "Athens alone" might have "the glory of this victory"⁵⁹. It is, however, more in accord with his account to suggest that he is simply reflecting a contrast which later Athenians probably drew between Athenian energy on this occasion, with its consequent spotlighting of the purely Athenian role, and Peloponnesian lack of it⁶⁰, for the notices we have just mentioned show Herodotos is not deliberately trying to disguise the presence of Hellespontine assistance to the Athenians. This explanation gains weight when we remember that Herodotos is obviously not thinking carefully about exactly who was present at the siege, for, as Meiggs remarks, "in his account" the islanders "neither stay nor return home"⁶¹. So the composition of the besieging forces with the Athenians at Sestos does not represent an incompatible discrepancy between Herodotos and Thucydides, and scholars have usually assumed that these Hellespontine allies joined forces with the Greeks when the latter arrived in the area⁶². Meiggs objects to this by claiming that "Thucydides in saying that" the Ionians and Hellespontine allies "remained with the Athenians clearly implies that they were with the fleet that sailed to break ... the bridges"⁶³. His objection seems to be based on Thucydides' failure to mention the Samos conference

and the act of sailing to the Hellespont. We have seen a possible reason why he omits the Samos conference, and it was fair of Thucydides to assume that his readers would assume that the Greek fleet sailed from Mykale/Samos to the Hellespont when he moves the scene of action from Mykale to Sestos. What does emerge as ambiguous in his account is at what point in the movement from Mykale to Sestos the Peloponnesians sailed home. He only says that it was $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\lambda\delta\eta$ the Persians had retreated from Europe and they had been defeated at Mykale. This does not contradict Herodotos' more detailed information on the exact point at which "after Mykale" the Peloponnesians left for home any more than his omission of the Samos conference contradicts Herodotos' account of it. Rather, it assumes a knowledge of and implicitly accepts Herodotos' information. Meiggs, though, seems to take Thucydides as meaning that the Peloponnesians sailed home from Mykale, for he implies that $\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ means the Ionians and Hellespontines remained with the Athenians at Mykale/Samos and sailed north while the Peloponnesians sailed home. This is not justified by Thucydides. $\epsilon\chi\omicron\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ should be taken as referring to the action of the Athenians, Ionians and Hellespontines in remaining at the task of flushing the Persians from the Hellespont. This is in contrast to the Peloponnesians who returned $\epsilon\chi' \omicron\lambda\kappa\omicron\upsilon$. So it is not necessary to take Thucydides as indicating that the Ionian and Hellespontine allies "remained with the Athenians" when they set out from Mykale/Samos. What Meiggs actually says is that we cannot take Thucydides as indicating that the Ionians and Hellespontines joined "after the Athenians had settled down to the siege", and in this he is right because in Thucydides the contrast made between

the Athenians and others remaining and the Peloponnesians leaving implies that the others had joined the Greeks before the Peloponnesians left. Since the Peloponnesians left from Abydos (H. 9.114) the Hellespontines could have joined the Greek fleet at Lektos (though only those without Persian garrisons) or at its arrival at Abydos, which is more likely since it is possible that the Persians quitted the cities only when the Greek fleet appeared in the Hellespont itself (H. 9.115). Since Herodotos, for whatever reasons, seems to have paid little attention to the presence of Hellespontine (and other non-Athenian men) at the siege of Sestos it is also possible that he has also omitted mentioning acceptance into the Hellenic League of such Hellespontines (and possibly further island states who had not been at Samos) as may have sent representatives to the Hellenic fleet at Abydos, before the Peloponnesian departure. Such acceptance would be in keeping with what we concluded about the most optimistic objectives for the naval arm of the Hellenic League for the campaign of 479, as well as with the actions of the Hellenic League in 478. In the present state of the evidence it is impossible to decide whether some Hellespontine cities were, in fact, accepted into the League in late 479.

As we have seen, Herodotos does not record the return home of the island contingents which were with the Greek fleet as members of the League since their admission at Samos. Everything (especially Thucydides' οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας points to their presence at the Sestos siege. What of mainland Ionians?

If, on the basis of Herodotos' disinterest and Thucydides' assertion of their presence at the Sestos siege we are prepared to

admit the possibility that cities from the Hellespont were admitted to the Hellenic League, why should we not do the same for mainland Ionians, enabling us to understand ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας in the way Thucydides commonly used it? Clearly because Herodotos' evidence, not challenged by Thucydides, indicates that all members had agreed that it would be impossible to guard mainland Ionia forever. They had not mentioned the Hellespont because the question had not yet arisen, and besides, it was understood to be an objective of the Hellenic League's actions against the Persians for 479. The coast of mainland Ionia was not, and there is no reason to assume that the League's plans had changed when they reached Abydos. Mainland Ionians cannot have been admitted to the Hellenic League between Samos and Sestos.⁶⁴

This is not to deny, however, that some mainland states, for example, Miletos, had decided, following the action of their forces at Mykale, that the best way of avoiding punishment was to do as much harm to the Persian cause ^{as possible} by encouraging other mainland states to revolt and perhaps make possible a re-formation of the Ionian League, enabling the cities to defend themselves against Persia⁶⁵. Such action would, in view of the clear statement by the Hellenic League at Samos of its assessment of the strategic situation in Ionia, seem foolhardy, and most cities will have tried to play down any anti-Persian behaviour at Mykale. The Athenian generals, on the other hand, need have had no compunction about accepting the help of such divisions in relieving their impatient men. The presence of such mainland Ionian contingents would also have impressed Hellespontine cities who were waiting upon events before committing themselves to the Greek cause. The Athenian generals had undertaken

no future commitments and so assistance by mainland Ionians would have been their own business. The evidence does not permit us to decide categorically one way or the other, but probability indicates that there will have been few, if any, mainland Ionians at Sestos.

Our analysis of Thucydides' evidence of events from Mykale to Sestos (89.2) has shown that his evidence, though open to different interpretations can, without strain, be understood to supplement and clarify some elements of Herodotos' account. Conversely, Herodotos' account does the same for some elements of Thucydides'. Neither stands in contradiction of the other. In particular, Thucydides supplies no grounds for claiming that the Athenians, at any stage between Mykale and Sestos, expressed any championship of the cause of liberating or protecting mainland Ionia against Persia. Had this been the case, his evidence would have stood in direct conflict with that of Herodotos. The explanation which we drew from Herodotos' implications, that the Athenian generals had no orders or guidelines on the question, and felt obliged to refer the issue to τὸ Ἀθηναίων κοινόν remains acceptable.

We must pick up the threads of our main argument. Themistokles in winter 480/79 enjoyed great popularity and influence at Athens and faced virtually no opposition. There is no evidence of internal disagreement over the strategy to be adopted for the 479 campaign. The plans which he had for Athens, παντελέως ἀπελάσας τὸν βάρβαρον (H. 8.109) excluded the possibility of extensive Athenian engagement in a war on the coast of Asia Minor. The possibility existed that once the Persian fleet had been cleared

from the Aegean (and army from Hellas, of course) Athenian emotions would persuade the demos to embark on such an Asiatic war. The emotions could be stimulated by a desire for the liberty of their kinsmen if they proved worthy, or, conversely, a desire to punish them if their loyalty to the King at Artemision and Salamis proved to be typical of their actions in the war as a whole. And vengeance against the King would naturally play an important, perhaps primary role. The war could be prosecuted in the framework of the Hellenic League, or otherwise.

Themistokles had to prevent this. It has been suggested that Themistokles, at some stage, openly opposed further conflict with the King⁶⁶. In view of later developments on the coast of Asia Minor, and of the fairly extensive and hostile tradition concerning Themistokles, it would indeed be quite remarkable that if Themistokles had ever openly declared himself in favour of such a programme no trace of it should have survived. In view of this I find it impossible to accept the idea. We should look for another explanation of how Themistokles attempted to put his policy into effect.

We have evidence of two incidents from the year 479 which arguably provide an answer to our problem. Both admit similar explanations. The historicity of one - Themistokles' activity over the rebuilding of the walls - is in no serious doubt; the other - Themistokles' reactions to the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet at Pagasai - is usually dismissed as unhistorical. Both these events created a war alarm at Athens. I suggest Themistokles decided he wanted to be in Athens when the Persian threat had been removed above all because he wanted to engineer a situation in which the Athenians would themselves feel it impossible to embark on an

aggressive war on the Asiatic mainland. The suggestion provides an adequate explanation of why Themistokles took no part in the campaigns of 479. While there were generals as experienced as Aristides who could be best allocated to the part of the board serving with the land campaign, it will have appeared most natural and best to send Themistokles with that part of the board of generals serving with the naval arm. For Themistokles to have insisted on being detailed to take part in the land defence would have been dangerous. It may have appeared to be an expression of excessive *φιλοτιμία* in wishing also to have a part in what promised to be another battle which would decide Athens' fate, at the expense of the common good, something which would soon be exploited by his competitors for influence. On the other hand, by declining to stand for election at all, he will have been able to represent his reluctance as a desire to allow others to take the fore in leadership - a gesture of reconciliation in the spirit of the recall of the ostracisés and a refutation of any suspicions being conceived that Themistokles was seeking to gain a reputation sufficient to enable him to aspire to tyranny⁶⁷.

It is no longer necessary to defend the historicity of the public events recorded in Thucydides' account of the walls incident (89.3 - 92)⁶⁸. The Athenians set to work on reconstruction on their return to Attika (89.3)⁶⁹. Thucydides says that the Spartans asked the Athenians not to rewall their city partly because they would have preferred every city without walls, and partly because they had been influenced by their allies who were afraid of the Athenians' boldness and their new fleet (90. 1-2). This seems to have been Thucydides' opinion, and it is safest to assume it was well-founded.

Thucydides (90.2) makes it clear that he believes Sparta in fact shared the suspicions of her allies by saying τὸ μὲν βουλόμενον καὶ ὑποπτον τῆς γνώμης οὐ δηλοῦντες ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. The official reason given by the Spartan ambassadors tallies in part with Thucydides' opinion: they wanted no one outside the Peloponnese to have a wall, their reason being the fear that the Persians would in future make use of such strongholds. They professed οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ κωλύμῃ, ἀλλὰ γνώμης παραινέσει δῆθεν τῷ κοινῷ ἐπρεσβεύσαντο (92).

Themistokles assessed the embassy differently. From the start he created the impression that Athens was in immediate danger of military intervention (τὸ τεῖχος ἑκάνον ἄρῳσιν ὥστε ἀπομάχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαϊοτάτου ὕψους - 90.3, cf. 91.3). He went on (at Sparta) to give reasons why he disliked the Spartan suggestion. Essentially, he argued that having her own walls would enable Athens to avoid dependence on others for protection (91.4), a situation which would ensure for her the influence in common debate which her recent astute judgements had proved that she deserved (91. 4-7). Thus he took the Spartan suggestion as an attempt to minimize the influence of Athens, and, as we saw, Thucydides seems to have agreed with him that this was at least part of the Spartan motivation. Thucydides does not, however, give any indication that he accepts Themistokles' suggestion that Athens was in danger of military intervention. If anything, he suggests that it was unlikely that this was the case (92: προσφιλεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τότε διὰ τὴν ἐς τὸν Μηδὸν προθυμίαν τὰ μάλιστα αὐτοῖς ἐτύχχανον - this seems to be Thucydides' own comment).

Historical reasons also argue against believing that the Spartans

considered invasion. It is true that because of recent history it will have been easy to ~~convince~~ convince the Athenians that Spartan troops might well invade Attika⁷⁰. Nonetheless, the behaviour of the Spartans in late 479 makes it difficult to accept that they were determined to stop the building. Once reports began to arrive at Sparta that the walls were going up fast⁷¹, despite Themistokles' presence there to discuss the question (91.1), they could easily have found out for themselves without waiting for Themistokles' suggestion that they send trustworthy men on an official embassy, and thereupon have acted accordingly. And if the Spartans had been prepared to take such desperate action to hinder the growth of Athenian power they would have done better to prevent the fortification of the Piraeus⁷². So if we leave aside Athenian suspicions over the Spartan request we must conclude that it was a purely diplomatic attempt to reduce the influence Athens appeared likely to be able to wield in the forthcoming years, stimulated not inconsiderably by Sparta's allies⁷³. The fear of an immediate invasion, then, was alarmist⁷⁴. The fear that she had an aggressive and envious group of enemies in the Peloponnesian League will not have been irrelevant to the question of whether to pursue the war against Persian interests on the Asiatic coast.

Plutarch (Th. 20. 1-2; cf. Ar. 22.2) records the Pagasai incident. Having narrated Themistokles' plans to fortify the Piraeus he says he had yet greater plans for securing Athens' naval power. At the same time (ἐπεὶ) as the Greek fleet was wintering at Pagasai, Themistokles made a speech to the Athenians in which he claimed to have a plan whose execution would be ὠφέλιμον and σωτήριον for the Athenians, but could not be stated publicly (ἀπόρρητον. δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς : Th. 20.1). The Athenians

decided he should elaborate his plan to Aristides, and if the latter agreed to it, it should be carried out. Themistokles explained to him that he proposed burning the Hellenic fleet which was wintering at Pagasai in Thessaly. Aristides reported back to the Assembly that the plan was extremely advantageous and extremely unjust, and Themistokles was ordered to drop it (Th. 20.2). Plutarch does not quote his source. The story has, not surprisingly, been widely rejected⁷⁵. Nonetheless, many of the scholars who reject it recognize that it is located in a surprisingly accurate context. The circumstances described in Plutarch's story conform to those obtaining in winter 479/8. The Peloponnesian contingent, led by Leotychides had left the Athenians and others at Sestos in late 479. It was thus a "Hellenic fleet". The Peloponnesians at Samos had spoken of the expulsion of Medizers in Hellas and their proposals to settle the Ionians in their place shows that they intended to carry out the expulsions. The question had been left open. Either way the Medizers should be punished. Herodotos (6.72) records an expedition led by Leotychides against Thessaly. Plutarch's Pagasai story is probably based on the historical presence of the Hellenic fleet at Pagasai, led by Leotychides, which sought to topple the prime Medizers in Thessaly, the Aleuadae, in winter 479/8⁷⁶. So Plutarch's source seems, at least, to have been familiar with some less than commonly-known details of fifth-century history⁷⁷.

Scholars have failed to pay sufficient attention to Busolt's important observation that the secret proceedings recorded by Plutarch have a close connection with those recorded by Diodoros (41.2) concerning the Piraeus fortification. He notes that "bei Diod. und Plut. ist die Einleitung zu der Geschichte der Hauptsache nach völlig

identisch"⁷⁸. In Diodoros' account the secrecy surrounding Themistokles' proposals has no point⁷⁹ and would appear to have been grafted on to the original story. It is probable that Ephoros had read an account substantially the same as Plutarch's Pagasai story and that the secret proceedings essential to it appealed to him as illustrating a (to an extent historical) feature of Themistokles' post-war career, in particular his relationship with the demos: τοῦ δὲ δήμου θαυμάσαντος ἅμα τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ὑποπτεύσαντος μήποτε τυραννίδα τινὰ κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ (Diod. 42.4). For this to be accurately reflected by the story of secret proposals, especially the element of admiration, the outcome had to be a success for Themistokles, which, besides, was desirable as contributing to the greater glory of Themistokles. But there was a further reason for transferring the subject of the secret consultation from the unsuccessful fleet burning plan to the Piraeus fortification plan, and this was the unscrupulous light in which the Pagasai story portrayed Themistokles. Nonetheless, Ephoros perhaps preserves an echo of Themistokles' failure as recorded in the original source, for he has the Assembly, despite the approval of the men assigned to hear and judge the proposal⁸⁰, still refuse to adopt his plans unconditionally (Diod. 42.4). So Plutarch's story most probably derives, perhaps only indirectly, from a source earlier than Ephoros⁸¹.

There is not much point in trying to show who the original source might have been. Bauer suggested Stesimbrotos, which is as good a guess as any⁸². All we can say with confidence is that the fact that the original source was sufficiently well-informed to place a Hellenic fleet, shortly after Xerxes' withdrawal, at Pagasai,

and that it assumed the knowledge, or perhaps stated, that the Athenian contingent was absent from it, suggests an intimacy with details of fifth century non-events which we would expect to find only in a fifth century writer. In view of this it is justifiable to pay greater attention than is usually done to the other elements in the story.

Plutarch's account is not impossible as it stands. It would, however, require Aristides' divulging the plan. This could have been politically advantageous to him, but Plutarch suggests he did not specify the proposal in rejecting it. Aristides' response, however, may, at some stage of the tradition, have been transformed from a simple rejection which mentioned the nature of the plan into a more sophisticated play on the dilemma created by the statesman's desire for justice as well as his city's advantage (cf. Pl. Ar. 25.3). On the other hand, if we take Plutarch's statement that the plan was to be expounded Ἀριστείδῃ... μόνῳ as merely an example of the tendency to contrast the two great men, and assume that Themistokles was ordered to consult secretly with the Boule, perhaps in the presence of the strategoi, then there would be less difficulty in accounting for a knowledge of the plan⁸³.

But perhaps there are good historical reasons for rejecting the historicity of Plutarch's account. In Plutarch they are clearly intended to be genuine proposals to burn the Hellenic fleet⁸⁴. That the Athenians had just been engaged in the refortification of Athens suggests that Themistokles can hardly have envisaged 'retiring to the Piraeus' (Thuc. 93.7) at this early stage, and conducting a naval war in the immediate future. One may doubt also whether she could get involved in a Peloponnesian war while she was probably

still to some extent dependent on Peloponnesian charity. Yet it is difficult to believe the story has been invented out of the blue. One explanation may be that the original source for the secret proceedings had knowledge of a public speech by Themistokles in which the threat of burning the Hellenic fleet wintered at Pagasai was mentioned. If the 'secret proceedings' source believed or wanted his readers to believe that Themistokles' object was in fact to destroy the fleet, then he did well to clothe the proposals in the secret proceedings. They may be pure invention, or modelled on the historical secret meeting between Themistokles and the Boule concerning the walls and embassy to Sparta⁸⁵.

What then would the point have been of a public speech in which Themistokles spoke of burning the fleet but did not in fact intend that such an act of war be carried out? Themistokles was soon to defend the position of the Medizing states, including Thessaly, in the Amphiktyonic council against the threat of expulsion posed by Spartan proposals (Pl. Th. 20. 3-4: see below). A threat of attacking the Hellenic fleet, if Leotychides' expedition against Medizers in Thessaly were not withdrawn, may have contributed to the decision to abandon the expedition. As well as the obvious advantage of contributing to the failure of Spartan designs on Thessaly, of intimidating Spartan expansionism and of winning friends among those threatened by Sparta, especially the Aleuadae⁸⁶, an important effect of such a speech will have been the heightening of the already existing sense of crisis and imminent war at Athens. Sparta will have been portrayed as aggressively expansionist within Hellas.

The opposition of Aristides reflected in Plutarch's story may be historical. At any rate within a few years, by the time

Timokreon wrote his fragment 1, Aristeides and Themistokles seem to have been seen as unfriendly rivals⁸⁷. There is also evidence that about now a "grand coalition" was being formed, aimed, it would appear, at the political extinction of Themistokles, and of which Aristeides was a member⁸⁸. His opposition to Themistokles now probably marked the end of that interlude of co-operation in an otherwise consistently hostile relationship which had characterized their dealings with each other since the recall of the ostracisés⁸⁹.

We have sought to explain Themistokles' absence from any military command in 479/8 in terms of his desire to be in a position to engineer a situation in which the Athenians themselves would form an opinion on questions of the direction of future military commitments which conformed with his own opinion. His alarmist reaction to the Spartan request over the walls is evidence enough that he was deliberately trying to create a sense of urgent danger among the Athenians. The explanation we offered of the tradition of Themistokles' talk of burning the Hellenic fleet at Pagasai would also fit such a policy.

If our analysis of Themistokles' actions in 479 is accepted, an important conclusion emerges concerning the nature of Athenian politics at this time. Despite the fact that when Themistokles made his decision not to stand for election his erstwhile enemies seem to have been more concerned with regaining the respect of the demos by quiet service rather than by criticizing and opposing Themistokles or his policies, and despite the fact that everything we know of events between 483 and 479 suggests Themistokles' influence with the demos will have risen, he nonetheless did not feel confident

enough of his influence with the demos to seize the opportunity by attempting to persuade the Athenians to accept a necessary element of his policy which he knew would have proved unpopular — namely, the abandonment of interest in active involvement in mainland Ionia. Instead, he felt obliged to resort to the devious and dangerous methods we have suggested. This is a testimony to the independence of the demos in forming their own decisions in the face of the advice of their leaders. They would appear to have been "led" to a lesser extent than we usually imagine⁹⁰.

οὗτινος δούλοι κέκληνται φωτὸς οὐδ' ὑπήκοοι,
wrote one of the men who had a place in the Assembly of 479 (Aisch. Pers. 242). This conclusion will be reinforced in the forthcoming chapters⁹¹.

How effective, then, was Themistokles' attempt to create fear among the Athenians?⁹² Diodoros (43.3) says Themistokles persuaded the Athenians to build twenty new triremes a year, apparently in connection with the Piraeus fortification. The notice looks authentic, not so much because it fits so well with Themistokles' policy, nor that it makes sense, but because of the way it is tacked onto the end of Diodoros' account of the Piraeus fortification⁹³. Part of the motive in maintaining a large, well-equipped fleet will naturally have been defence against Persia. Nonetheless, Thucydides (93.7) implies Themistokles had enemies nearer home in mind as well, since he advised the Athenians to use their naval arm πρὸς ἀπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι⁹⁴. A desire to maintain a defensive capability at home may be part of the explanation of the relatively small Athenian contingent which sailed east with the Hellenic fleet in 478⁹⁵. The fear of Spartan attack

which Themistokles had whipped up appears to have created a sense of sympathy for, and community with other states threatened by Sparta, for we should assume that the stance made by Themistokles at the Amphiktyonic council had the support of a majority of the demos⁹⁶. The story, recorded by Plutarch (Th. 20. 3-4), tells how Themistokles successfully caused the defeat of a Lakedaimonian proposal which aimed at excluding from the council those states which had not fought the Persians. He showed that the result of excluding, among others, the Thessalians, Argives and Thebans would be to have the council dominated by two or three cities. The scepticism of earlier scholars as to the historicity of this event was shown to be unwarranted by the analyses of Bengtson and Flacelière⁹⁷. It is now orthodox to accept Plutarch's account, and unnecessary to defend it⁹⁸. The meeting cannot have taken place long after Plataia. The autumn meeting of 479 is far less likely than that of spring 478⁹⁹. We have already referred to the significance of Themistokles' stance: like his probable reactions to the Thessalian expedition it not only helped to thwart an extension of Spartan influence outside the Peloponnese, but also established Athens as the defender of the autonomy of states threatened by Spartan domination. At home it had the effect of demonstrating to the Athenians that within Hellas there was a large power-base which could be tapped in challenging Sparta's traditional role as first city in Hellas. In particular, the states he chose to single out - Thessaly, Thebes, Argos - were important land- powers and would provide the necessary complement to Athenian sea-power essential in offering an overwhelming challenge to Peloponnesian power¹⁰⁰.

Finally, a usually unfairly rejected notice may provide evidence of an Athenian attempt about now to win a powerful friend against possible conflict with the Peloponnesians. The scholion to Thucydides 1.36. 1 (Eude 99) says that Themistokles had been granted the title *εὐεργέτης* by the Kerkyrans because he had prevented the other loyal Greeks carrying out a plan to annihilate them for not having taken part in the war. The pedigree of this notice is anonymous, but the information it provides plausible. We know that the Greeks began proceedings against the Kerkyrans (H. 168: *αἰτιωμένων γὰρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὅτι οὐκ ἐβόηθον...*). The scholiast agrees with Herodotos in taking Kerkyran pleas as specious, for he says *ἐσοφίσαντο*. He supplements Herodotos' account by recording that the Greeks intended to destroy them and that Themistokles opposed the action. There are no grounds to object against the supplementary information. The opposition of Themistokles fits precisely into the pattern that emerges in his post-war attempts to gain the friendship of states threatened by Sparta and inaccessible to domination by Athens. Kerkyra was the second most powerful naval state after Athens (Thuc. 1.4.2; H. 7.168). Athens could not hope at this stage to exercise control over western powers. If the Athenians took part in the annihilation of her power they would be increasing the strength of Korinth and other western states, as well as destroying a potential ally who could make a very significant contribution to any future conflict with the Peloponnese¹⁰¹. Nor is the other piece of supplementary information cause to reject the scholiast. There is a tradition that Karyai in the Peloponnese was destroyed (Vitruvius De Arch. 1.1.5) for what can only have been neutrality, not active support for Persia, during the

Persian invasion. Huxley has recently dedicated an article to defending the historicity of the tradition¹⁰². So mere neutrality may have been sufficient grounds for destruction. If Themistokles was pursuing a policy of befriending states threatened by Sparta then we should expect to find him opposing this action against Kerkyra, and so it is unwise to suspect this incident as being modelled on the Amphiktyonic stand¹⁰³. There must have been several occasions on which Themistokles gave expression to this policy. In fact the only connection between the Amphiktyonic story and this one is Themistokles' opposition to measures proposed against offenders. Since the action proposed was in connection with 480 we should keep it as close to that year as possible. The suggestion is unlikely to have been made after spring 478 when the attitude of the Athenians, over Thessaly and the Amphiktyonic incident, had been demonstrated, for it would be doomed to failure if Athens refused to take part. The attempted action should be dated around winter 479/8. In the absence of better evidence to the contrary, the scholiast's notice should be accepted.

The alternative explanation of the grant of *εὐεργεσία* found in antiquity does not deserve more credence than the scholiast's. Plutarch (Th. 24.1), most probably drawing on Theophrastos (POxyVII, nr. 1012, C11 23-33), says Themistokles had settled a dispute between Kerkyra and Korinth over Leukas in Kerkyra's favour. Usually without argument, this version is generally given preference¹⁰⁴. But the explanation is "very suspicious"¹⁰⁵, not least because "parallels may be detected with events later in the fifth century"¹⁰⁶.

For the moment, at least, Themistokles' further aim of discouraging active Athenian involvement in mainland Ionia seems to have

achieved success. Despite the tension he had created between Athens and Sparta it was accepted by all at Athens that it was necessary to contribute to the Hellenic campaign of 478 under Pausanias' command which intended to secure the Aegean for the Greek cause.

There can be no doubt that engaging in military activity on the mainland of Asia Minor was not an objective set for the Hellenic League's 478 campaign. The extensiveness of its achievements precludes the possibility that further tasks had been set but unfulfilled. The main objectives seem to have been essentially the same as in 479, the clearing of the Aegean from and including the Hellespont, but this year extending as far as Kypros also. More can hardly have been hoped for, but if there should happen to be time the objective next on the list was not attacks on Persian interests on the coast of mainland Asia Minor, but making a start on securing Thrace¹⁰⁷. There is no hint in the evidence that the Athenians or any other of the contingents serving in 478 were unhappy about the limitations of the programme. The shift of allegiance which was taking place throughout 478 towards the Athenians is reported in the sources as motivated primarily by discontent with Pausanias' behaviour and never with the programme of the League (Thuc. 95. 1-2, 4, 96.1, 130.2; H. 8.3; Plut. K. 6. 2-3; Ar. 23. 1 -3; Diod. 44. 5 -6, 46. 4 -5)¹⁰⁸. It is true that with the charter of the Athenian alliance a new direction was struck which aimed at involvement in Asia Minor. But this was some twelve months later, in special circumstances which will have radically altered the Athenian assessment of the situation, and so affords no presumption that the Athenians in spring 478 considered

active involvement in Asia Minor practicable¹⁰⁹. While we should assume, since we hear no more of the resettlement proposals, that the Athenian demos agreed with the personal recommendations of the generals who had been present at the Samos conference, and that they may have been formally rejected by delegates in 478, we do not hear of any alternative proposals. Apparently the Athenian demos, in the present crisis in Hellas, was prepared to postpone a decision on the question of the fate of mainland Ionia, at least until the situation nearer home stabilized, or, perhaps, until the threat to Ionia became more urgent.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE TRANSFER OF HEGEMONY

A detailed analysis of the evidence for Spartan attitudes in our period must remain outside the scope of this study¹. It is, though, not controversial to say that there existed at Sparta a shade of opinion which was less enthusiastic about active engagement in extra-Peloponnesian affairs, and it is not naive to see in this tendency a reflection of fear for the security of Sparta within the Peloponnese². Since Pausanias' campaign in Kypros and the Hellespont was an operation vital to Spartan security in that it secured the Aegean, it does not testify to a weakening of Spartan insularity so much as Leotychides' Thessalian expedition. The demonstrations of Themistokles' policy which we have analysed and which amounted to the offer of support to states threatened by Sparta and not accessible to Athenian control, will, to say the least, not have gone unnoticed and will have affected adversely the barometer of fear. Conversely, the tension created by Themistokles' actions was probably the primary reason for the dampening of Athenian interest in mainland Ionia which is discernible in 479 and 478.

But at Athens political competitors were beginning to look for opportunities to catch up with Themistokles. To judge by his later career and by Plutarch's comment (K. 16.1) that *ἦν μὲν . . . ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φιλολάκων*, Kimon, probably elected general for the year 479/8³, will not have found Themistokles' emergent post-war anti-Spartan policy attractive. We have noted that the tradition recording Aristides' opposition to Themistokles' stance over Pagasai may have a degree of truth in it. We shall see in this

chapter that by viewing the transfer of hegemony against this background we can avoid the violence done to our best sources for the nexus of events which has commonly accompanied modern accounts of the transfer.

Whether Aristides had developed his strategy for opposing Themistokles' new policy (which we shall elucidate in this chapter) by the time he went off with the fleet in spring 478, may be doubted. The course of events which enabled him to exploit the situation in the way he did occurred when they did largely as a result of Pausanias' behaviour, which could not be fully predicted. The exploitation of the situation must have been conceived during the season. This is confirmed by Thucydides (95.1). He says that those who were discontented *πολιτῶντές... πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους* making their proposals. We should accept the usual meaning of the word, translated best by Podlecki: they "kept going to the Athenians"⁴. Thucydides says (95.2) the Athenians acknowledged the suggestion and said they would consider it. There is no sign here of Aristides or any of his colleagues grasping the offer. It must have been after the first of these approaches that Aristides turned his mind to exploring the potential the situation offered⁵. Thucydides also informs us (95.3) that before the Spartans recalled Pausanias they had received reports about him. Now, some kind of public display of loyalty to the Athenians occurred at the time Pausanias was recalled (*ἀμα καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους... παρ' Ἀθηναίους μεκατὰξασθαι*: 95.4). It follows that the disaffected allies had not openly gone over to the Athenians before the recall. This public display of loyalty obviously represents the point at which the Athenians gave to the disaffected allies some more positive

response than their earlier promises to consider the matter. So in the period prior to this point the Athenians had been exploring ways of exploiting the proposals and the Spartans had received reports about Pausanias.

Who sent the reports? Thucydides (95.3) says the complaints were made ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἀφικνουμένων. Diodorus (44.6) tells of some Peloponnesians who deserted and levelled accusations against Pausanias at Sparta⁶. Plutarch (K. 6.3) says Kimon and Aristides τοῖς ἐφόροις πέμποντες ἔφραζον, ὡς ἀδοξούσης τῆς Σπάρτης καὶ ταραττομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀνακαλεῖν τὸν Πausανίαν. All three sources, of course, are compatible. The Plutarch passage represents a significant piece of information which not only fits in with other more reliable sources but indeed helps explain them. It is remarkable what little attention has been paid to this notice in connection with the transfer⁷. Plutarch's information is supported by the implications of Herodotos (8.3). He says the Athenians πρόφασιν τὴν Πausανίῳ ὕβριν προϊσχύμενοι ἀπεΐλοντο τὴν ἡγεμονίην τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. This suggests that the Athenians made some approach to the Lakedaimonians in connection with Pausanias' behaviour and used it as an excuse, as Herodotos saw it, to trick the Spartans out of the hegemony⁸.

No source says that an agreement was made between Athenian leaders with the fleet and influential men at Sparta in 478 over the question of naval hegemony. But let us examine whether an agreement is likely in the circumstances and whether it helps to explain subsequent events. Aristides had probably lost some credit

at Sparta because of his participation in the walls affair, though if he opposed Themistokles' stance over Pagasai he may have regained it. Nonetheless, a political friendship with Kimon will have proved useful in any attempt to come to an agreement with Sparta. It is surely now that he began to promote Kimon as

ἀντίπαλον πρὸς τὴν θεμιστοκλέους δεινότητα καὶ τόλμαν

(Pl. K. 5.4). The tradition also records that it was in 478⁹ that

the Spartans τὸν Κίμωνα προῆγον ταῖς τιμαῖς, ἀντίπαλον ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῷ θεμιστοκλεῖ καθιστάντες

(Pl. Th. 20.4)¹⁰. If not only Aristides and Kimon (and probably

others) but also the Spartans were anxious to put a stop to the continuing success of Themistokles' anti-Spartan policy there is an a priori case for their exchanging ideas on how to achieve their common aim. We have evidence that they exchanged ideas in 478. It is very easy to imagine that if they did exchange ideas they will have reasoned that if the Athenian fears which Themistokles had stimulated could be allayed it might be possible to induce the Athenians to take the leadership of an alliance of states which would proclaim and prosecute that war in Ionia which had been consistently rejected by Sparta and which the Peloponnesians, probably Themistokles and, we may suspect, Aristides and Kimon believed would last τὸν πάντα χρόνον (H. 9.106)¹¹.

Such a development would have obvious benefits for Sparta since, as Themistokles had recognized, it would inhibit Athens' freedom of action in expanding her influence to a point which would have to stop short of going to war with Sparta. It will have had the attraction to Aristides and Kimon of leaving Themistokles - unless he proved particularly subtle - on a political sandbank, stuck with

his anti-Spartan reputation in a political and military situation which could not afford conflict with Sparta or even the danger of it. Conversely, Aristides and Kimon will have appeared in the fortunate role of those maintaining the vital good relations with Sparta (cf. Pl. K. 16. 2 -3)¹². So there is every reason to describe the idea of an arrangement between some Athenian leaders of the fleet and some influential Spartans in 478 as not in the least improbable.

Let us examine whether our putative arrangement enables us to understand the events surrounding the transfer more easily. If the 'Greeks who came' to Sparta before Pausanias' recall mentioned by Thucydides included the messenger who carried the exchange of ideas between Aristides and Kimon and the Spartans recorded by Plutarch, then the striking fact that the disaffected allies went over to the Athenians precisely at the time when orders came from Sparta for Pausanias to return may offer some grounds for speculation on the course of the negotiations. If the response of the Spartans had been positive then the Athenians could feel free to give the disaffected allies a more positive response, conditional, of course, on ratification by the Athenian demos, but nonetheless probably a promise to recommend, and a significant step forward. Having received it the allies made some overt demonstration of loyalty to the Athenians¹³. There had presumably been detailed discussions before this point between the disaffected allies and Kimon and Aristides, in which the Athenians must have been able to elicit an assurance that they would be prepared to join in an anti-Persian war¹⁴.

Thucydides says that 'the Greeks' were alienated by Pausanias'

behaviour but that the most disaffected were οἱ Ἴωνες καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο (95.1). This reminds us of οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ζύμμαχοι, ἡδὴ ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως (89.2), though it helps little in establishing their more precise identity. It presumably includes some Hellespontine allies, members since 479, or only 478. It also included those islands which had been admitted at Samos. The prospect of the coast of Asia Minor and its hinterland being in friendly hands had obvious benefits especially for those living nearer the Asiatic coast. Subsequent events show that they were willing to join an aggressively anti-Persian war. If there were any forces from mainland Ionian cities unofficially accompanying the Hellenic fleet they will have been both few in number and the most enthusiastic for the war¹⁵.

It is impossible to know to what extent leaders of Peloponnesian allies were involved in any arrangement. No doubt they could be convinced of the wisdom of the plan. But at what stage they were drawn into discussions is not known. The evidence is not clear, but it seems likely that their contingents, at least, were withdrawn along with Pausanias, which might suggest they were aware of, and consented to the plan at its inception, or shortly afterwards¹⁶.

Aristeides will have had a good case to present to the Athenians. A large number of island states ready and enthusiastic to accept Athens as hegemon of an alliance and pay contributions to a war of revenge against the King's land, for which he had positive Spartan, and perhaps Peloponnesian, blessing¹⁷. We have good, if indirect evidence that during 478/7, after Pausanias'

recall, Aristides left Kimon and any other generals alone with the fleet in the Hellespont, and the conjecture that he had returned to Athens with his proposals seems inescapable.

The story recorded by Plutarch (K. 9) of Kimon's distribution of booty and prisoners captured from Sestos and Byzantion is of great value since it is taken from Ion's eye-witness account (fr. 13) of Kimon's narration of the story. Attempts to set Kimon's story in its context have not been lacking. Because it was believed that the story presupposed both Kimon's command and the capture of Sestos and Byzantion in one season scholars chose to make the very substantial addition to the historical record of a second capture of Sestos¹⁸. But there are very weighty objections to such an idea¹⁹. ATL proposed a slight modification; Sealey said that it "faces difficulties that are not insuperable but serious"²⁰. Woodhead made a careful review of the problem and concluded that the most likely reconstruction was that Kimon had been left by Xanthippos at Sestos guarding the prisoners who had just been captured, which he dates in spring 478. On the arrival of the Hellenic fleet at Sestos in mid-summer 478, with Aristides one of the Athenian generals, Kimon joined it and sailed on to Byzantion. After the recall of Pausanias but before mid-winter, Kimon made the distribution²¹. Sealey has a very similar solution, emphasizing that all that is needed to make sense of the available data is the hypothesis that the captives of Sestos were kept under guard for some months²².

The recent objections to the context offered by Woodhead and Sealey raised by Meiggs are not compelling. He says "it is most improbable that the Persian prisoners would have been left in

Sestos when the Athenian fleet sailed home"²³. We know that the Athenians were very impatient to get home (H. 9.117) and Xanthippos will certainly have been willing to postpone the main part of the distribution until next season in view of this. For his purposes he was able to make a spectacular enough return to Athens: ἀπέπλεον ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, τὰ τε ἄλλα χρήματα ἄγοντες καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν γεφυρέων (H. 9.121). Evidently Herodotos does not include the captives in this. His silence here is confirmed by the implications at 9.120. Having narrated how some Persians who had made their escape from Sestos just before its fall were captured (9. 118-19) he says they were bound up and brought back to the town to be guarded there. Artayktes was treated exceptionally and crucified (9.120). So the bulk of those who escaped were kept under guard, and in view of 9.121 we should assume that they remained under guard. In delaying the distribution of captives Xanthippos, on top of the negative reason, may have been hoping for word to spread among their relatives, and to cash in on the high ransoms which were in fact fetched. In order to encourage this development it was better if the captives were known to be at Sestos, not Athens. "Had the Persian prisoners from both towns been available when Byzantium was captured, would Pausanias have waited so long before dividing the spoils?"²⁴. It may have been in the awareness that at Sparta there was a tendency towards isolationism that Pausanias did his best to create a spectacular record of achievements during his season. He had no time to distribute booty. Lazenby's recent suggestion that Gongylos made off with some Persians while Pausanias was on a march in Thrace (i.e. late in the

season) is attractive²⁵ and it suggests that Pausanias had not yet got around to the job of distribution, for otherwise the captives would have been under Athenian supervision, not Gongylos', appointed by Pausanias (Thuc. 128.6). It is also possible that Pausanias was deliberately holding the men to be used as a bargaining point in any future negotiations with the King, if they really were so closely connected with him as was claimed after their escape (Thuc. 128.5)²⁶. "If the distribution was delayed beyond Pausanias' recall the responsibility should have passed to Aristides who commanded the Athenian contingent"²⁷ and Meiggs thinks "we should... need a better reason for Cimon rather than Aristides becoming responsible for the distribution" than Sealey's admittedly unconvincing one that Aristides was afraid of damaging his reputation²⁸. The point is valid not because Aristides was the commander of the Athenian contingent, though he was surely the most prestigious, but because he must have been considered equitable to be chosen to make the first quota assessment. This objection has been the most important stumbling block to acceptance of the 478/7 context for the distribution²⁹.

Our answer brings us back into the narrative of the transfer process. Straight after Pausanias' recall and the demonstration of loyalty to Athens by the disaffected allies, Aristides returned to Athens with the draft proposals. Leaving Kimon behind as perhaps the next most prestigious general, he perhaps emphasized that the 'new allies' should not be alienated. Kimon obeyed to the point of making a fool of himself (Pl. K. 9.3). As it turned out, though, he had the last laugh, and was able, four months after the distribution, to return home boasting of his booty (Ion fr. 13

ap. Pl. K. 9.4)³⁰.

Meanwhile at Athens Aristides apparently received a positive response. During the winter of 478/7 there will presumably have been further negotiations on points of detail. By the end of 478/7 the most important arrangements had been made, the first assessment submitted and accepted and the oath administered (AP 23.5). But before the Athenian alliance could come into existence, certain formalities had to be completed. At the beginning of the campaign season Sparta was still hegemon of the Hellenic League, many members of which were about to meet at Delos to formalize the arrangements agreed upon concerning the Athenian alliance. It is in this final stage of the transfer process that our suggestion of an understanding between Spartan leaders and the Athenians is most helpful in understanding the sources. I suggest that all the best sources can be understood by believing that at a meeting of the Hellenic League in early 477, perhaps at Delos, the Spartans sent Dorkis and some other men with a token force. There may have been some Peloponnesian representatives, but needn't have been. A programme was laid out for the continuation of the war, and discussed. The Athenian representatives at Sparta on the eve of the Peloponnesian war address the Spartans thus: ὁμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσαντων παραμείναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου.

In other words, they announced that they would be unwilling to lead this continuation of the war. The allies then approached the

Athenians and offered the hegemony to them: ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγέμονας καταστήναι (Thuc. 75.2). The Athenians

reacted positively to the offer: ἀρχήν... διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα

Their acceptance was partly because they, like the Spartan representatives considered themselves worthy: ἀξιολογούμενοι . . .

νομίζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες (76.2). In other words, the Spartans seconded, or joined in supporting the proposals for Athenian hegemony (cf. 75.4). The speech from which these passages are drawn looks back over the whole development of the Athenian alliance. But in applying the remarks to specific stages of the transfer process we are supported by other Thucydidean passages³¹. At 95.6 we are told that the allies did not award the Spartans the hegemony — not surprisingly since the Spartans ἀπαλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομίζοντες ἑκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε παρόντι ἐπιπλεδεῖους (95.7 cf. 75.2).

It is even possible, though not necessary, to believe that the Spartan delegation made an apologetic speech concerning their commanders which they advanced as their reason for withdrawing from the hegemony, and expressed friendship for the Athenians (95.7)³². At some point the Spartans must have announced their withdrawal from the war altogether. A vote was taken and the Athenians received (καταλαβόντες) the hegemony (96.1)³³. Having observed (αἰσθόμενοι) (95.7) this the Spartans left (cf. Thuc. 3. 10.2)³⁴.

Thucydides is explicit enough on the Spartan attitude to the transfer, and our suggestion of an arrangement between Aristides and Kimon (and perhaps others) and influential men at Sparta, designed probably primarily to thwart the so far successful execution of Themistokles' policy, is helpful in explaining their attitude³⁵.

That such a major decision could be taken at Sparta without any dissenting voices is impossible to believe. But Thucydides is not compatible with the idea that there was substantial opposition which was overcome by a narrow margin. Some scholars have tried to use this approach in suggesting that although Thucydides says the Spartans were pleased with the transfer, they were, in reality, deeply divided, or that they put on a good face to a fait accompli³⁶. Such a compromise will not do, especially when we recall Thucydides' remarks over Spartan reaction to the walls incident. To record that behind a facade of friendliness the Spartans ἀδύλως ἤχθοντο⁽⁹²⁾ did not take up much space, and to have done the same over the transfer would not have taken just as much space as the prelude to the Peloponnesian war as von Fritz exaggeratedly claims³⁷, and suggests the opposition in 478/7 was quite inconsequential³⁸. Our solution also provides the necessary explanation of the Spartans' dispatch of Dorkis, which has been wrongly taken as reason to believe that the Spartans did indeed wish to assume the hegemony again³⁹. It also accounts for the fact that Dorkis and his colleagues had only a brief στρατιάν... οὐ πολλήν which is inexplicable if they were sent to resume active Spartan hegemony⁴⁰. Let us examine the other sources. Perhaps the most important after Thucydides is Xenophon's account of the Spartan speech at Athens in 370. Xenophon is, of course, a reliable witness for what the messengers said. All the MSS except one have the Lakedaimonians claim that they had taken an active and positive part (συμβουλευομένων) in the discussions on the choice of Athens as hegemon and τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες (Hell. 6.5.34). This official Spartan account of the transfer confirms

that written by Thucydides (76.2) of active Spartan support for the allies' proposals⁴¹. It adds the information that as part of the proposals which the Spartans supported was the provision of Hellenotamiai, or τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες. Thucydides (96.2) only says that after the vote the Athenians in fact went ahead and created the office⁴². Xenophon's evidence represents substantial support for the historicity of Thucydides' account⁴³.

Herodotos' evidence is more cryptic. He says the Athenians πρόφασιν τὴν Πανσανίῳ ὕβριν προϊσχύμενοι ἀπείλοντο τὴν ἡγεμονίην τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (8.3). If Pausanias' hybris was only an excuse, we should like to know what Herodotos thought was really behind the transfer⁴⁴. As, however, the excuse seems to be offered to the Spartans, we would be unwise to try to argue that Herodotos had in mind as the real reason for the transfer the arrangement arrived at between Kimon and Aristides and influential Spartans which we have postulated. Taken in context we should assume Herodotos thought the real reason for the Athenians taking the hegemony was the honour, and, perhaps, with a view to later events, advantage, accruing from it. Since the Athenians, in his view, were able to offer an excuse for their action, the implication is that the excuse was accepted, for, as we know, the Athenians were able to take the hegemony. It follows that the negative implications of ἀπείλοντο need not reflect what Herodotos considered to be the Spartan view of the transfer in 478/7. It is Herodotos who, in retrospect, interprets the Athenian assumption of hegemony as a 'theft', and he no doubt reflects a deliberate and light-hearted popular Athenian attempt to misrepresent the transfer as a clever Athenian ruse. Herodotos, then,

does not provide evidence that the Spartans were reluctant to see the Athenians assume hegemony⁴⁵.

Plutarch (especially Ar. 23.6) fully supports Thucydides⁴⁶.

AP 23.2 has proved controversial. Gomme understood the last three words of τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἡγεμονίαν λαβεῖν ἀκόντων τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων to mean "Sparta being unwilling to keep the leadership" and he has not been without support⁴⁷. Others find this difficult to accept because "the genitive absolute depends on λαβεῖν"⁴⁸ and since "it was a matter of retaining, not taking the hegemony" they feel it cannot be correct⁴⁹. But these objections lose their force if AP's comment is applied to our interpretation of Thucydides. In an announcement by the Spartan delegates after the general objectives for 477 and future years were set out, and before a vote on hegemony was taken, the allies were advised that "the Spartans" would be "unwilling to receive the hegemony" were it to be offered them (cf. Thuc. 75.2)⁵⁰. Since the Spartans were unwilling to take this new award of hegemony, the Athenians did.

Diodoros' account of the transfer itself is not clear as to the attitude of ^{the} Spartans. He merely says (46.4 -5) that because of Pausanias' behaviour the allies went over to the Athenians, and οὐκέτι προσεῖχον to the men sent from Sparta. But that he means this in a defiant way becomes clear later (50.1) when the Greeks are described as 'having revolted' from Sparta (ἀφ' ἐσθηκόσιν). Furthermore, he certainly knew nothing about any agreement between Athens and Sparta, since he says (50.8) Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσ-εδόκων μέγαν πόλεμον ἔξειν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους περὶ τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἡγεμονίας. We noted earlier that there must have been some discussion at Sparta over resigning the hegemony. Some scholars have

maintained that Diodoros' evidence of Spartan reactions to the transfer is not at odds with Thucydides'. The validity of this claim is not immediately obvious, but it is made superficially plausible by the redating of the 'Hetoimaridas debate' (50. 2-8) from Diodoros' 475/4 date back to 478/7. The same reasons which show such a redating to be impossible also demonstrate that Diodoros' account of the transfer is in direct contradiction to Thucydides'.

It is held that Thucydides reports the final result of the decision-making process described by Diodoros⁵¹. Now Thucydides (95.7) certainly creates the indubitable impression that he is describing Spartan reactions in 478/7, and not in the years following. Diodoros, by contrast, as we have seen, envisaged the action of the allies as a revolt (50.1) and the implication -- that the Spartans resented the action at the time -- is confirmed unequivocally by his comments on the Athenian fear of war with Sparta at the time of the transfer (50.8). Clearly, unless Thucydides' and Diodoros' interpretations are to clash head-on, the mood of the Spartans as described by Diodoros must cover a very short period, and their change of heart, occasioned by the persuasive Hetoimaridas, must come before that point in time to which Thucydides' refers when he describes their attitude as one of wanting to be rid of the Persian war and the Spartans as considering the Athenians to be ἐκτελέσιους (95.7)⁵². Since such a putative period of shifting opinion at Sparta is unrecorded by Thucydides (cf. 69.1, 75.4, 76.2) it could have been of months, at most, certainly not of years. But a closer look at Diodoros' account makes it quite clear that he thought of the period between the transfer and the conclusion of the Hetoimaridas debate as covering a period of at least many months, and probably a

few years.

The use of the imperfect in ἡπείλουν (50.1) could suggest that the action refers to more than the one communication required by those who would deny a contradiction with Thucydides. Secondly, the motion of the Hetoimaridas debate does not seem to fit the 478/7 context required for it if the length of the period of animosity prior to it is not to conflict with Thucydides. The hegemony which the Athenians acquired in 478/7 was of a group of states which intended to prosecute an aggressive war πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (Thuc. 96.1). In Diodoros there is no mention, or, it would appear, thought of the Barbarian; the important point is only to regain the hegemony of the naval states, which, in 478/7 would have meant in a war against the Barbarian. We shall argue later that Diodoros' debate as it stands does make sense in the context of the mid-470s when Athens was hegemon of the Aegean and showing little energy in attacking King's land. Thirdly, in speaking about Athenian fears about the consequences for Atheno-Spartan relations of the transfer, the very fact that Diodoros (50.8) says πρῶτον suggests he is looking back over a period of more than a couple of months. Furthermore, in the period between the transfer (πρῶτον) and the Hetoimaridas debate the Athenians have time to re-equip their fleet (τριήρεις κατασκεύαζον πλείους) and to accumulate a large sum of money (χρημάτων πλήθος ἐκορίζοντα). The use of the imperfect would render tendentious an attempt to see in those actions the single phoros collection and the single year's building programme for 477 (cf. Diod. 43.3). There was even time for a discernible pattern of behaviour by Athens towards her allies to emerge (τοὺς συμμάχους ἐκλεικῶς

προσεφέροντο). And finally, Diodoros does, after all, date the Hetoimoridas debate to 475/4. So it is evident that Diodoros, who probably accurately reflects Ephoros in this, has left sufficient internal evidence to confirm as deliberate his date of 475/4 for the Hetoimaridas debate. The conclusion of this debate, then, cannot be related to the evidence of Thucydides for the Spartan support of Athenian assumption of hegemony, which is too firmly rooted in 478/7. Further, Diodoros' evidence is clear in portraying Spartan animosity towards Athens and her new allies at the time of the transfer and at the time of the beginning of the Hetoimaridas debate, and there is some indication that he believed the animosity was uninterrupted in the intervening period. Diodoros thus stands in irreconcilable conflict with Thucydides over the Spartan attitude to the transfer.

Recent scholarship has demonstrated that Diodoros' Hetoimaridas debate contains elements which provide sufficient grounds for accepting at least something like it as historical⁵³. There are, however, no similar grounds for retrojecting the animosity expressed in the first part of the debate back to 478/7, as we saw Diodoros' account does. Those scholars who, accepting the implications of the debate, redate it to 478/7 are falling into the same 'rational' trap as Ephoros probably did when he retrojected its animosity to 478/7⁵⁴. To judge from Diodoros' language, Ephoros had not disguised the fact that his source for the debate placed it some years after the transfer. But especially in view of the evidence it provided for Spartan resentment (probably) in mid-decade, he, like one recent scholar, felt that "the anodyne mildness of Thucydides' Spartans at 1.95.7. can hardly be the whole story"⁵⁵, and proceeded to retroject the animosity to 478/7. If we are prepared to accept this

suggestion it makes Diodoros' misrepresentation of the situation in 478/7 easier to understand. If it is not accepted it does not alter the fact that Diodoros must be rejected if he conflicts with Thucydides.

Let us examine the possible reception of the proposals in Athens, and the general situation arising. There is virtually no evidence and we must rely on inference. The Ion fragment is indirect evidence of Aristides' presence in Athens in 478/7 attempting almost certainly to secure Athenian support for the new alliance. We cannot, however, trace other stages in the process which led to the final ratification by the demos⁵⁶. But some general observations may be appropriate at this stage.

In response to Themistokles' alarmist behaviour in 479-8 the Spartans had proved themselves acquiescent - over the walls and the Amphiktyonic stand, and perhaps over Thessaly, Kerkyra and possibly other similar issues. This very acquiescence, while it will in part have been attributed to Themistokles' skilful and resolute stance, robbed Themistokles of the most effective tool he had in putting his policy into effect, namely, fear of Sparta⁵⁷.

It was probably between about six and nine months after the Amphiktyonic affair that Aristides returned home with his proposals which would give Athens hegemony of a not inconsiderable section of the Greek world, and, as was so often marvelled at in later literature, and no doubt appreciated at the time, without having to fight for her position (cf. e.g. Xen. Poroi 5.5-6; Isok. Pan. 4.72). Indeed,

Sparta was to confirm her recent deferential pose towards Athens by actively supporting her attempt to create for herself a hegemonial position in the Aegean. She had done everything in her power to allay Athenian fears. It is not necessary to argue the fact that Kimon supported the formation of the new alliance. It was most probably now that Sparta awarded him proxenos status - an overt and reassuring gesture of approval for the new Athenian policy⁵⁸.

We noted above that Athenian feeling towards their Ionian *συγγενείς* was intense and that after Salamis and Artemision certainly, and probably Mykale, too, their feelings will have been ambivalent. We showed that in all probability few, if any of the Asiatic Ionian states had transformed their mutinous action at Mykale into a full-scale revolt from the Persian empire. The stated objectives of the Athenian alliance reflect Athenian feeling not only towards the Barbarian, but also towards the Ionian and other Greek Asiatic states (Thuc. 96.1)⁵⁹. Those states which did not revolt from the King would be part of the "King's land" and would, accordingly, be ravaged⁶⁰. The implication that those who did revolt and join the alliance would be protected by it is sufficiently obvious to require no specific mention by Thucydides⁶¹. The professed intention of the alliance was as much a threat as a promise to the Greeks of Asia⁶². As such, it had a greater chance of being acceptable to the Athenians. Aristides, it should be recalled, probably made his first appeal to the Athenians little more than a year after they had returned to devastated Attika. The destruction which surrounded them will have been a not inconsiderable factor in persuading them to take on this war of attrition⁶³.

We said that the complete silence of the sources about any overt

opposition to pursuing the war against the King's land by Themistokles is probably sufficient to assure us that he in fact never did express opposition. He was too astute to commit himself on such an emotive issue⁶⁴. We may guess that if he had been called upon to express his opinion publicly he would have said that of course the aims of the alliance were highly commendable but that the Athenians must be ever vigilant against a Spartan 'stab in the back'⁶⁵.

There is one notice which describes Themistokles' reactions to Aristides' assessment of the tribute. Plutarch (Ar. 14.4) said that Themistokles ridiculed the praise he won for his assessment as fit not for a man but for a purse. The implication is that Themistokles would have extorted a more profitable contribution, perhaps as he had tried to do in 480. The anecdote may reflect a well-founded belief in the more imperialistic aims of Themistokles as opposed to the attempts of Aristides and Kimon to enjoy a more civilized relationship with the allies (cf. e.g. Pl. K. 11.2⁶⁶). But the story fits much too neatly into the conventional pattern of Themistokles-Aristides anecdotes for it to inspire confidence.

That Athens was now committed to continuing the war in the east was a blow to Themistokles' plans to establish Athenian influence not only in the Aegean but also in mainland Hellas and eventually to offer a challenge to Sparta's traditional position as first city of Hellas. But it was not a public defeat because he had at no stage openly opposed the continuation of the war in the east⁶⁷. The Athenians had supported Themistokles in his attempts to check Spartan expansion of influence outside the Peloponnese. Tension was now relaxed because of Sparta's behaviour between 479 and 477. But there was no reason why Themistokles should not continue to enjoy support if Spartan

ambitions were again to appear to exceed what most Athenians could be persuaded was unacceptable. Whether they could back up their opposition with force would depend upon the extent of their military involvement in Asia.

CHAPTER EIGHT · CHRONOLOGY 478/7 - 465/4

I do not propose to discuss the problems connected with the constitution of the Athenian alliance. For our purposes it is important only to note the non-controversial fact that Athens was able to guide the direction of the alliance's activities, however she may have managed to do so¹. Nor shall I go into the two related problems presented by the first assessment figure of 460T. (Thuc. 96.2) and the precise extent of the alliance in its first years. None of these issues is sufficiently relevant to our theme to warrant detailed treatment, though we shall have occasion to touch upon the last two in the course of our analysis of the 470s and 60s.

It will be appropriate in this chapter, primarily concerned with establishing a plausible chronological structure for the period 478/7 - 465/4, to argue the point that there are insufficient grounds for assuming that the Athenian alliance undertook campaigns in Asia before the campaign which culminated at Eurymedon.

After the foundation of the Athenian alliance in 478/7 (AP 23.5) we have the evidence of the scholion to Aischines 2.34 (Dindorf 48) that in the archonship of Phaïdon three Athenian generals, Lysistratos, Lykourgos and Kratinos, were killed at the hands of the Thracians after the capture of Eion. The scholiast could, however, be dating the capture to Phaïdon. Despite attempts to associate Phaïdon with the archon of 469/8 there remains very little doubt that Phaïdon was, in fact, archon in 476/5². The possibility that 'Phaïdon' could refer

to the archon of 469/8 exists because Diodoros (48.1, 63.1) has named the archon for 469/8, as well as for 476/5, Phaidon (some MSS give 'Phaion'). The other sources, despite some variants, all draw on a tradition which named the 469/8 archon Apsephion. These facts alone make it permissible, without treating the principles of source criticism unduly brutally, to reject Diodoros as mistaken as to the name of the 469/8 archon. That said, however, we must examine the positive reasons which scholars have advanced for believing that the scholiast's date for the death of the generals should be 469/8 and not 476/5.

Several nineteenth century scholars felt certain that the Dionysia judgement, recorded and dated to the archonship of Aphepsion by Plutarch (K. 8.7 -8: correctly, Apsephion) should be causally and temporally linked with the immediately preceding events in Plutarch's narrative, namely, Kimon's capture of Skyros and the return of 'Theseus' bones (8.3 -6)³. Most of these scholars went on from this to conclude that the oracle bidding the Athenians bring back the bones of Theseus had been mistakenly dated by Plutarch (Thes. 36.1) to the archonship of Phaidon, in place of the 'correct' archonship of Apsephion⁴. Since most of these scholars felt there should not be a gap of some seven years between Thucydides 98.1 (capture of Eion) and 98.2 (capture of Skyros) they were consistent and condemned the scholiast's 'Phaidon' for the Eion episode as mistaken, replacing it with 'Apsephion'⁵. The consensus of all this, was, in short, a chronology which placed the capture of Eion around 470-69, the oracle, fall of Skyros and Dionysia judgement in 469/8.

Wilamowitz' fully justified observation that the only connection in Plutarch between the return of 'Theseus' bones and the Dionysia

judgement was that both events were remembered by the Athenians, and that there was neither a causal nor temporal connection between the two was widely accepted, and laid to rest the chronology which had been based on that erroneous belief⁶. In fact, the date of the judgement had better be left out of the attempt to secure the chronology of our period altogether⁷. We shall discuss the validity of some of the assumptions made by those early scholars when we discuss the date of Skyros. For the moment, though, it is sufficient to conclude that Wilamowitz' observation removes the original problem which had led to Eion being dated around 470-69.

In 1967 Smart took up the problem again, and via a more refined route came to the same conclusions as the earlier scholars⁸. His approach differed in that he postulated two divergent archon lists, one giving the archon of 469/8 as Apsephion, the other as Phai(d)on. The main reason, though, for making this assumption is to explain Diodoros' demonstrable error over the dates of Leotychides' reign⁹. This is almost certainly too deferential to Diodoros, not a careful historian¹⁰. The existence of an alternative archon list is attested nowhere else¹¹.

Smart tries to draw support for his belief that the scholiast used an archon list giving Phai(d)on for 469/8 from the following arguments. Noting that the scholiast mentions leaders other than Kimon for the first ἀτύχημα, Smart maintains that he cannot be referring to the first expedition against Eion since this was led by Kimon (Thuc. 98.1; H. 7.107). He concludes that ἐπ' ἀληθοῦτες Ἐϊόνα must refer to a second capture of Eion, after the locals had rallied, by a colonizing expedition. Kimon's capture would then be in the preceding year. We shall see later that this interpretation

of the evidence is unnecessarily cumbersome, but the result that Kimon captured Eion in the archon year prior to that of Phaidon may nonetheless be correct¹². Smart goes on to try to determine the date of Kimon's expedition to Eion using the familiar method of ascertaining which of a series of events listed by Diodoros under one archon year is likely to be the one correctly dated. Under 470/69 Diodoros has listed Kimon's capture of Eion and Skyros, as well as the Eurymedon victory (60 -61). Smart chooses Eion by a process of elimination¹³.

A closer look at Diodoros' account makes this result most improbable. *ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀθηναῖοι στρατηγὸν ἐλόμενοι Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου καὶ δύναμιν ἀξιώλογον παραδόντες, ἐξέπεμψαν ἐπὶ τὴν παράλιον τῆς Ἀσίας βοηθήσοντα μὲν ταῖς συμμαχούσαις πόλεσιν, ἐλευθερώσοντα δὲ τὰς Περσικαῖς ἔτι φρουραῖς κατεχομένας (60.1).*

Diodoros has expressly dated the election of Kimon as general as well as the task set him by the Athenians, namely to conduct operations on the coast of Asia. Implicit in this is that Kimon was sent from Athens. There then follows (60.2) the brief account of Kimon's sailing from Byzantion (cf. POxy XIII, 1610, fr. 6) and his capture of Eion and Skyros. Neither, it will be noted, is on the coast of Asia. We next find Kimon at Piraeus, making preparations for *μειζόνων πράξεων* (60.3). These preparations complete, he sails off from Piraeus and collects ships from *τῶν Ἰώνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων* (60.3). Clearly, it is this expedition from Piraeus to Ionia and then on to Karia (60.4) which the Athenians instructed Kimon to undertake (60.1). These instructions can not be connected with Kimon's sailing from Byzantion to Eion and then to Skyros; these two expeditions have been slipped in by Diodoros between the dated election to the strategia and accompanying instructions and the

preparations made by Kimon to enable him to execute the instructions¹⁴. Diodoros' notice, far from providing evidence for dating Kimon's Eion expedition to 470/69, in fact establishes nothing more than a terminus ante quem for it. As such it does not support the contention that the scholiast's archon year 'Phaidon', the year of the campaign of Lysistratos etc. and perhaps the year after Kimon's, must be after 470/69.

So far we have only undermined Smart's supporting arguments¹⁵. It remains impossible to disprove the existence of two divergent archon lists. The only way to prove that the scholiast was thinking of the archon of 476/5 when he wrote 'Phaidon' would be to cite a passage where he had referred to the archonship of 'Apsephion', and this he has not done. But Smart's only valid positive argument is that his theory helps to explain an error of Diodoros¹⁶. It needn't be argued that for Diodoros to have blundered here as elsewhere is not in fact improbable. And if two lists did exist, and Diodoros drew on the one giving Phai(d)on as archon for 469/8, that list did not record the post-Kimonian expedition of Lysistratos etc. under that year, because Diodoros has recorded under 470/69 events which he clearly took to be subsequent to Kimon's Eion campaign. This deduction makes it necessary to assume that if the scholiast, as Smart suggests, was really referring to the archon of 469/8 when he named Phaidon, then he must have been drawing on a completely different chronographic source to Diodoros, one which supplied different information for the different archon years. This fact reduces the desirability of seeing the scholiast's 'Phaidon' as referring to the same archon as Diodoros has for the year 469/8.

Finally, an old point which has been (I think) ignored this century

at least deserves mention. Blass noted that the obscure line of Aischylos' Persai 868 (delivered in 473/2 (Hypothesis)) referring to Ἀχελῷος presupposes among his audience a fairly intimate knowledge of this area of Thrace which could hardly be the result of hearsay or learning, and is best accounted for by a prior campaign at Eion¹⁷. This is obviously not conclusive but it adds more weight in the scales of probability against Smart's 470/69 date for Kimon's capture of Eion. We might add, too, that the whole section 864-908 of the Persai suggests that the areas listed were no longer under predominantly Persian control. Were the important city of Eion still not "liberated", section 865-70 would have had an inappropriately ironical ring. On balance, then, we should not believe that the scholion to Aischines 2.34 (Dindorf 48) was referring to the archon of 469/8 but to that of 476/5¹⁸.

We said Smart's reconstruction of the events connected with the capture of Eion was unnecessarily cumbersome. The scholiast's note is ambiguous, since it could be understood as dating the capture of Eion or the sticky end which befell the three generals after the capture, or both. In fact, though, the ambiguity presents no serious problems: we have unquestionably a terminus ante quem for the capture of Eion. The detailed chronology of events from Pausanias' first recall until the deaths of the three generals near Eion in 476/5 will not affect our interpretation of events, and so we shall deal with it briefly¹⁹. Since Pausanias was most probably recalled in late 478, and the foundation of the Athenian alliance was completed by the end of 478/7, we may presume that the Athenians and their allies²⁰ proceeded to Eion before the end of the 477 season, for the negotiations leading to the escorting of Pausanias from Byzantion can

have taken no more than weeks. It can be inferred from the first of the Hermai quoted by Plutarch (K. 7.4: κρουερόν τ' ἐπάγοντες Ἄρηα) that the Athenians spent a winter campaigning²¹. At any rate the Hermai certainly imply a long and difficult siege, and this is confirmed by other sources. Herodotos (7.107) says that Kimon offered Boges safe passage back to Persia, which suggests the Athenians did not rate their chances of a quick siege highly. The offer being refused the Persians had to be starved out (cf. Pl. K. 7. 2-4) which must have taken a long time, especially since provisions were for a while getting past the blockade (Pl. K. 7.2)²². The financial assistance afforded by Menon of Pharsalos (Demosth. 23.199) is evidence that the allies had run out of money, which further suggests that the campaign proved longer than anticipated.

The evidence is not offended, then, if we suggest that the Athenians and their allies arrived at Eion in 477, defeated the Persians in battle (Pl. K.7.2)²³, began the siege of the town and expelled the Thracians who had been supplying the Persians. Soon after the capture of the city an expedition was sent inland. We know only that three Athenian generals were killed²⁴. For all we know Kimon may have been with the expedition, and have escaped death²⁵. That the purpose of the expedition inland was to establish a settlement is not attested by the scholiast. If we accept Plutarch (K. 7.3) that as a result of the capture of Eion the Athenians were able to settle the surrounding country we should conclude that despite the deaths of the three generals domination of the country around Eion was achieved²⁶. Eion was captured before their deaths, the latter being either in or after 476/5. If they died after 476/5 then Eion fell in that year. It is not impossible that the city was captured

in 476/5, but I prefer some time in 476.

Thucydides (98.3) says *πρῶτον μὲν Ἡλίονα... εἶλον... ἔπειτα Σκύρον... ἡνδρακίδισαν*. Those nineteenth century scholars we listed above who were prepared to alter the 476/5 date given by the scholiast for the capture of Eion to 469/8 in line with what they mistakenly believed was a reliable date for the capture of Skyros did so in the belief that Thucydides' words could hardly separate a gap of six or seven years²⁷. Some would say Thucydides suggests a very close temporal connection²⁸. But whether Thucydides' connectives can be pressed to yield chronological distinctions of a year or so, may well be doubted²⁹. The POxy fragment relating to these events (XIII, 1610, fr. 6), however, clearly suggests that there was no delay between the capture of Eion and that of Skyros³⁰. But the nature of the fragments perhaps makes it risky to base chronological deductions on these lines³¹. But these rather insecure implications are proved to be, in fact, trustworthy by our best evidence for the date of the capture of Skyros.

Plutarch (Thes. 36.1) dates the oracle commanding the Athenians to bring back Theseus' bones to the archonship of Phaidon, 476/5. Plutarch's account of the proceedings leading up to the action against Skyros seems to fall into two parts. At 'Kimon' 8. 3-4 we have an account of the action taken by Thessalian merchants against Skyrian pirates at the Amphiktyonic council. Winning their suit against the whole island, they fail, however, to get satisfaction because the Skyrian authorities refuse to shoulder responsibility for the crimes of individual pirates. So far this sounds (to me, at least) credible enough, but then we have the suspicious sounding letters sent by the pirates to Kimon inviting him to bring his fleet and take the island³².

Indeed this epistolographic element, in providing us with an immediate occasion for, and explanation of Athenian intervention, may have disrupted what would otherwise have been an internally logical account of the lead-up to the Athenian action. As it is now it leaves the second part of Plutarch's account (K. 8.5-6) concerning the oracle and 'Theseus' bones at something of a loose end, and not, apparently, immediately connected with any Athenian excuse to intervene at Skyros. Yet to judge by his reference to these events at 'Theseus' 36.1 Plutarch's source (cf. Paus. 3. 3.7 - see below) almost certainly did relate the oracle and bones incident to the immediate 'reason' for intervention. The epistolographic element looks to me like an extraneous strand which Plutarch has allowed to wander into an otherwise convincing tradition.

In Plutarch's second part (K. 8. 5-6) we are told that the Athenians had the oracle concerning Theseus' bones but that the Skyrians would not allow them to make a search of their island. In other words, Delphi had given the Athenians an excuse to enter the island. The Skyrians were, not unwisely, somewhat suspicious and refused admittance to the Athenians. It is, then, tempting to connect the Amphiktyonic dispute with the Delphic oracle and to see in the latter a legitimization of the use of Athenian force of arms to punish a recalcitrant member of the Amphiktyonic League. If the island community put up no resistance when the fleet of the Athenian alliance³³ filled its harbour, the story of the pirates' treason might easily have arisen³⁴.

If such a connection is accepted then it follows that the oracle must indeed have been executed at no great distance in time from when it was issued. There is an a priori case for assuming a close temporal

connection between the oracle and its execution, anyway, but without our proposed connection it can be maintained that the oracle was acted upon only several years after its issue³⁵.

Our interpretation of Plutarch is supported by Pausanias (3. 3.7). He says that the oracle told the Athenians that if they did not find the bones they would be unable to take the island. This need not mean that the Greeks had already begun actual military operations against the island when they consulted the god. Indeed, this is made most unlikely by the rest of Pausanias' account, for he goes on to say that after Kimon discovered the bones he cleverly took the island. From this we should assume that after the pressure of the Athenian alliance's fleet was brought to bear on the suspicious islanders, the Athenians were allowed onto the island and a search for the bones was begun. In connection with their presence it was made possible to take the island from within. I think we should follow the more simple command of the oracle as given by Plutarch, that the Athenians should see to the return of Theseus' bones, in preference to the more explicit assistance to Athens' imperialistic designs represented by the oracle as found in Pausanias. But in so far as Pausanias' source has made the assumption that the oracle was given in intimate connection with Athens' designs for the capture of Skyros, it is probably correct³⁶. Everything, then, points to dating the action against Skyros in 476/5. It was probably completed swiftly. It could be as early as 476/5 but hardly later than 475/4.

The next event recorded by Thucydides (98.3) is the war which broke out against the Karystians. There is nothing other than Thucydides to determine the date. If anything may be deduced from the narrative it is that the war followed closely upon the capture of Skyros³⁷. I

have avoided bringing interpretative arguments to bear in trying to establish the chronology, but in the absence of anything else, we may be permitted to note that the domination of Karystos can be understood as fitting, with Eion and Skyros, into a pattern of operations designed to secure Athenian control of the routes between Piraeus and the northern Aegean³⁸. As such it would seem logical to keep the war against Karystos in close temporal connection with the preceding domination of Skyros, which was not after 475. The Karystos war, then, will have begun in 475-4. We do not know how long the war continued³⁹.

We shall discuss the chronology of events between Karystos and Drabeskos now in the course of tackling the question of the completeness of Thucydides' account of military events between Eion and Drabeskos. The widely held belief that Thucydides' account of Athenian military activity between Eion and, for our purposes, let us say, Drabeskos, is very selective has been refined by ATL by their suggestion that the military actions listed in chapter 98 represent only examples of types of campaigns⁴⁰. Evidence of military actions not specifically recorded by Thucydides in the period Eion to Drabeskos forces us to accept the possibility that this suggestion is correct; I do not believe it is correct. My opinion is based on two different approaches. The first will try to show that the operations not specifically recorded by Thucydides may be merely parts of a campaign indeed referred to by him, so making it less acceptable to add considerably to his narrative by inventing unattested campaigns. The second approach will seek to show that there are, in fact, not insubstantial reasons which militate against adding to Thucydides in this way, over and above the general

methodological principle which requires us to seek to interpret our evidence as it stands.

Since Diodoros' date for the election of Kimon to the strategia and the allocation of certain tasks connected with prosecuting the war in Ionia does not conflict with any other evidence, but rather, fits well, we should accept it as correct (60.1: 470/69). We decided that the date of Skyros was 475/4; after Skyros, according to Diodoros (60.3) Kimon returned to Piraeus and before setting out for Ionia, Karia and Lykia undertook an extensive preparatory programme. So Diodoros' source recognized as two distinct campaigns the Eion-Skyros campaigns and the eastern campaign⁴¹.

Kimon is said to have arranged for the redesigning of the triremes built at Themistokles' suggestion to enable the alliance's fleet to carry more hoplites. This redesigning is connected specifically with preparations made for the campaign which culminated at the Eurymedon (Pl. K. 12.2). This notice is surely to be connected with Diodoros' (60.3) in which he says that Kimon added new triremes and *τὴν ἄλλην ἡγεσίαν ἀξιόλογον παρασκευασάμενος* before setting out for Ionia, Karia and Lykia and the Eurymedon. Chronologically, Diodoros' evidence of preparations beginning in 470/69 for an eastern campaign which culminated at Eurymedon is confirmed by the date of the Eurymedon battle, which was in 465⁴². Let us examine these preparations more closely and compare other sources.

Diodoros seems to reflect a two-stage programme which may have been more clearly defined in Ephoros. The initial activity of preparing the Athenian fleet for large-scale undertakings on the

other side of the Aegean was followed by mustering ships (*ὕστερον δὲ μεταπεμφόμενος παρὰ τῶν ἰώνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δαπάνων*).

Now, Plutarch (K. 11) gives an important account of the process by which many of Athens' allies were assessed in terms of cash in place of ships. He says that while financial contributions were paid some allies refused military contributions *ἀπαγορεύοντες ἤδη πρὸς τὰς στρατείας, καὶ πολέμου μὲν οὐδὲν δεόμενοι*, preferring to sow their land and relax (Pl. K. 11.1). Kimon accepted their contributions in cash and had Athenian crews serve in rotation. Plutarch does not mention any actual fighting on the part of the Athenians, but seems to think they were training (*ἀσχοῦντας* — K. 11.3). While scholars have recognized that the antithesis between the good Kimon and nasty 'other generals' should not be taken too seriously⁴³, they nonetheless accept the notice's factual statements, and have proposed different contexts. The issues involved in determining the context are wide-ranging and I do not propose to go into them⁴⁴. But it must be admitted that the most obvious context for at least the beginning of the conversions process should be where Plutarch puts it — immediately before the campaign which culminated in the Eurymedon battle (Pl. K. 12.2 — 13.7). It has been recognized that Plutarch's account is based on Thucydides' chapter 99, though probably supplemented by at least one other source⁴⁵. Thucydides' comments are made in the context of the Naxos revolt, immediately before the notice of the Eurymedon victory. It is clear that his remarks on the causes of revolt are not intended to be applied only to the case of Naxos⁴⁶. But the fact that he locates them here shows that the factors he mentions as leading to revolt must, by the time of the Naxos revolt, have been already in

play⁴⁷. Thucydides supports Plutarch, then, in placing a rigorous training campaign, resulting in certain states choosing to be assessed in cash to avoid being away from home, in the period leading up to the Eurymedon victory.

By combining our three sources a consistent and plausible picture emerges of the preparations made by Kimon for his eastern campaign, commissioned by the Athenians in 470/69, according to Diodoros (60.1). A bout of shipbuilding activity at Piraeus (Diod. 60.3) was supplemented by the modification of existing triremes to suit the new style of fighting which would be required if the Asian seaboard were to be kept out of enemy hands (Pl. K. 12.2). In this context it is easy to believe Plutarch's statement that Kimon accepted contributions from the allies not only of cash but also of empty ships (Pl. K. 11.2)⁴⁸. Especially in view of the new style of naval warfare which would be entailed by carrying large numbers of hoplites, an intensive training programme was needed (Pl. K. 11.3). It was in this context that some states chose to convert to cash contributions (Pl. K. 11.1 -3; Thuc. 99.1 -3). As part of the training and the mustering of the fleet Kimon went to Ionia (Diod. 60.3). Plutarch follows his account of the conversions with a narrative of the campaign which led to the Eurymedon battle, but he is very vague about what happened where on the Asian coast: τὰ μὲν ἐπόρθει καὶ κατεστρέφετο, τὰ δὲ ἀφίστη καὶ προσήγετο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὥστε τὴν ἅπ' Ἰωνίας Ἀσίαν ἄχρι Παμφυλίας παντάπασιν Περσικῶν ὅπλων ἐρημῶσαι (K. 12.1). We can imagine the allied fleet demanding contributions from those already in the alliance as well as from those who had not yet joined. It is not necessary to assume that cities in mainland Ionia offered any serious resistance to the 'invitation' to

join the alliance and contribute to the protection against Persia. Ejection of any remaining Persian garrisons would probably be an internal matter. But it is not impossible that occasionally it proved necessary to besiege cities. Diodoros (60.4) suggests opposition was encountered only in Karia (cf. Frontius Strat. 3.2.5), and perhaps Lykia. It is in this context that Plutarch's story (K. 12.3-4) of the forced inclusion of Phaselis in Pamphylia should be set. So this action in Pamphylia and perhaps others in Karia, Lykia and possibly even Ionia were merely part of the mustering of 'allies' in preparation for the Eurymedon clash. They, like the training programme, could be implied by a reference to the crowning victory to which they led. As such Thucydides may have felt that his statement of the Eurymedon victory was sufficient and that specific mention of such minor preparatory moves could be omitted. The existence of such operations should not, therefore, encourage the assumption that similar actions on the Asiatic coast were commonplace before Kimon was instructed to undertake operations in Ionia in 470/69.

It seems obvious, though, that the revolt of Naxos was in some way connected with the large scale mobilisation in the early 460s which we have described. The revolt had not been crushed by 466⁴⁹ and so it is likely that it had begun in 467 or earlier. It could, then, be maintained that Thucydides should also have viewed the revolt of Naxos in terms of the preparations for Eurymedon and have omitted specific reference to it. But, of course, Naxos stood apart in that it was the first revolt from the alliance to be suppressed and not merely a refusal to join it. Unlike others she probably refused to make even a financial contribution. Also, the potential effect on

discipline must have required the Athenians to make an all-out effort in suppressing the revolt as quickly as possible. It probably caused the Athenians to break off their preparations⁵⁰. For these reasons the revolt of Naxos warranted special mention.

These considerations provide us with fairly precise absolute dates. Since Naxos and Eurymedon belong virtually together in so far as there would be no time for other military activities between them⁵¹, we must assume that the Eurymedon preparations were before 466 and if Naxos began in 467 as is probably the case, then before 467. Kimon was ordered to embark on an eastern campaign in 470/69 and his preparations began with a period of rearmament in the Piraeus. His fleet then may have put to sea in 469. The training, mustering and, on occasion, coercion of 'allies' therefore took place in the period 469-7.

We could see the other military operations not mentioned by Thucydides, but attested elsewhere, in the same way. The fighting in the Chersonese recorded by Plutarch (K. 14.1) and some of the casualties listed by IG 1² 928 can be seen as mopping up left over from the Eurymedon preparations or as being in connection with the attempt on Eneahodoi (Thuc. 100.3)⁵².

That said, it must be admitted that the evidence of operations unrecorded by Thucydides renders the argument from silence inconclusive. But what are the positive reasons adduced by modern scholars for adding to the historical record by postulating military actions other than those we have already noted? Firstly, the stated aim of the Athenian alliance was to ravage the King's territory. Secondly, we argued that few cities of mainland Ionia revolted from the King shortly after Mykale, yet by 472 we have what I am prepared to accept

as evidence of the membership of the alliance of at least a fair proportion of mainland Ionian cities (Aisch. Pers. 898-903). Lastly, Meiggs thinks that the reminiscences of the jurors in Aristophanes' Wasps (1097-8) of the time when they took many cities from the Medes should be taken as a hint confirming "common sense" which requires us to assume that there were actions in the 470s against the Persians besides Eion⁵³.

It is obvious that the words of the Choros in the Wasps needn't be applied to the 470s, as opposed to a later period⁵⁴. The lines of the Persai confirm the implications of the task given to Kimon in 470/69 recorded by Diodoros: as well as expelling any remaining Persian garrisons on the Asian coast, he is to βαρθύνουσα μὲν ταῖς συμμαχούσας πόλεις. There were cities allied to Athens in the late 470s on the coast of Asia. This does not, of course, mean that the Athenians had provided military assistance in bringing about the revolts from Persia. The revolts had probably been occurring from within throughout the 470s, as a result of the threat wielded by the professed aim of the Athenian alliance. It is this professed aim which has provided the strongest argument in favour of assuming the existence of otherwise unattested actions against the Persians. The fact that by 472 some, perhaps many, cities in Asia had joined the alliance does not, however, presuppose that the alliance's threat was acted upon. Threats can be as effective as action. It is methodologically questionable to make such an assumption. We should, in general, attempt to make sense of the information available before adding to it. It will be argued later that an absence of military operations in the east in the 470s does admit of a satisfactory explanation.

These are, furthermore, positive reasons in Thucydides which should prohibit adding to his evidence of military activity. Thucydides (96.1) dubs the professed purpose of the alliance, namely, to ravage the King's territory, a mere 'excuse'⁵⁵. Those who would assume, on the basis of Thucydides' statement of the 'professed aim' (*πρόσχημα*)⁵⁶ of the alliance, that more extensive military activity occurred on the Asian coast than Thucydides has recorded are, in effect, appealing to his statement in order to justify the assumption of events which, if they existed, would contradict the sense of the very statement (*πρόσχημα*, 'excuse') which they think supports the alleged events. Thucydides' comment on the professed aim of the alliance thus confirms the paucity of actions against the Persians in the 470s which his narrative of events (98.1-3) implies. ATL's 'examples hypothesis' is also unconvincing. Thucydides has just claimed (97.2) that he is going to write an account of the Pentekontaetia, partly, because it has not been properly covered by previous writers, and so we may deduce that to record the events was thus an end in itself⁵⁷. Furthermore, he criticizes Hellanikos' account of the period for its brevity. It is difficult to believe that he goes on to omit extensive campaigning on the Asiatic coast because he considered the example of Eion sufficed. Thucydides is guilty of omissions in the account of the Pentekontaetia, but that is no reason for us to dream up campaigns of which there is otherwise no sign.

The fact that sources not based on Thucydides have no echo of campaigns on the Asiatic coast which we would have to locate before the Eurymedon preparations would be surprising if such a campaign had existed. We tend to moan about how 'scurvily' we have been

treated by our sources for the Pentekontaetia, but it is worth noticing that all the campaigns recorded by Thucydides in the 470s are in fact attested by other sources which are not dependent on Thucydides⁵⁸. It would, then, be surprising if no commemorative or comic verse, no incidental reference in Herodotos or the orators and no anecdote set in this context should have survived of the putative campaigns on the coast of Asia in the 470s.

The conclusion that these campaigns did not exist is implied by other sources. We argued that the programme of trireme redesigning for the Eurymedon campaign (Pl. K. 12.2) should be connected with Diodoros' notice of preparations, the beginning of which is dated to 470/69 (60.1). Scholars have noted that the new style of trireme reflects what was expected to be a new style of warfare needed to engage the Persians on the coast of Asia⁵⁹. If the coast of Asia Minor were to be held permanently, the Athenian alliance would have to be able to deploy large numbers of hoplites on land. One thinks of the hasty retreat after Mykale. The implication of these facts is that before 470/69 the Athenian alliance had not been engaged in operations against the Persians on the Asiatic mainland⁶⁰.

CHAPTER NINE. SUCCESS IN ATHENIAN POLITICS FROM THE FORMATION OF THE ATHENIAN ALLIANCE UNTIL THE WAR WITH KARYSTOS.

It is no longer necessary to argue the case that fifth century Athenian politics did not function within the highly artificial party system familiar in modern politics¹. In the final analysis a politician was successful on the strength of his own abilities, proven or suspected, although his chances in public life were increased by support from other men within a variety of frameworks which we shall have occasion to note later. Constitutionally, of course, it was the Assembly which accepted or rejected a man's proposals. Such a situation did not encourage the expounding of inter-related, long-term policies, of a manifesto, so to speak. This is not to say that leaders did not have long-term objectives for the city nor that they did not see individual issues within their wider context, but that these circumstances would make it impracticable to relate each decision facing Boule or Assembly to such policies, and less effective to justify proposals in terms of such policies, rather than in terms of immediate, short-term advantages². But the repeated success of a man in having his proposals adopted may justifiably be described as the successful implementation of his policy, in the broader sense of the word. In this chapter we shall attempt to locate the most important considerations which led to the adoption of a man's proposals by the Assembly. To do this two stages are necessary. Firstly we must try, by comparing known events with what we can glean of the long-term policies of Athenian leaders, to decide who proposed the actions; we thus have a rough measure of success. Secondly, by establishing categories to cover qualities

which can be attested as contributing to political success, we shall be in a position to measure the relative importance of these categories by comparing the success of individuals with what should be the strength of their endowment with the qualities covered by our categories. We shall recognize in due course the obvious limitations of such a method applied to our period as well as, however, offer a defence of the results it affords.

Recent ostraka finds have confirmed that our literary sources have over-simplified the complexity of Athenian politics by omitting mention of numerous men who, though less important than the great names, were significant enough to poll a 'respectable' number of votes in the ostrakophoriai³. And yet even though there may have been groups of men and issues which stood in no direct relationship to the great names or to the direction of foreign policy over which the great men clashed, our picture of political conflict, while over-simplified, probably reflects correctly the predominant issues and groupings of the period.

We have already outlined Themistokles' post-war policy. One element in it was secure control of the Aegean. Aristides, and, in support of him, Kimon had persuaded the Athenians to pursue the war against Persia, partly in the hope of excluding Themistokles from influence, which they might hope to achieve since both his provocative anti-Spartan stance was incompatible with a concerted war in the east, and, perhaps, his standing with the islanders as a result of his behaviour in 480 would not recommend him as a leader of the Athenian

alliance⁴.

Let us try to relate the military actions of the Athenians to the policies of Themistokles and those of Aristides-Kimon. The first minor action against Pausanias is not very helpful. It is not difficult to imagine that Themistokles turned Pausanias' action into a stick with which to beat the Spartans. Pausanias returned to Byzantion ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον (Thuc. 128.3). Whatever Thucydidean usage may be in designating wars, this is probably what Pausanias actually said. What Pausanias meant is debatable⁵. It could undoubtedly be interpreted as an expression of aggressive intentions against Athenian interests on the part of the Spartans. The evidence is such that it is unwise to base too much on speculations about the role Pausanias played in the politics of the 470s and 460s in the Hellenic world. But it is worth mentioning the possibility that Themistokles was the first to level accusations of relations with the Persians against Pausanias in his capacity as a high-ranking Spartan official⁶. Yet his expulsion was probably sanctioned by Spartan officialdom, and so will not have conflicted with the wishes of Aristides or Kimon.

Before we analyse the relationship of Eion, Skyros and Karystos to the policies of our two groups, it is worth emphasizing that we should not automatically equate the most prestigious general on a campaign with its initiator. While on questions of tactics the board was, naturally, given a free hand, matters of overall strategy, objectives and policy were determined by Boule and Assembly, and the generals were given their tasks to fulfil⁷. It will be remembered that we felt confident that at no stage in his career can Themistokles have openly discouraged actions directed against the Persians, and

that now, shortly after the adoption of the aggressively anti-Persian programme of the new alliance, he will not have gone against the tide of emotion. There is no evidence to suggest that Kimon or Aristides may have preferred an objective other than Eion to launch the alliance's anti-Persian drive. On the other hand, an exploration of the possibility of seeing Themistokles as an enthusiastic advocate of Eion as the alliance's first target can lead to the conclusion that on balance it makes more sense to postulate Themistokles rather than his enemies as the prime mover of this campaign.

Firstly, if Themistokles was aiming at Athenian domination of the Aegean a secure base at Eion will have seemed invaluable. It also represented a remarkably strategic site in dominating the land routes. As well as its immediate strategic value the site may have been viewed as a stepping-stone, eventually, to greater ambitions, namely, the annexation of part of Makedonia, an action which would facilitate the supply of timber. The annexation of part of Makedonia was, at any rate, a plan of Kimon's enemies in the late 460s when it was considered feasible (Pl. K. 14.2)⁸. The potential threat of denying access to this attractive source of ships' timber which was made possible by the secure hold Alexander probably had over export may well have posed an unacceptable danger, in Themistokles' view. This fear will have been brought home all the more if, in constructing their Persian war fleet the Athenians had had to rely to a large extent on timber from the west, as a result of Alexander's commitment to the Persian King (see H. 5.21, 8.136)⁹. So, while complying with the popular desire to take vengeance on the Persians, the choice of Eion will also have furthered the realization of Themistokles' plans for Athens.

The capture of Eion, in as far as it may have been thought of as a potential base for further operations against Makedonia, also had the advantage for Themistokles of continuing to focus Athenian attention on the potential power and influence they could wield in mainland Hellas. Thanks to Themistokles' action at the Amphiktyonic council, and, if accepted, his stance over the expedition of Leotychides, at least those areas of Thessaly dominated by the Aleuadae were now friendly to the Athenians - especially Themistokles - and could be viewed as potential allies¹⁰. If Themistokles was the prime mover of the decision to take on Eion as the first target it was not only a useful stage in his post-war policy but also a brilliant move politically.

Themistokles may have known Eion and the surrounding area, perhaps from his involvement in the analysis of the strategy of the defence of Hellas before Xerxes' invasion. Also, however, the possible connections between Themistokles and Thasos in the 490s and 480s might well have encouraged a trip to the island, stimulating interest in important features of the area as a whole¹¹. He can't have been ignorant of the difficulty that would be encountered in taking this fortified city, and he was probably aware of the dangers lurking in the interior for any who were ordered to venture inland. He may even have heard tales of the type of man Boges was.

Since 478/7 the influential Aristides had been promoting Kimon. There is contemporary evidence which suggests that Themistokles in the 470s sought to dismiss Kimon as skilled in the gentle arts of singing and lyre playing but not in the more urgent ones of making the city wealthy and great (Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.1), relevant to the situation facing Athens in the 470s. In 477/6 Kimon was to be

among the leaders of the Eion campaign. The support of Aristides, as well as the 'auctoritas' deriving from his family name, put Kimon in an influential position on the campaign's board of generals. It was Kimon's name which was to be associated with Eion, and may have been from the start. Kimon must have been seeking to substantiate his claims to political leadership with tangible success. Themistokles was probably aware that if the Eion campaign did not put a premature end to Kimon it might well be expected to prove a disastrous start to his career. To some extent it was¹².

We have already seen that the siege was long. Running out of money and improperly equipped to deal with the military situation, Menon of Pharsalos, probably no friend to Themistokles, helped Kimon out of the pickle he was in (Demosth. 23.199)¹³. With this assistance Kimon was able to maintain the siege long enough to starve out the inhabitants. Athenian disappointment at finding nothing of worth in the city must have been deep (cf. Pl. K. 7.3). The Athenians had had their first taste of the reality of 'ravaging the King's land'. They also learned that despite domination of the coast besieging a city with a determined population and a hostile hinterland was a difficult and dangerous business (cf. Pl. K. 7.2; schol. Aisch. 2.34 (Dindorf 48)). The situation on the coast of Asia Minor was not the same, but it had similarities, and parallels may have been drawn by the men shivering in front of Eion.

Our sources are particularly unhelpful about discussion of issues at Athens. The fact that there is no mention of Themistokles in connection with the decision to go to Eion does not argue against his being the prime mover. Yet all we may insist upon is that to suggest Themistokles was an eager supporter makes good sense, and

that the campaign should not be seen as a political defeat for him. There is, on the other hand no reason to suppose that his enemies opposed the campaign.

The capture of Skyros strengthened the security of the sea route between Piraeus and Eion and the Hellespont. It was, though, hardly the most urgent objective in a war which professed to be exacting revenge from the Barbarian. The apparent ease with which the island was taken must have demonstrated to the Athenians the difference between a policy of naked imperialism in the Aegean, similar to that Themistokles was perhaps associated with in 480, and the tiresome, dangerous and sometimes profitless task of ravaging the King's land, be it on the Thracian or Asiatic coast. There is some circumstantial evidence to connect Themistokles with the decision to proceed to Skyros. The excuse for attacking Skyros was based on two elements, both associated with Themistokles. The provocative judgement of the Amphiktyonic council in favour of the plaintive Thessalians (were they friends of the Aleuadae?) against Skyros may represent an example of the type of influence Themistokles had in mind when he won the friendship of many of the states sending delegates to the council. This judgement, and the Skyrian refusal to comply, provided moral grounds for an attack. Themistokles seems to have had a special relationship with the Delphic oracle¹⁴. It would, perhaps, not have been difficult for him to elicit, in 476/5, an oracle demanding that the Athenians find Theseus' bones and return them to Athens. The co-operation of Delphi on this point provided the excuse for a specifically Athenian intervention in Skyros¹⁵. The fact that Kimon was able to exploit this action brilliantly for his own purposes (Pl. K. 8.6) should not rule out the

possibility of seeing it essentially as an expression of Themistokles' imperialistic Aegean policy. Podlecki has recently collected the possible hints in the evidence of attempts by Themistokles to claim some of the propaganda value accruing from the 'Theseus' incident¹⁶. Nepos (Th. 2.3) says Themistokles rid the seas of pirates. This might reflect a source which had Themistokles at least partly responsible for the expulsion of the piratical inhabitants of Skyros¹⁷.

The action against Skyros fits better with what can be gleaned of Themistokles' plans than with those of his enemies. Yet Kimon's intimate and enthusiastic involvement in it suggests they were not openly opposed to it. But we may speculate that if the understanding reached between influential men at Sparta and Kimon and Aristides which we postulated were not to be strained the Athenians should resume their anti-Persian drive, and preferably on the Asian coast. This was not to be the case.

Modern scholars have recognized that whatever the reasons Athens may have advanced for the war against Karystos it must have appeared high-handed. It was not a Persian stronghold, the inhabitants, as far as we know, were not piratical and they had already been punished in 480 for their Medism. At any rate, it could hardly have been maintained that Karystos' independence from the alliance represented a serious threat to security sufficient to take precedence over the real job of attacking King's land and Persian strongholds. The war was a purely imperialistic venture and represented another step towards achieving a complete Athenian domination of the Aegean and which served Athens' interests primarily¹⁸. The war may have cast doubt on the integrity of the

motives behind the operations against Eion and Skyros.

It will be remembered that Themistokles, backed by the Hellenic League's fleet, had visited Karystos in 480 making financial and perhaps political demands. The Karystians had evidently held out against some of or all the demands and so had had their land devastated. Personal animosity may have existed between Themistokles and the Karystians. We suggested that the accusation that the Karystians in 480 had in fact sent money to Themistokles which Herodotos (8.112) records, was made now, around 474, to discredit Themistokles. Timokreon seems to have been encouraged by these 'official' accusations to level similar ones of his own. He also made the more justified complaint that Themistokles' actions were inconsistent. While some, notably the Aegean islands, were being treated harshly, allegedly, we may presume, because of their behaviour in 480, the Medism of others, notably Argos, Thebes, Aleuada Thessaly and, perhaps, Kerkyra, was made secondary to more pragmatic considerations¹⁹. If such a context for, and interpretation of Timokreon's fragment are accepted, the mention of Aristides as the man most deserving of praise would be evidence that he opposed aggression against Karystos. The context would also suggest that feeling in the Aegean was at least dubious²⁰.

One of the reasons why Sparta had been willing to withdraw from the hegemony of the offensive war against Persia and to support Athens' adoption of it was the hope of seeing Athens' forces entangled in a war on the coast of Asia which would last 'for ever'. Instead what had happened was that Athens was enjoying the advantages of the *φύρος* and was exploiting her position as hegemon to expand her own power in the Aegean and seemed in no hurry to get involved in

Asia Minor. It was in this situation that some Spartans may well have considered making war upon Athens to rob her of the dangerous power which she was amassing. If the Hetoimaridas debate really does reflect some kind of historical debate in 475/4 on the possibility of war with Athens, and if the Karystos war began in 475-4, then we are almost compelled to draw a causal link. Since I accept both conditions I believe that the Karystos war acted as a direct stimulus to the debate²¹. Fear of a threat from Sparta was, we argued, a ploy used by Themistokles in 479-8 to discourage Athenian involvement in Asia. An action which created another crisis situation might encourage us to see Themistokles as connected with proposing it. If the Spartan reaction which we have postulated is accepted then it is certainly evidence that Aristides and Kimon were not responsible for proposing the Karystos operations and we should have expected them to have opposed the war. The interpretation we have offered is perhaps confirmed by the high ^{probability} that Kimon did not act as general in the war²².

A glance at the map is sufficient to testify to the fact that the domination of Karystos can be interpreted as serving the same aim as control of Eion and Skyros in securing the safety of essential supply routes for Athens, and as a potential means of wielding influence on other states by her command of this route (cf. Ps. Xen. 2.2 -3)²³. This effort to ensure the import of essential goods is matched by other measures taken at Athens serving the same end. Themistokles' authorship of these may suggest associating him with the former, too²⁴.

So it is fair to say that on the basis of the first three campaigns of the Athenian alliance, Eion, Skyros and Karystos, the

influence of Themistokles' policies and Themistoklean thinking is perhaps discernible. These military actions, though, certainly can not be cited as evidence of Themistokles' decline in influence. To do this is to confuse tenure of office with real power. The latter lay in the ability of a man to put his plans into practice. The strategos in the field was not in a position to do that. He was the servant of the demos' orders. It was the man who could influence the resolutions of Boule and Assembly who wielded real power²⁵. To do that it was not wise to be away from Athens for almost half the year campaigning. Let us examine, then, what evidence there is for us to determine what factors led to a man's opinions and plans being adopted by the demos. Admittedly, the categories which we shall set out are to some extent artificial, but nonetheless justifiable ultimately, I feel.

We may distinguish three main categories which played a part in the acceptance of a man's proposals by the demos: 1. the intrinsic persuasiveness of his arguments, 2. the reputation, in the positive sense, which he enjoyed, and 3. philoi support.

1. the best example of success based on persuasive argument is probably Themistokles' ability to persuade the Athenians to dedicate the recent silver strikes to building a new fleet to settle the Aeginetan war (H. 7.144) even though ἐς πρῶτους νέωσι παρών (H. 7.143). Thucydides' comments on Themistokles' insight and persuasiveness (1.38.3) also suggest that this gift at least contributed to Themistokles' influence in the pre-Salamis stage

of his career.

2. Good repute would derive from three main sources:

a) from his family. A man would inherit the reputation his ancestors had built up. Thucydides (5.43.2) says, for example, of Alkibiades, that although young, ἀξιώματι δὲ προχόνων Τιμώμενος. If the full publication of the Kerameikos ostraka does, in fact, prove that Kimon was a serious candidate for ostracism in the first half of the 480s, the fact would also provide good evidence that it must have been his family's reputation which gave a lad probably still suffering from adolescent acne the degree of political significance presupposed by his candidacy²⁶.

b) from his own achievements. The two best testimonies to this source are Herodotos' explanation (8.110) of the Athenian sailors' acceptance of Themistokles' advice at Andros: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον δεδοχμένος εἶναι σοφὸς ἐφάνη ἐὼν ἀληθέως σοφὸς τε καὶ εὐβουλος, πάντως ἔτοιμοι ἦσαν λέγοντι πείθεσθαι, and the implications of his account (6.132) of the Athenians granting Miltiades seventy ships, an army and money to proceed against an unspecified target, immediately after his achievement at Marathon. Success breeds success.

c) Lastly, an attractive personality would supplement a good reputation won by family and achievement. Kimon's generosity contributed to his political success (Gorgias fr. B.20 (Diels 82) ap. Pl. K. 10.5; Theopompos fr. 89; cf. AP 27.3; Pl. Per. 9.2)²⁷ Aristides' even-handedness no doubt contributed to his political success in Athens (Timokreon fr. 1 ap. Pl. Th. 20.2; H. 8.79). Plutarch (Th. 22.1) attributes, at least in part, Themistokles' ostracism to his self-laudatory speeches and behaviour. The recently

discovered ostrakon dedicated to 'Themistokles' honour' perhaps confirms Plutarch²⁸.

3. Our final category is the influence a man derived from support from his φίλοι. This term covers both family and friends, including hetairoi²⁹. These philoi will in turn, as well as trying to secure the support of more influential men with whom they may have been close, have been able to secure some support for their friend or relative from a pyramid structure of dependants. But it is not clear how influential such connections remained at the lower, broader end of the structure. Nor is the working of such influence at local or 'national' level clearly attested³⁰. There is evidence, furthermore, that Peisistratos and Kleisthenes sought to reduce the dependence of the 'average' Athenian on his local aristocrats³¹. The economic developments of the sixth and fifth centuries, as well as the nature of decisions facing the Athenians in the thirty years following the expulsion of Hippias, should, a priori, have discouraged the importance of this type of influence³². A man could extend his access to this type of support by alliance with powerful families, usually by marriage.

Despite the deficiencies in our evidence, it is still worth relating these categories to the moderate political success of Themistokles in the years down to Karystos, and to compare his endowments with those of his opponents. Which opponents? We have already stressed that by dividing Athenian politics into only two groups, 'Themistokles and his opponents', we are almost certainly over-simplifying the pattern of politics at this period. Yet we can do no more than recognize this fact if we wish to attempt to relate the recorded events to specific political conflicts³³. And it is

in fact probable that as well as numerous other men of greater or lesser importance beyond whose name we know little, a consistent attempt was made by a group of men to stem Themistokles' political success and that this attempt had the ultimate aim of annihilating him politically. Aristides' active co-operation with Themistokles in 480 represents a break in his otherwise consistent opposition (H. 8.79). This was at least partly motivated by a desire to regain his credibility with the demos as a loyal Athenian. The same will have been true of Xanthippos, though it is far less certain that he should be viewed as an enemy of Themistokles in the 480s. We have no information about Xanthippos after his return from the capture of Sestos in 479/8. He should be dead by 473/2 when his son served as choregos; he needn't have still been alive in the mid-470s when Timokreon mentioned him. But there is evidence which suggests that if he was alive until 475-4 he will have lent his support to the "grand coalition" (see below) in opposing Themistokles. It is possible that he also chose not to stand for election to the strategia in the 470s in order to exert his influence as fully as possible in Athens where decisions were made. Few deny that we should see Aristides and Kimon as enemies of Themistokles during the 470s. Aristides may have chosen to remain in Athens for the same reasons as Themistokles and perhaps Xanthippos. We must, then, concentrate our enquiry on the competition for influence between Themistokles and his unknown philoi and Aristides, Kimon and Xanthippos and their philoi, for we have no knowledge of other men which could be used to fill out our picture of Athenian politics.

1. Persuasive argument. Since we have no information on the arguments used in setting the direction of Athenian energies down to

475-4, we cannot even decide whether there was disagreement between Themistokles and his enemies. We saw, for example, that Eion and Skyros could fit with what we know of the aims of both groups. If there was division it is most likely to have occurred over whether to make war on Karystos. The importance of the role of persuasive argument must, then, remain uncertain in determining these early targets for the alliance. It is pertinent here to emphasize that the term 'persuasive argument' should not be allowed to obscure the fact that policy was not conceived in isolation in the minds of Athenian leaders and then 'sold' to the demos. The process was dynamic, popular feeling influencing the detailed policy of leaders, and leaders influencing popular feeling. We saw this feature of Athenian politics in the failure of Themistokles to advocate a necessary aspect of his policy which he knew would be deeply unpopular. We shall have occasion to observe different manifestations of this interaction in later chapters.

2. Reputation:

a) family³⁴. Later ancient, and some modern writers, have over-emphasized the modesty of Themistokles' family. His membership of the Lykomidai genos is well-attested enough for us not to doubt, even if the senior branch to which Themistokles did not belong were jealous (Simonides ap. Pl. Th. 1.3; Theodorus Metiochus (Müller and Kiessling 608))³⁵. The ancient ritual duties of the clan testify to its nobility (Hippolytus *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 5.20.5.-6³⁶). Menon of Phlya (AP 1; Pl. Solon 12.3) may have been among Themistokles' ancestors³⁷. While Themistokles' broader family connections were thus impressive, his immediate family history probably contributed less to his reputation. Plutarch (Th. 1.1)

knew of no achievement of his father Neokles. That Plutarch's impression of a less than prominent man was correct is perhaps objectively confirmed by the fact that he is nowhere attested as *kalós*³⁸. If Themistokles' mother was foreign it needn't have been to his discredit³⁹, and his father probably did not disown him⁴⁰. The family's remoteness from Athens may have contributed to its probable political obscurity⁴¹. When Themistokles entered public life with his 3T. he was only moderately well-off (Kritias fr. B.45 (Diels 88) ap. Ael. V.H. 10.17)⁴². Nor did Themistokles match up socially with some of his political competitors (Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.1)⁴³. Beyond the more remote reputation accruing from his membership of the Lykomidai, his immediate family, wealth and social standing were not outstanding. Though his marriage to Archippe daughter of Lysandros of Alopeke may have helped him up the social scale, essentially his success would owe little to the reputation he won from his family⁴⁴. There is no reason to believe that any of his children married well in the 470s⁴⁵.

The case is strikingly different with his enemies. The traditions concerning Aristides' poverty are exaggerated⁴⁶. The social status of his father, Lysimachos, is testified by his marriage to a sister of Hipponikos Kalliou, and daughter of Kallias Phainippou⁴⁷. So on his mother's side Aristides was related to the Kerykes genos, one of the great gene of the fifth century, and certainly very wealthy⁴⁸. Aristides might have had a connection with the Alkmeonidai, but the evidence is not good⁴⁹.

Kimon's family background was most illustrious. Despite the sticky end his father Miltiades had come to (H. 6.136) it was Miltiades' association with the Marathon victory which remained upper-

most (cf. H. 6. 109-10, 136)⁵⁰, as well as his other military exploits (H. 6. 136-40) and his regal and adventurous existence in the Chersonese (H. 6. 34, 40-41)⁵¹. His family's glories, of course, extended back far beyond his father, Miltiades Kimonos. Among the reasons for its good repute may have been the memory of the fact that in the sixth century it was this family which was "most obviously at loggerheads with the regime"⁵². Membership of the Philaid genos, or perhaps we should say Kimonid⁵³, automatically conferred on Kimon a belief in his ability to lead, because of the traditions and experience of his family, once, of course, he had demonstrated that he had not inherited his grandfather's block-headedness (Pl. K. 4.3) which he seems to have done early in his career (cf. e.g. Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.2-4, generally K. 5.1)⁵⁴. The reputation he enjoyed because of his family will have been heightened by two important marriages. Kimon's sister, Elpinike⁵⁵, married Kallias Hipponikou. The precise date is not certain. It was after Miltiades' death, which was probably in 489-8. The stories of her sexual relations with Kimon during their co-habitation (Eupolis fr. 208 (Kock) ap. Pl. K. 15.3 ; Pl. K. 4.5) suggest that they lived together for at least a few years. At the other end of the scale we have the fact that the child of this marriage, Hipponikos, himself sired a child around 450⁵⁶. All that means is that Hipponikos should have been born by about 475. Any date between about 485 and 475 for the marriage is acceptable⁵⁷. There is, then, no reason to object to Bicknell's c.479 context for the marriage⁵⁸. Whenever it was concluded this link between the Philaidai and Kerykes boosted the prestige of both, and was effective in the 470s. It established a link between Kimon and Aristides, and possibly with the Alkmeonidai⁵⁹.

A more securely attested link between the Alkmeonidai and Philaidai is the marriage of Kimon and Isodike, daughter of Euryptolymos Megakleous⁶⁰. To determine the date of the marriage we must examine the evidence of Stesimbrotos and Diodoros Periegetes. Diodoros (fr. 37 ap. Pl. K. 16.1) stated that Kimon's children, Lakedaimonios, Eleios (correctly Oulios) and Thessalos were borne by Isodike; Stesimbrotos (fr. 6 ap. Pl. K. 16.1) says the first two were $\xi\kappa$ $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma\ldots\kappa\lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\omicron\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, and he probably included Thessalos, too (Pl. Per. 29.3)⁶¹. In view of Stesimbrotos' proximity in time scholars have been reluctant to reject his evidence⁶². Since Kimon's marriage to Isodike is not in doubt (cf. Archelaos (Edmonds, Elegy and Iambus 446) ap. Pl. K. 4.9) scholars have suggested two wives, the Kleitorian woman and then Isodike, which only partially resolves the conflict⁶³. A better solution was offered by Raubitschek and adopted by Davies, namely, that 'Kleitórias' should be understood anatomically, not geographically⁶⁴. Stesimbrotos, then, is referring, consciously or unconsciously to Isodike⁶⁵. In that case we have a terminus ante quem for the marriage in the birth of Lakedaimonios. He should have been at least thirty when he served as hipparch, probably in 446 (IG 1² 400). While c.470 would be the very latest date for his birth⁶⁶, c.476 is more comfortable. If we accept the existence of three other children, Kimon, Miltiades and Peisianax (Schol. Ael. Arist. (Dindorf 515)), as we should⁶⁷, we must also fit Miltiades in as the first born, as onomastic convention would require. The best date, then, for the marriage is in or near 479⁶⁸.

As with the Philaidai-Kerykes connection this Philaidai-Alkmeonidai connection served to enhance the splendour of both houses. Alkmeonid involvement in Athenian history was long and intimate, if

not uncompromised⁶⁹. The curse which had been incurred over the Kylon affair was used as a stick to beat them down into the fifth century⁷⁰. By the 480s they were also suspected of Medism, presumably at Marathon (cf. H. 6. 121, 123-4). Yet it would be wrong to believe that the reputation they had built up over generations, as well as the memory of the real contribution the family had rendered to Athenian independence in the last decade of the sixth century, was completely wiped out by the Medism charges⁷¹. The choice of the Alkmeonid Leobotes as the accuser of Themistokles (Krateros fr. 11; cf. Pl. Th. 23.1) by Themistokles' enemies in the early 460s is itself testimony to the renown attaching to the family's name in this period. Association with the Alkmeonidai was an asset.

Xanthippos had married into the family, probably in the 490s⁷², which did represent a political association⁷³. In view of Kimon's association with the Alkmeonidai and of the choice of Leobotes^{as the formal accuser of Themistokles} in the next decade, we must believe the Alkmeonidai and their friends were enemies of Themistokles in the 470s.

Themistokles' main competitors for influence after Salamis, Aristides, Kimon, and, for as long as he lived, Xanthippos, will almost certainly each have derived greater renown individually from his family's reputation than Themistokles could. The imbalance was compounded by the fact that by the 470s they were seen to be linked by *κνδεία* ties and so to some extent their individual reputations took on a collective weight. Themistokles was far outmatched in this source of reputation.

Not so, however, in our second source of good reputation, deriving from b) a man's own achievement. It is difficult to know how

complete our information is for the 490s and 480s. Xanthippos had, at least, established something of a name for himself by his part in the successful prosecution of Miltiades (H. 6.136). By the late 480s AP (22.6) states that Xanthippos was considered *μεῖζον εἶναι*. As probably the most respected of the generals on the board leading the Athenian fleet in 479 (cf. H. 9.120) he will have won high regard for the victory at Mykale, and the determination to fulfil the tasks set by the demos (H. 9.117) may have irritated the sailors at the time, but in retrospect must have earned Xanthippos popular respect. The dedication of the tackle of the bridges (H. 9.121) boosted recognition of Xanthippos' achievement.

By the mid-470s Kimon was only just beginning to build up a reputation for his own achievements. We have noted the evidence suggesting that his first strategía was in 478/7; nothing remarkable is reported from it. His role in the formation of the Athenian alliance, especially his useful Spartan connections, was, however, significant, and will have won him some credit at Athens. I doubt whether the distribution of captives was important. The expulsion of Pausanias was a minor affair, but may have been thought of as an Athenian victory. Eion, as we saw, was of dubious value for his reputation, though he made the best of it (Pl. K. 7.4.-5). His skill at using what little achievements he had to his name was again demonstrated after Skyros. We argued that there was probably no military resistance by the Skyrians. By his showmanship Kimon was able to turn the event into a major achievement⁷⁴. Plutarch (K.8.6) cites the return of 'Theseus'' bones as the chief cause of the popularity of Kimon. That Kimon's own achievements were only beginning to win him a name by the mid-470s is perhaps confirmed by

the fact that he is not mentioned as a possible candidate for praise by Timokreon (fr. 1, ap. Pl. Th. 21.2).

It was probably Aristides whose personal achievements won him the greatest reputation among Themistokles' enemies. He may have served at Marathon as general (Pl. Ar. 5.2). If he was important enough to be ostracized some seven years later there is little reason to doubt that he was old and significant enough to be elected strategos for the year of Marathon. The problem is merely that neither Herodotos nor, apparently, Ephoros mentions him as general⁷⁵. This is not decisive, and on balance it is probably best to go along with the tradition in the absence of even a priori reasons against it⁷⁶. If Aristides Lysimachou was the eponymous archon of 489/8 (cf. Pl. Ar. 5.7) he will have been an Areopagite⁷⁷.

During the 480s it is probable that Aristides lost credit because of strained Atheno-Aiginetan relations. In fact, it was probably some kind of opposition to Themistokles' plans to turn Athens' new silver resources against Aigina (H. 7.144; Thuc. 14.3) which led to his ostracism⁷⁸. But Aiginetan valour at Salamis (H. 8. 91-3; Pindar Isth. 5. 48-51) will have vindicated Aristides to some extent. Aristides' leadership of the action on Psyttaleia won him praise (cf. Aisch. Pers. 435-71; H. 8.95). Although his part in the leadership of the Athenians at Plataia was obviously to his credit the victory was nonetheless considered, in contrast to Salamis, a 'Dorian victory' (Aisch. Pers. 816-17). His participation in Themistokles' alarmist antics over the walls was merely a demonstration of his loyalty⁷⁹, and the main credit for the show will have gone to Themistokles. The high-point of Aristides' personal achievement surely came with the formation of

the Athenian alliance⁸⁰. The accomplishment was always attributed mainly to him. His reputation was boosted not only by his having secured Aegean hegemony for Athens, but also because of the 'international' recognition and acclaim which the formation of the alliance and the assessment of tribute won (Timokreon fr. 1 ap. Pl. Th. 21.2; Thuc. 5. 18.5). The reputation Aristides enjoyed as a result of his own achievement should have been considerable during the 470s.

And yet it still did not compare favourably with Themistokles in this regard. His personal achievement was truly outstanding. As eponymous archon in 493/2 (Dion. Hal. R.A. 6.34.1) he may have begun the Piraeus fortifications (cf. Thuc. 93.3). The office will have earned him a seat on the Areopagos council. He must have fought at Marathon, but the implication of Plutarch (Ar. 5.3) that he was, like Aristides, general of his tribe does not inspire much confidence, while there is no reason, apart from the silence of other sources, against believing it⁸¹. Themistokles may have been a candidate for ostracism in or before 487/6⁸². Plutarch (Th. 31.1) mentions the office τῶν... ὁδᾶτων ἐπιστάτης

as having been filled at some unknown time by Themistokles. But it was most probably over the war with Aigina in the 480s that he made a name for himself. It is reasonable to assume that he held one or more strategia before 483/2 and established his reputation for military skills in connection with that war.

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that Themistokles' personal achievements from 483-0 were quite extraordinary. It was his suggestion over the use of the new silver finds which not only saved Hellas but also made the Athenians safe in the face of 'all their

enemies' (cf. Thuc. 93.7). He may have had a leading role in putting an end to the internecine wars, enabling the Greeks to face the invasion with a degree of unity (Pl. Th. 6.3)⁸³. It was his interpretation of the oracle which proved correct, and his strategy which won the sea battle for the Greeks, widely held to have been decisive (Thuc. 74.1). For his strategic sense alone

ἔδοξεύθη εἶναι ἀνὴρ πολλὸν Ἑλλήνων
σοφώτατος ἀνὰ πάντας τὴν Ἑλλάδα (H. 8.124)⁸⁴.

The walls incident demonstrated to the Athenians that he was prepared to forfeit the special favour the Spartans had accorded him (H. 8.124; Thuc. 74.1, 91-1) for the sake of Athens' autonomy. Yet again it must have seemed as though Athens' freedom had been secured by Themistokles.

It is clear that Themistokles sought to keep the memory of his achievements alive in the 470s. To some extent this was not difficult because his achievements were part of the overall Athenian achievement, and so his reminders fell on willing ears. Probably soon after 480 Simonides wrote one or two pieces on 'The Sea Battle off Artemision' and 'The Sea Battle off Salamis' (Suidas s.v. Σιμωνίδης). There is sufficient evidence to put a personal relationship between Simonides and Themistokles beyond real doubt⁸⁵. The role of Themistokles in his verses will not have been minimized (cf. Simonides fr. 91 (Edmonds) ap. Pl. Th. 15.2)⁸⁶. In 477/6 Themistokles was choregos for a victorious trilogy of Phrynichos (Pl. Th. 5.4). I know of no scholar who has rejected Bentley's guess that one of the plays was the Phoinissai⁸⁷. The Hypothesis to Aischylos' Persai suggests that the two plays were similar. Again the comparison with the Persai reveals that the significance of Themistokles' contribution

will have been given due prominence⁸⁸. Plutarch (Th. 22. 1.-2) records Themistokles having built a small temple of Artemis Aristoboule near his home in Melite. It was felt, Plutarch claims, that Themistokles had overstepped the mark in this implied self-praise⁸⁹. Remains of the temple have been discovered⁹⁰. Plutarch's (or his source's) interpretation of the motives behind the building may only be guesswork but surely correct⁹¹. We might add that the intimation that Themistokles had given the best advice (βουλευσάμενος) was not merely a celebration of past achievement, but carried the implication that Themistokles was still offering the best advice, and in view of past experience, the Athenians would do well to accept his suggestions now. Finally, we have Plutarch's statement (Th. 22.1) that Themistokles cultivated the tedious habit of referring repeatedly to his own past glories. We have already noted the possibility that Plutarch may be confirmed by the 'Themistokles' honour' ostrakon⁹².

The final category from which a man might derive good reputation was c) his personality. We shall stay with Themistokles. The last two items discussed - the Aristoboule temple and Themistokles' self-laudatory speeches - illustrate an important trait in Themistokles' character: his arrogance. I do not believe that Themistokles' confidence in his own ideas was itself a disadvantage to his reputation, but rather the implication of his attitude as expressed in the Aristoboule temple that the Athenians should accept his opinions and advice on trust because he had shown himself wise. This was probably also the context in which he had made the references to his past achievements (Pl. Th. 22.1). The same attitude can be detected in a fragment of Ion (fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.1) citing a comment of Themistokles that he the πόλιν δὲ ποιῆσαι μεγάλην καὶ
πλουσίαν ἐπίσταςθαι. Such an approach was a negation of

rational debate and an insult to the intelligence of those whose business it was to choose between rational arguments. This feature can only have emerged after his achievements in the Persian war, and the Plutarch passage suggests that this development was in the period leading up to his ostracism⁹³.

Another trait of character which had a negative effect on Themistokles' reputation probably only at a later stage in his career was his wiliness. That he was tricky — let us say resourceful — had been attested by the two messages to the King and by the walls incident. Once the fact was established it will not have been difficult, as the ancient tradition shows, to interpret many of his actions as double dealing. It has been shown that such a character trait was viewed positively by many of his contemporaries⁹⁴, but it nonetheless left Themistokles open to the suspicion that he might turn his 'resourcefulness' against the interests of the demos⁹⁵.

It is difficult to know how much of the information offered by Plutarch should be accepted, but the fact that so many anecdotes were developed to illustrate Themistokles' wit encourages accepting this as a historical personality trait⁹⁶. A sense of humour is always an asset to politicians relying on popular appeal. The tradition that Themistokles was particularly intimate with the man in the street first recorded by Cicero (de Sen. 7.2; cf. Val. Max. 8.7. ext. 15; Pl. Th. 5.4), with its suspiciously Roman ring, doesn't inspire confidence, though Themistokles' comments about his ignorance of the finer arts (Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.1) perhaps confirms an appeal to popular sympathies⁹⁷.

It is hard to know to what extent Kimon had developed his public personality by the mid-470s. We have already noted his

generosity. He had perhaps already developed an easy manner (cf. Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.3; Pl. K. 6. 2.-3; 11.2). There may have been a real contrast between Kimon and Themistokles. The latter's arrogance was contrasted by a more sophisticated approach to self-advertisement by Kimon. While Themistokles emphasized his own achievements, the epigrams set up for Eion sought to flatter the demos (Pl. K. 7. 4-5)⁹⁸. The festive atmosphere of the 'Theseus' bones celebrations was more engaging than Themistokles' autopane-gyrics. The slippery element in Themistokles' character was contrasted with Kimon's straightforwardness, even naivety (Stesimbrotos fr. 4 ap. Pl. K. 4.4)⁹⁹. On the whole it is best to believe that already by the mid-470s Kimon's personality was an asset to him politically¹⁰⁰.

Regarding Aristides' character little can be said beyond the fact, mentioned earlier, that the tradition of his fairness was probably contemporary and should also have been an asset¹⁰¹.

Our final category was 3. philoi support. It is incontestable that at the beginning of a man's career the advice and support he would receive from his wider family and their friends must have been invaluable. For lesser politicians this basis of support no doubt remained important for their whole careers. But what of the great leaders on whom we are forced to concentrate by the bias of our sources? How important would an extensive philoi complex be in achieving the final success in politics, that is, not election to office, but the exercise of real influence on the decisions of the Assembly, thus determining the direction of Athenian policy; and the ability to command enough support to effect the ostracism of an enemy or to escape ostracism oneself? Bicknell has written

"cabals of noble philoí ... frequently linked by marriage ties, work together as hetaíroi ... Followings of lesser men, local clientelae and, much harder to control, urban supporters, are pooled by the hetaíroi ... Until Perikles' day ... local resources of patronage remained available and were the key to political power, notwithstanding the fact that" the Solonian crisis, the tyranny and "Kleisthenes' reforms had resulted in even the rural demos acquiring a measure of self-assertiveness"¹⁰². Sealey suggested that "perhaps a wealthy family could influence the political behavior of its dependents by economic pressure"¹⁰³. We have already pointed to the evidence for the series of marriages which had linked the Philaidai, Kerykes and Alkmeonidai by about 479-8. The significance of this formidable nexus of families has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Bicknell, without exaggeration, called it a "grand coalition"¹⁰⁴. Such a coalition should have been able to command not only an extensive complex of loyal philoí support but also support from a correspondingly large number of "dependents", that following of "lesser men, local clientelae and ... urban supporters". There is no evidence to suggest that Themistokles should have had anything approaching comparable support of this type.

We stated at the beginning of this chapter that our aim was to characterize the relative importance of the categories we have set up, and to do this it would be worth relating them to the moderate political success of Themistokles in the first half of the 470s. Yet it will be objected that our first category, persuasive argument, remains an unknown quantity. Nor were we able to show decisively whether Themistokles or his enemies should have found more support as a result of reputation based on personality. In terms of

reputation based on personal achievement Themistokles clearly outstripped the collective reputation of his enemies, while they could individually point to family backgrounds more prestigious than Themistokles'; collectively, through their marriage ties the reputation they could derive from this source was immense. A further consequence of this "grand coalition" should be that Themistokles' enemies were able to depend on the loyal support of many more "dependents" than he could. So we are reduced to saying with certainty only that in terms of personal achievement Themistokles was paramount while his enemies could rely mainly on the reputation of their families and on their philoi support.

It may be further objected that the other side of the comparison, the measure of success, has not been sufficiently firmly established to render any conclusions valid, for while we denied that Athenian foreign policy down to Karystos can be cited as evidence for a decline in Themistokles' influence, we admitted that, with the probable exception of Karystos, the choice of targets needn't have been opposed by Themistokles' enemies. But even if this was the case, we should still have to characterize Themistokles' role in Athenian politics in this period as successful. There can be no doubt that Themistokles' enemies were concerned primarily not with bringing Themistokles round to their way of thinking in terms of foreign policy, but with his extinction from the political arena, regardless of the aims he pursued; policy was the weapon of personal animosity¹⁰⁵. That they were unsuccessful in achieving this until 471/0 is a fact which saves our whole approach from sinking into a quagmire of uncertainty¹⁰⁶. The date of Themistokles' ostracism, whatever the ups and downs of Themistokles' success in implementing

his policy may have been, is clear enough evidence that the nature and extent of broad based support of "dependents" has been exaggerated. The number of 'floating voters', so to speak, who were not sufficiently dependent on, or loyal to the next family up the hierarchical scale to take its advice about whether to vote and who to vote for was obviously greater than the number of dependants and loyal supporters who could be mustered, throughout the 470s, collectively by "the three most aristocratic families of early fifth century Athens"¹⁰⁷. This fact, obvious though it is, is worth stressing because some recent work on Athenian politics, while correcting some of the anachronistic interpretations of past generations, has at points given the impression that the elucidation of family politics is itself a sufficient explanation of success or failure in Athenian politics. Clearly, other factors were of decisive influence in determining success. All we can conclude at this stage is that reputation based on personal achievement may have been the decisive feature in seeing Themistokles through the 470s. We shall try to fill out this conclusion after analysing Athenian politics from Karystos to Themistokles' ostracism. But before we do that we must take stock of the situation in the Peloponnese.

CHAPTER TEN. SPARTA AND THE PELOPONNESE, 478/7 - 465/4.

We do not know whether those elements at Sparta who supported the agreement with Aristides and Kimon and the consequent transfer of hegemony in 478/7 did so only with a view to Sparta's securing her position within the Peloponnese, or whether some, at least, saw the prospect of Athens engaged in an everlasting war as an opportunity for Sparta to expand her influence outside the Peloponnese. I suspect the latter. That the Spartans in fact desisted from such expansion¹ is explicable because even those who were enthusiastic about extra-Peloponnesian activity will have recognized the need to re-establish control in the Peloponnese, as well as accepted the argument that some time should be given to rob Themistokles of ammunition aimed at stirring up fears of Sparta.

The Spartans had most probably not been secure within the Peloponnese in the decade or so before 480². As well as the provocative behaviour of Argos, events connected with the Persian invasion left debts to be settled. Elis and Mantinea had failed to send their contingents to Plataia on time; "the battle ... was not a sudden affair, and the abstention ... must be taken as deliberate"³. The citizens of the two cities acted before the Spartans and exiled their generals (H. 9.77). It has been argued that after the Persian invasion Karyai suffered for its alleged Medism⁴. There may well have been other actions of this kind of which no record remains. A priori, we should anyway assume that Sparta saw to her internal security in this period⁵. Another reason for believing in a tightening up of security is the discernible development towards hawkishness, presupposing as it does a sense of

internal security. Leotychides' actions in 479 show that he was enthusiastic for an expansion of Spartan influence in mainland Hellas. As hinted at above he may have believed it worth Sparta staying her hand in Hellas in the hope of achieving the political ruin of Themistokles. The actions against Eion and Skyros, and Themistokles' maintenance of influence in Athens, may have convinced Leotychides and like-minded men that it was no longer worth Sparta continuing her passivity. A witness to Leotychides' 'crime' was conjured up in 476/5⁶ by those who feared the consequences of such agitation⁷. The desperate remedy employed suggests that they feared extensive popular support for him. Those who were angered by developments in the Aegean between c.477 and c.475 may have pointed to the useful base Pausanias was occupying⁸. It is tempting to date his recall and imprisonment in the mid or late 470s (though the chronology is quite fluid) and to see it as a reaction against a development towards hawkishness, similar to Leotychides' case. But the decisive evidence, of course, is the Hetoimaridas debate⁹. That a motion to make war on the Athenians¹⁰ could be debated is evidence not only of Spartan anger with the Athenians but also of a sense of security within the Peloponnese. That it was defeated was probably the result of a revival by Hetoimaridas of a latent sense of insecurity. It is true that Diodoros does not specify the λόγους ἐπρόζοντας used by Hetoimaridas, but in view of the events of the next ten years it would be surprising if none of his arguments were connected with feelings towards Sparta in Argos and Arkadia, and perhaps Elis and Messenia, too¹¹.

Peloponnesian chronology during the 470s and 460s is not straightforward. Apart from the notorious difficulties surrounding

the dates of the third Messenian war¹², the paucity of information concerning the battles of Tegea and Dipaia has caused historians to date them according to deductions based on disputed interpretations and chronologies. There is a variety of approaches to the problem, and it would not be profitable to examine all in detail. The discussion which follows is susceptible to the same uncertainty as others. Yet for our purposes it is essential only to show that there was an anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese in the late 470s. I shall argue that it is safer to date Tegea in the 470s, but even if those scholars who date it in the 460s¹³ are correct, the beginnings of the movement which led to it would have to be located in the late 470s.

The basic evidence for the anti-Spartan movement within the Peloponnese is Herodotos' report of five Spartan victories (9.35), apparently in chronological order: Plataia, Tegea (over the Tegeans and Argives), Dipaia (over all the Arkadians except the Mantineians), Isthmos (over the Messenians) and Tanagra. Pausanias (3.11.8) helps us by saying that from Isthmos the Messenians retired to Ithome, which locates the battle before 462 when the insurgents were already blockaded on Ithome¹⁴. Another useful testimony is Polyainos (1.14.1), who mentions a King Archidamos who fought "the Arkadians". There are good reasons to identify the King with Archidamos II¹⁵. The designation "the Arkadians" suggests the battle at Dipaia rather than at Tegea. Dipaia should, therefore, be after Archidamos' accession in 469/8¹⁶. Isokrates (6.99) indicates that the Spartans were heavily outnumbered at Dipaia¹⁷. Wade-Gery suggested this might be explained by casualties caused by the earthquake¹⁸. But an equally adequate explanation would be that other forces had to

be deployed elsewhere at the same time. This could be explained by the fact that the third Messenian war had begun in 469/8¹⁹. Potentially more useful is the combination of two facts. According to Herodotos (9.35), although the Argives had assisted the Tegeans at Tegea they are not mentioned at Dipaia, and it is, therefore, safe to assume that they were not present. In the late 460s Argos was an enemy of Sparta (Thuc. 102.4). There is no reason to believe that between the battle of Tegea and the late 460s there was a period of friendship²⁰. One naturally wonders why they were not at Dipaia. Diodoros (65.1) says war broke out between the Argives and Mykenaians in 468/7. It is clear that his source, Ephoros, has drawn a causal link between the beginning of the third Messenian war and the Mykenanian war (Diod. 65.3 and 4)²¹. Some scholars, accepting the causal link, have dated the Mykenanian war to c.464, because they believe the Messenian war to have begun only in 465/4²². If we accept Diodoros' 469/8 Messenian war date, as we have done²³, there is no objection to accepting his 468/7 Mykenanian war date. It has been suggested that the reason for the Argive absence from Dipaia was her war with Mykenai²⁴. The suggestion is acceptable, and allows a plausible reconstruction of events.

The anti-Spartan movement in Arkadia may have been gathering strength since the battle of Tegea (see below); and will have been encouraged by the beginning of the Messenian war. Sparta had lost face because of the recent Pausanias affair²⁵. Diodoros (65.3) tells us that the Argives invited their allies to help them, and Strabo (8.6.19, p.377) says they included Tegeans (and Kleonaians). It is possible that at the same time²⁶ other Arkadian states (except Mantinea: H. 9.35; Xen. Hell. 5.2.3) acted in concert in defying Spartan hegemony, perhaps by refusing to supply contingents for the

Messenian war, but possibly even by mustering at Dipaia in preparation for a campaign against Sparta in support of the Messenians. The Spartans, anyway, made an attack which resulted in the battle of Dipaia. The Tegeans were present at the battle (Paus. 8.45.2). Either they returned from Mykenai after the Mykenaians had been defeated in battle (Diod. 65.3), or they had divided their forces between Mykenai and Dipaia. The Argives, of course, stayed to secure the defeat of Mykenai. The revolt of Arkadia, then, suppressed by the battle of Dipaia, thus becomes one of the *ἰδίους πολέμους*, along with the Messenian war, which prevented the Spartans bringing aid to the besieged Mykenaians (Diod. 65.4)²⁶. 468/7 is thus a terminus post quem for Dipaia. Several reasons require us to date it shortly after 468/7. Diodoros appears to date the outbreak of the Mykenaiian war (65.1). Although the Mykenaians had to be besieged, they were taken by storm, not starved out (Diod. 65.4), and so we should not postulate a lengthy war. It perhaps ended in the next archon year, 467/6. According to our interpretation Dipaia was fought during the Mykenaiian war, so between 468/7 and 467/6. It seems more likely that the concerted Arkadian action should come about at the beginning of the Argive action against Mykenai, soon after it was obvious that the Spartans felt compelled to retain their forces in Lakonia and Messenia, rather than that the Arkadians should give the Spartans a chance to deal with her enemies one by one. Finally, by 465/4 the Spartans were sufficiently recovered from their problems of security within the Peloponnese to be able to convince the Thasians that they would be prepared to invade Attika²⁷. Let us describe the date of Dipaia as about 467. This date receives slight and indecisive confirmation

from the chronology of Themistokles' flight. Andrewes was right to dismiss Busolt's contention that the Spartans must have already defeated the Arkadians when they applied for Themistokles' extradition²⁸. But Themistokles' behaviour does suggest that Arkadia was not safe from Spartan intervention, which corresponds, we may assume, less to the situation obtaining before Dipaia, than after it. Themistokles' flight from the Peloponnese should fall within the period spring 468 and summer 466²⁹.

The relationship of the battle of Dipaia to that of Tegea is not too clear. But contrary to what Busolt says, there is, in fact, reason to suspect that Dipaia did not follow closely upon Tegea³⁰. At Tegea the Tegeans had no other Arkadian allies. By the time of Dipaia a completely new and radically altered alignment had taken shape with the revolt of all Arkadian states, except Mantinea, from Sparta. One naturally looks for either a long gap or a significant event. The troubles besetting Sparta associated with the third Messenian war would provide an explanation of the upsurge in Arkadian self-assertiveness. That merely gives us a terminus ante quem of 469/8 for the battle of Tegea. The Hetoimaridas debate provides a lower terminus post quem for Tegea than Herodotos' battle of Plataia. Tegea town was not destroyed after the battle (Simonides fr. 129 (Edmonds))³¹. As Busolt noted, the fact that the Tegeans were to fight another day underlines the implications of the epigram³². Had there been an indecisive war of this sort against the Tegeans at some stage between 479 and 475/4 it would be inconceivable that the proposal to make war on Athens should have been almost accepted at Sparta. The first hint of discord between Tegea and Sparta comes with Leotychides' choice of Tegea as his place of exile.

Yet this should not be over-interpreted. Leotychides was afforded protection by the sanctuary of Athena Alea, not by the Tegeans (Paus. 3.5.6)³³. But his presence there must have recalled the trauma occasioned by Kleomenes' activities in Arkadia (H. 6.74-5), and may have featured as an argument in Hetoimaridas' case³⁴. Pausanias (3.5.6) suggests that the Spartans were in a position to force Leotychides' extradition, but chose not to. This fits with an attack on Tegea while the King was still there, i.e. 476/5-469/8³⁵. The purpose of the action against Tegea, then, may have been nothing more than a demonstration that it would go ill with the Tegeans if they were to listen to any revolutionary suggestions Leotychides might make. It would also serve as a warning to other Peloponnesian states. As such it fits best as a direct consequence of the Hetoimaridas debate. It was a reassertion of Sparta's firm control over the Peloponnese³⁶. So a date in the second half of the 470s seems much more likely than one in the early 460s.

It is possible that the action against Tegea had the opposite effect to that intended, embittering feeling towards Sparta throughout the Peloponnese, as witnessed by the near unity of the Arkadians at Dipala. Perhaps another reaction was the decision of the Eleians to synoikize in 471/0 (Diod. 54.1)³⁷. It is gratifying, finally, to note that our chronological deductions based on the literary evidence, can, arguably, be supported in broad outline by numismatic evidence³⁸.

To sum up, the period following the transfer of hegemony saw at Sparta a generally-accepted drive to secure firm control of the Peloponnese (except the Argolid). There may have been some who also wished to expand Spartan influence outside the Peloponnese, too. The Hetoimaridas debate provides evidence, paradoxically, both of

extra-Peloponnesian ambitions, with the sense of security within the Peloponnese which those ambitions presuppose, and of the fact that this confidence was shaky, in so far as the Spartans could be persuaded to believe that this security had not yet been achieved. The second half of the 470s saw the Spartans acting high-handedly in a counter-productive attempt to discourage any tendency towards self-assertiveness in the Peloponnese. The "strong sense of common nationality among the Arcadians of the earlier fifth century"³⁹ certainly achieved some kind of political union which warrants the designation 'Arkadian League'⁴⁰. The divisions in the League, manifested in the absence of Arkadian support for Tegea at the battle of Tegea and in the consistently aloof stance of Mantinea should not be used to minimize the significance that the degree of unity the League could show at Dipala had for Spartan security⁴¹. Argos was consistently anti-Spartan in the 470s and 460s⁴². The third Messenian war fell into two stages, ^{the first in} 469/8-465/4, when there must have been a series of engagements, at the end of which the Spartans appear to have regained virtually full control. Shortly after the Great Earthquake launched the second stage and threw Sparta into dire peril. The failure of the Arkadians to re-establish their pre-Dipala unity in order to exploit this situation may in part be explained by the fear Athenian assistance to Sparta engendered in potential Arkadian enemies of Sparta. If so, the deal over the transfer had paid an unexpectedly high dividend.

CHAPTER ELEVEN. THE ATHENIANS, 475-4 - 471/0.

In chapter eight we argued against adding to the evidence for the period between Karystos and 470/69 by postulating Athenian military activity. I suggest that the inactivity is explicable primarily in terms of Themistokles' response to events in the Peloponnese. This suggestion requires some defence because no source connects Athenian policy at this time with Peloponnesian events.

While the details of proposals to make war on Athens made during the Hetoimaridas debate may not have become known at Athens the atmosphere of growing hostility towards the Athenians which formed the background to the debate and which may have found other expressions was most probably known to the Athenians¹. It is not arbitrary to guess that Themistokles will have pointed an accusing finger at Sparta's attempts at gaining a firmer grip on her control of the Peloponnese, and have warned the Athenians of what he interpreted their ultimate objectives to be. To do so would have been consistent with his actions in 479-8². His reputation for anti-Spartanism was probably not based solely on his stance over the walls, Pagasai and the Amphiktyonic proposals. The attempts by Sparta to annihilate him in the 460s suggest he was still actively anti-Spartan then, and so it is reasonable, almost necessary, to assume he was anti-Spartan in the intervening period also.

It would not have been difficult to portray Spartan actions in the Peloponnese as the first stage in a domination of mainland Hellas which would eventually include Athens, and one can imagine how Themistokles could have related this to the question of involvement in Asia. If, for example, an embassy from a group of men planning

to stage an anti-Persian revolution in a Greek city of Asia appealed for Athenian military assistance, Themistokles, while wishing their cause well and without advocating renouncing the intention of becoming an active 'protector' of Asiatic Greeks, might have been able to point to the threat which Spartan expansionism was posing Athens, and warned that the Athenians could not risk a large scale engagement in Asia while the danger of a Spartan 'stab in the back' existed³. Bearing in mind the ambivalent attitude we deduced the Athenians must have had towards their Ionian kinsmen and other Asiatic Greeks as a result of their less than 'patriotic' role in the Persian war, the Athenian demos may well have been content to allow the Asiatic cities the chance of showing their own commitment to ridding themselves of the Persian yoke. The crisis would come when cities which had done so and had joined the alliance were attacked by the Persians again.

On the other hand, if we are right to date the battle of Tegea in the second half of the 470s, it is difficult not to guess that the Tegeans and Argives, once decided upon conflict with Sparta, sought a military alliance with Athens. The rivalries and hostility of 480 and 479 were less relevant to the Argives and Tegeans now than the evidence of Athens' posture as protector of the autonomy of Greeks threatened by Spartan interference which Themistokles had, as representative of the Athenians, assumed after Plataia. If such an appeal were made I think Themistokles would have been a vigorous supporter of advancing aid.

There is, indeed, some indirect evidence that the question of supporting the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese was in the air. We have seen that Cicero (*de Off.* 2.49; cf. *Val. Max.* 6.5.

ext. 2) mentions a proposal by Themistokles to burn the Spartan fleet at Gytheion. It is very possible that he or his source has simply confused Themistokles' stance over Pagasai with Tolmides' action against the Spartans at Gytheion (Thuc. 108.5; Diod. 84.6). Yet Cicero seems to have been very well informed sometimes about details of Themistokles' life⁴. It is not impossible that Cicero has conflated Themistokles' stance over Pagasai not with Tolmides' actual burning of the docks, but with a historical proposal by Themistokles in this period connected with possible assistance that could be afforded the anti-Spartan movement⁵.

There is better evidence to show that aid to the movement in the Peloponnese was a divisive issue in Athens at the time of Tegea. Simonides fr. 130 (Edmonds) is dedicated εἰς τοὺς ἐν Τεγέᾳ
κεσόντας ἀριστεῖς Ἀθηναίους. No adequate reason has been advanced for the tendency of modern scholars to ignore this valuable document⁶. Yet Herodotos (9.35) says the Tegeans and Argives fought at Tegea, with no hint of Athenians. Thucydides (102.4) says the Athenians abandoned their alliance with the Spartans only in the late 460s, which, without comment, is incompatible with military conflict between the two states before that time. But rejection of an appeal by the Assembly did not prevent private volunteers offering their assistance (H. 6.92). Herodotos' omission of these probably not numerous Athenians who fell at Tegea may be the result of the abbreviated nature of his or his source's reference to the battles in the list (cf. the slightly fuller account of Pausanias 3.11.7). Thucydides was correct in implying that the two states, Sparta and Athens, were officially allied until the late 460s. Themistokles, then, failed to persuade a majority of the Assembly to support the

Tegeans and Argives against the Spartans but, apparently, succeeded in motivating one section of favourable opinion to this degree of commitment⁷. The reference in the second couplet to the freedom of Hellas gives us a hint as to the light in which Spartan actions in the Peloponnese may have been cast.

Finally it is tempting to interpret the elusive battle at Oinoe in a similar way⁸. The Peisianakteion (Pl. K. 4.5) was most probably built shortly before 460⁹. Such an interpretation of the battle would enable us to understand how it could have taken place some time before the erection of the stoa and have been portrayed in it. While it is possible to believe that the Oinoe painting was not included in the original building¹⁰, we should only resort to such a hypothesis if no other explanation of the evidence is possible. Its inclusion in a building which celebrated the achievements of Kimon's family causes no difficulty when viewed against the background of hostility felt at Athens towards Lakonizers which erupted after the Spartan insult to the Athenians in 462¹¹. If Andrewes' location of the battle site is accepted then the engagement cannot have involved large numbers¹². It would be possible but hazardous to attempt to fit the battle into the pattern of events in the Peloponnese during the 470s and 460s which might account for the size of the forces involved. It is, however, safer to conclude only that Oinoe could have occurred during the 470s or 460s before the Athens-Argive alliance, as its representation in a building roughly simultaneous with the alliance suggests, and that Thucydides' silence could be explained by believing the Athenians who died there did so as volunteers and not as representatives of the Athenian state¹³. If this is correct these volunteers may have gone as a result of attempts

by Themistokles (or his political heirs) to persuade the demos to protect Argos.

There is sufficient reason, then, in view of earlier and later Themistoklean actions, and in view of the indirect evidence we have just noted, to believe that Themistokles and his friends were advocating support for the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese in the second half of the 470s and it may well be that they justified their stance by portraying Spartan actions as representing a potential threat to Athenian security. The fears that they engendered thereby may in part explain the lack of anti-Persian activity at this time. But the Athenians also ceased military operations against non-Persian targets throughout the Aegean. This was perhaps in response to the analysis of international relations offered by Themistokles' enemies which may have interpreted high-handed actions like that against Karystos as leading inevitably to bad blood between Athens and Sparta, and indeed, other Greek states¹⁴.

This tendency towards *ἡσυχία* may be further accounted for by the need to turn seriously to the reconstruction of Athens and Attika which the Athenians had begun immediately after their return but which must have progressed only at a slow pace because of the long campaigns of 478, 477 and perhaps 476, 475 and 474 also. The need to reconstruct affected all citizens, and the probably not numerous wage-earners will have benefitted from the need of their more wealthy neighbours to employ extra hands in reconstruction, be it in Athens or Attika¹⁵. This more practical reaction to the destruction of Attika may have been replacing the emotional lust for vengeance which probably characterized Athenian feelings in the period immediately after the return to Attika.

This inclination towards *ἡσυχία* must also have been effective in contributing to the rejection of the positive elements of Themistokles' policy. Other reasons, however, may also be deduced. The significance of the existence of an alliance between Athens and Sparta so far unbroken by the latter should not be underestimated. The instability and disunity of the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese, demonstrated for us by the lack of Arkadian support for Tegea at the battle of Tegea, will not have commended it as a reliable partner. The emotional repugnance of joining arms with Medizing Argos must have been considerable. These must have been some of the considerations against which Themistokles will have applied all the influence he could muster, for he had committed himself irrevocably to an anti-Spartan policy, and his political position would become extremely vulnerable if the Athenians not only rejected the idea of support for the anti-Spartan movement but also turned to the war in the east with such commitment that they became dependent on the good will of Sparta in Hellas. Kimon (and Aristides) were, conversely, equally dependent politically on the policy of friendship with Sparta to which they were committed. In portraying Sparta as a threat to Athenian security, I suspect that the persuasiveness of Themistokles' case was directly related to events in the Peloponnese, which, as we saw in the last chapter, we are unable to chart in detail. But it is a fact that the longer a warning of danger is held out without any substantiation the less effective it becomes. Kimon's simple response to Themistokles' prognostications -

ἀλλ' οὐ Λακεδαιμονιοί γε ποιοῦσι (Stesimbrotos fr. 7 ap. Pl. K. 16.4) - will have gained more credibility as time

passed and Themistokles' warnings appeared more and more baseless¹⁶.

The Persai was first performed in Athens in 473/2 (Hypothesis). It will, then, reflect feelings, say, in 474-3. The play evinces an admiration for the achievements of Themistokles¹⁷. It is reasonable, then, to interpret the implications of passages in the Persai in terms of what it can tell us about the arguments used in the debate on foreign policy in which Themistokles played a leading role. The most striking impression conveyed by the Persai is the fact that Persian power has been completely destroyed, and has not suffered merely a military setback (Aisch. Pers. 249-55, 260-61, 278-9, 282-4, 517, 532-5, 589-90, 595-7, 669-70, 677-80, 714, 716, 728-33, 790-831, 904-8, 929-31, 1008, 1016, 1035). The point is made so consistently throughout the play, and in such a variety of ways that it is fair to deduce that Aischylos was supporting the view that Athens no longer stood in direct danger from another Persian invasion. The words of Darius' ghost (790-93, 794, cf. 823-31) render the general implication more explicitly and make the point in more specific terms; if Persia is to prosper again she must learn the lesson never again to make war against Hellas; the number of men needed to do so cannot be supported by the produce of Hellas' barren land¹⁸. The point that the Persians were not planning to invade Hellas again is made from another angle, too. Early in the play Atossa notes that in the event of defeat Xerxes will remain King (213-14); the audience is thus reminded that despite his defeat Xerxes is still on the throne. It is emphasized that the mistake of invading Hellas was made as a result of youthful recklessness (744, 782, cf. 753-8, 829-31). By the time the play was performed some ten years had passed since the Greeks learned of the

young Xerxes' intention to mount an invasion, and the implication may have been recognized by the audience that a more mature man -- as Xerxes in 473/2 was -- would be unlikely to undertake such a rash venture.

I think we may deduce from this that Aischylos was supporting Themistokles' rejection of one particular approach his enemies were making to discourage the demos from accepting his anti-Spartan proposals. It would be an obvious method of discouraging involvement in the anti-Spartan movement to suggest that the Persians would be quick to mount another campaign once they saw the two "yoke-fellows" at war¹⁹.

A related question was the position of the cities of the Asiatic mainland. We interpreted the declaration of intent of the Athenian alliance as both a promise of protection to those who revolted and a threat of reprisals from the alliance to those who remained loyal to the King. For a few years the mere announcement of intent may have provided a pro-Athenian wave throughout the coast of Asia, but the example of any city which chose not to join the alliance and which was not being ravaged by the alliance's forces will have slowed down the momentum of any pro-Athenian wave. There may have been revolts within some cities from the alliance. We showed that although Themistokles probably had sufficient political acumen not to advocate openly the abandonment of interest in these Asiatic cities, the policies he was advocating in fact would have prohibited Athens engaging her energies in Asia in such a way as would probably eventually be required if she were to back up the promise-cum-threat expressed in 478/7. Also, we were able to interpret the actions of the Athenian-dominated alliance down to 475-4 as directing energies

away from conflict with Persia and towards rule of the Aegean, resulting in a heightening of tension within Hellas which had the effect of discouraging Athenian involvement in Asia; this effect was only one of the reasons we noted which encouraged believing Themistokles was influential in setting this course. By 474-3 the suggestion may have been made that Themistokles' policies were leading to the abandonment of an Athenian commitment to involvement in Ionia.

It is possible to interpret parts of the *Persai* as an attempt to counter such an attack on Themistokles' policies. Two approaches are discernible. Firstly, the impression is created that in fact most of the cities of the Ionian mainland have been freed from Persia. This is done by failing to list individual cities which, as a result of Xerxes' defeat, are about to revolt from Persia (898-900, 584-90), as Aischylos had done for the islands (879-96). Furthermore, the ultimate credit for the successes that had been achieved in Asia is directly attributed to the victory at Salamis, and so in large measure to Themistokles (595-7, 904-8). In this way Aischylos was mollifying the reaction to Themistokles' policies of that area of Athenian feeling which inclined towards a magnanimous sense of responsibility for the liberation of Ionian cities.

The sympathy of this magnanimous area of feeling will have been won by a second device which I take, however, as directed primarily at the other extremity of the ambivalent Athenian feeling towards the Ionians. Aischylos appears to be trying to minimize the fact of active Ionian Medism in 480 and 479²⁰. The purpose of this may well have been to mollify that area of feeling which sought vengeance from those Greek cities which were still 'King's land'²¹. The *Persai*,

then, can be seen as directing attention away from involvement in mainland Asia, as well as affirming the absence of danger to Hellas from Persia; as such it is fair to assume these two elements were included in the strategy of opposition to Themistokles, and that Aischylos is lending poetic support to Themistokles' position.

Although we are unable to give an account of specific stages in the process, it is easy to imagine how and why popular Athenian feeling gradually shifted away from even the partial acceptance of Themistokles' analysis of the 'international' situation in favour of that of his enemies. We have already noted how the warning of a danger from Sparta became less effective as time went by in explaining the Athenian rejection of Themistokles' anti-Spartan proposals. The ineffectiveness of this warning also removed one of the factors which contributed to discouraging active involvement in Asia²². By c.471 the first stages in reconstructing Attika - rebuilding and replanting - should have been completed²³, making the emotionally and materially attractive prospect of 'ravaging the King's land' more practicable. Specific events in the east may have stimulated the Athenians to the action they finally took in 470/69 (Diod. 60.1 and 3). As well as the possibility of internal revolutions resulting in revolt from the Athenian alliance, there may even have been the beginnings of renewed Persian military actions against Greek cities in the late 470s. Kypros, for example, an island so difficult for the Athenians to dominate that it may have been viewed by Themistokles in the same light as mainland cities, may have been dominated by the Persians shortly after the production of the Persai in 473/2 (Hypothesis). At any rate, the loss of Kypros occurred between 473/2 and 465, the date of Eurymedon²⁴. *ἡ σελία* was, anyway, not a

condition the Athenians were likely to remain in for long (cf. Thuc. 70.9; Pl. K. 18.1)²⁵.

The rejection of Themistokles' policies is presupposed by, though does not in itself explain, the fact that the Athenians chose to ostracize him. Proposals and advice could be rejected by a vote in the Assembly. Why did so many citizens not only reject Themistokles' proposals on Sparta and incline towards acceptance of pursuing the war in the east, but also consider it desirable to have Themistokles removed for a decade? The sources do offer some indication of why he was ostracized, and they fit into the pattern we have reconstructed of a debate on foreign policy. But the rejection of his foreign policy forms only the background against which the decisive reasons can be seen.

Plutarch (Th. 22.1 cf. 22.3) and others attribute the ostracism of Themistokles (and others) to φθόνος, which is obviously true to an extent, but not very helpful²⁶. We want to know why this envy took the malignant form it did, when it did. Plutarch (Th. 22.1) also mentions slanders levelled at Themistokles. Slander seems to have been a regular feature of Athenian political life, as the comments on the ostraka show, and Plutarch (Th. 22.1) implies that Themistokles was slandered throughout his career and that it was only because of their envy that people began to listen to them (ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν διὰ τὸ φθονεῖν ἡδέως τὰς διαβολὰς προσιεμένων). Something in Themistokles' behaviour must have changed which made the charges levelled at him more plausible, or opened him to more telling criticisms, for envy of Themistokles should have been at its height at the time of his splendid personal achievements, not several years later.

Plutarch, in this context, has only one concrete example of such slanders. He quotes Timokreon's accusations of bribery (fr. 1 ap. Pl. Th. 21. 2 -3). At worst, these, and perhaps other similar accusations, resulted in a trial at which Themistokles was acquitted²⁷. Plutarch connects the willingness of the demos to listen to these slanders with Themistokles' painful tendency to refer frequently to his own achievements (cf. Plato Georg. 516 d), noting, too, the disquiet his building of the temple of Artemis Aristoboule caused. We have already analysed the significance of these facts and concluded that what was particularly damaging to Themistokles' political standing was the implication that the Athenians were wrong to reject his advice²⁸. He was not prepared, in other words, to accept the judgement of a majority of citizens if it ran counter to his own judgement. Our analysis led us to emphasize one side of the effect this had, namely, the impression it created of arrogance, and the insult to the demos' intelligence his attitude implied²⁹. Another related interpretation could be and was emphasized and exploited by his enemies.

In his written defence against Medism charges, sent to Athens while Themistokles was living in Argos as an ostracisé, he made use of προτέρας κατηγορίας (Pl. Th. 23.3) which had been slanderously levelled at him by his enemies to the people (διαβαλλόμενος γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας). These accusations (κατηγορία) needn't have been formal. They had claimed he was ἀρχειν μὲν αἰεὶ ζητῶν, ἀρχεσθαι δὲ μὴ πεφυκὼς μηδὲ βουλόμενος (Pl. Th. 23.4)³⁰. This is confirmation of the implications we drew from Plutarch's comments about Themistokles' tendency to attempt to convince the Athenians that they

should accept his advice as a matter of faith, contrary to their own judgement³¹. In other words, even though the Athenians had been rejecting his proposals to support the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese he would not drop his pressure. Nor were his arguments without appeal, as Thucydides (138.3), in a general comment, emphasized, and as the presence of Athenian volunteers at Tegea demonstrates.

So as well as indignation at his arrogance, and perhaps even a sense of the constitutional impropriety of Themistokles' refusal to accept the Assembly's considered judgement, Themistokles' ostracism is explicable as a practical measure, for the proposals of his enemies to pursue in earnest the war in the east against the "King's land" were becoming increasingly popular, and it was feared that it would be dangerous to embark on such a drive while the persuasive and so divisive Themistokles was still in a position to move the Athenians to war with Sparta³². The last years had shown that he would indeed continue to exploit that position. Furthermore, such actions as Athenian volunteers fighting against Sparta must have been seen by the demos as provocative to Sparta. Themistokles' warnings of an eventual Spartan attack on Attika will have been recognized as a potentially self-fulfilling prophecy. His ostracism also represented an emphatic assurance of Athenian goodwill to Spartan imperialism within the Peloponnese. These considerations, I feel, sufficiently explain why the Athenians felt it necessary, beyond the rejection of his policy, to remove Themistokles from Athens³³.

Finally, let us apply these results to our attempt to establish the relative importance of the three categories we distinguished which contributed to political success. Our first category was the

intrinsic persuasiveness of a man's arguments, and we emphasized that the fact that a man was advocating a policy which conformed with the desires of the majority of the demos made his arguments persuasive. We suggested that Themistokles in the first half of the 470s had deliberately emphasized that element in his policy which he knew would correspond to popular desires. It is likely that Themistokles put all his efforts into persuading the Athenians to adopt the less popular notion of support for the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese in the second half of the 470s when that movement becomes discernible. We were able to list possible reasons why his arguments failed to convince the majority of Athenians, and conversely why his enemies' policies were more attractive. There is, then, a *prima facie* case for believing that these possible reasons in fact contributed to Themistokles' political failure in the second half of the 470s, and so we should assume that the intrinsic persuasiveness of the case Themistokles was presenting was less compelling than that of his enemies.

Our second category was good repute. In the second half of the 470s reputation deriving from the glory of a man's family remained static. As far as reputation deriving from a man's own achievement is concerned, Themistokles should still have outstripped all other men, although he had actually achieved nothing (as far as we know) since 480-78, while Kimon had been able to exploit such "achievements" as Skyros and 'Theseus' bones with some skill. The third source of reputation, a man's character, is an area in which we can say with confidence that Themistokles' credit went down. We have already shown that his attitude towards his past achievements suggested the Athenians should follow his advice on trust and that this was interpreted as arrogance. In trying to demonstrate the wisdom of his attitude he had to refer repeatedly to his own past

achievements, and he did so to a boring extent. We also argued that it was with the war against Karystos, in 475-4, that Themistokles' financial integrity was first seriously called into question. These three elements - arrogance, tediousness and dubious integrity - must have represented a serious deterioration in the assessment of Themistokles' character in the second half of the 470s.

We have no information which could shed light on the assessment of the demos of the personalities of Themistokles' enemies at this time, though there is no reason to doubt that Aristides (if he was still alive) continued to be well-respected (Pl. Ar. 26. 1-3), or that the attractive elements we pointed to in Kimon's character in the first half of the decade diminished now or were marred by the emergence of any less pleasing traits. The coincidence of the decline in the assessment of Themistokles' character and his political failure is likely to be significant.

The last category we discerned was success deriving from the support of philoi connections. We noted above that the time-lag between the formation of the "grand coalition" by 479-8 and Themistokles' ostracism in 471/0 is incompatible with the belief that the extensiveness and influence of philoi support was the decisive element in determining success or failure in Athenian politics. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that by the time of Themistokles' ostracism there is some reason to believe that the coalition was less unified than in its first few years when it had failed to ostracise Themistokles. Since Perikles took on the choregia of Aischylos' Persai in 473/2 (IG II² 2318, 9) he should have had his family's finances at his disposal, and so his father,

Xanthippos, should already be dead. In view of the pro-Themistoklean tone of the play we may assume that Perikles was to some extent already in sympathy with Themistokles, or at least his policies. This is perhaps confirmed by his part in the prosecution of Kimon a decade later (Stesimbrotos fr. 5 ap. Pl. K. 14.4; Per. 10.5; AP 27.1)³⁴. The coalition had probably lost the co-operation of one area of Alkmeonid support by the end of the 470s. Yet, despite the weakened coalition Themistokles is ostracized. Other factors were evidently of more consequence than philoi connections.

To sum up, then, our analysis of Athenian politics in the 470s leads us to conclude that for leading politicians such as Themistokles and Kimon success depended heavily on the persuasiveness of their arguments, the reputation they could win from personal achievement and on an attractive personality. The importance of reputation deriving from family prestige and support from philoi connections was apparently less important to the great leaders, which is not to deny that these two elements were useful in the early stages of any politician's career and probably at all stages for the minor politicians, whose careers must unfortunately remain undocumented.

CHAPTER TWELVE. THE KIMONIAN ERA

In chapter eight we showed that Diodoros (60.1) dated the beginning of preparations for an Athenian drive against the Persians in the east to the year 470/69. I can see no objection to accepting this date as correct, and there are in fact interpretative reasons in favour of accepting it. Diodoros links these preparations with the election of Kimon as strategos with orders to carry out the campaign, and this no doubt meant also the preparations necessary for it. So Kimon will have been elected to the strategia of 470/69 shortly after the ostracism of Themistokles in 471/0, expelled partly because his presence in Athens was incompatible with the planned offensive against Persian strongholds in the east. So the 470/69 date for the beginning of preparations fits well with the securely dated ostracism of Themistokles¹. I have nothing to add to the description of the preparations for and execution of the military operations down to the beginning of the Thasos revolt which has been given².

There is little to be said of political life in Athens in the period from 470/69 until the Thasos revolt. Those politicians who had been sympathetic towards Themistokles' policies will not have been foolish enough to continue to press for those policies which had contributed to Themistokles' ostracism, until the climate of opinion had changed³. We know of two men who advocated an anti-Spartan policy in the later 460s, Ephialtes and Perikles⁴. In order to account for the influence Ephialtes was to command in the second half of the 460s it is reasonable to wonder whether he did not occupy the strategia during the late 470s and/or early 460s.

Perikles had indirectly expressed support for Themistokles' policies by his choregia of Aischylos' Persai in 473/2, though he was a very young man still, probably in his early twenties⁵. Plutarch (Per. 16.2) would appear to date ^{the start of} his political career right at the beginning of the 460s, though his evidence is suspect⁶. He should have been able to control an area of loyal Alkmeonid support, but we may doubt that his influence was extensive in the city generally. He, like other men sympathetic to Themistokles' attitude to Sparta, most probably left the dangerous subject alone in the early 460s, anyway. There is, at least, no evidence at all of open opposition by Ephialtes or Perikles or anyone else to Kimon and his friends or to their policies in the first half of the 460s.

Indeed, what evidence there is speaks of a closing of ranks and a unified effort by all Athenians behind the anti-Persian drive. Of the Seven Against Thebes, produced in 468/7, "Aristophanes has Aeschylus say ... that "every man in the audience would have longed to be a fighter" (Frogs 1022), but this need not be taken seriously ... as an explanation of why Aeschylus wrote it." Podlecki's reason for this judgement is that he thinks Athens was at this time "riding on the crest of success"⁷. In fact, she was probably facing discontent among her allies, notably Naxos, and perhaps Thasos, too, and, although there may have been an expansion of the Athenian alliance in 469 and 468, it is very possible that rumours of the Persian intention to mount another campaign had reached Athens by the time Aischylos wrote his play⁸. We may, then, take the evidence at face value. The fact that it was Aischylos who made this rousing appeal is significant of the degree of unity this new drive and new threat had forged among the Athenians⁹.

It is only this relatively brief period, after the ostracism of Themistokles until during the Thasos revolt, some six or seven years, which can be aptly termed the Kimonian era, and not, as is often the case, the whole period from 478/7 until Kimon's ostracism¹⁰. The dominance which Kimon enjoyed during this period appears to have been exploited to the full in what we may deduce to have been an attempt to secure his own continued predominance by means of both subtle and crude methods¹¹. Four incidents give us a glimpse of the political climate of the Kimonian era.

In 469/8 the archon appointed the board of generals to act as judges at the Dionysia (Pl. K. 8.7). The decision would appear, according to Plutarch, to have been Kimon's alone¹². He chose Sophokles' trilogy in preference to Aischylos'. Kimon's decision may have been influenced by purely artistic considerations; there is some reason, though, to look for another explanation¹³. The decision was probably connected with Aischylos' erstwhile sympathy for Themistokles' policies. "Kimon, it seems, could be vindictive"¹⁴.

Between 468 and 466¹⁵ Spartan envoys came to Athens and required the punishment of Themistokles for what they maintained had been his complicity in the alleged plots of Pausanias (Thuc. 1.35.2). I believe a plausible reconstruction of the outline of Pausanias' intentions and explanation of his downfall has been made by those scholars who have interpreted the charges of helotism as based on Pausanias' plans to exploit the military potential of the helot population, at the same time removing the threat to Sparta, so paralysing to her vital energies¹⁶. The Spartans, then, probably had their own reasons for liquidating Pausanias, and the boon of being able to implicate Themistokles in the affair was a (surely very

welcome) spin-off, so to speak¹⁷. There is no doubt that they had the backing of certain Athenians. The precise legal procedures which took place between the arrival of the Spartan envoys and the condemnation of Themistokles are not clear, and are for our purposes not important. But a reliable tradition has preserved the name of Leobotes Alkmeonos of Agryle in connection with an εἰσαγγελία (Krateros fr. 11; cf. Pl. Th. 23.1; Mor. 605e)¹⁸. Leobotes, an Alkmeonid, appears not to have been otherwise active politically at this time; we hear nothing else of him, and, as far as I know, he has not yet appeared on any ostraka¹⁹. It is fair to assume that he was used by other men. Plutarch, in fact, has vague words about others involved in a less formal way in this final attack on Themistokles. Among others he specifically mentions Kimon (Ar. 25.7)²⁰. At what stage in the legal procedure Kimon and others²¹ added their weight is not clear. The important point, however, is that Kimon and his friends supported the Spartan accusations²². In view of the good relations Kimon enjoyed with Sparta, one not unfairly wonders whether they had made contact on this matter before the Spartans arrived at Athens. Such contact would, of course, be made with great tact and the cover-up would be carefully planned. We have no evidence of a framing operation, but since it would fit the atmosphere of the Kimonian era discernible from more securely attested events, suspicion is justified²³.

It has been pointed out that the decision to pursue Themistokles (Thuc. 136.2) was un-Athenian²⁴. The decision probably reflects the intensity of feeling against Themistokles. It is no longer necessary to defend the claim that the idea of Themistokles' Medism is unconvincing²⁵. An explanation of the Athenian willingness to believe

the accusations over and above the 'evidence' is required.

Cawkwell made the valuable link between news of the intention of the King to mount another operation against the Greeks and the exile of Themistokles²⁶. Cawkwell specifies the link by emphasizing that "Themistokles had been less than zealous for the *Μηδικοῦς πόλεμος*"²⁷. Now we felt compelled to agree that while this was in fact the case Themistokles had sufficient political acumen in the 470s to avoid admitting his true attitude. Instead, he directed Athenian energies and fears in such a way as to bring about the cessation of hostilities with Persia. As such there is no reason to believe that before these accusations were made there had been any inkling that Themistokles could have had illicit dealings with the Persians, and this is supported by the silence of the ostraka as to such suspicions. By 471/0 Themistokles was provocatively anti-Spartan, and was ostracized, in part, for this reason. While the Athenians realized it would be dangerous to embark on the war in the east in earnest if Themistokles continued his anti-Spartan agitation (as he surely would) the intellectual leap had not been made which could equate this anti-Spartanism with aiding the King's cause. It was, I suggest, the sudden and blinding flash of the apparent perception which the Medism hypothesis produced, allowing, as it did, so many facets of Themistokles' character and policies, and of present circumstances, to fit into the picture it created, it was this which enabled Themistokles' enemies to whip up the anger of the demos to such an extraordinary level. Feeling duped, and under the psychological stress of a new Persian threat, the Athenians will not have received sympathetically or rationally the more sober questioning of the evidence and interpretation of Themistokles' career

which his philoi may (or may not) have dared to pose and offer²⁸.

Two other incidents remain to complete our thumb-nail sketch of the political atmosphere of the Kimonian era. Stesimbrotos (fr. 3 ap. Pl. Th. 24.4) says that for having brought Themistokles' wife and children to him at Admetos' court, Epikrates of Acharnai was prosecuted by Kimon and condemned to death²⁹. The notice has been widely accepted as historical³⁰. The harshness of the measure strongly suggests it belongs to the period immediately after Themistokles' flight, and before Eurymedon, while anger and tension were still running high³¹. The incident probably illustrates the methods Kimon used in exploiting the atmosphere to remove political opponents. There is no reason to suppose the incident was isolated³². It is not our job to moralize, but it is noteworthy that even Schachermeyr, after trying to mitigate Kimon's role as merely one of formal accuser, shifting the real blame onto the demos, admits that there "blieb ein bitterer Nachgeschmack", which he has not unnaturally read into the evidence³³.

The decree against Arthmios of Zeleia³⁴ should also be seen in the context of the immediate aftermath of Themistokles' exile³⁵.

M.B. Wallace has recently described these actions of the Kimonian era as "the first attested judicial witch-hunt in western history"³⁶.

In view of the oppression of political opponents which was made possible by the events and feelings associated with Themistokles' flight, it is not surprising that we find little evidence of opposition to Kimon and his friends, or to their policies. If Kimon was a gentleman "des Alteren Stilles" then one of his models was Antilochos (cf. Homer Il. 23. 420-440)³⁷.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN. THE END OF THE KIMONIAN ERA (465/4 - 462/1)

The decision not to proceed to Kypros after the victory at Eurymedon was presumably dictated by the need to establish Athenian control firmly on the northern Aegean¹. The necessity of achieving this security will have been recognized by Kimon, and there is no reason to suspect that he did not approve of the withdrawal². The operations in the north³ were probably seen as causing only a postponement of the war in the south which would be prosecuted at a later stage. It is not impossible that Athenian plans to settle Enneahodoi and dominate the region were originally intended to serve as a base of operations against Makedonia but in view of Kimon's active involvement in related operations at Thasos and in view of his later opposition to aggression against Makedonia (see below) I do not believe such designs were part of the original motivation⁴, though some may have had the possibility in their minds. The Drabeskos disaster was a setback. Some scholars are confident that the disaster will have reflected badly on Kimon⁵. There is no indication of this in the sources, and, as the scholars in the last note realize, such hostility would have been most unfair, especially since Kimon might not even have taken part in the operation. I prefer, then, to believe that Kimon's reputation, no doubt at its zenith about now, remained unshaken by the defeat.

Kimon did not remain at Thasos throughout the duration of the siege⁶. At any rate, there is good evidence that he was in Athens in late summer 464, when the first Spartan appeal for assistance against the Messenians was made (Thuc. 101.2; Aristoph. Lys. 1137-42; Pl. K. 16. 6-8)⁷. Ephialtes καλύοντος καὶ διαμαρτυ-
ομένου μὴ βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἀνιστάναι πόλιν ἀντίπαλον
ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθηνάς, ἀλλ' ἔαν κείσθαι καὶ πατηθῆναι
τὸ φρόνημα τῆς Σπάρτης (Pl. K. 16.8).

Plutarch goes on to refer to a remark of Kritias' on Kimon's response to the request. Ion, however, is cited as the authority for a quotation from Kimon in the debate which was supposed to have been decisive in swaying the decision. Ion, then, quotes the actual words while Kritias comments on the outcome and significance of the debate. There need be little doubt that Ephialtes' striking phrase was also drawn from Ion's more dramatic account, and not from Kritias' more detached commentary on the incident. We have, then, in all likelihood, an eye-witness account of part of the debate (Ion fr. 14 ap. Pl. K. 16.8). We shall analyse the two phrases used by Ephialtes and Kimon after we have examined the background.

The timing of the crisis was not propitious for Ephialtes' case. It will be remembered that we suggested that Themistokles in the 470s had done his best to stir fears of the danger from Sparta. He had had a measure of success but had failed to persuade a majority of the Athenians that they should join with Sparta's enemies in the Peloponnese in crushing her. During the period in which Athens had thrown herself into the anti-Persian drive, 470/69 - 465, there had been no 'stab in the back' from Sparta as Themistokles probably implied, and perhaps claimed there would be. True, Sparta had been engaged in continuing to assert her authority within the Peloponnese, but this will have appeared to have been substantially completed by about 467-6, the time of the murder of Pausanias and the suppliant helots at Tainaron. Anyway, shortly before the Spartan appeal the Spartans had been secure enough within the Peloponnese to render a promise to invade Attika plausible to the Thasians and to Thucydides, and so were probably perceived as being in a strong position. Given the opportunity, the Spartans, so the Athenians mistakenly believed, had

not had any unfriendly intentions towards the Athenians.

In view of the fate suffered by Themistokles as a result of his refusal to cease pressing for actions to counter the alleged threat from Sparta, we may even describe Ephialtes' stance as daring. The difference, of course, between Themistokles' position in the 470s and Ephialtes' now was that the Athenians were no longer analysing their relations with Sparta against the background of the possibility of a new Persian offensive in Ionia, the Aegean and perhaps also against Hellas ultimately. Eurymedon had enabled the Athenians to tolerate the luxury of questioning their relations with Sparta.

But if our conclusions on Themistokles' proposals in the late 470s are correct, then Ephialtes' position now was less extreme. Sparta's very existence was in peril when she made her appeal⁸. Failure to send Athenian support might have been sufficient to cause the destruction of Spartan power; support for the insurgents would certainly have been⁹. Ephialtes shrunk from proposing this measure. Unlike Themistokles, in the present circumstances Ephialtes could hardly attempt to portray Sparta as a threat to Athens' security. Let us examine Ephialtes' approach to dissuading the dispatch of aid more closely. Clearly, he held out the non-intervention of the Athenians as leading to the annihilation of Spartan power — they should not ἀνιστάσθαι Sparta; that is she should remain prostrate. His justification for Athens following this course seems to have been twofold. It was to τὸ πρόβλημα τῆς Σπάρτης that he drew attention. Since present circumstances could not have illustrated this quality we may assume he catalogued incidents from the past; they will not have been lacking, and we needn't list all the possible

examples which he might have used.

The course for which he was pleading, though, was not justified exclusively by Sparta's past arrogance. Ephialtes' words indicate that he projected the influence this quality would have in the future. The idea of permanence contained in the word κεῖσθαι suggests by implication that in his speech Ephialtes painted some picture of the effect that allowing the re-emergence of her arrogance would have. Apparently he analysed the relationship of Athens and Sparta within such a potential situation: Athens should not ἀνιστάναί πόλιν ἀντίπαλον ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας. The word ἀντίπαλον here has been loosely rendered in a variety of ways¹⁰, though most are too strong. "Competitor" would be more appropriate than "enemy" or the like. The word has the implication that the competition is evenly balanced, which at the time of the debate was not true. Ephialtes is looking to the future when Sparta has regained the upper-hand and will be vying with Athens for influence in Hellas and behaving with characteristic arrogance. This presumably means that she would refuse to recognize Athens as an equal.

But which areas would be the prizes of this competition for influence? Not the Aegean and Ionia; events since 478/7 had apparently shown that Sparta was not opposed to the existence of a naval alliance under Athenian leadership. Again, the timing of the debate was unfortunate for Ephialtes, for it forced him to talk in generalities. Themistokles had been unsuccessful in kindling interest in the exercise of Athenian influence in mainland Greece. The threat from Persia had been removed only some twelve to eighteen months before the debate on aid to Sparta, and since then the Athenians had been busy establishing security in the northern Aegean, and we concluded earlier that Makedonia was most probably not publicly specified

as an ultimate objective at this early stage. So by the time of the debate Ephialtes had no prior public discussion of possible areas of mainland expansion by Athens upon which to draw and to use in his argument.

The vagueness suited Kimon's rhetoric. We may assume that Kimon showed up any shortcomings in Ephialtes' case on a rational level, but he was also able to exploit an emotional approach as a result of Ephialtes' vagueness as to future competition, drawing as he did on the interpretation of the lameness oracle¹¹ offered by men like Hetoimaridas to create the impression that the Spartans were ready to respect Athens as an equal partner in the hegemony of Hellas, adding the 'yoke-fellow' image himself perhaps, though this too may have been borrowed from Spartan rhetoric. The detailed questions of where the line between the two spheres of influence was to be drawn were left unanswered. The vote was taken, and Sparta saved, but the debate was not over: the detailed questions now passed into public debate where rational analysis had a greater chance of carrying weight against Kimonian influence and rhetoric.

I see no way of determining whether Thucydides took the second half of 465 or the first half of 464 as the point at which he dated the beginning of the Thasos revolt¹². It lasted over two years and so if the beginning were dated in 465/4 it will have ended after some point in 463/2. Equally possible is a date after some point in 463/2. Thucydides' expression suggests that the siege did not last only a short while into the third year. On balance, therefore, a date in

462 is more likely to be correct. Furthermore, since Kimon was expected to mount a campaign against Makedonia after Thasos' capitulation (Pl. K. 14.2), the latter is likely to have been nearer the beginning of the campaigning season than the end. 463/2 is a fairly secure date for the end of the Thasos revolt.

It is clear that in his excursus on the Pentekontaetia Thucydides did not at all times observe strict chronological order in his narrative order, on top of the occasions when he warns us of a departure (the safest example is 109. 1-3). But as a working rule it is, nonetheless, necessary to take his narrative order as chronological, unless compelling reasons to the contrary can be given¹³. So the second Spartan appeal (Thuc. 102. 1; Pl. K. 17.2) was made after the collapse of the Thasos revolt (Thuc. 101.3; Pl. K. 14.2)¹⁴. Thucydides' narrative (102.1) suggests that the request followed soon after the end of the Thasos revolt. On this basis one would assume the request to have been sent around the middle of, or in the second half of 462. That this assumption is correct is suggested by a number of other arguments which confirm it¹⁵.

By the time of the second Spartan appeal for assistance, about two years after the first which opened the public debate, we have some indications that decisions had been made on the direction in which Athenian energies should be aimed abroad and where limits should be set¹⁶. Some traces have remained of the public debate which led to these decisions. There is no reason to suspect that anyone in this period (464-2) opposed the idea of pursuing the war in the south-east against the Persians. We supposed the intention to reconquer Kypros was postponed only until the situation in the northern Aegean permitted. In view of Kimon's hitherto vigorous

anti-Persian stance, and of his fateful campaign against Kypros after his return from ostracism (Thuc. 112.2) it is permissible to assume that Kimon was not unenthusiastic about the prospect of renewing the offensive once the situation in the north allowed¹⁷. The only evidence we have of the attitude of other men is that Perikles with fifty ships, and Ephialtes with thirty, sailed past the Chelidonian islands (Kallisthenes fr. 16 ap. Pl. K. 13.5). No matter what we might think of Kallisthenes we cannot simply dismiss this notice¹⁸. Unless Plutarch or Kallisthenes has been misleading, Perikles' expedition should be in close temporal connection with Ephialtes', and so both should be dated between 465 (Eurymedon) and 462/1 (Ephialtes' death: AP 25.4 with 26.2)¹⁹. While their support for the operation is not put beyond dispute by their taking part in it as generals, we should, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, assume that they in fact did support it²⁰. The notice would appear to suggest that the fleet commanded by Ephialtes and by Perikles was expected to prevent any incursions by the Persian fleet into waters west of the Chelidonian islands and that they showed sufficient daring to sail east of the islands, showing the flag and creating the impression in the area that the Athenians had by no means relinquished claims to the region and perhaps implying that a new Athenian offensive was imminent. The positive attitude of Ephialtes and Perikles to a renewed offensive against Persian-dominated areas in the south-east will form an important argument in our assessment of the nature of Athenian politics in our period. We could, but needn't, speculate on the various suggestions which men may have made on how this attitude to Persia, taken for granted probably by all, should be related to the other suggestions which

were mooted as to the expansion of Athenian influence within Hellas²¹.

When the Spartans dismissed the Athenian contingent from Lakonia the Athenians concluded alliances with Argos and Thessaly εὐθὺς (Thuc. 102.4). We must assume, therefore, that very little discussion was necessary either among the Athenians or their prospective allies, and this suggests that the issues involved and the terms the parties were prepared to agree upon had been discussed before the dismissal of the Athenians. For the Argos alliance this suggestion is supported by the evidence of Aischylos' Suppliants. Commentators have seen in the play a recommendation of an alliance with Argos²². It cannot be doubted that Aischylos is at pains in the play to express admiration for the god-fearing and unhesitating resolution the Argive people showed (605-9) in deciding to support the just cause in the face of violence (forebodings of violence abound: 342, 356-9, 377, 398-401, 439, 451-4, 474-7, 632-8, 663-6, 678-83, 710-953, 1043-6)²³. The same cannot be said of the more careful assessment of the situation which Pelasgos makes²⁴. And the course of the trilogy was to demonstrate that Argive loyalty to their decision was not to be broken by the reality of war, or even of defeat²⁵. Aischylos would appear to be trying, with the evidence of myth, to reassure what we are justified in assuming was the suspicion of his audience as to Argive integrity²⁶. The parallel to the situation represented in the Suppliants offered by the predicament of Themistokles at Argos has been noted by scholars²⁷. Despite the lack of independent evidence, I am prepared to guess that the Argives let it be known that they would be prepared to protect Themistokles from Atheno-Spartan extradition demands.

Podlecki and Forrest have stressed seeing the Suppliants as "a thanksgiving for services rendered to Themistokles", an expression of "the gratitude of Aeschylus ... to Argos"²⁸. Rather, I think we should see the parallel primarily as a reminder to the Athenian audience of the steadfastness and loyalty the Argives were capable of showing²⁹.

There is no doubt that Aeschylus was at pains to emphasize the fact that the decision facing the Argives was such that it could only be reached by the final authority of the Assembly (365-9, 601, 603-24, 739-40, 942-3, 965). It has been observed that the point is stressed so strongly as to require explanation³⁰. Later in the fifth century the Argives were considered to have a democratic form of government (Thuc. 5.29.1, 31.6, 44.1). Later, conflicting Argive traditions agreed in seeing Argive love of 'isegoria' and 'autonomia' as very ancient (Paus. 2.19.2-4). The process which led to what was eventually termed 'demokratia' had already begun in the ethos represented by Homer, if the privilege of voting in full Assembly is accepted, as it must be, as a feature of democracy. We are fortunate in being relatively well-informed about some of the developments in Attika which may have been significant in forming the process which led to democracy there, and about some of the events which may be taken as charting stages in that process. Scholars in both ancient and modern times have disagreed on the question of at what point the term 'demokratia' becomes applicable. Although in the late 460s we are still some decades away from the first certain record of the word (H. 6.43)³¹, it is arguable that certain expressions in the Suppliants provide evidence that an awareness of perhaps the most basic principle of 'demokratia' - the right of the

Assembly to decide certain issues - had been conceptualized³².

But the process which at Athens had led to this degree of conscious independence on the part of the demos was, we know, gradual. In view of the Argive constitution later, the Argives in 464 will probably have been at some stage in a process which we may assume was comparable, though no doubt in many ways different to that at Athens. We have no way of knowing at what stage she was³³. It is, therefore, to a large extent meaningless to say that the Argive constitution was or was not democratic in 464³⁴. Forrest and Podlecki do believe that Argos was in some way democratic at this time³⁵. They assume that this fact in itself would have recommended a drawing together of Argos and Athens³⁶. Now, before we rely on evidence from later in the century when the Greeks had become far more conscious of the principles and implications of democracy, it is important to remember that we have good evidence that around mid-century the Athenians were happy to support whichever elements in a city were pro-Athenian, irrespective of the constitutional forms which those elements favoured (Ps. Xen. 3.11)³⁷. Since interest in an alliance with Argos was stimulated primarily by her value as an ally against Sparta (as events show), and since it is difficult to believe that any group in Argos - irrespective of their attitude to constitutional forms - should be less than hostile to Sparta³⁸, there is no reason why the extent of democracy at Argos in 464 should have been relevant in commending her as an ally to the Athenians.

Ehrenberg explained the emphasis on the Assembly's authority and the technical phraseology merely as the poet and audience seeing events incidentally in terms of "their own daily experience"³⁹. But, as Podlecki insisted, this does not account for the central position

the theme is clearly intended to assume⁴⁰. I shall argue below that the theme may, indeed, deliberately reflect the question of the sovereignty of the demos in Athens. But there is a further (not alternative) explanation which is relevant here. We have already seen how Aischylos was at pains to allay the dubious feelings of the Athenians as to the prospect of having Argos as an ally. Another way of doing this would be to portray the Argives supporting the decision to go to war for a just cause, not half-heartedly, but unanimously. The point is made in a powerful speech at the dramatic centre of the play (603-24) and repeated towards the end (942-3). To an Athenian audience the most effective way of illustrating a city's determination to adhere to a course of action was to portray the unanimous vote of a packed Assembly. Furthermore, the point is made that any decisions concerning the possibility of war would be made only with the full support of those involved in fighting, and not imposed 'from above':

οὐ πῖναξίν ἐστιν ἐγγεγραμμένα
οὐδ' ἐν πτυχαῖς βίβλων κατεσφραγισμένα,
σαφῇ δ' ἀκούεις ἔξ ἐλευθεροστόμου
γλώσσης. (946-9).

Whether this basic democratic principle, and perhaps other more elaborate procedures, were in fact adhered to at Argos in 464 will have been less important than the impression of unanimous and steadfast support for a just cause it created for the Athenian audience considering an alliance with Argos.

So much for the positive recommendation of an alliance with Argos in the Suppliants. Can we deduce anything further of Aischylos' view of how such an alliance might fit into the wider pattern of inter-city

relations? Not much, beyond a clear anti-Spartan attitude, discernible from a variety of angles⁴¹. Most obviously recommendation of an alliance with Argos implied hostility to Sparta because Argos and Sparta were not only traditional enemies but possibly in a state of war, for Thucydides (102.4) describes the Argives as *πολεμίοις* to Sparta by the time of the Atheno-Argive alliance⁴². Perhaps a more profound hostility towards Sparta may be detected in the theme of supplication. The religious obligation to honour the suppliants' right is central to the play. One of the gods to whom the suppliants address their prayer is Poseidon (218). It is difficult to believe that the Athenians in the 464 expedition sent to Lakonia did not get wind of the theory which attributed the cause of the earthquake to the Spartan sacrilege committed by tricking some suppliant helots from the shrine of Poseidon at Tainaron (Thuc. 128.1)⁴³. While the situation at Tainaron was in many ways different to that represented in the play, the basic question of polluting the altar does invite comparison, and the contemporary Spartan lack of piety contrasts with the Argives' piety in the myth. The implication is not only that as such Sparta does not deserve support, but also that it may prove dangerous, for she had invited catastrophe by her sacrilege.

We noted above that after Eurymedon the Athenians felt they could afford the luxury of discussing the value of their alliance with Sparta. One of the reasons why Themistokles' pre-ostracism policy had been rejected was probably fear of Spartan military might. The Athenian relief force in Lakonia in 464 were able to view the severely debilitated condition Spartan power was now in. One of the reasons for rejecting an anti-Spartan policy had now been removed⁴⁴. The parallel in the Suppliants with Themistokles may well have served as

a reminder of Themistokles' pre-ostracism policies, intended, perhaps, to prompt discussion. Such a reminder should have been very pertinent and effective in the period following the return of the first Athenian relief force.

The last three points we have just made to illustrate the anti-Spartan tendency of the Suppliants were deductions. The final point, however, is evident in the text. Aischylos supports (250-59) the Argives (by implication against the Spartans) in their claims to seniority and leadership⁴⁵. The extent of Pelasgos' Kingdom is surprising; he claims it reaches up to the Strymon. His claim brings us to the question of how, beyond enmity to Sparta, an Atheno-Argive alliance might fit into the pattern of inter-city relations, of which we said not much of an answer can be offered. I suspect, however, that some reflection of current opinion is contained in these lines, and that our ignorance of the debate blurs our appreciation of it. As we shall see, between 464 and 462 it was decided that the Athenians should attempt to annex part of Makedonia. Gülke therefore took Pelasgos' claim as an expression of purely Athenian ambitions to be achieved with allied (including Argive) assistance, the fruits of which will be enjoyed by all⁴⁶. As it stands her case is not well-argued, but it may, indeed, point in the right direction.

It is arguable that Alexander enjoyed good relations with Argos. It was believed that Alexander was of Argive descent (H. 5.22, 8.137)⁴⁷. When Mykenai was captured by the Argives, part of the population was given a home in Makedonia (Paus. 7.25.6), which could be interpreted as co-operation between Argos and Alexander⁴⁸. One might, then, imagine that Aischylos was reflecting one tendency in the public debate of 464-2 which was arguing against aggressive military action

against Makedonia, and in favour of cultivating friendly relations with Makedonia, which would at least secure a supply of timber. This task would be made easier by friendship with Argos. Pelasgos says (258-9) his domain is bounded by the sea. This is reminiscent, perhaps, of the dual hegemony principle. Did some envisage not merely allying with Argos as with, for example, any other member of the Athenian alliance, but as taking Argos as replacing Sparta as Athens' "yoke-fellow"?

But the evidence for good relations between Argos and Alexander is not compelling. The main point upon which it rests is Alexander's reception of Mykenaiian refugees. The same source also notes that less than half of the population of Mykenai were received by the Kleonaiians. Forrest took this as an unfriendly act⁴⁹. The Kleonaiians, however, had joined with the Argives in the initial attack on Mykenai, and they were present when it was captured (Strabo 8.6.19 (p.377)). Assuming the Argives were merciful enough to desist from slaughtering all those who had been in favour of resistance (and to judge by the stand made by the Mykenaiians they were the majority), the simplest explanation would be to suppose that those who had urged making terms with Argos (a minority of Mykenaiians) were settled by the Argives in nearby, friendly Kleonai, while those who had been determined to resist were expelled from the Peloponnese as a danger. Their reception by Alexander was not necessarily unfriendly towards Argos, but it certainly loses any *prima facie* claim to being a friendly gesture. For these reasons I prefer to interpret Pelasgos' curious claim differently. A military alliance between Argos and Athens would give the Athenians, as allies of the Argives, mythological justification for involvement in Makedonia, and, indeed,

the whole of mainland Greece. On the more rational, strategic level, Argos may have been seen as protection against attack from the Peloponnese⁵⁰. So Aischylos' Suppliants is a valuable reflection of some of the issues being discussed in the public debate on the direction of Athenian foreign policy which was stimulated by the debate on the Spartan request for assistance in 464.

The possibility of an alliance with Thessaly must have fitted into the discussion of Athenian foreign policy in these years. As well as the implications of Thucydides' εὐθὺς which we have already noted, we may also note Kimon's pregnant remark at his trial in 462 that he was not, as others were, a proxenos of rich Thessalians, to be courted and given gifts (Pl. K. 14.3). So his enemies could be represented as serving certain Thessalian interests in prosecuting him for having failed to invade Makedonia. The Thessalian alliance, then, may have been proposed in connection with the invasion of Makedonia⁵¹.

On his return from the successful siege of Thasos and consequent acquisition of Thasian mainland possessions (Thuc. 101.3; Pl. K. 14.2) Kimon was prosecuted for having been unwilling (μὴ θελήσας) to annex a large part of Makedonia even though this was considered an easy task. The prosecution sought thereby to demonstrate that he must have been bribed by Alexander (Pl. K. 14.2) and demanded the death penalty (Pl. Per. 10.5). AP 27.1 says the occasion was Kimon's εὐθὺς⁵². There was at least one fifth century account of the trial, by Stesimbrotos (fr. 5 ap. Pl. K. 14.4)⁵³. Now, it may seem obvious, but since the fact is significant and has been insufficiently emphasized, perhaps it is worth noting that the accusations against Kimon could not have been made unless Kimon had

been directed by the Assembly to lead some kind of incursion into Makedonia if circumstances should permit. That he was acquitted⁵⁴ should not obscure the fact that without such an order the accusation would have been quite absurd, in that it would have taken Kimon to task for not doing something which he would certainly have required the authority of the demos to do, and it is hard to imagine that the case should have been presented to court.

So the trial of Kimon is evidence that by 462 the Athenians had made at least this decision on Makedonia as a result of the public debate. The Athenians evidently considered the opportunity offered by their presence in the area and by the psychological effect created in the area by Athenian success worth grasping even though this meant a further postponement of the planned Kypros campaign. The decision may also have been prompted by the knowledge that Alexander was a potential or real competitor in the area⁵⁵. The imperialistic mood of the Athenians in the years following 462 makes it unnecessary and unwarranted to look for any other explanation other than purely imperialistic ambitions⁵⁶. By combining the Makedonia decision with another important decision reached in 462 we may perceive the drift of Athenian conclusions reached in the public debate.

The Spartans, thanks to Athenian and other allied aid in 464, had managed to confine the insurgents to Ithome. Since then they will have been following the Athenian public debate with interest and alarm. Their action in calling in Athenian assistance in 462, although not in an emergency, may appear to have been a test of Athenian feeling. Without speculating on the Spartan background to this most curious episode to try to decide whether the request was

in fact intended as a test, we are permitted to apply it as such. There is no reason to suspect that the vote at Athens was a close thing, for Kimon was sent with a large force (Thuc. 102.1: $\pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\epsilon\iota$ $\omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \delta\lambda\acute{\iota}\gamma\omega$). We may, therefore, deduce that the idea of breaking with Sparta and allying with her enemies in the Peloponnese, notably Argos, supported so vigorously by Aischylos, was eventually rejected by the majority of the Athenians, who sought instead to support actively Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnese. Evidently, however, the majority of Athenians considered that involvement in Makedonia could not in fairness be castigated as violating the principle of dual hegemony. What evidence is there of the attitude of leading Athenians on the question of relations with Sparta and of the proposed invasion of Makedonia?

We have seen that in 464 Kimon was the chief spokesman of those whose considered it best to support Spartan power, at least within the Peloponnese, and since Kimon led the second relief expedition in 462 we may assume he was consistent throughout the two intervening years in advocating the maintenance of good relations with Sparta. Ephialtes' proposed break with Sparta had been defeated in 464. There is no evidence of his stance in the period 464-2. Themistokles somehow earned himself a reputation for being open to bribery. Ephialtes, by contrast, had been careful to win a reputation for being $\alpha\delta\omega\rho\omicron\delta\acute{o}\kappa\eta\tau\omicron\varsigma$ (AP 25.1)⁵⁸. Themistokles had been ostracized, mainly, because he had persisted in advocating an anti-Spartan policy despite the repeated rejection of his proposals by the Assembly. Perhaps Ephialtes had drawn a lesson from the experience of Themistokles in this, too. It is possible that, having made his views known, perhaps in greater detail than

was possible in the 464 debate, he desisted from repeating himself in the Assembly, though no doubt expounded his views through personal channels, concentrating instead on cultivating his reputation by activity in the strategia and in his attacks on the corruption of certain Areopagites in their handling of 'euthynai' (Pl. Per. 10.7; AP 25.2)⁵⁹. His reputation for being δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (AP 25.1) was surely in part derived from these prosecutions, but it may also have been enhanced by his respect for the finality of a decision of the Assembly.

The attitude of Perikles to the extreme anti-Spartan, pro-Argive aspect of the public debate is not known. We shall be able to show in the next chapter that his career was generally anti-Peloponnesian and we might assume that during the public debate he supported the anti-Spartan point of view in some way. We do have, though, clear evidence of his position, and of Kimon's, on the question of aggression against Makedonia.

Kimon's refusal to invade Makedonia was not thought to be defensible in terms of the military situation (Pl. K. 14.2:

ῥαδίως ἐπιβῆναι Μακεδονίας... ὥς ἐδόκευ).

Thus his decision was not a tactical one, an area in which strategoi must have enjoyed considerable freedom, but represented a decision of overall strategy, of foreign policy. Such decisions were the prerogative of τὸ Ἀθηναίων κοινόν (H. 9.117)⁶⁰. The prosecution, however, perhaps mistakenly, sought to use this manifest transgression as the basis for the even more serious charge of corruption⁶¹. Now, we do not know whether Kimon attempted to defend his action in military terms. The surviving account has no trace of it if he did (Pl. K. 14.3). The portion of his defence which has

been preserved suggests that he justified his action in terms of the wider issues of the direction of foreign policy. Firstly he cast aspersions on the motives of his accusers, implying that they were in the pay of "rich Thessalians", suggesting thereby that their concern was not for the good of Athens but for that of certain Thessalians⁶². Kimon referred to his proxeny of Sparta, apparently, in order to claim that he could not be guilty of corruption because he modelled himself on Spartan frugality and self-control.

(τὴν... παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐτέλειαν καὶ σωφροσύνην), above which he would honour no amount of wealth (ἤς οὐδένα προτιμᾶν πλοῦτον), and he was able to point to the booty he had dedicated to the city, taken ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων. His reference to his love of Spartan ways was relevant in trying to establish his probity. But his reference to his Spartan proxeny may betray, too, his unwillingness to carry out actions which would offend Sparta. The vagueness of the implications of "dual hegemony" had now become clear; Sparta, and her proxenos Kimon, objected not only to Athenian influence in the Peloponnese but also in Makedonia (hardly a direct threat to Spartan security) and, we may presume, other areas of northern and central Greece⁶³.

We are compelled to deduce that those who spoke against Kimon, whether they were motivated primarily by private animosity or not, were prepared to be seen publicly as being in favour of aggression against Makedonia⁶⁴. Sealey has argued that Perikles' role in the prosecution was one of at least "three occasions... when Perikles cooperated with Cimon"⁶⁵. The core of his argument is that the story as represented by Stesimbrotos "presupposes the certainty of prevarication by Pericles" upon which he thinks other elements have

been built; he says Stesimbrotos is particularly valuable since he preserves contemporary gossip, which itself "presupposes what is matter of common knowledge"⁶⁶. I suggest another approach is methodologically preferable. It is important to distinguish between objective, public fact and interpretation of the facts. Stesimbrotos' account contains only one public fact: Perikles spoke once in accusation of Kimon. Now, Stesimbrotos would appear to have come to Athens after 435, and his work on the three Athenian statesmen was completed some time after 430/29 (fr. 11-ap. Pl. Per. 36.3)⁶⁷. So while he was doing his research Stesimbrotos may have had the opportunity of witnessing the mature Perikles, the great speaker (cf. Eupolis fr. 94 (Kock) ap. schol. Aristoph. Ach. 530 (Koster 74); Diod. 12.40. 6)⁶⁸. At any rate, the men to whom Stesimbrotos will have spoken at Athens will have had the memory of the mature Perikles dominant in their recollections, and Stesimbrotos will have gathered an impression of Perikles as a remarkably powerful speaker. Perikles' participation in the prosecution, as a man of about thirty, was his first important public appearance (AP 27.1 - unless he had appeared earlier without distinguishing himself). Other senior men will have taken the floor before him and have spoken longer. The young Perikles was confirming his political independence from the "grand coalition", a hint of which he had given already in 473/2, and which by now may, in any case, have been well-known⁶⁹. But it was not his place to speak vehemently or long⁷⁰. As such, Stesimbrotos' one public fact has an authentic ring, and is likely to be based on a good source. It is possible that Stesimbrotos himself is responsible for two misinterpretations of the public fact which are discernible and are

based on one anachronism. The first is that Perikles was *ὁ σφοδρότατος* of the accusers. As we have just said it would not have been proper for probably the youngest of the accusers to be the most vehement, and Stesimbrotos has probably been influenced by Perikles' later rhetorical skills or by stories of his opposition to Kimon, or both, and has assumed Perikles would have been the most vehement⁷¹. The same anachronistic view of Perikles' position has led Stesimbrotos to misinterpret Perikles' minor role as being motivated by a deliberate desire to do as little harm as possible to Kimon, a view encouraged by Kimon's acquittal. That Stesimbrotos has misinterpreted Perikles' performance is confirmed by another tradition (AP 27.1) which recorded this as the first occasion on which Perikles distinguished himself. Within accepted conventions his speech was outstanding and he showed promise as a speaker⁷².

The evidence to connect Ephialtes with this important trial is only circumstantial, but, I believe, adequate.

We discerned in Ephialtes' speech of 464 concern about Spartan attitudes to future Athenian ambitions which, we concluded, must have been on the mainland. While he probably chose not to fan the hostility towards Sparta which seems to have been one feature of the public debate, there was no reason why he should not develop into specific proposals those vaguely expressed territorial ambitions. The vote in the Assembly in 464 had not rejected these ambitions; it had merely rejected Ephialtes' assessment of the effects his predicted Spartan arrogance would have on the ambitions. Logically, then, we may associate Ephialtes with the mainland expansionist designs expressed in the decision to invade Makedonia, and, as such

there is a *prima facie* case for assuming he was associated with those other mainland expansionists who were behind the accusations levelled at Kimon in 462.

Another argument commonly used to connect Ephialtes with this attack on Kimon is the analogy with other known relations between the two men. But before it can carry weight, I believe it requires the demonstration we have made that the question of mainland expansion was common to the conflict between the two men in 464 (if only indirectly), and to the trial of Kimon in 462. It is not sufficient to argue that, because Ephialtes opposed Kimon over friendship with Sparta in 464 and/or because of the personal animosity which that conflict caused or reflected, we should assume that each man opposed the other on every issue he chose to support. The relationship between Aristides and Themistokles in 480-79 warns against that assumption. As it is, though, the assumption would in this case have been correct⁷³.

Plutarch (Per. 10.7) possibly provides further evidence of Ephialtes' involvement in the trial. We left open the precise definition of the nature of Kimon's trial⁷⁴. Whether it was at a 'euthynai' as such, or an 'eisangelia' resulting from dissatisfaction with an original decision, AP's remark that Perikles *κατηγόρησε τὰς εὐθύνας* (27.1) of Kimon's *strategia* might be held applicable to either. It was precisely in connection with 'euthynai' that Plutarch (Per. 10.7) says Ephialtes earned a reputation for being *ἀπαράτητον* and, if we accept Sealey's suggestion⁷⁵ that Ephialtes' attacks on individual Areopagites *περὶ τῶν δωκευμένων* (AP 25.2) should refer to their practices in judging 'euthynai', the trial of Kimon might be said to

conform to a style of politicking characteristic of Ephialtes.

Finally, in support of the belief that Ephialtes was associated with the trial is the fact that Plutarch (Per. 10.7) says Ephialtes had the reputation of being ἀπαρτήτων in trials τῶν τὸν δῆμον ἀδικούντων. Our sources, perhaps as a result of their selectiveness or of the derivative nature of the tradition, have omitted mention of that part of the process(es) resulting from the charges levelled at Kimon which dealt with Kimon's refusal to carry out the orders of the demos. Again we may detect in the trial an approach whose type was characteristic of Ephialtes' attacks on his enemies, in that Kimon's behaviour lacked respect for the demos' sovereignty.

We have contemporary evidence that the sovereignty of the demos in deciding questions of war was an issue at this time. The question of sovereignty is a central theme of Aischylos' Suppliants. Pelasgos repeatedly assert that he must obey the decision of demos (365-9, 398-9, 946-9). It is possible that during the public debate which followed the debate in the Assembly in 464 on aid to Sparta, Kimon, at the zenith of his influence, sought to discourage the demos from adopting plans which he disliked by warning, after giving his reasons for disapproval, that, should these plans be adopted, the Athenians would not be able to rely on him to help effect them. There may have been a deliberate ambiguity: would he refrain from standing for election or refuse to accept the orders of the demos to carry out actions of which he disapproved? His enemies no doubt emphasized the latter. Aischylos, composing the Suppliants perhaps in the winter of 464/3, is thus lending support to those enemies of Kimon who criticized Kimon for his threatened refusal to obey the orders

of the demos by asserting the propriety of a magistrate's duty to act only as the executor of the demos' will and not independently of it in cases which were central to the well-being of the state⁷⁶.

We are unable to trace the development of this strand in the debate between the production of the Suppliants in spring 463 and the next occasion where it apparently occurs again in the record, namely, as the basis upon which the more serious charge of bribery was built, a charge which resulted in the trial of Kimon probably in mid to late summer 462. It was one thing to threaten such action but another to carry it out. Kimon's refusal to invade Makedonia must have given grounds for some form of reprimand, and, whether the transgression was dealt with at the trial for bribery of which we have an account or some prior process, it seems clear that Kimon was acquitted of it, and, if our analysis of his defence is correct, he should not have been⁷⁷. The popular indignation this blatantly biased judgement might be expected to arouse enabled, I believe, Ephialtes and his friends to stimulate the demos to act against a related problem of which Kimon's acquittal was probably only a particularly important outbreak.

Now, the principle of the accountability of magistrates was firmly established at Athens by the late 460s⁷⁸. We have noted the evidence that Ephialtes was renowned for being vigorous in his dealings with 'euthynai' and we may deduce that he tried to see to it that none of his enemies were given an easy passage, so to speak. At this stage 'euthynai' were judged by the Areopagos⁷⁹. R.W. Wallace has recently emphasized that "in the superintendence of *δοκιμασσαι* and *εὐθυναί*" the Areopagos held "powers tantamount to control over" the "political futures" of strategoi⁸⁰. If Sealey is right

that Ephialtes' prosecution of Areopagites was in connection with their handling of 'euthynai'⁸¹ then we would have evidence that Ephialtes considered their judgements were biased. Apparently he had a degree of success (AP 25.2), but if he used the process of 'eisangelia' the trials will again have been judged by the Areopagos⁸². Perhaps in order to make Areopagite bias less obvious some clear cases were decided in his favour. There is no reason to believe that appeal would be possible (AP 8.4 - contrast 9.1 and Pl. Solon 18.2). Probably not all cases went his way and they are likely to have been the most important politically.

A man of Kimon's social connections will have had many philoi in the Areopagos⁸³. Since 487/6 we should imagine that the council was increasingly composed of men less interested in real political power than in social prestige. Most of them will have desired to cultivate their relationships with politicians in proportion to their social and political standing. Starting with the formation of the "grand coalition" and accelerating with the ostracism of Themistokles and the successes of Kimon which followed, a snowball effect will have been in action. By the mid-460s it had become a vicious circle; because of their prestige Kimon and his friends could influence enough Areopagites to make it difficult for a young man to get on in his career if he appeared to support policies contrary to those of Kimon and his friends or if he was personally obnoxious to them. The simple solution was to court the friendship of Kimon, and no doubt many did. Such men would have enjoyed the procedure in reverse⁸⁴.

Now this type of abuse of influence was not an issue upon which widespread public indignation could be mobilized. What could be more natural among philoi?⁸⁵ Only a very small percentage of the

citizen body cared about the attempts of Ephialtes and his friends to achieve success in the city as an end in itself. But in the issue over Makedonia Ephialtes was given a chance to show that Kimon's influence was not merely being used to promote the careers of his own friends but also to attempt to carry out his own foreign policy against the orders of the demos with impunity, and on such an issue Ephialtes might hope to muster sufficient public support to effect a change in the system which allowed such excessive freedom to the role of friendship in political life. Kimon's behaviour in 462 and his acquittal⁸⁶ was a revolutionary assumption of power by a magistrate which would have represented a serious limitation to the sovereignty of the demos which had been an accepted feature of political life since 508.

There were other opportunities open to counter such attempted assumptions of power by individuals. It would be possible to fail to elect a man like Kimon to the next strategia, or to ostracize him. But neither removed the susceptibility of the system.

The transfer of 'euthynai' from the Areopagos to popular supervision is the element of the 462/1 reforms most securely attested and least disputed⁸⁷. In the present state of our evidence there will always remain an element of doubt as to other possible changes Ephialtes, and perhaps his associates, might have introduced⁸⁸. As we have seen, the change in the authority hearing 'euthynai' won support because of a specific abuse by Kimon in 462 on a question of executing foreign policy. The change, however, thereby lessened the general influence of favouritism which Kimon and his friends had been able to apply to the careers of politicians⁸⁹. Other changes which have a good claim to inclusion can be seen within the framework

of execution of foreign policy. The establishment of the Boule and heliaia, in place of the Areopagos, as the authority responsible for hearing 'eisangelia', as Rhodes has shown, was probably Ephialtes' work⁹⁰. The development which resulted in the classical pattern of jurisdiction in which the archon's court had become a mere preliminary stage of the process with no verdict, and automatic reference to a dikasterion, was probably gradual⁹¹. And even if Ephialtes was responsible for proposing some specific legislation on procedure, this too, it has been maintained, was probably aimed at preventing the potentially powerful influence of the Areopagos on the decisions of archons, and so again to protect the political careers of men who might suffer as a result of such influence⁹².

Recent scholarship has rightly reacted against the conventional picture of Ephialtes as a doctrinaire democrat whose work represented a daring leap into the political unknown⁹³. Instead, a generally more convincing attempt has been made to interpret his work within the immediate political context of 462/1. I have accepted Sealey's main thesis that Ephialtes was concerned to put an end to the abuses to which the Areopagos' conduct of 'euthynai' had led. Sealey was aware of the role Kimon's acquittal may have had in stimulating the reforms⁹⁴, but he failed to analyse the way in which the trial should be related to the mustering of popular support for the reform. Not only did he not go into the implications of the trial (in this context) in detail but he has also taken inadequate note of the significance of Rhodes' recent demonstration that 'eisangeliai' were, in the pre-Ephialtic period, heard by the Areopagos⁹⁵. This means that even if Kimon was tried at an 'eisangelia', as Sealey believes, he was acquitted by the Areopagos and not a popular court. This

enables us to see his acquittal as the main stimulus to the popular indignation at the system which allowed the flaunting of the demos' orders to go unpunished, and so to enable Ephialtes to mobilize support for the reform of the system⁹⁶.

J. Martin, whose interpretation of the reforms is essentially convincing, has noted the importance of the trial of Kimon as an illustration of the great influence the Areopagos could wield in the debate on foreign policy, and sees Areopagite control of magistrates as setting limits on Athenian expansion and preserving the understanding between Sparta and Athens. He believes Ephialtes' purpose was to remove the possibility of the Areopagos' exercise of these constraints⁹⁷. But he has not emphasized sufficiently the question of sovereignty which formed the background to the trial and which provided the popular support for the reforms.

Ruschenbusch's one sentence summarizing his view of the essence of Ephialtes' motives implies much that is valid: the necessity of changing the authority hearing 'euthynai' before he could achieve a successful condemnation of Kimon's "Amtsführung", thus paralysing ("lahmlegen") Kimon politically and before he could effect a change in policy towards Sparta⁹⁸. The assumption of Areopagite favouritism and the specific link with foreign policy are correct, but much is left undeveloped. I have no doubt that R.W. Wallace is correct when he argues that Ephialtes was seeking to remove the constraints which could be imposed by the Areopagos on the success of the careers of certain strategoi. His failure to elucidate the reasons for the hostility between Ephialtes and the Areopagos raises the central issue of the nature of the political conflict in the late 460s. In short, R.W. Wallace believes that Areopagites would feel "a natural

aversion ... toward an increased democracy that would restrict their competence"⁹⁹, and that they were "conservative, hostile to any political competition". "Radical politicians" on the other hand - presumably those who wished to 'increase democracy' - "working through" an Areopagite-dominated "machinery would meet at best impartiality"¹⁰⁰, and he believes Ephialtes restricted the competence of the Areopagos because it had "been active in blocking or hampering both greater democracy and his own political ambitions which were dependent on it"¹⁰¹. Thus R.W. Wallace does not grapple with the chicken and egg problem posed. Either Ephialtes and other "radical politicians" wished to threaten the competence of the Areopagos first and that body sought to diminish the success of such men, or the Areopagos chose to thwart men like Ephialtes who then, and for that reason, embarked on a campaign of reform¹⁰². Since R.W. Wallace rightly rejects the idea of a "theoretical question of self-government" as "unsupported"¹⁰³, there seems little reason to recommend the first alternative, for then the 'radicals' lack any motivation for taking on the Areopagos in the first place. So we should examine the possibility that the Areopagos conceived a dislike for Ephialtes and his friends, and that the prejudice which resulted from this dislike was a cause, not effect, of Ephialtes' reforming zeal.

Why might the Areopagos have taken a dislike to men of Ephialtes' ilk? The answer, of course, depends on what such men were like politically, and on what the bulk of the Areopagites were like politically. R.W. Wallace mentions "possible tension between Areopagites and strategoi for influence during this period"¹⁰⁴. If this were the cause we should expect all influential strategoi to have suffered at the hands of Areopagite jealousy. But the acquittal

of Kimon in 462 and his attempts (Pl. K. 15.2) to rescind the 462/1 legislation show that some prominent strategoi had an excellent relationship with the council. The case of Themistokles may help. R.W. Wallace notes that the condemnation of Themistokles by the Areopagos on the one hand, and its acquittal of Kimon on the other, may be significant¹⁰⁵. There is no evidence deserving credence which associates Themistokles with any plans to limit the competence of the Areopagos, or with any interest in expanding 'democratic' institutions¹⁰⁶. One feature that Themistokles and Ephialtes had in common was their enmity with Kimon. We have noted that Kimon is likely to have had extensive personal connections within the Areopagos in the 460s. Their enmity with Kimon is perhaps a sufficient explanation of the prejudice men like Themistokles (by the 460s) and Ephialtes probably found in the Areopagos, but it leaves unanswered the question of the causes of the enmity between Kimon and men like Themistokles and Ephialtes. Recent scholars have tended to emphasize the personal element in political conflict. Nonetheless, such conflicts were at least partly expressed in, and, I believe, partly caused by real differences in policy. There is evidence that Themistokles and Ephialtes advocated a different direction in Athenian foreign policy to that favoured by Kimon. As a discernible cause of conflict between Kimon and Ephialtes, and since the animosity of the Areopagos towards Ephialtes can, on the available evidence, only be explained in terms of his conflict with Kimon, we should emphasize Ephialtes' foreign policy as the reason for Areopagite prejudice against Ephialtes¹⁰⁷. Thus it is not only fair to say that the immediate cause of the reforms of Ephialtes was, as we have maintained, an issue of foreign policy (Kimon's trial over Makedonia) but also that the more distant back-

ground to the reforms was also a divergence over foreign policy.

It is, therefore, wrong to divide the major political conflicts of the late 460s into two aspects, foreign policy and domestic policy.

The latter was a mere weapon used in the real battle which was the attempt to execute foreign policy ambitions. This seems to me to be true of the whole period with which we are concerned.

The reforms, then, are adequately explained if we believe that Ephialtes was seeking to remove the judgement of a magistrate's action from a body which was prejudiced in favour of his personal and political enemy to one which, as our analysis of success in the 470s showed, was less susceptible to the influence of philoi connections, namely to bodies representative of the Ekklesia¹⁰⁸; the popular support for the reforms, on the other hand, can be adequately explained by the unacceptability of a system which allowed magistrates to ignore the orders of the demos with impunity. The Athenians were merely defending the basic principle of sovereignty which had been accepted in practice for over forty years, against the incursions of Kimon. It is unnecessary, and therefore unwarranted, to add to this adequate explanation by postulating a belief in the wisdom as such of an expansion of the demos' participation in the day to day running of the administrative and judicial system, or in its right to so participate¹⁰⁹.

The closeness in time of the behaviour of Kimon which necessitated the reforms and the decision to send Kimon with further assistance to Sparta¹¹⁰ is evidence of a remarkable degree of political maturity. Not only had the demos, by its orders to invade Makedonia, rejected one element of Kimon's policy but they had been forced by his manipulation of state machinery to effect preventative reforms. In a

less politically mature environment we might have expected his behaviour to have evoked a complete reaction against all aspects of his policy. Such might have been the case had those in the demos who had been supporting Kimon before the Makedonian affair been doing so largely because they supported the man rather than his policies. As it was a majority of the demos was still prepared to employ Kimon as the man most fitted to preserve the good relations with Sparta (cf. Pl. K. 16.2) which, by their support of her position within the Peloponnese, they showed they wanted to maintain.

Against this might be raised the 'hoplite absence' theory, by which it is imagined that the reforms of Ephialtes were successfully carried because a large number of hoplites were absent at Ithome, and that this group would have opposed them. There is nothing to commend this idea. Not only is there no sign in the ancient evidence that the reforms were carried because of the hoplite absence (as opposed to the personal absence of Kimon: Pl. K. 15.1) but the idea is not even persuasive. The reforms sought to divest the Areopagos, composed of the two upper census classes, of responsibility for control over magistrates and to invest it in popular bodies, composed of all census classes, which, in practice, no doubt, included only a very small proportion of the upper two census classes. The proportion of thetes to the other three census groups cannot be determined with confidence, but they are unlikely to have represented more than half of the total citizen population in 462/1. The tendency of the least poor to be able to afford the least time for active involvement in politics will have rendered the zeugitai class at least as influential as the thetes in the heliaia (or dikasteria), Ekklesia and Boule, though it is probably wrong, anyway, to imagine political differences corresponding

to property differences. So there is no reason to believe that the zeugitai, as a class, would object to the reforms, nor that the thetes, as thetes, would be particularly zealous¹¹¹. Furthermore, the hoplites can not have been so opposed to the reforms, for they could have repealed them on their return had their vote been decisive; anger expressed towards Kimon because of Spartan behaviour would have been no reason to accept the ex hypothesi anti-zeugitai, pro-thetes reforms¹¹².

One of the reasons for Kimon's ostracism in 462/1¹¹³ was his refusal to accept the considered decision of the demos on the desirability of a system of accountability less susceptible to personal influence. It is important to distinguish this as an independent, and perhaps equally effective reason, from the more emotional anger at the Spartan insult for which Kimon and others were made scapegoats. At 'Kimon' 15.2 -3 Plutarch sets Kimon's repeal attempts as the background to his ostracism, though he mentions only the slanders concerning Kimon and his sister (cf. Ps. Andok. 4.33) and the accusation of Λακωνισμόν. Having explained the grounds for this latter accusation (K. 16.1 - 17.1) Plutarch comes back to the second relief expedition and its dismissal (which he had had in mind at 15.1) and continues his account of the attacks on Kimon. The Athenians were angry τοῖς Λακωνίζουσι, especially with Kimon, at the insult they had suffered, καὶ τὸν Κίμωνα μικρὰς ἐκτελαβόμενοι προφάσεως ἐξωστράκισαν (K. 17.2). So far we have anger at the Lakonizers and the accusation that Kimon was one, coupled with slanders about his sister. The latter may be what is meant by the πρόφασις (cf. Ps. Andok. 4.33), but may refer to the charge mentioned by Plutarch at 'Perikles' 9.4 that Kimon

was *μισόδημον* as well as being a Lakonizer. It will be remembered that Ephialtes was able to muster popular support for his reforms as a result of Kimon's disregard for the will of the demos. Kimon's attempts now to repeal the reforms which sought to create a more thorough check on the responsibility of men like Kimon to the will of the demos could appropriately have been dubbed *μισοδημία* ¹¹⁴.

In a way it is unfortunate that the second relief expedition to Lakonia ended so embarrassingly for Kimon; had all gone well, he would no doubt still have attempted to rescind the reforms, and we should have had a more accurate indicator of the strength of the demos' determination to protect its sovereignty against the refusal of one of its leaders not only to accept its decisions, but to do so on an issue which was intended to strengthen the ability of the demos to exercise its control over attempts at ignoring its sovereignty. Plutarch's evidence certainly shows that this played a role in Kimon's ostracism, but the other major element — anger at friends of Sparta — was also effective in confounding his situation ¹¹⁵.

There seems no reason to suspect that Kimon made any attempt to renounce his friendship for Sparta. It would be daring to base anything at all on Plutarch's absurd tale of Kimon's ardent patriotism at Tanagra and the suspicions of Perikles' friends and of the Boule (Pl. K. 17. 3-5; Per. 10. 1-2) ¹¹⁶. But the anecdote might appear to seek to disprove the Athenian assumption that Kimon would favour the Spartans. More concretely, the traditions which linked his name with peace negotiations with Sparta specify his continued proxy and presuppose good relations between Sparta and Kimon (Pl. K. 17. 6-18.1; Per. 10.3; Theopompos fr. 88; Nepos Cim. 3. 2-3; Andok. 3.3(?);

Aischin. 2.172(?)). This suggests he did not turn his back on Sparta¹¹⁷. Others at Athens were certainly more pragmatic. No more persuasive context than now can be found for the renunciation of his Spartan proxy by the elder Alkibiades (Thuc. 5. 43.2)¹¹⁸. We noted earlier that the Peisianakteion appears to have been completed by c.460 and that the stoa contained paintings celebrating and intimating victories of Kimon's family¹¹⁹. The decision to include a painting of the Argo-Athenian victory over the Spartans at Oinoe was probably taken after Kimon's dismissal from Lakonia. It is impossible to know whether the action was a purely ingratiating gesture to popular feeling by Peisianax himself or a more subtle attempt by Kimon's circle to claim that while they wished to preserve good relations with Sparta they were first and foremost loyal to the greater glory of Athens, and that they too were proud of this minor victory over Spartan hoplites by a group of Athenian volunteers¹²⁰. We shall see in the next chapter that Kallias Hipponikou, who had married Kimon's sister, went on an embassy to Persia in 461, and we shall interpret this as an attempt by the Athenians to face the danger of military conflict with Sparta with all their energies. Thus Kallias also recognized the break with Sparta and registered his sympathy with the anti-Spartan feeling in this constructive way. The fact that Kallias and Elpinike appear to have divorced is perhaps to be connected with Kallias' stance now¹²¹. That differences between Kallias and Kimon should be dated around this period is suggested by the fact that c. 455 Kallias gave his son Hipponikos in marriage to the relative and ex-wife of Perikles, with the woman's agreement (Pl. Per. 24.5), suggesting good relations between Kallias and Kimon's enemy, Perikles¹²².

CHAPTER FOURTEEN. FROM KIMON'S DISMISSAL UNTIL THE DISPATCH OF AID TO INAROS.

There exists what may be described as an orthodox chronology of the period from the end of the Thasos revolt until the 'signing' of the Five Years' Truce, despite minor differences within the broad framework. Nonetheless, attempts both old and new to challenge this framework cannot be dismissed out of hand¹. In chapter thirteen we argued that it was most likely that the siege of Thasos ended in 462, though we admitted that a date in 463/2 could not be ruled out, as any time before 463/2 could be. Before we try to assess the chronological indications for the placement of events between the end of the Thasos revolt and the dispatch of aid to Inaros, let us note the evidence of Thucydides which provides a possible terminus ante quem for the beginning of Athenian involvement in Egypt.

The 'signing' of the Thirty Years' Peace is datable to the period between late summer 446 and late winter 445 (Thuc. 87.6 with 2.2.1; cf. Diod. 12.7; Paus. 5.23.4)². Before it was concluded Pleistoanax had invaded Attika, and this is unlikely to have been after autumn 446 (cf. Thuc. 2.21.1; Diod. 12.6 (447/6))³. We should construct our chronology on the assumption that this invasion occurred after the expiry of the Five Years' Truce (Thuc. 112.1)⁴. Thus the Truce was not concluded after autumn 451. Between the Truce and Perikles' Gulf operations (Thuc. 111.2-3) there elapsed three 'empty' years (Thuc. 112.1)⁵. Perikles' operations, then, did not take place after autumn 454. They were οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον the unsuccessful expedition to Thessaly (Thuc. 111.1-2). For ATL this positively implies that the two expeditions were in the same

season, and we may agree, at least, that the expression permits such an interpretation⁶. This brings us to summer 454 as the latest possible date for the Thessalian expedition⁷. An even more intimate chronological link is made between the end of the Egyptian expedition (Thuc. 110.5) and the Thessalian expedition, being joined only by $\delta\epsilon$ (Thuc. 111.1). ATL would date the end of the Egyptian expedition to immediately before the Thessalian expedition, though I am prepared, with Cloché, to believe that only part of the Thessalian expedition was subsequent to the disaster in Egypt⁸. So summer 454 should, according to Thucydides' evidence, be the latest possible date for the end of the Egyptian expedition⁹.

What about a terminus post quem for the end of the Egyptian expedition? Happily we have good external evidence that Tolmides' periplous (Thuc. 108.5) was in 456/5 (schol. Aisch. 2.78 (Dindorf 55-6)¹⁰). The end of the Egyptian campaign must be dated after Tolmides' expedition. There would be no reason for Thucydides' placing Tolmides' expedition before his narrative (Thuc. 109.1-110.5) of the second and final stage of the Egyptian expedition if it occurred, in fact, after the Egyptian disaster. It could as easily and effectively have been placed before the Thessalian expedition (111.1)¹¹. Could we be quite sure that Thucydides took the end of the expedition to be the capture of Prosopitis (109.4 - 110.1) Tolmides' expedition would provide a useful terminus. We know that Megabyzos' tampering with nature could only have been successful in, or a month or so before June¹². If this was after Tolmides' periplous we would be able to establish 456/5 as the earliest possible date for it. But it is not impossible that Thucydides took the destruction of the $\delta\iota\alpha\delta\omicron\chi\omicron\iota$ (110. 4 - 5)

as the point which marked the end of the Egyptian expedition¹³. This would mean that it would be possible to maintain that the capture of Prosopitis occurred in May or June 456, Tolmides' expedition in 456/5 and that the end of the expedition, the destruction of the *δίαδοχοι*, followed in the second half of 456, perhaps even at the same time as Tolmides' expedition¹⁴. But Thucydides is unlikely to have taken the destruction of the *δίαδοχοι* as the end of the expedition; the capture of Prosopitis is a much likelier candidate, for it is in this context (110.1) that Thucydides mentions the six year duration of the campaign, suggesting that it was this particular point which determined his arrangement of the Egyptian narrative within the order of events in Greece. So while we cannot rule out a date between summer 456 and summer 454 for the end of the expedition, the capture of Prosopitis is more likely to have been in summer 455 or 454.

When we turn to the beginning of the campaign it is equally difficult to establish a precise date. Thucydides dates the capture of Prosopitis to six years after the beginning of active involvement¹⁵, which, therefore, was in one of the summers between 462 and 460 inclusive. Is it possible to fit the beginning of the Egyptian expedition in 462? If Thasos was over by the end of 463, and we concluded this was unlikely, Kimon could have gone to Lakonia in the first half of 462. Dismissed, the Athenians could have had their alliances with Argos and Thessaly 'signed' before the end of spring. As soon as it was safe to sail the Athenians took Naupaktos, and, receiving the Messenians who had capitulated soon after the dismissal of the Athenians, settled them there. The Megarian treaty might have been concluded shortly before the arrival of Inaros (or his

ambassadors), which would have been just as the Athenians were leaving for Kypros¹⁶, winning Athenian support. If, for argument's sake, we leave out of consideration the highly controversial date of the end of the Messenian war and the related problem of the date of the settlement at Naupaktos, I would not be prepared to deny that such a chronology is possible. Lacking conclusive arguments we must rely on probability. As we saw it is unlikely that Thasos had ended by the end of 463. Since Kimon is specified as being present at its capitulation (Pl. K. 14.2), which was probably in 463/2, and since he had to stand trial, most probably, before he was dispatched to Lakonia, he is unlikely to have returned until rather late in the season for him to embark with the fleet on the Kypros-Egyptian expedition¹⁷. At the other end of the campaign, too, probability weighs against the end being in 456. 462 then, for the beginning of the campaign is not impossible, but it is unlikely. Thucydides is not of very much more help in choosing between 461 and 460; but Herodotos may be. He says (7.151) that a good while after 481 Kallias was on an embassy to Artaxerxes on business which he does not specify, when, perchance (ΤΟΥΧΕΙΝ), an Argive embassy approached the King and asked whether he had adopted the friendship his father had formed with the Argives or whether he regarded them as enemies. Modern scholars traditionally connected this Athenian embassy with the famous Peace of Kallias of a later date¹⁸. E. Walker argued that this cannot be right, and that for Herodotos' embassy "the date that suits best lies somewhere between 462 B.C. and 460 B.C."¹⁹. He argued rightly that the Argive embassy must be fairly soon after Artaxerxes' accession, and concluded correctly that it should be after the alliance with Athens²⁰. It is

now widely accepted that an Athenian embassy was at Sousa in the late 460s²¹. So if the Atheno-Argive alliance was towards the end of 462, this joint Atheno-Argive embassy concerning φιλική cannot have been on its long journey much before winter set in. It is as likely that it was postponed until spring because of travelling conditions in winter. In view of the distances involved (see H. 5.52) the results of the discussions are unlikely to have been known at Athens long before the end of the campaign season of 461. Any decision on whether to proceed against Kypros must have awaited the results of this embassy. Thus it is unlikely that the expedition against Kypros (Thuc. 104.2), and hence the simultaneous aid to Inaros, were dispatched still in 461. 460 is the probable date for the beginning of the Egyptian expedition²².

Let us examine Thucydides' section 103.1-104.2. After the alliances with Argos and Thessaly (Thuc. 102.4), which we dated to towards the end of 462, Thucydides chronicles the capitulation of the rebels on Ithome (103.1). The Messenians were given safe passage, and οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατὰ ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπакτον κατέκλισαν, ἣν ἔτυχον ἡρηνότατες νέωσι Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἔχόντων (Thuc. 103.3). The case for believing that this notice, and the earlier one stating that the rebels capitulated δεκάτω ἔτει (103.1), come in their proper chronological position in Thucydides' narrative has been argued in detail, and in my view, cogently. It would, however, not be methodologically acceptable to emend δεκάτω on the strength of it²³. For this reason, and for the positive independent evidence supporting it, I have accepted the solution to the problem posed by believing the revolt began about 465-4, which

Hammond and Scharf proposed²⁴, and which obviates the need to emend while allowing the end of the revolt to come in its proper chronological position in Thucydides' narrative. There have been, however, repeated pleas by scholars to take the end of the revolt down to the mid-450s, pulling down with it the capture of Naupaktos to shortly before²⁵. I do not propose to enter into the arguments against this late date for the end of the revolt itself, but I shall make a few points in response to arguments which have recently been directed specifically against the earlier date for the capture of Naupaktos²⁶.

Diodoros (84.7) dates the capture of Naupaktos to 456/5. He has almost certainly lumped together the earlier capture and subsequent settlement with Tolmides' famous, later periplous (Thuc. 108.5; schol. Aisch. 2.78 (Dindorf 55-6))²⁷. This would be particularly easy to understand if Tolmides had in fact captured Naupaktos originally, and so the exploit would already have been lumped together with his others by Ephoros²⁸.

Reece deduces that the fact that the Corinthians' hatred for the Athenians was originally caused not least (ὁδὲ ἡκιστα) by the Athenians' co-operation with Korinth's enemy, Megara (Thuc. 103.4) implies that Naupaktos was captured after the Atheno-Megarian co-operation, for otherwise, Reece thinks, Thucydides would, in effect, be saying the Corinthians calmly watched the occupation of Naupaktos by their greatest trade rival and only subsequently were they aroused to fierce hatred²⁹. Let us try to imagine the way most Corinthians will have viewed the capture of Naupaktos on the one hand, and the Megara alliance on the other. We noted earlier that the coolness in relations between Athens and Korinth in 464 may have been, if not

solely caused by Kimon's blundering and bombastic behaviour, then certainly aggravated by his person. Corinthian fear of too close a tie between Athens and Sparta may also have been a factor³⁰. The rupture of Atheno-Spartan relations and the decline in Kimon's political fortunes may then be expected to have occasioned a sympathetic response in the Corinthians. They are likely, moreover, to have understood Athenian outrage at the insulting behaviour of the Spartans, and as such they may have felt that the Athenian alliance with Argos was directed not at Corinth but at Sparta³¹. In the same way the capture of Naupaktos must have been recognized as a potential base for operations against the Peloponnese, but Sparta was the enemy against whom Athens was wielding the threat³². This might have dangerous consequences for Corinth, if friction developed into conflict, and if the conflict escalated, but Sparta, at any rate, was unlikely to adopt an aggressive stance. I believe both Athens and Corinth viewed the capture of Naupaktos primarily in military terms³³. If a commercial threat were perceived it can only have been interpreted as legitimate competition, or, at worst, meddling in Corinth's sphere of influence. And Thucydides, of course, does not say there was no friction before the alliance with Megara. The alliance with Megara, on the other hand, represented an act of war against Corinth, and announced that the Athenians considered the whole Peloponnesian League to be their enemy³⁴. If Sparta was likely to avoid aggressive action, Athens appeared unwilling to let the matter drop. This act, furthermore, put the possession of Naupaktos in a new and dangerous light. The potential threat to Corinth's vital interests which had seemed to present only a remote risk of being acted upon now took on a greater urgency. Before the Megarian

alliance the Athenians and Corinthians were at peace, after it they were at war; as such Thucydides was right in isolating this action as the prime cause of Corinthian hostility. Reece's deduction, then, is invalid, and furnishes no argument against an early date for the capture of Naupaktos.

Hammond believes the settlement of the Messenians at Naupaktos (captured, he believes, in the preceding season) must be dated after Tanagra because of Thucydides' *κατὰ ἔχθρας* 457. He rejects the traditional view that this enmity be equated with that caused by the Spartan dismissal which amounted only to a *διαφορὰ* ... *φανερὰ* (Thuc. 102.3) and not 'enmity' which "came after a declaration of war"³⁵. But immediately on their return from Ithome the Athenians entered into an alliance with the Argives, who were *πολεμίας* to the Spartans. It was this alliance which was, effectively, a declaration of war against Sparta, and which established a state of *ἔχθρας* between the two.

Finally both Hammond and Reece objected on a priori grounds to an early date for the capture of Naupaktos³⁶. Whether the capture is probable or not at the early date is dependent on how we interpret the Athenians' motives. As an attempt to gain influence in central Greece it may indeed seem ill-placed in a 462-0 context. But I think we should see the action primarily as a threat to the Peloponnese, especially aimed at Spartan interests, and less as a base for influence in central Greece. Naupaktos was captured before the Athenians knew they were going to command not only Pegai but also the land route from the Peloponnese into central Greece (Thuc. 103. 3 -4). It was possession of both land and sea routes which gave the Athenians the power to impose their influence on central Greece;

control of the Korinthian Gulf, however, assumed significance for influence in central Greece only when they could secure the land route. I do not deny that the decision to attack Naupaktos was made in the awareness of the potential value it had for influence in central Greece, but since it would not assume it immediately, and since it did have, as well, other strategic advantages, we may see its capture as being primarily motivated by the advantage it would give the Athenians as a base against the Peloponnese. Control of the Gulf, which Naupaktos provided, was used by Tolmides (Thuc. 108.5) to attack the Peloponnese, and by Perikles (Thuc. 111. 2-3) for operations against targets in the Peloponnese (and in western Greece). So as a direct response to the insult caused by Spartan behaviour in late 462 it is not improbable to locate the capture of Naupaktos in the early context, and it would seem logical to place it as soon as possible after the event which caused it, which would be at the beginning of the campaign season of 461³⁷.

After the capture of Naupaktos, the Messenians, in 460/59, capitulated³⁸, and were soon settled in Naupaktos (Thuc. 103.1, 3). Very shortly afterwards, still at the beginning of 460/59, the Megarian alliance was 'signed' (Thuc. 103.4) and was followed closely by the successful request for aid from Inaros (Thuc. 104.1) which caused the diversion of the expedition bound originally for Kypros (Thuc. 104.2)³⁹.

So much for chronology; let us try to understand the events and to deduce what they can tell us of the nature of Athenian politics in the late 460s. The results will confirm a tendency which we have observed throughout our period in the relationship between the demos and its leaders, and will also show this tendency to have developed

to an extreme form by 460.

The deference the Athenians had proved themselves willing to show to Spartan power within the Peloponnese was thrown to the wind in autumn - winter 462/1 with the dissolution of their alliance with Sparta and their alliance with Sparta's enemy, Argos. In view of the consistent loyalty they had evinced over the past sixteen years the Athenians felt justifiably outraged at Spartan suspicions⁴⁰. The renunciation of Spartan friendship by some philolakonian men indicates how universal the feeling of outrage was at Athens.

It is perhaps impossible to decide whether the Athenians took the measures they did in this period primarily out of fear of attack by Sparta⁴¹ or out of anger at the insult to their honour. I suspect the latter is nearer the truth. Be that as it may, Athenian actions in 461 all point to the fact that war with Sparta and perhaps the Peloponnesian League, too, was expected. The Thessalian alliance should have given Athens a considerable advantage with the use of Thessalian cavalry. Argos was useful in that she would be likely to prove implacably hostile to Sparta, was not an inconsiderable land power and was strategically protective to Athens (cf. H. 9.12)⁴². Naupaktos was a useful base for operations against the Peloponnese. Thus the plans to invade Makedonia were again postponed⁴³, and the operations to recover the Persian held areas of Kypros, postponed since Eurymedon, also had to be shelved. The fact that the Athenians were expecting war in Greece is illustrated most strikingly by the decision to send Kallias Hipponikou to Sousa to try to negotiate a peace with Artaxerxes. Kallias' constructive reaction to the Spartan insult⁴⁴, assuming he proposed the embassy, and its acceptance by the Athenians was a recognition of the fact, expressed also in the

ostracism of Themistokles, that war with Sparta was not safely compatible with continuing to face the Persians. It is perhaps idle to speculate on what the terms proposed by each side may have been. At any rate, the Athenians rejected any agreement, as the planned Kypros campaign shows. Artaxerxes must have been aware of developments in Hellas. The embassy had been an implicit admission of the weakness of their position. The Athenians may even have feared an offensive in Ionia and the Aegean by the King as a result⁴⁵. The Athenians in 461 may have seen themselves as being on the brink of losing all the gains of the 460s. The thought of such a reversal will not only have stiffened their resolve to show no weakness in the east and south-east but will also have acted as a significant intensifier to their existing hatred of the Spartans, whom they will have regarded as the cause of the vulnerable position into which Greek 'freedom' was being pushed⁴⁶. So, some time after the return of Kallias, probably in 461, the Athenians took the bold decision to mount a campaign against Persian strongholds in Kypros, despite the tense situation in Hellas. Before they embarked on the campaign, in mid 460⁴⁷, news of the end of the Messenian revolt arrived, arrangements were being made to accept the refugees and the plan to settle them at Naupaktos suggested itself. This plan was not calculated to relieve tension between Sparta and Athens. So far the quarrel involved only Sparta and Athens. We have already analysed how the alliance with Megara transformed the dimensions of the crisis in Hellas. It would be naive to believe a desire to protect Megara from Corinthian injustice played any role in the Athenians' decision to accept the offer of alliance⁴⁸. It is obvious that the alliance

represented an immense strategic gain to Athens⁴⁹; that the Athenians were motivated by a genuine fear of Spartan aggression is not impossible⁵⁰. At any rate, all are agreed that even if the earlier alliance with Argos had not made war with the Peloponnese certain, this alliance rendered the outbreak of hostilities imminent⁵¹. There can be no doubt, irrespective of when we date the Athenian attack on Halieis (Thuc. 105.1)⁵², that in summer 460 the Athenians were expecting to go to war in Hellas shortly. As is well known they did not, as a result, postpone the Kyprian expedition in order to have their forces nearer home, but instead listened with willing ears to the appeal for assistance from Inaros and committed some two hundred triremes to Egypt⁵³.

The idea that the Athenians should have embarked quite deliberately on a war on two fronts has evoked a wide range of response from modern historians. To Beloch it would have been "ein offener Wahnsinn" while Burn, more kindly, thought it an example of "superb self-confidence"⁵⁴. The course of action embarked upon in 460 looks like the result of a serious misjudgement. Some facts pertinent to an assessment of the situation facing the Athenians in 460 are probably unknown to us, but one is hard pressed to imagine any which would alter an assessment of the situation sufficiently to allow us to accept their actions as well-advised. Hindsight confirms first impressions. It is tendentious to deny that the Athenians blundered in 460.

The ancient sources preserve a virtually total silence on attitudes at Athens in 460 on the question of embarking on an ambitious and distant commitment just as war in Hellas appeared imminent⁵⁵. Modern historians have sought to fill the silence with deductions based on interpretations of other pieces of evidence.

The expedition against Persian interests fits perfectly with what we know of Kimon's views on foreign affairs. Beloch used this as an argument for dating the expedition to before Kimon's ostracism⁵⁶. We have seen that the evidence weighs heavily against dating the Kypros-Egyptian expedition so early. Others have accepted the sensible chronology and suggested that Kimon's friends were sufficiently influential after his ostracism to put his anti-Persian policy into effect⁵⁷. When the question of proceeding against Kypros and that of assisting Inaros were discussed some friends of Kimon may have spoken in favour. But their anti-Persian attitudes in the 460s will have been so intimately associated with the principle of dual hegemony in Hellas that I suspect they may have chosen to keep a low profile. Their association with Kimon and his pro-Spartan stance would lead us to expect that they lost a great deal of political credit, and therefore we should not attribute powerful influence to this group unless no other explanation of events is possible.

Interest naturally centres on Kimon's enemies, who, we would imagine, gained in influence as a result of the events of 462. Among the enemies of Kimon there may have been men who were not opposed to his policies but were personally obnoxious to him. Such a man might seek the political friendship of Ephialtes. He might, for example, have been particularly enthusiastic about re-opening the campaign in Kypros. In order to preserve the valuable friendship of a man of Ephialtes' stature he would have to support him, for example, over Makedonia, though he may have not liked the venture much. He would have gladly supported him over the Areopagos reforms. Such a man would have gained in political credit as a result of 462 and he would have vigorously supported the Kypros campaign.

But of Kimon's enemies it will obviously have been the most vociferously anti-Spartan who will have experienced a sharp increase in the respect they enjoyed in the city. Ephialtes was probably dead before the end of 462/1 (AP 25.4 with 26.2)⁵⁸. Had Perikles been associated with anti-Spartan policies? We deduced that Ephialtes had been, like Perikles, a supporter of the Makedonian venture. Ephialtes may have dropped the question of breaking with Sparta in the period 464-2, but he had made his position clear enough in 464, and in 462 there is reason to believe he will have been the main advocate for breaking relations. The identity of Ephialtes' and Perikles' views over the Makedonian question suggests that they also shared similar views on the related question of relations with Sparta. Scholars have warned against inferring a staunchly anti-Spartan position at this early stage of Perikles' career on the basis of his later intransigence towards Sparta⁵⁹. The warning is entirely valid, but even without such an inference there is enough evidence to allow us to conclude that, in 460 and the years following, Perikles offered no opposition to the war against the Peloponnesians. Participation in a campaign does not prove a general's support for it; but in the absence of evidence to the contrary we should assume he did in fact support it. Perikles' generalship recorded by Thucydides (1.11. 2-3) was energetic and aggressive, hardly the leadership of a man opposed to, or even unenthusiastic about the war⁶⁰. That Perikles' suspicions of Sparta date from the earliest stages of his career is strongly suggested by his association with Aischylos (no friend of Sparta) as choregos for the Persai in 472, a play which we interpreted as indirect support for Themistokles' attempts to turn Athenian energies towards mainland Hellas by assuring them of the annihilation of the

Persian threat. On the other hand, Perikles' association with the suspension of hostilities in 446, when Athens' back was against the wall, and the fact that he was probably not opposed to the cessation of hostilities in 454 or to the Truce of 451⁶¹, for both of which there were very sound reasons, cannot be interpreted to form the basis for sufficiently reliable inferences about Perikles' general attitude to Sparta and the Peloponnese to justifiably outweigh the consistent conclusions to which the evidence we have cited leads. There is, then, good reason to support the traditional view that Perikles was anti-Spartan in the late 460s, and, therefore, that he not only gained in political credit as a result of 462 but also that in 462-0 he was not opposed to the actions which contributed to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War⁶².

Thucydides chose to mention the names of four Athenian generals of the First Peloponnesian War⁶³. We may presume that the three others besides Perikles, that is, Myronides, Tolmides and Leokrates, were also supporters, probably even before the outbreak of hostilities, of policies that were in some way anti-Spartan. Let us call these men mainland expansionists. These men are also likely to have benefitted from the events of 462. It is often said, or assumed, that these enemies of Kimon, sometimes irrelevantly described as 'the democrats', 'came to power' in 462. The expression is misplaced and misleading. An investigation into the attitude of these mainland expansionists to the question of pressing the war against Persian interests will reveal something of the character of Athenian politics at this time.

We do not know what attitude (if any) Perikles and other mainland expansionists expressed over the question of pursuing the war against

Persian interests⁶⁴. But I think we can say that either a) these men were able to influence Athenian policy decisively and they supported the war on two fronts; or b) they opposed the pursuit of the war against Persian interests but were in fact not so influential as is usually assumed; or c) they did not oppose the pursuit of the war against Persian interests.

a) Since the first possibility carries the corollary that the mainland expansionists were stupid, it is perhaps surprising to find that it has been the most popular explanation of the events of 462-0. Scholars have laid greater or less emphasis on the role of Perikles, with varying degrees of apology or condemnation for the decisions taken⁶⁵. We saw above that there is no reason to believe that Ephialtes and Perikles had opposed the idea of pursuing the war against Persian interests in the period after Eurymedon, and although we refrained from speculating how, we said this could have fitted rationally into a policy of mainland expansion. The deliberating atmosphere of the situation in 464-2 cannot be compared with the situation in 460. The alliances which the Athenians had concluded made it likely that a reaction would set in which would be beyond the Athenians' control. Therefore the evidence for the attitude of Perikles and Ephialtes in the period 464-2 cannot be used to claim that Perikles must have actively supported the Kypros-Egyptian expedition in 460, or that the policy of Ephialtes and Perikles was over-ambitious in the period 464-2, with the consequence that an over-ambitious policy may be attributed to Perikles now, in 460. The idea that Perikles and other leaders who shared similar views were stupid or that they simply suffered a temporary aberration into imprudence is not impossible, but it is not a safe basis upon which

to build a reconstruction. We should examine the other two possibilities.

(b) It is precisely the men who should have gained in influence as a result of the events of 462, the anti-Spartan mainland expansionists, whom we should have expected to oppose the Kypros-Egyptian expedition. That they were influential in this period is suggested by the fact that Thucydides chose to mention the names only of leaders active in the operations against the Peloponnesians. His choice may be deliberate and reflect their political standing⁶⁶. Yet this raises the question of how influential, in fact, leading men were in Athens in our period. We should recall at this point what we concluded was Themistokles' reluctance to propose openly a course of action he knew to be unpopular, though he was at the zenith of a remarkable career; we should recall that despite the rejection of Themistokles' policies, the "grand coalition" failed to influence enough Athenians to ostracize Themistokles, and that he seems, eventually, to have been expelled not so much because of the loyalty of his enemies' supporters but because of his refusal to accept the considered decisions of the majority of the Assembly. If the mainland expansionists did in fact oppose the Kypros-Egyptian expedition -- and it cannot be excluded as impossible -- then we should have to conclude that despite their prestige as a result of the events of 462 they were unable to dissuade the demos from a course of action which was carried by less prestigious men than themselves because the project itself was already popular. If so, it should not cause surprise for it would fit into a pattern of behaviour which we have observed throughout our period. In deciding questions of high policy the Assembly was to a very real extent independent of the views of

its "leaders".

c) I do not, however, believe that the mainland expansionists did in fact seriously oppose the campaign in the east; my reasons will become clear when we discuss the nature of this group of men. Their failure to do so, however, does not require us to abandon the interpretation of the relationship between leading men and the demos which we have just outlined; rather, it enables us to make a more precise characterization of that relationship in the context of 462-1 which can be understood within the broader framework sketched above.

Of these mainland expansionists only Perikles is known to have been a friend of Ephialtes. Even if we could assume that the others of whom we know, Myronides, Tolmides and Leokrates, had all been friends of Ephialtes, too, we would not be justified in seeing them as working with each other rather than against each other, especially after Ephialtes' death. While the direction, though probably not the details of their policies were the same, each was seeking to increase his individual influence, not their collective influence. And each will have been concerned not only to influence the direction of the city's energies, but also to be seen to be successful in achieving this goal. The demonstration of this ability will have made the possibility of his political friendship, that is, his support, more attractive to other politicians. Such friendship was a contributing factor in achieving success, that is, in influencing the decisions of the city. In 460 the importance of proving oneself successful will have been particularly great, for in the previous decade at least three major figures had been removed from the political scene, loosening alliances and creating, we may presume, a greater fluidity than usual in the constellation of political personalities. So com-

petition among the mainland expansionists is likely to have been keen. It would be difficult to guess who was most respected and influential among them in 460⁶⁷. These observations on what was probably the nature of this group of men, make it easy, I believe, to imagine that most of them were reluctant to make a stand against proposals which were obviously popular and likely to be carried, anyway. They had no desire to be seen to fail to persuade the demos to their way of thinking.

Their failure to oppose the prosecution of the war against Persian interests can also be understood in the context of two themes which had characterized the relationship between the demos and its leaders in the last two decades. The sovereignty of the demos' decisions had developed into an issue over the two decades since the victory at Salamis. The issue is discernible in the ostracism of Themistokles in so far as he refused to accept as final the judgement of the demos. A much more blatant usurpation of sovereignty by Kimon had formed the background to the reforms of Ephialtes, and Kimon's attempts to repeal them, in other words, his refusal to accept the judgement of the demos as final, had contributed to his ostracism. The men of 460 had learned the lesson too well. They were afraid to oppose the clear wishes of the demos⁶⁸. The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations leads us to the second feature of the relationship between the demos and its leaders.

Not only were the decisions of the demos substantially independent of the wishes of leading men, but the policies of leading men were to a degree dictated by popular views. The same conclusion is arrived at by another approach. Themistokles' views on expansion in Hellas had been rejected partly because of the negative effect they were

likely to have on the ability of the Athenians to wage war against the Persians. We saw that there is some evidence that Ephialtes and Perikles, while advocating expansion in mainland Greece, were probably in favour, in the period 465-2, of pursuing the war in the east. I suspect that they, and any other men who spoke of expansion in Hellas, had not only to not oppose the war against Persia but to appear to support it vigorously, in order to avoid calumny and suspicion⁶⁹. It is probably significant that the man who led the embassy to Artaxerxes to seek an agreement, and who had perhaps proposed the idea, was Kallias, a man who had been closely associated with Kimon. I doubt whether any of the mainland expansionists would have dared propose the embassy.

Against this background it is easy to understand the course of events of 461-0. We have already discussed the capture of Naupaktos and the decision to send Kallias to Sousa. To explain the rejection of an agreement with the King we probably do not need to turn to the fact that the men who should logically have supported it - the mainland expansionists - were inhibited by political considerations. Because of the terms offered by Artaxerxes there may have been no question of acceptance. But the response of the Athenians to the results of the embassy will have provided the mainland expansionists with a barometer of Athenian feeling towards pursuit of the war. As we can see by later events, the intensity of feeling against Persia had not lessened. The mainland expansionists will have taken note in forming their public opinions (if they expressed any) on the proposed Kypros expedition.

The appeal from Megara, which must have come after the decision to proceed against Kypros, offered the Athenians a chance of pulling

off a major shift in the balance of power in Hellas. Acceptance of the Megarian offer will have dealt a serious blow to Spartan strategic superiority. The alliance will have represented a further snub to Spartan pride, and as such will have had great popular appeal. It also meant the near certainty of war with Korinth and probably the Peloponnesian League, too. Those who had been friends of Kimon were prohibited from dissuading the demos from accepting the offer by obvious political considerations. One would like to know whether any of the mainland expansionists opposed the alliance. Since the argument would imply that if the Athenians wished to ally with Megara they would have to abandon the Kypros expedition, they may have felt inhibited. Most of the mainland expansionists were eager to be seen to be influential, and it was not wise to speak against a proposal which had every chance of being adopted, thus allowing one's rivals the credit of being seen to appear to direct Athenian policy. It must have seemed much wiser to follow the trend of one's policies of the last few years and be seen to be successful, too. The mainland expansionists, as individuals, failed to modify their policies to the new situation. Even if disaster ensued, they could hope to put the blame upon those who had been most vigorous (unlike themselves) in supporting the Kypros expedition (and who now, on the question of the Megara alliance, were probably subdued).

Ehrenberg expressed concisely a typical approach to explain the fact of Athenian involvement in Egypt by asking, "whose idea was it?" and then considering possible Athenian candidates⁷⁰. The approach is misguided. The idea came from Inaros, as Cloché and Thucydides pointed out⁷¹. He, or his ambassadors, will have been eloquent and persuasive advocates of Athenian intervention. It has been con-

vincingly argued recently that 'isegoria' was a reality at this period⁷². Active Athenian support for the proposal need not have come from Athenian 'leaders' at all, but from the floor. It is only necessary to explain, as we have, the absence of effective opposition to the proposals.

The cool and detailed evaluation of the practicability of conducting a war against the Persians in Egypt at the same time as one in Hellas against what was likely to be the Peloponnesian League should have been possible in the Boule. It is possible that the men on the council for 460/59 were incompetent and offered the Assembly poor advice. It is as likely that on an issue of such magnitude they chose to make no recommendation⁷³. Yet although the decision to send aid to Inaros was made without adequate regard for its practicability, we should at least recognize that the decision did not underestimate Athenian resources in morale; the positive response was not the result of a fleeting burst of anger but was based on a deep-rooted hatred which sustained the Athenians to the end⁷⁴. Part of the explanation of this remarkable optimism or recklessness, and of their sustaining this level of activity for six years, may lie in the increasing numbers of young men who were reaching the age to attend the Assembly who had not had the chance (so to speak) of contributing to the war against the Barbarian. Not a few of these men will have lost their fathers in 480-79 and 465⁷⁵.

If the Assembly took a series of ill-judged decisions in 461-0 a good part of the responsibility lies with the prominent men of the day, who, drawing on the experiences of the two decades since Salamis, failed to warn the demos honestly of what they should have been able to recognize was the dangerous direction in which popular

feelings were tending, taking more care of their own political careers than the good of the city⁷⁶. The citizens who experienced 460-54 seem to have learned to value a restraining influence in deliberations on policy. At least one of the 'leaders' of that period, still, no doubt, acting with an eye to the success of his own career, was able to develop his political style accordingly.

Thucydides considered this an important aspect of Perikles' career:

κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο
μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἤγε (2.65.8).

ὁπότε γοῦν αἰσθαιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει

θαρσύνοντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι (2.65.9).

CHAPTER ONE

NOTES

1. Correctly, Macan 527; μεταβαλὼν signifies an "actual change of place": the sailors did not witness the debate.
2. Cf. Grundy 411-15; Macan 531; How and Wells 272; Green 205; Gottlieb 110; Schulte 118-9; Burn 469; Schachermeyr 4) 84; Knight 37; Podlecki 2) 70; Lenardon 1) 84.
3. While it is true that the case against Herodotos for unfair treatment of Themistokles has been overstated (see e.g. Strasburger 21-4; Guratzsch 49-51; Fornara 4) 66-74; Lenardon 1) 84), certain episodes, including the one we are discussing, are clearly anti-Themistoklean in motivation (cf. Guratzsch 52; Schachermeyr 4) 83-4; Podlecki 2) 68-72; Lenardon 1) 84-5). The traditional view can be found at G.W. Williams 3) 60; Erbse 27-8; Gillis 142-5; Cawkwell 40-3; Knight 35-7.
4. See Gomme's survey 400-1.
5. The "unfortunate result of the battle" (Gomme 441) was not Themistokles' fault - he had to defend himself - and in no way diminished his right to claim thanks for the favour he had done in warning the King; cf. Gomme loc.cit. See too J.W. Cole's comment, 45. (I should like to thank Prof. Heinz Heinen of Trier for drawing my attention to this article).
6. Later we shall be able to suggest an explanation of exactly what Thucydides meant by saying Themistokles made this claim
 ψευδῶς : below N29.
7. Bauer 49 and N3 e.g. - an interpretation which E. Meyer 372N1 considered possible.
8. Cf. e.g. Gomme 441.

9. Cf. Marchant 263; How and Wells 272; Gomme 441; Hignett 2) 242.
10. Hignett 2) 241 rejects Thucydides' evidence here. On Thucydides' reliability, see Milton 263-6; it must be admitted, though, that Rhodes' suggestion (see Milton 265N51) that Themistokles tinkered with the details of his flight, while not tenable if they were to conflict with public facts, may here be acceptable. It is then, not impossible that Themistokles, if he is the ultimate source here, sought to establish a 'patriotic' message after Salamis (on which see text below). But we are primarily concerned not with the nature of a historical second message but with the relationship of Herodotos' account of it to the alternative tradition, and the light this throws on Herodotos' account of the immediate post-Salamis period.
11. Doubts on the letter: see last note. Couldn't refer to non-existent letter, cf. Podlecki 2) 26-7; Lenardon 1) 84. Knight 37 rejects the historicity of a second message without facing the problem presented by Thucydides' evidence; cf. Grundy 415.
12. Hignett 2) 242. Cf. How and Wells 271.
13. Nepos Th. 5. is similar, and probably based on Ephoros: Bauer 160-1; Holzapfel 53.
14. Bauer 159.
15. Cf. Uxkull 69. For the other later accounts see Bauer-Frost 58-9. They are discussed by Bauer 160-2.
16. Uxkull 69.
17. Podlecki 2) 26 and N26.
18. See Uxkull 65.
19. Ephoros' use of Hellenikos: Barber 113, 122-3; Schreiner

- 1) 55N7; Jacoby (RE XI, 2, col. 2061) says of Ktesias' evidence, "einiges, was neben Herodotos über Salamis brauchbar erscheint, kann aus Hellanikos stammen". Alternatively, though, it is not impossible to believe that Ephoros was here following Ktesias in the main, but that his account has been 'contaminated' with another source, as Urkull 67-9 did (following von Meiss' demonstration that Ephoros had used Ktesian elsewhere).
20. Cf. How and Wells 271; Gottlieb 109 and N42 ('Adeimantos' a slip for Eurybiades). The plagiarism of Herodotos' Themistokles is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
21. Contrast Gottlieb 109-10.
22. It is possible that the original source failed to name the second messenger and so we should entertain the possibility that Ephoros took over Sikinnos from the Herodotean version, and in consequence 'rationalized' the first messenger into a deserter (Diod. 17.1). Ktesias may simply have named Arnakes to fill the silence of his source, or, also disliking the use of Skinnos on both occasions, have replaced him by Arnakes as the second messenger; Cf. Maean 533; Burn 469.
23. Hignett 2) 242.
24. It would then, be no surprise to find Ephoros (fr. 191) could follow Thucydides' account of the letter to Artaxerxes (if POxy XIII 1610 fr. 1 is Ephoros: see Africa; and if the author is drawing on Thucydides).
25. The fact that Themistokles could, apparently, turn it into a favour to the King does not make its patriotic motive any the less likely. See e.g. Podlecki 2) 26; Lenardon 1) 84. How and Wells 272 find it odd.

26. Grundy 415 and Hignett 2) 242 note that Herodotos' message does not encourage the King's departure.
27. Macan 525. Cf. e.g. How and Wells 271. Macan's belief (524,533,2) 324-5, 329, 330; cf. E. Meyer 372N1) that the Greeks had to await the withdrawal of the Persian land forces, is, however, erroneous: see Grundy 413; How and Wells 271; Hignett 2) 240-1; Burn 469N52.
28. Though remember N10 above.
29. Some reasons why sailing to the Hellespont in September 480 was probably never seriously proposed are discussed by Grundy 414; Macan 2) 330; How and Wells 272; Ehrenberg 1) 421N87.

Besides, if the contents of the message were as we have deduced, its purpose will have been mutually exclusive with that achieved by actually destroying the bridges.

The fact that the Greeks never intended to break the bridges, I think, is why Thucydides castigates as deceitful Themistokles' claim to have been responsible for τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν οὐ διάλυσιν. It is a pity that Thucydides has paraphrased here. But since the message came from Salamis, it is impossible, as we saw, to imagine that it contained the idea that the Greeks had decided not to destroy the bridges; this means that it is unnecessary and unattractive to take

προσεκοιήσατο as applying not only to the claim made in the letter, but also to a putative claim in the message.

This is what Gomme 441 does, taking it as confirmation of Herodotos' message. Others (Bauer 49N3; Marchant 263; cf. Fornara 4) 71) refer this to Themistokles' action in dissuading the Athenians at Andros from proceeding.

The message will, no doubt, have included a promise to try to prevent the destruction of the bridges (as Plutarch's message contains: see text below). To this extent it could be described as a message about the "non-destruction" of the bridges, as Thucydides appears to do. But only once the Greeks had turned back from their pursuit could Themistokles claim to have prevented the destruction of the bridges. This he did for the first time in the letter.

30. Burn 469. See also Macan 2) 325.

31. I wonder whether the message mentioned plans similar to Themistokles' alleged proposals at the council of strategoi at Andros that the Greeks should διὰ νήσων τραπομένους καὶ ἐπιδιώξαντας τὰς νέας πλέειν ῥθέως ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον λύσοντας τὰς γεφύρας (H. 8.108), on the ambiguities of which, see Macan 525-6. If such plans were mentioned in the message the ambiguity would be desirable.

32. Whether it had determined Xerxes' decision is quite another, and for our purposes irrelevant matter. See e.g. Green 208.

33. To a lesser extent, I feel, because the need for the ruse questioned whether Salamis was in fact such a devastating blow to Xerxes' power as Themistokles certainly wished to claim.

34. Reduction of numbers: see below N40.

35. See above N29.

36. Cf. Fornara 4) 71.

37. So, Gottlieb 110; cf. E. Meyer 372N1.

38. Macan's suggestion (532) that Themistokles' assistants were tortured to provide confirmation of the story, in view of the

evidence for the nature of Kimon's attempts to stabilize his predominance in the early 460s (see chapter twelve) is attractive. But, as Macan notes, they provided no information, according to Herodotos. Macan, in fact, believes the story in Herodotos arose on the basis of the Themistokles letter referred to by Thucydides. I think, however, that this letter was probably not in general circulation but was the result of Thucydides' own research (see Milton 265 and N51, 266 and N52). Thucydides' research probably merely confirmed the common tradition found in a source prior to Ephoros and Ktesias and based originally on Themistokles' claims in the 470s as transmitted by oral tradition.

39. I say "stage" because it bears traces of various attempts to discredit Themistokles, not all of which have been completely synthesized; see below N41.
40. I agree with the implications of Schulte's remarks (119) that Herodotos is expressing the opinion of the Athenians in describing Themistokles as σοφός τε καὶ εὐβουλος (contrast Macan 532). But there is no implication that Herodotos disagreed with the judgement.

Fornara 4) 70 believes that the suggestion to break the bridges is intended to show Themistokles again hitting on exactly what the situation required. It is true (70 N13) that Herodotos has portrayed Xerxes as fearing such an action. Nonetheless, the arguments presented against sailing are perceptive and cogent, and do represent a more intelligent analysis of the situation facing the Greeks than the proposal to 'catch Asia in Europe' (pace Schulte 120). At any rate, the reduction of Persian land

forces at Plataia (whatever the real figures involved) which the non-harrassment of the retreat encouraged, was believed by fifth century Greeks to have been valuable: Aisch. Pers. 803-4; Thuc. 73.5; cf. Plut. Th. 16.5; Diod. 19.6, 59.2. See How and Wells 273-4; Hignett 2) 267-8.

41. The adoption of arguments used by Eurybiades is noted by Cawkwell 42; Schulte 115 and Knight 37. This implied accusation of plagiarism seems to me the predominant means of minimizing Themistokles' contribution at Andros, but a different approach, not fully synthesized with the other, and indeed logically incompatible with it, can be detected. As Macan 531 noted, there is an assumption - or rather a hint - that Themistokles did wrong in dissuading the Athenians (cf. Bauer 20). This is least veiled in the almost defensive tone of Herodotos' explanation that in part the Athenians followed Themistokles' advice because of the σοφίη he had previously shown. It is also implied by the fact that Themistokles should use this act as both a potential and real source of Persian gratitude. Such implications may derive from responses made to those who argued that whenever Themistokles sent the second message and whatever it contained he nonetheless did right in dissuading the Athenians from breaking the bridges, because of the reduction in Persian numbers at Plataia this encouraged. That this element is only faintly, if at all, detectable shows that in Athens at the time Herodotos was absorbing his anti-Themistoklean source(s) it was generally believed that Themistokles had in fact been εὐβουλος in his advice at Andros, and therefore it was more important to deny his authorship of it than to deny its wisdom.

42. Macan 526.
43. It is unimportant that Xerxes in fact made his retreat without the bridges being intact (they were destroyed by storm: H. 8.117).
44. When the Greeks in 480 spoke of breaking the bridges it also meant harassing Xerxes' lines of communications and supplies and attempts at crossing the Hellespont. "The bridges" was a shorthand, perhaps even symbolic way of expressing the things that their existence ensured the King. This is most evident in the 'Persai' (736) where Xerxes is said to have
ἀσμενον μολεῖν γέφυραν γαῖν δουῖν ζευκτηρίαν.
44. Bauer 21 and N2; Cf. the doubts of Macan 530 on the whole parenthesis.
45. Schulte 116-8.
46. H. 7.143 (oracle), 8.41 with Plutarch Th. 10.1. (Akropolis snake); Plutarch Th. 22.1. (Artemis Aristoboule: in view of this personal interest in Artemis one wonders whether Themistokles didn't play a prominent role in the Athenian dedication to Artemis (Pl. Th. 8.3.)). Note too Wilamowitz' suggestion that the official hymn sung at the dedication of the Boreas shrine was "The Sea Fight off Artemision" written by Themistokles' friend Simonides: see Podlecki 2) 50-1 for references.
47. Cf. Podlecki 1) 23.
48. Schulte 116-7 and N77.
49. See Podlecki 1) 21-3 for references and discussion.
50. Cf. Bauer 20. Macan 530 detects an archaic tone in σκόρου ἀνακῶς ἔχέτω, "appropriate in the mouth of Themistocles", and perhaps his actual words.
51. Godley's (Loeb) translation. Macan 530 has produced no trenchant

argument against taking this as conditional in sense, as Stein 86 had also done. See too the references at chapter four N13.

52. See further Macan 527.

53. Macan 531 says they were "a concession to gain the Athenians".

54. See chapter three.

55. Stein 86.

CHAPTER TWO

NOTES

1. Cf. Maean 536; Schulte 120; see too Guratzsch 52.
2. Plutarch (Ar. 24.1) notes that the Greeks made financial contributions under Spartan hegemony, and may be referring to these events: ATL 189N15; Brunt 138. Kiechle 272-3N28, though, locates them under Pausanias' command in 479/8.
3. Cf. E. Meyer 374; How and Wells 272; ATL 185; Podlecki 2) 27. H.D. Meyer 410 goes, therefore, too far in calling the action a "Sonderunternehmen Athens", "ein Ausläufer" from the Hellenic League.
4. H. 8.4-5 (Artemision): cf. Schulte 121-2.
5. Cf. Barth 34, and generally on the tradition of Themistokles' avarice.
6. Cf. e.g. Barth 37; though some have found the accusations plausible: e.g. How and Wells 272; Hignett 2) 244.
7. See chapter eight.
8. See e.g. Podlecki 2) 51 and N18.
9. See Bowra 353.
10. Podlecki 2) 53 would like to connect Timokreon's *προδοτὰν* with the technical charge of *προδοσία*, probably levelled at Themistokles (Pl. Th. 23.1; Thuc. 138.6). But the fact that Timokreon wrote a separate poem to celebrate the charge of Medism against Themistokles (fr. 2 and 3 with Plutarch's commentary (Th. 21.4)) suggests not that fr. 1 was written "at a time nearer to that at which he composed" the Medism poem, but that at the time of the composition of fr. 1 there was no hint of the later accusations of Medism, for otherwise Timokreon would have made much more of them. Furthermore, the

meaning "traitor to his xenos relationship" fits far better in this context than the legal term. See correctly Bauer 13 and N3 and Mattingly 3) 233.

11. Preferring the reading *γελοῖως* to *γλοῖως*
12. Perrin in the Loeb Life of Themistokles translates "prayed Heaven 'no happy return of the day for Themistocles'"; Bowra 351: "praying that no attention be paid to Themistocles", and Edmonds 423, (adopting *ῥας* in place of *ῥαν*) "meat that they ate with curses on his head".
13. Cf. Kirchhoff 41.
14. Exceptions include Maas (R.E. 6 A col. 1271) and Fornara 2) 259N9.
15. Pace Kirchhoff 41; ATL 185N10.
16. A terminus post quem for the composition is, of course, of no use to us in trying to determine the date of Themistokles' alleged activities, but would be useful in establishing the range of dates in which Timokreon levelled his accusations (which I assume to be done for the first time in his poem). The Isthmos provides a 480 terminus, while Bowra's interpretation of 'Lato' as referring to the formation of the Athenian Alliance (353-4, which I accept) provides a lower terminus of 478/7. Others had reached a similar conclusion by considering the prominence of Aristides, presupposed by the poem, pointed to a date after his 478/7 strategia activities: Kirchhoff 40 (expedition of Pausanias and Aristides to Kypros and area); Bauer 13, in 1881, was probably thinking of the Athenian alliance when he said the poem was composed after 476 (only AP 12-13 and 21-2 had been discovered by 1880); Wilamowitz 1) 138N27;

Busolt 14N1; von Domaszewski 8; E. Meyer 374N2; Fornara

2) 257N1 expresses this view but will not press it, insisting only on a post 479 date; Lenardon 1) 104.

17. E.g. Wilamowitz 1) 138N27; Busolt 14N1.

18. See White and Lazenby 244.

19. See chapter six N76.

20. Podlecki 2) 53 objected to this approach regarding Pausanias, and he was followed by Mattingly 3) 233N10 who added Leotychides.

21. See above N10.

22. Cf. Beloch 4) 108.

23. Kirchhoff 42-4, followed by Bauer 13, postulated Timokreon, among others, vainly soliciting Themistokles' aid while the latter was at Andros (Bowra 352 completely misrepresents Kirchhoff's views). Wilamowitz 1) 138N27 and E. Meyer 374N2 also located the request in 480. See also the relevant references in the next note.

24. The idea of a Themistokleon expedition, either in 480 or in one of the years following is now orthodox: see ATL 185 and N10, 191 and N26, followed by Brunt 141; French 1) 85; H.D. Meyer 410; Sealey 3) 245-6, cf. 2) 246 for 480. Others who accept a later expedition include Beloch 145N1, cf. 4) 109; von Domaszewski 8; Burn 468N50; Lotze 263N5 ('Timokrates' is a slip for 'Timokreon'); Meiggs 415; Balcer 2) 22N4, cf. 25; Podlecki 2) 52; Mattingly 3) 232. None of these scholars has defended the assertion that Timokreon suggests that Themistokles was actually in Rhodes. It presumably rests on the following two elements. The *ζευία* relationship: this could have been

established long before 480, and may, in any case, have been based on a visit by Timokreon to Themistokles, and not vice versa. Secondly, the expression that, having been bribed not to reinstate Timokreon, Themistokles went, $\pi\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ εἰς Ὀλεθρον. The metaphor prohibits taking $\pi\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ literally; Themistokles needn't have been, and probably wasn't, at sea when he allegedly received bribes. And even if the expression is taken as indicating naval activity by Themistokles it needn't be taken as indicating that Themistokles sailed away from Rhodes. Kirchhoff 41; Fornara 2) 258N3 and de Ste. Croix 173N20 deny that Timokreon requires an expedition led by Themistokles to Rhodes.

25. Beloch 4) 108-9.
26. Cf. Beloch 145N1.
27. Fornara 2) 259. On the context of the poem within Plutarch's 'Themistokles' see Kirchhoff 39; Beloch 145N1 and Fornara 2) 261N16.
28. This will be justified in chapter six.
29. See Fornara 2) 258-60; Mattingly 3) 231; Beloch made use of this argument only in his "Griechische Geschichte" 144-5N1.
30. Cf. Fornara 2) 260-1; Mattingly 3) 232, though I do not agree with the latter's suggestion that Themistokles was left to consolidate the Karian district in 478 and rejected Timokreon's approaches while there. It is not impossible that Themistokles was with the fleet in 478 but Timokreon offers no support, and, since the fleet should have begun this busy season early, his presence conflicts with the very probable date of his attendance as pylagoras at the Amphiktyonic council of spring 478 (on the

date see chapter six N99).

31. It was rejected by Maas (R.E. 6A col. 1272); Kirchhoff 46-8 (hardly a "less sceptical interpretation" as Podlecki 2) 54N28 describes it). Podlecki 2) 54 offers explanations of how the story could have emerged.
32. Cf. e.g. Kirchhoff 41 (4). Podlecki 2) 51 thinks "there is a clear implication that Themistocles had ... violated an agreement between the two men".
33. See chapter six and N99 on the date of the Amphiktyonic council and the discussion of the tradition of Themistokles' defence of Kerkyra. We do not have any information on Themistokles actually restoring exiled men to their cities, and line 9 of Timokreon's fr. 1 (τοὺς μὲν κατὰ γὰρ ἀδίκως) may be taken in this way. I do not consider this a serious objection to the interpretation I have offered. The defence made by Themistokles of the post-war independence of certain states may have given the signal for the return of men exiled by nervous cities. Also Timokreon's words should not be pressed; he may merely be maintaining the maritime metaphor of the previous line (πλέων εἰς ὀλεθρον) rendering the idea that Themistokles brought some men out of the turbulent seas in which they found themselves after the Persian defeat into the safe harbour of Athenian protection; or, more simply, Timokreon may just be exaggerating in order to make the contrast with exiling more striking.

CHAPTER THREE

NOTES

1. See chapter seven.
2. Podlecki 1) 14, 19-21, 2) 16-7, 29, 4) 4-5. I choose to attack Podlecki's representation of this fairly common theory because, in my view, his opinions deserve to carry considerable weight.
3. See e.g. Hammond 2) 385-8.
4. Badian 15-16N44. Lenardon 1) 105-6, cf. 38 considers listing the play in the trilogy which included the Phoinissai and dating it to 477/6, or even equating it with that play or a particular theme or scene in it. Apart from chronological difficulties this is implausible because of the fact that it is hard to imagine that the trilogy of which the 'Capture of Miletos' was a part should have won first prize, as the 477/6 trilogy did (Pl. Th. 5.4.). On Badian's pressing of *ἀναμνήσας* see Podlecki 2) 7N9.
5. Forrest (in Podlecki 1) 158N18, 2) 7N9) says that there was not much time between the fall of Miletos and a production in 494/3; but the date cannot be ruled out. "Recent grief" could, in my view, mean up to four or five years after the event. Cf Badian 15-16N44.
6. I accept that Themistokles Neokleous Phrearrios was eponymous archon in 493/2 (Dion. Hal. R.A. 6.34.1.).
7. Podlecki 1) 14, cf. 20, 2) 6-7.
8. Podlecki 2) 6.
9. Podlecki 1) 14, 19, though, seems to suggest the play commended further support, which I can not believe is correct. See too Podlecki's comments below at N17.

10. See too Freymuth 53-63.
11. Podlecki 1) 20; How and Wells 72; cf. von Stauffenberg 130.
12. And so the question as to whether Themistokles began his policy of improving Athens' naval defences in 493/2 does not make any difference to the question of determining his attitude to defence of Ionia. On Podlecki's blurring of the distinction between defence of Hellas and defence of Ionia see below N17.
13. Podlecki 1) 20.
14. Podlecki 1) 19-20.
15. Podlecki 1) 20-1, 2) 29, 4) 5-6.
16. Podlecki 2) 29; see too 4) 6, 1) 21.
17. Podlecki 2) 6-7 confuses vigorous defence against the Persian invasion with a desire to protect Ionia when he maintains that Themistokles' "later policy of resistance to the Persian menace ... suggests that he felt Athens had acted wrongly in abandoning the Ionians" after the initial failures of the Ionian revolt. In fact it tells us nothing about his attitude to the Ionian revolt.
18. From Thucydides we have the account of the walls incident (90.1-93.2) and, in particular, Themistokles' aggressive speech (91. 4-6). His remarks about the Athenians being able ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς πάντας ἀνθίστασθαι (93.7.) and the statement that from Argos ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον (135.3) are not expressly anti-Spartan but have been convincingly interpreted as such (the former by Cawkwell 44; Podlecki 2) 34, the latter by, I think, everyone who has commented on the passage). Plutarch's evidence is more explicit: at 'Themistokles' 20 he recounts Themistokles' proposal to destroy the Hellenic fleet

anchored at Pagasai (cf. Ar. 22.2) and Themistokles' opposition to the Spartans at the Amphiktyonic council, which finally established Spartan loathing of Themistokles (cf. K. 16.2.).

19. de Ste. Croix (176) drew attention only to Hammond's assumption that Themistokles envisaged pursuing the Persian war, but the idea is fairly widespread: see e.g. E. Meyer 452-3, 478 (in the years immediately after 478/7); H.D. Meyer 431-3 and N56; Kagan 40 and N38, 57, 83; Podlecki 1) 21, 2) 96-7, 4) 4-5; Bengtson 1) 193. Others deduce that Themistokles showed less interest in the Persian war (e.g. von Domaszewski 9, Amandry 210; Schachermeyr 5) 67; Burn 565, 3) 188; Podlecki 2) 34 considers the deduction legitimate). I would not, however, press the argument of those who draw support for this deduction from the later allegations of Medism (so E. Meyer 481 (who takes Themistokles' waning interest as a feature of his later career), followed by Hignett 1) 190, and Cawkwell 45-6; cf. de Ste. Croix 176. See chapter twelve. Diodoros (41.4) says that in a war for hegemony Themistokles thought the Athenians would have on their side the Ionians *διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν*, who would assist in freeing the other Asiatic Greeks. But the passage has no value, for the considerations are said to have been kept top secret (42.1.). In the light of later events Ephoros was not irrational to assign this motivation to Themistokles' post-war naval policy. Furthermore, the section in which this passage occurs (41.3-43.2) looks very much like a mere elaboration of the simple fact that Themistokles fortified the Piraeus; any elements taken from it would need to be

- independently justified as credible or trustworthy.
20. See Cook's analysis (10-16) of the evidence for where, in so far as there was one, the frontier line between Ionia and Persia should be drawn. The apparent successes of the Athenians in detaching coastal cities from the Persian empire may have been one of the most important causes of the material poverty of Ionia in the fifth century (9-10) in that she was unable to dominate much of the good land, which, remaining King's land, ceased to benefit the community as a whole (16-18). Given the economic and strategic realities of the situation, Themistokles may well have realized that the threat to Athens' "defence" of mainland Asiatic cities might, in time, not only be from external sources but from within, too. See H. Schaefer 109-11, 302 and N4 for an analysis of the background to pro-Persian sympathies in Ionia. Olmstead gives an account of Persian attempts at expansion towards the sea only until Mykale in his article on "Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem".
21. Thuc. 93.4 (see, correctly, de Romilly 107N1, cf. 57, followed by e.g. Cawkwell 45 and 55N10); Pl. Th. 20. 1-2, cf. 7.3 (cf. Ael. Arist. 46. 186-7 (Dindorf II p.252)), 4.3; (Diod. 41. 3-5 does not deserve credence - see above N19).
22. Cf. among others, Kiechle 271.
23. Herodotos' inclusion of these two powers in Themistokles' speech in 480 at Andros was not anachronistic: see Macan 535; How and Wells 272; further Schulte 122; pace Strasburger 21.
24. Gelon: H. 7. 158 with Brunt 158-62; Argos: H. 7. 148.
25. The idea that Athens had previously had an 'Aegean hegemony' is not convincing: see e.g. Brunt 146-8.

26. See chapter ten.

27. Sources, see above N21. Interpreted thus by e.g. E. Meyer 452 (though I find no evidence to support E. Meyer's view that Themistokles was in part motivated by the "nationale Interesse" rather than purely Athenian interest); Keil 70-71; Amandry 210-11; Schachermeyr 2) 36, 5) 68; Kagan 58; Cawkwell 45; Morrison and R.T. Williams 225; Brockmeyer 39; Podlecki 2) 32. The argument that the mainland expansionist designs of the 'heirs' to Themistokles' policies - Ephialtes and Perikles and others - represent evidence of Themistokles' policy is worth mentioning but carries little weight.

CHAPTER FOUR

NOTES

1. The story that Themistokles was rejected by the god at Delphi when he tried to make the dedication personally (Paus. 10. 14. 5-6) does not deserve credence: see Amandry 206-7; Podlecki 2) 27-8.
2. Herodotos says ἀπῖκετο θέλων τιμῇ θῆναι. It is possible that he had gone there "to discuss with her leaders the strategy of the next campaign" as Hignett 2) 275 (cf. Macan 551) presumes, but Herodotos' statement that Eurybiades was awarded a crown of olives suggests that the invitation had been made with a purely ceremonial agenda. This is not to deny that there were strategic talks also, but there is no evidence for it. There is, therefore, no basis for assuming that Themistokles' strategy for the forthcoming season was identical with what we may deduce the Spartans' to have been, pace Hands 61.
3. Hignett 2) 277.
4. As e.g. Beloch 144; Macan 2) 332-4; Schachermeyr 1) 96; and Podlecki 2) 30 do.
5. See Podlecki 4) 4; cf. Lenardon 1) 99; Fornara 3) 17N21, 42. Pace Beloch 144.
6. By e.g. Busolt 2) 189 and N1; How and Wells 276; Burn 491.
7. See e.g. Fornara 3) 60-61, 75.
8. Cf. Hignett 2) 276N2. Note, too, the article by Labarbe, who is right to draw attention to the difficulties in the Herodotean account of Timodemos (34-6). If his suggestions are followed, as they have been e.g. by Euxley 2) 32, then "Timodamos of Aphidna" was not even an Athenian. Sealey 1) 27, and 38N96 takes

Themistokles' words as implying Timodemus was not an Athenian, but interprets the comment as "regional snobbery" aimed at the remoteness of Timodemus' deme. I am undecided, and so assume, for argument's sake, that he was Athenian.

9. See e.g. Podlecki 2) 30 for the implausibility of Ephoros' attempt to portray the complaint as popular. Note too that the popular dissatisfaction recorded by Plutarch (Th. 22. 1-2) is certainly to be associated with a later stage of Themistokles' career, as the resultant ostracism (Th. 22.3) shows: cf. Hignett 2) 276N2.
10. One exception being Hauvette (according to Hignett 2) 276N2) who apparently included suspicions of Themistokles' honesty; though, as we have seen, such accusations were probably levelled only at a later date.
11. Correctly Kiechle 264-5N4. This explanation is favoured by Prestel 25; Kahrstedt (R.E. 5 A2 col. 1692); Amandry 209; Schachermeyr 1) 95, 103, 2) 19, 31, 5) 64; Green 210; Zinserling 107.
12. See e.g. How and Wells 389; Hignett 2) 279-85; Burn 504.
13. See above, chapter one. Cf. Macan 2) 332-4. Hignett 2) 278N3 gives no reason why he considers Macan's position to be "over bold". Scholars who consider strategic disagreements as a possible reason for Themistokles' disappearance include Busolt 2) 189; Bury 414; E. Meyer 380-81; Burn 490-91 (who had previously attributed it to a postulated appointment of the strategoi of 479/8 by the Areopagos: 2) 35); Hignett 2) 278; Podlecki 2) 30.
14. See Busolt 90-91N3; Davies 302; ATL 159-60.
15. Plutarch (K. 5.4) has him only fighting at Salamis.

16. The generally accepted year for his first generalship: e.g. Busolt 95 (though note 65N1); Podlecki 2) 33. Jacoby 2) 2N4, though, will only accept 476/5 as his first certain tenure. Bicknell 1) 93N43, 103N17, 4) 173N18 is wrong to deduce that Kimon was strategos on the basis of the alleged embassy he undertook in 480/79 (on which see text below). See too Fornara 3) 43.
- Some suggestions on what to do with AP's (26.1) $\nu\epsilon\omega\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \delta\upsilon\tau\alpha$ can be found in Radet; Wilamowitz 1) 136; von Fritz and Kapp 170-71N76; Anastasi; Scott 117. I follow Rhodes 2) 150 in believing that the comment should refer to the early 470s and has been misplaced. Smart's acceptance of the tradition at face value (138) is based on his proposed chronology for the 470s and 460s which, it will be argued in chapter eight, should not be accepted.
17. It might well be Krateros, cf. Gomme 309; Bicknell 1) 93N43; Burn 505N49; but we are not permitted to cite him, as Wilamowitz 1) 136 did: "Krateros bei Plut. Ar. 20" (a slip for 10); similarly Hereward 45 "Plut. Aristides 10, 10, quoting from a decree in Krateros' collection"; cf. Hignett 2) 283.
18. See Willemssen 28-9.
19. See Hignett's discussion 2) 283-4 of Macan. See also Green 230 Note, 231. Munro 3) 146-8 had a different solution.
20. See Gomme 62N1, 309; Burn 505N49; Schachermeyr 1) 316-7N2, 2) 241N33 expresses caution in using the decree.
21. If Bicknell's recent guess (1) 93N43) that Myronides was a Lykomid should be correct.
22. See Thomsen (95N262), who reports sherds of Kimon, Themistokles and Megakles from the same pot. D.M. Lewis knows of at least 3

joins between Megakles and Kimon ostraka; but see my remarks at chapter nine N82.

23. Suspension of judgement: D.M. Lewis 3) 4, the quotation is from page 3.
24. Bicknell 4).
25. Mattingly 2) 284-5.
26. Dated Feb. 15, 1979.
27. The study of the possible allocation of various ostraka to ostrakophoriai by Mattingly which Thomsen 81 and N180 announced was "forthcoming" has, unfortunately, had to be postponed until after the full publication of the Kerameikos ostraka.
28. The story should perhaps not be dismissed out of hand ("a trivial story", sneers Podlecki 2) 33, while Fornara 1) 53 dubs it "a myth of the purest transparency"). It has at least two points in favour of its historicity: it is followed immediately by a passage based on Ion; and it does not fit into the usual pattern of Themistokles versus Kimon. But an attempt to secure for Kimon some of the credit for the salvation of Hellas and Athens may well be all that lies behind the tale. At any rate, it perhaps testifies to the absence of any tradition of opposition by Kimon during the Persian war. Wilamowitz 1) 136N25 finds the story plausible but will not build on it; E. Meyer 2) 41 calls it a "gewiss authentische Geschichte" and H. Schaefer 148; Burn 2) 36; Hammond 4) 265; and Kagan 60 accept it as historical; cf. Kiechle 295.
29. Hignett 2) 408-11; followed by Fornara 1) 51 and Knight 40. Cf. Podlecki 2) 23. See too Bury 415 and Raubitschek 8) 127N1.
30. Cf. Pl. Ar. 8.1; Comparison of Aristides and Cato 5.3. The

same basis may be behind another artificial tradition portraying a division of responsibilities between the two: AP 23.3 (cf. Pl. Ar. 8.3); scepticism: Wilamowitz 1) 139; Busolt 63N3; E. Meyer 453N1; though "im Kern richtig" according to H.D. Meyer 433N56.

31. E.g. How and Wells 286; Hignett 2) 273N4; Burn 495N18.
32. Podlecki 2) 29.
33. I see nothing in Xanthippos' behaviour between 480/79 and 479/8 which might hint at conflict with Themistokles; see chapter six and below N35.

It is not a sufficient explanation of Themistokles' disappearance from the *strategia* merely to point to co-operation between Kimon, Xanthippos and Aristides, as Bicknell 1) 93 and N42, (cf. Knight 32) seems to do. That this approach to Athenian politics is inadequate will be shown in chapter nine, especially. Munro's theory of a deal (2) 301) is not only "far-fetched" (Hignett 2) 278), but also works on a fundamental misconception of the nature of Athenian politics at this time. How and Wells 390, though, were sympathetic.

34. There is a degree of uncertainty surrounding the date of the recall of the ostracised (AP 22.8; Pl. Ar. 8.1). AP 22.7, after describing Themistokles' use of the new silver, which he dates in the archonship of Nikodemos (the Berlin papyrus and Dionysios Halikarnasseus 8.83 give Nikodemos, though the London papyrus has Nikomedes; on Raubitschek's attempt 8) 127-8 to see in this discrepancy two different archons see Badian 2-3N3 and Bicknell 5) 170N3. Pace Badian loc. cit. and 33 'Nikodemos' is preferable; cf. Podlecki 2) 206N8). Nikodemos was archon in

483/2 (Dion. Hal. 8.83). At the same time as this (ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καίροισι) Aristides was ostracized. "The clear implication ... is that the ostracism occurred in the same year as the navy bill" (Hignett 1) 336 - correctly rejecting Sandys' attempt at assigning the ostracism to 484/3; cf. Wilamowitz 1) 25). AP then says Aristides was recalled in the fourth year after his ostracism, which would be in the archonship of Kalliades, 480/79 (H. 8.51), though he says it was in the archonship of Hypsichides, who is not mentioned in other sources, and who could have been archon in one of the two vacant years 482/1 or 481/0. Plutarch (Ar. 8.1) helps us by saying that in the third year after Aristides' ostracism the Athenians recalled the ostracisés. This certainly looks as though it derives from a reliable chronographic source (cf. Hignett 1) 337). It would seem safest to take the τετάρτῳ in the MSS of AP as a corruption, rather than seeing ἀρχοντος Ὑψιχίδου as erroneous, and place Hypsichides' archonship in 481/0 (despite the contentions of Sumner 34 and N3). This is the solution accepted by, among others, Wilamowitz 1) 25-6; Cadoux 118 and Hignett 1) 336-7. Plutarch's evidence cannot be minimized by his mistaken statement that the recall occurred "while Xerxes was marching through Thessaly and Boiotia" which is probably his own comment, based purely on dramatic considerations. The attempt by Carcopino 153-7 (followed by Burstein 96-7) to apply a more subtle approach to AP's apparent internal contradiction results in dating Hypsichides' archonship to 482/1, which conflicts with Plutarch. Nor can Herodotus (8.79) be called in to support a recall in 480/79. I do not think that his account of Aristides'

crossing from Aigina to Salamis on the eve of the battle shows that he thought Aristides was returning from ostracism. And if he had thought this there is some indication that he would have been mistaken, for Aristides should have been back in Athens in time for the strategia elections of 480/79 which took place in "whatever prytany after the sixth there are favorable omens" (AP 44.4 - see B.D. Meritt (277 for the translation)); cf. Hignett 2) 277; Burstein 97. Some suggestions for getting around this are proposed by Sumner 35, one of which is criticized by Burstein 97. That Aristides was strategos is virtually certain since he led the military action on Psyttaleia (cf. Bury 418; How and Wells 262-3; Hignett 2) 277; Podlecki 1) 25; Burstein 97. This is denied by, as well as Sumner 35, Fornara 1) 51 and N4, 3) 42 and Bicknell 2) 436N68. While the mawkish anecdote recorded by Philochoros fr. 116 concerning Xanthippos' presence at the evacuation of Attika is quite untrustworthy, the fact that he led the Athenian naval contingent in spring 479 should mean that he too was elected strategos for the year 480/79, since the tenure of the strategia began and ended, like other Athenian offices, on the 1. Hekatombaion (see Pritchett's 1) conclusive examination of the evidence against Mayor's attempt to date the beginning of the tenure shortly after the election which "may frequently have been held in the seventh prytany" (B.D. Meritt 278)). The argument concerning Xanthippos' generalship would be invalid if we accepted Hammond's idea that Athenian generals elected to the Hellenic League operations held office from spring to spring: 1) 382, cf. 322. On the false notion that the tenure was according to the conciliar year see the references

cited at Staveley 288N25.

So, all in all, it is best to attribute the recall to 481/0.

35. So too Cornelius 502 (though I disagree with the arguments he uses as well as his other conclusions). The best example of both these behavioural characteristics is furnished by Xanthippos (who was probably the most prestigious of the generals besieging Sestos) in his determination not to return home unsuccessful (H. 9.117) and his dedication of the tackle of the Hellespont bridges (H. 9.121) - doubtless with much pomp. (Amandry has argued that they were dedicated at Delphi (and states it as fact at Amandry 221). None of ML's reservations (54, with full reference to Amandry's Fouilles de Delphes, cf. Meiggs 36) is decisive and the association is accepted by Hammond 1) 314 and Boersma 51.

Even if we accept as historically accurate the tradition of hostility and suspicion towards the ostracisés analysed by Burstein 105-10, we should, of course, still expect them to behave in the way we have described in order to dispel that suspicion.

36. Beloch 144-6; criticism by e.g. Hignett 2) 277-8 and Podlecki 4) 4.
37. Further analysis of aspects of the political situation in Athens between Salamis and Plataia is included in chapter six.

CHAPTER FIVE

NOTES

1. First published by Robert 293-316 in 1938. Further work on the inscription is noted by Siewert, especially 5-8.
2. See the references collected by Siewert 3.
3. See Siewert 47-8.
4. See Siewert 48-51.
5. See Siewert 61-75; cf. Meiggs 505. Herodotos' silence, however, despite Siewert 50-51, still remains puzzling, though not decisive. (Perhaps the Athenian defence of Medizers, represented especially by Themistokles, in the 470s, encouraged the Athenians to forget this unfulfilled oath).
6. See e.g. Meiggs 505.
7. See Siewert 103-4.
8. As Meiggs 155-6, 504-7, cf. 2) 37-9 would. Without relying on the contentions of Carpenter, the list of nine temples and shrines which were rebuilt or restored in the decades following 479, recorded by Boersma (despite the fact that he is prepared to accept as historical the "temples clause" (51, 63, 68, 99)), does, in fact, provide confirmation of Siewert's arguments (102-6) against the authenticity of this clause (see Boersma's Catalogue 42, 46, 49, 52, 53, 64, 66, 122, 125). See also Siewert 111-12. Schreiner 2) 38N37 is not convinced by this part of Siewert's case. Wüst 2) 148, and N2 came to precisely the opposite conclusion to Siewert - that the Oath is false apart from the "temples clause". Morgan 103 also accepts the clause.
9. See chapter eleven and N15.
10. Compare the analyses of e.g. ATL 102-4, Siewert 91-3 and Brunt

153-5; I find Brunt's most persuasive.

11. See especially Burn's comments 545N19 on Raubitschek's claims 9) 179-80.
12. See Busolt 2) 212-13N5; E. Meyer 391N1; ATL 101-4, 186-9; Brunt 153-6; Habicht 34; Sealey 6) 194-5; Frost 4) 186; Hignett 2) 342; Burn 544-5. Others who register their rejection include Wüst 2) 144N2; Schachermeyr 1) 313N21; Green 275; Lotze 270. The case for authenticity has been put by Larsen 1) 177-9, 2) 262-4; Raubitschek 9) 181-3 has argued for a fourth century source behind a tradition (not in Plutarch) which claimed the Greeks, after Plataea, swore everlasting enmity to the Persians. Siewert 89-93 bases his support for authenticity partly on Larsen's arguments from the alleged 'double' oath sworn by the Samians (90; see chapter six N42), partly on an interpretation of the Hellenic League and of passages from Thucydides which are themselves controversial (see also the interpretations of e.g. ATL 102-4 and Brunt 153-5). Meiggs 508 thinks "there is probably a genuine core to the 'Covenant of Plataea'", though only "a formal decision to carry on the war" and arrangements for "care of the graves and dues to the gods".
13. Burn 526.
14. Burn 526.
15. See chapter four on the absence of evidence for division on strategy in 480-79, which some had believed existed and reflected socio-political divisions. A sample of the application of the socio-political conflict interpretation can be found in e.g. Munro 3) 145; Schachermeyr 1) especially 89-90 and more extremely 5) 42-3; Green 210.

16. Busolt 2) 200N6 (cautiously); Hignett 2) 321.
17. Pritchett 2) argues on the basis of Krateros' book divisions that the transfer in fact occurred shortly before Eurymedon, and so is able to accept the tradition found in Theophrastos as historical. H.D. Meyer 444-5; Hammond 1) 332, 338N2; Meiggs 48 cannot, in any case, be right in assuming that a proposal to transfer was made in Aristides' lifetime but that it was not acted upon, because this would not have illustrated the point Theophrastos was trying to make. See further references at chapter fourteen N22.
18. Burn 527.
19. Others who accept the plot include Prestel 26; Chroust 284 and N24; Green 253, 296N9 (following Burn); and Hands 58 thinks it possible, while Frost 1) 120N70 says discontent "may have been of the type described by Plutarch".

CHAPTER SIX

NOTES

1. Sealey 3) 241 fails to mention that Aristagoras, after repeating at Athens the arguments that had been unsuccessful at Sparta, was able to add that the Milesians were *ἄποικοι* of the Athenians. Perhaps this, and not material benefits was the decisive factor in swaying the Athenians (cf. e.g. Wolski 2) 36-7). At any rate, however we interpret the emotional effect of Phrynichos' 'Capture of Miletos' it certainly had nothing to do with booty (H. 6.21). Kinzl 1) 284 also emphasizes booty as a motive for Athenian assistance to Aristagoras.
2. Justin-Trogus 2.12.25 must be rejected in the face of Herodotos' evidence.
3. Podlecki 1) 20 is prepared to doubt Herodotos' belief on the basis of the Phoenician accusations levelled at Ionian loyalty to the King at Salamis. I follow Xerxes' assessment of their performance, who, after all, was in a good position to judge (H. 8.90). See too Grundy 414 Note.
4. But see the comments of Wolski 2) 42N42; von Fritz 2) 275N68; Hammond 1) 311N3.
5. Hignett 2) 249-50.
6. It is no longer necessary to defend this explanation of the size of the fleet: see Busolt 2) 193N3; Hignett 2) 249-50; Burn 500 N34, 547; Meiggs 33; and Lazenby 2) 272 on Athenian manpower in 480.
7. Beloch 53-4, cf. 2) 59.
8. There is, of course, no evidence of reinforcements having been sent to Leotychides' fleet of 110 ships at any time in the season:

- see the references above N6. How and Wells 390, cf. 395 claim that the data given by Herodotos are not sufficient to explain the move, and that reinforcements sent to Delos (after the Spartans had moved into Boiotia) would do so (cf. Munro 1) 341, 3) 146-8). Herodotos' silence on such an important development would be startling, and so it is better to take his evidence at face value. How and Wells 331 nonetheless reject the synchronism. Busolt 2) 214N2 has the fleet eagerly awaiting news of Plataia at Delos, though doesn't explain why news of victory should be a reason to proceed against a fleet "fast um das Dreifache" (215) as their own. ATL 187 think it possible that Plataia "inspired the naval forces with a new courage" and suggest (187N4) the synchronism derives from Phrynichos' 'Phoinissai'. The latter suggestion is unconvincing because if this was the play performed in 477/6 (Pl. Th. 5.4) it is hardly likely that the poet would portray a synchronism which all his audience knew to be false, whatever the dramatic effect. Furthermore, we do not know whether the play contained a description of Mykale (see chapter nine N88). Larsen 2) 264N23 rejects the synchronism. See too H.D. Meyer 413-14; Gauthier 7.
9. Cf. Hammond 1) 316N1.
 10. Hignett 2) 259, with further references.
 11. Hignett 2) 252 speculates that the Samians also brought news of the withdrawal of the Phoenician contingent, that is, somewhat earlier than Herodotos (9.96) suggests.

There is nothing in the sources which suggests there was any division between the Spartan and Athenian leaders on the question of advancing beyond Delos. If anything can be based on Herodotos

9.91 then Leotychides was certainly not reluctant. The decision, however, was no doubt taken in council, as was normal (cf. Brunt 140-41; H.D. Meyer 408; Siewert 85). H.D. Meyer 414, while recognizing that there are no grounds for seeing the Athenians as pushing the decision, nonetheless describes the situation in such a way as to leave the impression that they in fact did, and he thinks that the "einfachste plausible Erklärung" of the advance is that Leotychides had to go along with them and the Ionians if Sparta were to retain her credibility as hegemon.

12. For a criticism of the idea - which might have offered a rational explanation had it been acceptable - that the Greek naval advance was intended to force Mardonios to take the offensive in Boiotia by causing revolt in Ionia see Munro 3) 147-8 and Hignett 2) 251. Kinzl's explanation 1) 284 - booty - begs all the questions.
13. Diodoros' statement (34.3) that the Greek leaders at Delos decided to liberate the Greeks of Asia has been rightly recognized as a tendentious elaboration of Herodotos which deserves to carry no independent authority: see e.g. Hammond 1) 318.
14. See H.D. Meyer 424; Burn 553; Fornara 3) 18; Lotze 266N1; Kinzl 1) 228. The order was obviously dependent on other strategic considerations permitting.
15. I do not find Munro's shuffling of Herodotos' chapters attractive: 1) 342, 344.
16. See chapter three.
17. Cf. Munro's concluding reflections on Mykale: "Was Mycale a big battle or a hasty raid? designed to liberate the Hellenes of the eastern continent at large or merely to destroy the enemy's

last fleet in the Aegean before his army could come down from Sardes?" 1) 344.

The role of the Greeks in the Persian forces in the battle is discussed in the text below.

18. The most important analyses are by Highby 39-43 (though the whole section 39-57 is relevant); H.D. Meyer 415-24 and Hammond 1) 416-21.
19. See H.D. Meyer 416-7 for a full statement of the arguments supporting this assertion.
20. Notably E. Meyer 393N1, 2) 217N1, explaining it in terms of the debates of the Archidamian war. Macan 2) 339 tends towards outright rejection, and Ehrenberg 1) 423N104 describes it as "probably apocryphal"; f. Podlecki 2) 29, 4) 6; Sealey 2) 227, 3) 248.
21. Nöthe (referred to by Busolt 39N1); Munro 1) 344 even says the proposal "has its humorous side" and thinks it may have only been "an argument or debating point in the controversy" (1) 345). See too Hammond 1) 317; Hignett 2) 260; Burn 552.
22. See Parke 2) especially 95-6.
23. This is the best reading of the MSS, though see Hignett 2) 260 N1.
24. Parke 2) 96.
25. See H.D. Meyer 415N24.
26. Cf. Macan 805-6; Hignett 2) 257; Sealey 2) 226-7.
27. On ἑτεραλκία see Hignett 2) 257N5.
28. Correctly, Sealey 2) 227.
29. See too Sealey 3) 243.
30. Ephoros probably included Aiolian contingents (Diod. 36.5). This is, of course, open to suspicion (though no one can disprove

Hammond's suggestion 1) 318 that this item may derive from Hellenikos), but I take Herodotos' omission of them not as decisive (see Highby 51-3; Sealey 3) 244) but merely as confirmation of his imprecise knowledge and impressionistic account of the part played by the Asiatic Greeks in the battle.

31. It should be noted that Herodotos provides no information about what happened in the cities of Ionia when their contingents returned home after the battle. He says only that the action of the troops at Mykale constituted treason (cf. Sealey 2) 227, 3) 243). We may doubt the appropriateness of Herodotos' overall judgement, but we cannot accept the judgement and then, however, apply it to another set of putative events of which his text otherwise has no hint. Hammond 1) 316 recognizes this, admitting that to the question of "whether the Aeolian and the Ionian mainlanders did revolt from Persia, when the victories at Mycale and at Plataea became known" the "sources give no clear answer" (1) 319), yet he is nonetheless prepared to consider the possibility that some did revolt and that Herodotos is guilty of having "speeded up the narrative for dramatic effect" (1) 316). Gomme 257 correctly relates Herodotos' comment to Mykale, yet at 295 refers to it for the conclusion that in the cities there followed a political revolution; cf. 335. (For the background to loyalty to Persia in Ionia see H. Schaefer 109-11; cf. Cook 14, 16-18; and on the possible social divisions reflected in differing Asiatic Greek attitudes to Persian domination, see Hignett 2) 253 and Sealey 3) 247). This is not to say that no Asiatic Greek cities underwent a change of regime in the weeks and months following Mykale, but it is wrong to cite Herodotos

9. 104 as evidence for it (on Thuc. 89 see text below). For a detailed analysis of the individual cities of Ionia and Aiolia see Highby 43-55 (though I do not agree with all his arguments or with the idea that the cities which were being considered in the resettlement plan must have already rid themselves of pro-Persian regimes, (39)).

There is no evidence for Leotychides interfering in internal Milesian affairs: see chapter ten N1.

Scholars who believe in a widespread expulsion of pro-Persian leaders from the Asiatic Greek cities shortly after Mykale include Beloch 2) 60; E. Meyer 393N1, cf. 456; H.D. Meyer 414; Meiggs 34, 464; Bayer and Heideking 99.

32. Munro's belief 1) 344 that the "real business of the meeting was to determine whether the fleet should now go home or to the Hellespont" is based on his rearrangement of Herodotos' text. (cf. above N15). On Hammond's idea (1) 316) of what the real business was see text below.
33. Kiechle 268 maintains only that the Spartans and Athenians did not differ in their assessment of the danger the Ionians were in from Persia. H.D. Meyer 416-17 emphasized Athenian agreement in the assessment of the situation. It will be suggested in the text below that Diodoros' account of the Samos conference is a conflation of Ephoros and Herodotos; if accepted it means Diodoros understood Herodotos in the way we are proposing.
34. And so Highby 41, e.g., is quite wrong to say "according to Herodotos, the Athenians promised to take upon themselves the protection of Ionia". I find Podlecki's 4) 6 reason for wondering whether the Athenians gave "the Ionians ... informal

assurances" difficult to discern. He says the Peloponnesians suggested the resettlement because the "Ionian coast" appeared indefensible, but then goes on to say that it may be significant that Herodotos reports the inclusion of the "other islanders" as allies immediately after this, and he asks if we are to see in this a sign of the Athenian assurances that the Ionians - by which, according to his comments about the indefensibility of the coast, he should mean the mainlanders - would not be transported to Hellas but could rely on Athenian protection. At 2) 29 he says that the Athenians are supporting the contention that they "had a right to count on the loyalty of the Ionian Greeks" (which, incidentally, is derived from Themistokles' appeal at Artemision and is not expressed at the Samos conference, as recorded by Herodotos) "and (by implication, at least) also a corresponding obligation to look after their interests". See text below and also chapter three.

35. Hammond 1) 316.
36. H.D. Meyer 416-16, 421-2: see below N42.
37. See H.D. Meyer 415N25.
38. See Barber 113, 118-20.
39. It has been widely rejected or ignored in modern scholarship: e.g. by Kirchhoff 5-6; Bauer 45N1; Busolt 39 NN 1 and 2; Highby 40; E. Meyer 329N1; How and Wells 333; Hignett 2) 260; ATL 188; H.D. Meyer 415N25; Meiggs 414; Hammond 1) 318-19. (The textual tinkering of Steup and Schwartz (see Busolt 39N1 for references) have been rightly ignored).

Since Diodoros has the Asiatic Greeks as members of the League from the start of the conference he is able to have them

take part in it, which in reality was not the case. Also, Diodoros can not have the Athenians press for admission of the Asiatic Greeks at that second stage at which he records an Athenian advocacy of their defence by the Hellenes. I am concerned with the attitude of the leaders of the Athenian contingent in 479 to the question of defence of the Asiatic Greeks, and so the distinction between advocacy of defence by means of inclusion in the Hellenic League (a modern idea not found in any source) and advocacy of defence as part of a policy of the Hellenic League towards some of its members (so Diodoros) is an unimportant one which I have deliberately blurred in the text.

40. Sealey 3) 235 found this difficulty alone sufficient to discredit all Diodoros' evidence for the conference.
41. Herodotean elements in Diodoros are unlikely to have been derived via Ephoros: see Barber 118-20.
42. H.D. Meyer's account of the Samos conference (416-19) is in part inspired by Diodoros' claim of alleged Athenian promises of independent assistance to the Asiatic Greeks (421) though his N25 on 415 gives no reason to trust Diodoros. Without using our own interpretation (see further text below) of the conference as reason for rejecting one that differs, I think there are independent grounds for condemning Meyer's account of the Samos conference as inadequate and improbable.

He believes that the inclusion of the islanders into the Hellenic League represents a complete victory for Athens (418), since her main concern was to secure the continuation of the naval war (417) against Persia which the protection of the

islands required. This also had the effect of thwarting Spartan intentions to pursue a land war against the Medizers in Hellas (418).

The notion that the Peloponnesians had opposed the inclusion of the islands is remarkably widespread when compared with its improbability (cf. e.g. Kirchhoff 4 (implied); E. Meyer 2) 217; Larsen 1) 181, 3) 14-15; H.D. Meyer 2) 499; Meiggs 36, 38; Lotze 266 says we do not know whether Leotychides had inhibitions about accepting the islanders, but the reference (266N1) to Herodotos 9.106 (προθύμως εἰζᾶν αἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, cf. below N45) as justification for his statement that "Herodots Bericht spricht eher dagegen" is misguided, since their giving way was not on the question of the islanders but on that of resettling the mainlanders. The other argument he uses also suggests that he believes the Spartans did, in fact not desire the admission of the islanders). If Hellas, including the Peloponnese and Sparta, were to remain secure from future Persian attacks, the Greeks had to control the sea (Thuc. 93.7). The Greeks had now cleared the Persian fleet from the Aegean. It is absurd to imagine that they now intended to allow the naval bases on the eastern side of the Aegean to be used by the Persians for a new naval build-up, and that the Greeks should withdraw and (presumably) defend Hellas' coasts from Delos again for years to come.

Three problems result from H.D. Meyer's interpretation of the acceptance of the islands into the Hellenic League. Firstly, if the admission of the islands represented such a blow to Spartan policy, why did they give way on the question? (On this point.

see Lotze 261). The assumption that "die Ioner dabei mitgewirkt haben" is inadequate; H.D. Meyer points in particular to the Samians who, he believes (418, following Larsen) were already members, bringing us to the second problem. I do not understand how a belief in the membership of Samos, and so the League's duty to defend it, can be reconciled with the claim that by admitting the islanders to the Hellenic League - "gleichgültig... ob viele oder wenige ionische Gemeinden durch den Hellenenbund geschützt werden mußten" - Sparta "hatte sein Prinzip durchbrochen." (In fact, though, Samos was probably not a member before being admitted with Lesbos, Chios etc.: see Brunt 153-4N2; Hammond 1) 317-18N2; and there is still less justification to claim that Lesbos, Chios etc. had been sworn into the League before Mykale, as How and Wells 333 and de Ste. Croix 380 do). The last objection to H.D. Meyer's interpretation concerns his assertion (418) that as a result of the inclusion of the islands "von Bestrafung der Perserfreunde im Mutterland konnte keine Rede mehr sein". I do not know when H.D. Meyer dates Leotychides' expedition against Thessaly, but if he is wise he will follow the best dating, to late 479 (see below N76), and as a result drop his contention about the effect admission of the islands had on Spartan policy. So we should reject H.D. Meyer's interpretation of the inclusion of the islands not only because it is based on no evidence, but also because it is internally inconsistent.

H.D. Meyer also believes that with the acceptance of the islanders Athens became "Wortführer einer Koalition" of "Anhänger" who would be prepared to stand up and be counted with

Athens against Sparta and the other Peloponnesians (419, cf. 422, 424), as well as some kind of leader (the Athenians "führten" - 419) of Asiatic Greeks (419-24) to whom the Athenians alone seem to have given a promise of protection (421, following Diodoros 37.3). That the achievement of such a position, indeed hegemony, was a consistent Athenian aim throughout the war is the main thesis of H.D. Meyer's paper. Accepting, but only for argument's sake, his framework, it is impossible to accept that the Athenians, between Mykale and the beginning of the conference, had not taken the trouble to inform themselves of the attitude of the relevant Ionian cities to the resettlement proposals. H.D. Meyer suggests that the Athenians had gone along with the proposals at the beginning of the conference because they had 'obviously relied on the Ionians' firm rejection' (417). He imagines that the Athenians are suddenly taken by surprise by the Ionian acceptance of the proposals. Such incompetence would be incredible, and would contradict H.D. Meyer's own assessment of Athenian intentions: if the Athenians were seeking to become spokesmen or leaders of the Ionians as the offer to protect the Ionians (Diod. 37.3) and the alleged championship of island inclusion (H.D. Meyer and others) would suggest, why did they not do so from the beginning of the conference (and in close collaboration with the Ionians)? There is as little explanation of the contradictory position of the Athenians in H.D. Meyer's paper as in Diodoros; it remains a crux, not to stimulate and challenge the ingenuity of the historian in finding a further hypothesis to add to the pile, but to testify yet again to Diodoros' lack of skill.

43. For this reason Hammond's attempt to explain Herodotos' failure to mention what he believes was the Athenian opposition to the "non-admission of the mainlanders" at Samos in terms of Herodotos' "bias in favour of Athens" 1) 317 is entirely unconvincing. Had such an Athenian stance existed at Samos Herodotos' failure to mention it would represent a bias against Athens. Since his bias in favour of Athens is not contested we should accept his silence on the putative stance of the Athenians at Samos as evidence that it did not, in fact, exist.
44. Brunt 140.
45. I prefer to take $\pi\rho\theta\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omega\varsigma$ with $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\xi\alpha\nu$ $\sigma\tilde{\iota}$ Πελοποννήσιου as Hammond 1) 317; von Fritz 1) 602; Wolski 2) 45 and N54.
46. I do not go into speculations on the question of Spartan motives behind the proposals (nor into the reasons why the Athenian leaders at Samos were personally opposed). But I note that while Lotze 261-62 is right to question the interpretation of von Fritz and others of it as purely "machtpolitisch", Leotychides probably did, as well as other reasons, see a potential increase in Spartan power resulting from the execution of the plan. Lotze's argument (261) that Spartan compliance suggests otherwise, is not quite valid here, for such a plan could not have been carried out in the face of open Athenian hostility to it. See too Wolski 2) 45.
47. Johnston 106 also seems to think the question of the Ionian mainlanders was left open.
48. See ATL 190 N17 on this phrase, and Blackman 182 and N7 for a discussion of which islands may have been included.

49. See e.g. Bauer 44-5.
50. See von Fritz' comment 1) 601.
51. ATL 191 (cf. 190 N17). They think the reason for their not being admitted at Samos was that "events at Samos followed so closely upon Mykale that all the new recruits (islanders and mainlanders) did not have time to be sworn into the League on that occasion". But Miletos would have had time, and Herodotos excludes the possibility that any mainlanders were admitted. I think this interpretation is also favoured by Bauer 45N1, but I am not sure that I understand his note properly. Meiggs 413 and 459 thinks this is what Thucydides believed, but he rejects (35 and N4) his evidence. Further references at Busolt 68N1 (who rejects the interpretation). For the possibility that some Hellespontine and island states joined the Hellenic League between Samos and Sestos see text below.
52. Highby 41-2 (criticism at H.D. Meyer 421N36) with his reference to Nöthe, who came to the same result. Beloch 2) 60 says, in his categorical way, "mit den festländischen Städten ... schlossen die Athener ein Separatbündnis", though he refers us in his note (2) 60 N1) to Herodotos 9. 104 (which must be in justification of the earlier part of his sentence which mentions the 'revolt of Ionia') and to Leo (see Beloch loc.cit. for reference) who, however, on page 64 in fact follows Wilamowitz 3) 338N21 in the unwarranted deletion of *ἑσπέρων* from Thucydides' text. Despite all this, I still assume Beloch must have had Thucydides 89.2 in mind when he made his assertion. See too Larsen 1) 182.
53. Busolt 40 says it is "nicht zu erkennen" whether the "Schutz-verhältnis" was formalized, but in 40 N1 he insists that *ἑσπέρων*

- can be taken informally, as Kirchhoff 9 had proposed. See too How and Wells 333; Gomme 257; Hignett 2) 261-2; H.D. Meyer 420-23.
54. Kirchhoff 9; Hammond 1) 320 (who also argues for taking *ἑσπέρων* formally within the Hellenic League: 1) 320-21 and 321-2N4) makes the best case, Sealey 3) 236 is prepared to admit that there may have been some mainland Ionians, but not many, at Sestos, and at 3) 244 insists that the expression could refer exclusively to islanders; cf. 2) 241; this view is implied by Lotze 267.
55. We shall discuss 'Hellespontine allies' in the text below in comparing the evidence of Herodotos and Thucydides.
56. Only Kirchhoff 9 in fact adheres to all these points.
57. Diodoros' comment (37.4) that the 'Ionians and islanders' were with the Athenians at Sestos is based on his belief that the mainlanders joined the League before the start of the Samos conference, and, like it (see text above with N39), is worthless.
58. Cf. e.g. Kirchhoff 9; Hignett 2) 261N6.
59. Hammond 1) 319. Sealey 3) 236 suggests Herodotos is following a different source to Thucydides.
60. It is possible that the Athenian envoys at Thucydides 75.2 are referring to this occasion when they say *ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλοντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου*, but I prefer to associate it with 478/7; see chapter seven.
61. Meiggs 35N1, cf. 459.
62. See e.g. Kirchhoff 9; ATL 190.
63. Meiggs 35.
64. Cf. N51 above.

65. Hammond 1) 319 postulates the re-formation of the Ionian League; I do not believe it was, in fact, re-formed.
66. Most recently by de Ste. Croix 175-6, 378-9, who tentatively suggests that Themistokles proposed something like a 'King's Peace' (Xen. Hell. 1.5.1.31). See also E. Meyer 494; von Domaszewski 9; Hignett 1) 190; Amandry 210; Forrest 2) 208; Cornelius 503.
67. Cf. Bicknell 1) 112 (drawing a different conclusion). Beloch 146 says Themistokles could not sail east in 479 "da er in diesem kritischen Augenblick Athen nicht so lange fernbleiben durfte", adding also that he would only have been able to win glory second to that of Salamis. There is some truth in this second point, too, for Themistokles probably would not have increased his influence by further military achievements. Hignett 2) 278 says that Beloch is "reduced to" these arguments to explain Themistokles' disappearance from Herodotos' pages, though he doesn't explain why he finds them so pitiful. Schachermeyr 1) 96, 15) 65 wonders whether Themistokles stayed in order not to lose further contact with the demos by being away so long.
68. Beloch's over-confident attack (149-54) is notorious. von Fritz 2) 274N61 described it as a "Musterbeispiel übergescheiter moderner Kritik". Hammond 1) 312N4 said the theory "passes my comprehension". von Stern also attacked Thucydides' account, while E. Meyer 454N1, 3); Busolt 3) and Gomme 267-70 defended Thucydides and set out some methodological principles. Fornara 3) 17N21, however, has recently expressed agreement with some of Beloch's suspicions. There are also scholars who accept the

story in essence but suspect some of its details.

69. Boersma 45-6 has attempted a more detailed reconstruction of the various stages of the rebuilding of the wall.
70. As emphasized by Busolt 45N1 and de Ste. Croix 167-8.
71. Plutarch (Th. 19.1) mentions in particular Polyarchos of Aigina.
72. Beloch 151-2 made much of this, and Gomme 269 granted that there was some substance to the argument that Sparta had little to fear from a walled Athens. Lotze 258-60 emphasizes that Sparta did not seem as engaged as we should expect from a state with "'imperialistischen' Zielsetzungen" (260) describing her stance, not inaccurately, as "nachgiebig" (261). See too E. Walker 35; French 2) 110 (an inexplicably neglected article).
73. I would take the words of the Corinthians at Thucydides 69.1 to refer to the Spartans having allowed the Athenians to strengthen the power of their city throughout the Aegean (*τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατύναν*) rather than simply strengthen the walls of the city. But the latter is possible and would be evidence that in 432 Sparta's allies implied that they had wanted her in 479 to do more than she did to prevent the rebuilding of the walls. That would still not be evidence that anyone in 479 except the Athenians really believed Sparta would invade.
74. Holm (reference at Busolt 45N1) thought Themistokles' actions unnecessary, though he offered different explanations. Busolt rejected his opinion only because of previous Spartan adventurism. For an analysis of the other sources on the walls incident see Bauer 106-10.
75. By e.g. Wilamowitz 1) 138N27, cf. 124N4; E. Meyer 453N1, 490N1; Busolt 85N2; Beloch 148-9; Gomme 365; Bengtson 2) 91; What

1) 62N2; White 145N21; Lotze 265.

76. Scholars who recognize the historicity of the story's setting include Wilamowitz 1) 138N27; Busolt 85; Beloch 192 (see Gomme's comments 400 N1); E. Walker 466; Highby 89; Johnston 106; Wüst 1) 62; White 145N21; Lotze 265; Meiggs 49; though not all date it to 479, the most obvious date against which there are no insuperable objections (cf. Paus. 3.7.9. Bayer-Heideking 106-7 give a selection of modern dates for the expedition). Thucydides (89.2) says the Peloponnesians

ἀπεχώρησεν ἐκ τοῦ οἴκου.

This, of course, is

true even though they broke their journey at Pagasai. The unsuccessful adventure was not of sufficient moment or relevance to allow Thucydides to mention it; see too Lotze 265. It is also possible that the fleet returned to Aigina before setting out again in the same (479) season, as E. Walker 33 states, though it was late in the season. The argument that the expedition must have immediately preceded the end of Leotychides' reign (which was in 469/8 - see e.g. Clinton 261; E. Meyer 2) 507; Beloch 190-92) is not compelling. The absurd story of how Leotychides was caught is almost certainly a fabrication (pace Parke 1) 106 and N1) and as such could have been trumped up at any time after the event. Since Herodotos believed in his guilt, he naturally presumed the trial took place immediately on his return to Sparta (cf. E. Walker 466).

Diodoros' erroneous date for the end of Leotychides' reign is 476/5 (48.2). It is possible that Diodoros has simply confused the archonship of Phaidon with that of the name of the archon he believed to have held office in 469/8, Phaion (63.1),

as suggested by Krüger 1) 151 and more recently Andrewes (in White 145N21, followed by Smart 136). A more satisfactory explanation, however, is that Diodoros has recorded, not, as he thought, the end of Leotychides' reign and his death, but the date of his flight to Tegea (H. 6.72). This explanation is favoured by e.g. Wilamowitz 1) 147N42; Busolt 83-4N1; Gomme 406; Parke 1) 110; Johnston 111.

On the composition of the fleet, see below N84.

77. The variant tradition recorded by Cicero (de Off. 2.49; cf. Val. Max. 6.5. ext. 2) in which Themistokles proposes burning the Lakedaimonian fleet anchored at Gytheion may represent a conflation of this and another Themistoklean proposal (see below chapter eleven) or may be simply a slip.

78. Busolt 85N1; Diodoros 41.2: διὸ καὶ μετεωριζόμενος ἐπὶ τῇ δόξῃ πολὺ μείζουσιν ἄλλαις ἐπιβοκαῖς ἐχρήσατο πρὸς αὐξήσιν ἡγεμονίας . . . τῇ πατρίδι.

Plutarch (Th. 20.1): Themistokles δὲ καὶ μείζον τέ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς διανοήθη δυνάμεως.

Compare also Plutarch (loc.cit.): δημηγορῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἔφη τινα πράξιν ἔχειν ὠφέλιμον μὲν αὐτοῖς καὶ σωτήριον, ἀπόρρητον δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, and Diodoros (42.1): ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ δὲ διελέχθη τοῖς πολίταις ὅτι μεγάλων πραγμάτων καὶ συμφερόντων τῇ πόλει βούλεται γενέσθαι σύμβουλός τε καὶ εἰσηγητής, ταῦτα δὲ φανερώς μὲν λέγειν μὴ συμφέρειν, δι' ὀλίγων δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐπιτελεῖν προσήκειν.

Rhodes 1) 41N2 tacitly recognizes that the process described by Diodoros over the Piraeus fortification is essentially the same as that over Themistokles' proposal to burn the fleet, though he refers not to Plutarch's account but to Cicero's.

79. I think this is obvious enough from a reading of the whole section 41.1 - 43.2 to require no discussion.
80. The addition by Ephoros of Xanthippos to Aristides, as found in Plutarch (Th. 20.2, Ar. 22.2), may be merely in conformity with an Ephoran fabrication (Diod. 27.3: cf. chapter four and N6) intended to add verisimilitude; but see further text and N83 below.
81. This was recognized by Bauer 111N2. I am prepared to admit only a remote possibility that Plutarch's story is a modification of Ephoros' or a version upon which Ephoros is dependent; not so much because the secret proceedings in Plutarch are an integral part of the story whereas in Ephoros they are extraneous but because it is hard to imagine a later source inventing the obscure details of Plutarch's version.
82. Bauer 111N2. On Stesimbrotos' anti-Themistoklean attitude, see now Meister 282.
83. Diodoros (42.5-6); as well as Aristides and Xanthippos (both strategoi in 479/8: H. 9.28, 114), has the Boule secretly judge a set of proposals. Proposals discussed by the Boule in secret session are well attested: see e.g. de Laix 26 and N76; Rhodes 1) 41 (who shares the general suspicion of the historicity of Diodoros' account).
84. But Amandry 215 and Lenardon 1) 33 seem to take the story seriously. (Amandry loc. cit. does not give the sources he is

- drawing on, but since he says Themistokles proposed burning a Spartan fleet at a Thessalian port he is combining Plutarch (Hellenic fleet in Pagasai) with Herodotos (Lakedaimonian expedition to Thessaly) and/or Cicero (Lakedaimonian fleet at Gytheion). Herodotos' focusing attention on the Spartan element in the Hellenic fleet is no more significant than his omission of other allies with the Athenians at Sestos (cf. Highby 89).
84. Kagan 58, although he finds Plutarch's story "suspect", thinks it nonetheless "possible".
85. Though Ephoros' secret meeting over the walls is probably based only on Thucydides' $\delta\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\lambda\omega\nu$ (90.4; see Pfister 382); but if we are to accept Thucydides' account of the walls incident, even in outline, we must assume a degree of secrecy over Athenian intentions.
86. See chapter nine, N10.
87. This is at least the fairly clear implication of the lines; cf. G.W. Williams 3) 59; Schachermeyr 4) 82; see too chapter seven, N67.
88. See chapter nine.
89. Though Rhodes 2) 148 suspects that the two men were aligned together throughout the 470s.
90. See the survey of modern scholarship by Kluwe 3) and, indeed, his own comments at 2), especially 65. Cf. Musiolek, especially 315 (I am not sure that I fully understand the main thesis of this paper, but it contains a great deal that should be rejected).
91. In keeping with our general conclusion are the implications regarding the relationship between the demos and its leaders of the fact that even during the period of evacuation the Boule and

Assembly were functioning normally (H. 9.5: see de Laix 26N73) and of the fact that an office of *στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ* did not exist during the Persian war (see e.g. Dover 2) 72-3; Burn 491 and 492N12; Fornara 3) 12-16; Bicknell 1) 111 and N6; Badian 5N11); nor does the evidence require us to postulate any extraordinary position for Athenian generals, as Hammond 1) 378-82 does; cf. Hignett 1) 218.

92. We shall tentatively suggest an answer to the question of how effective his ploy was in forming Athenian opinion on the direction of Athenian foreign policy in chapter nine.
93. The notice is accepted by most commentators: Wade-Gery and Meritt 187; Morrison and R.T. Williams 225; French 1) 94; Kagan 58; Blackman 203 and N73, 213; Meiggs 262-3. Rhodes 1) 115 advises caution; see too Podlecki 2) 111.
94. Cf. Cawkwell 44; Podlecki 2) 34.
95. Thirty ships (Thuc. 19.4.1; Diod. 44.2). For an attempt to reconcile Thucydides' and Diodoros' figures for the non-Athenian contingents see Hammond 1) 323N1; see too H.D. Meyer 425N41; Lotze 270N1.
96. In Athens pylagorai were elected; cf. Wüst. 2) 135.
97. Bengtson 2); Flacelière 19-28. ATL 105 and N46, 302N6 accepted the story without knowledge of the work of Bengtson or Flacelière.
98. Podlecki's opinion is curiously ambiguous. At 2) 29 he says the account "is not in itself implausible" and would appear to "accept its historicity, at least in essence", while at 4) 2N3, which was published in the same year (1975) as 2) he dubs it "an altogether dubious episode" (which, I suppose, needn't refer to its authenticity but would be most natural to take it so). Sealey 2) 266N6 is suspicious. For a less reliable account of further

diplomatic attacks on Spartan pretensions, see Pseudo-Demosthenes (59.96-8), discussed (and accepted) by Wolski 1) 82, 91, 2) 39.

99. See Lotze 264. de Ste. Croix 174N25 notes that spring 478 is preferable "because Themistocles' activities at Sparta over ... the walls ..., in the winter of 479/8, are more easily understandable if he had not already antagonised the Spartans". The complex of events surrounding the walls incident, however, began *εὐθὺς* after the withdrawal of the Persians (Thuc. 89.3) and so Themistokles almost certainly went to Sparta before the Amphiktyonic Council, anyway. Bengtson 2) 92 and Flacelière 22 consider both 479 and 478 possible. ATL 105N46 say "probably 478", 302N6 "perhaps 478"; Cawkwell 46 favours 478; cf. Wolski 1) 91. Arguments based on a causal connection between the Amphiktyonic proposals and Leotychides' expedition are quite inconclusive: see Gomme 365; Wüst 1) 64; Lotze 264-5.

100. Themistokles' stance has been characterized as an early expression of an Athenian "Amphiktyonic policy" traceable down to beyond mid-century: see ATL 302N6; Raubitschek 11) 40; Meiggs 174-5.

Lotze's arguments 262-3 (cf. Keil 70) are at their weakest over Spartan intentions at the Amphiktyonic council. He admits (262N1) that Themistokles' action was 'machtpolitisch'.

101. The hints of Themistokles' interest in the west should be seen in terms of developing a military as well as trading partnership; the evidence is collected and discussed by e.g. Kacan 451-2 and de Ste. Croix 378-9. For a cautious interpretation see Mattingly 1) 202-4. Despite Gauthier 31-2 I am not prepared to base anything on the anecdote in Plutarch (Th. 25.1) in which Themistokles

attacks Hieron at Olympia. Gauthier argues that Aelian (V.H. 9.5), who has Themistokles motivated by the tyrant's inadequate assistance during the Persian war, may correctly represent Theophrastos or an earlier source.

102. Huxley 2).

103. As Gomme 438 does, and as believed by Lenardon 1) 127.

104. Wilamowitz 4) 152N1 even claimed it was "gewiss urkundlich" and many scholars do not even mention the scholiast's version (e.g.

Bisolt 129 and N1 (with his cross references); de Ste. Croix 379). See also D.M. Lewis' comments 1) 416.

105. Gomme 438, cf. 62; Podlecki 2) 40 also suspects Plutarch's version may be "mere guesswork".

106. Lenardon 1) 127. I have been unable to read the article by L. Piccirilli "Temistocle εὐεργέτης dei Corciresi" referred to by Lenardon 1) 234N200 as, apparently, one who shares the suspicion of Plutarch's explanation (Lenardon's N199 should refer to H. 7.168, not 8.168). Burn's suggestions 293-4 do not provide grounds for preferring Plutarch's version.

For our purposes, of course, it is unimportant to decide what the real reason for the grant may have been. It is not unlikely that both events offered by antiquity as explanations were historical (which would mean Plutarch's would take chronological priority), and both could be, though neither need be, in fact, the grounds for the award.

107. On the chronology, see Lazenby 238-9. Andrewes 2) 304N13 finds unnecessary problems in the programme for 478. Balcer 1) 106 is wrong when he says the fleet in 478 liberated "coastal cities from Persia"; his references to Thucydides and Diodoros in N5 do

not say this. Diodoros (44.1) is wrong, to judge by

Pausanias' actions and by the 'Tendenz' of Ephoros, to say

1. Pausanias was ordered by Sparta to free the Asiatic Greeks:

2. see Hammond 1) 322.

108. Cf. Lippold 324. Lang 1) 82, though, thinks that Pausanias

3. (reflecting Spartan policy) brought accusations of Medism upon

4. himself by his lack of enthusiasm for extending the war of

liberation.

109. See chapter seven on the circumstances of the transfer.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NOTES

1. But see chapter ten for some comments.
2. For different explanations see Balcer 1) 111; Andrewes 2) 95.
3. See chapter four N16.
4. Podlecki 4) 6.
5. Larsen 1) 181 and Kagan 39 appreciate that the Athenians were not quick to accept the offer. Kiechle 269, by contrast, thinks the offer was a mere formality. Wolski 2) 41 says in the negotiations the Athenians emphasized their tribal affinities (with the Samians). This is nowhere attested. Plutarch (Ar. 23.4) also suggests that the Athenians delayed before giving the disaffected allies a positive response.
6. Wolski 2) 47N62 is wrong when he says Diodorus calls them Spartans.
7. Larsen 1) 181N4 notes it, but it is widely ignored — even by the usually exhaustive Busolt (67N4). Podlecki 4) 8 notes the version and draws the right conclusion (see text below).
8. Herodotos' evidence will be discussed further in the text below.
9. On the date see chapter six and N99.
10. The importance of Kimon's role in the transfer is emphasized by Kiechle 278 and Balcer 1) 105.
11. At the formation of the new Athenian alliance the ritual dumping of iron lumps into the sea (AP. 23.5) almost certainly testifies to the permanence of the alliance (despite V. Martin 152 Note and recently Jacobson) which in turn should cause no surprise since it represents a reaffirmation of the assessment of the military situation in mainland Ionia made by the Greeks at Samos in 479. Cf. Brunt 151; Kiechle 275N35; Meiggs 463.

12. The position of the disaffected allies and the Peloponnesians, and the possible Athenian response to the proposed new alliance, will be discussed later in the chapter.
13. E. Meyer 458N2 believed that the story of Ouliades of Samos (a genuine Samian name: see the references at Meiggs 42N2) and of Antagoras of Chios recorded by Plutarch (Ar. 23.5) may derive from local chronicles. He is followed by Wolski 2) 41 and N36. H.D. Meyer 429-30 N51 (cf. 2) 499); Kagan 39; Lippold 324 accept the story for the wrong reasons. Larsen 1) 181N3 rejected it. I incline towards accepting the story, though not Aristides' part in it (see Kiechle 268-9N15). Pausanias was leaving Byzantion (προεκπλεύουσιν) at the time of the incident, and the fact that he threatens punishment for the future (ὀλίγω χρόνῳ) suggests he could not postpone his present journey, which suggests the summons to Sparta. The story thus fits with Thucydides' evidence. But there may well have been a less dramatic and more widespread demonstration as well as this incident.
14. Cf. ATL 192N31.
15. Kiechle 280 is wrong to say that in 478 "daß sich ... in der hellenischen Flotte Kriegsschiffe sowohl der Insel- wie der Festlandioner befanden, überliefert Thukydides sogar ausdrücklich". In N52 he says Thuc. 95.1 includes mainlanders "offensichtlich". See Hammond 1) 323 and N2 whose interpretation keeps strictly within the evidence.
16. Diodoros 44.6 says only that some Peloponnesians returned home before Pausanias (i.e. deserted). Those who take him as indicating that this was the point at which they all sailed home

do not accept the information as reliable: See Sealey 3) 253N7; Meiggs 52N2. Thucydides (95.4) could be taken as implying that unlike the disaffected allies the Peloponnesians returned home with Pausanias; it was probably rather late in the season anyway (pace ATL 192N29). The absolute chronology is not very important, but everything points to late 478 for the date of Pausanias' recall; for some differing opinions and discussion see: Beloch 182-3, 186, 2) 61; Busolt 65N1 (the point about Thracian trips in mid-winter is valid, if not that about letters to the King), 69N1; ATL 191-3; Wolski 1) 78; Balcer 1) 106, 111; Lippold 324N16; Hammond 325N1; Fornara 2) 265-6; Lazenby 238-9; Bayer and Heideking 105-6.

17. The Athenian reaction to his proposals is discussed at the end of this chapter.
18. Kirchhoff 18, followed by Holzapfel 128-9; cf. Busolt 4N3, 89N4, 96-7N1; Wilamowitz 1) 145 and N40; Highby 95-6.
19. See Beloch 187-8; E. Meyer 2) 63-5, cf. Geschichte des Altertums 456N2; E. Walker 467; Hereward 47 (whose suggestion of a third capture is unnecessary - see text below).
20. ATL 206N55; Sealey 3) 251.
21. Woodhead 10-12.
22. Sealey 3) 251-2. See too Lazenby 239N14.
23. Meiggs 463.
24. Meiggs 463.
25. Lazenby 236. If Gongylos was acting in his own interests he will have done well to make off with only some, not all, the captives, for the sake of inconspicuousness - pace Holzapfel 128.
26. See Lazenby 239N14 for another possible explanation.

I do not, incidentally, accept Sealey's suggestion (3) 252-3) that the Peloponnesians sailed home in disgust at Kimon's distribution. There is no evidence of anything like this in the sources. Nor do I accept even that "a dispute about booty was likely to arise" (3) 252). It would not have been unduly difficult to agree that it would be fair to divide the Byzantion booty among all present, since all had contributed to the capture. To make this simpler it may be that those who had taken part in the Sestos siege as well would be taken as one unit. The Peloponnesians had probably received their quota before Kimon's distribution took place (E. Meyer 2) 65 offers a similar explanation). This probability is reinforced when we remember that Kimon's distribution was fifty-fifty between Athens and the rest, which cannot be a division among all the members of the Hellenic League, but is eminently reasonable among Athens and the non-Peloponnesian element. The impetus to divide the spoils was probably given by the recalling of Pausanias. Having received their share, the Peloponnesian contingent most probably sailed home with Pausanias - cf. N16 above.

27. Meiggs 468.
28. Meiggs 463; Sealey 3) 252.
29. Cf. references at N18 above; E. Walker 467 is also categorical in requiring a context where Kimon is not merely in joint command with Aristides. Cf. Hereward's objections to Sealey's context (46). Woodhead 10 and 11 played this down, and Lazenby 239N14 thinks there are "a variety of reasons" why Kimon "may have got the job".

30. The fact that Kimon returned home four months after the distribution with gold to spare rules out the second 'capture' of Byzantion, from Pausanias (Thuc. 131.1), as a possible setting for the distribution; POxy XIII, 1610 (fr. 6), which may derive from Ephoros (doubts: see Africa 87), says that the Athenians went from Byzantion to Eion. That Pausanias had already been evicted when they left for Eion should be assumed in the absence of better evidence to the contrary (cf. e.g. Wolski 1) 79; Smart 138N5; Blamire 300 N17; Lazenby 239; pace Fornara 2) 270; Lippold 362, 339-41; Rhodes 3) 397; Meiggs 468) which is not constituted by Justin 9.1.3 (keep reading). The siege of Eion almost certainly lasted more than four months (see chapter eight), and to judge by the gift of 12T. by Menon of Pharsalos (Dem. 23. 199) Kimon not only did not have gold left over for the city but had run out before the end of the siege; Busolt 102-3N1 noted that the booty money must have run out but failed to draw attention to the contradiction this creates with the Ion fragment. A surprisingly impressive list of recent scholars have taken up and tried to extend the arguments of an earlier generation of scholars (see references at Busolt 96N1; cf. Beloch 186-7; E. Meyer 486-7N2) which conclude that we should respect Justin's authority (loc. cit.). His evidence, however, can carry very little weight (see Wilamowitz 1) 145-6N40; Busolt 96-7N1; Highby 97-8; Gomme 399-400; Lazenby 239; Andrewes 2) 94, 303N8). Besides being in conflict with Thucydides (131.1: it is not natural to understand the *Kai* connection as designating a gap of seven or so years: cf. Busolt 96N1; Highby 91;

- Podlecki 5) 304), the fact that Justin was half asleep when he epitomized this section of Trogus, contrary to the opinion of E. Meyer 2) 60-61N3, really does minimize the value of the whole passage. Thucydides (98.1) says the first action of the Athenian alliance was the besieging of Eion. To judge by the fact that Pausanias had one ship (Thuc. 128.3, 131.1), his expulsion will not have been more than an escort from the city; (the comparison with the siege in the sanctuary (Thuc. 134.2), occasioned by the use of *ἐκπολιορκέω* for both, is useful - see Gomme 433). It may have been considered far too minor an event to be listed by Thucydides. A further explanation may be that the escorting of Pausanias occurred before the swearing of oaths which marked the formal inception of the Athenian alliance. The revivalists, initially Fornara 2) 267-71 and Lippold 339-41, are now supported by Lang 1) 79N6; Smart 137-8; Rhodes 3) 397; Meiggs 446-8. Podlecki 5) 304 seems to be withdrawing his earlier mild support (2) 198N19).
31. de Ste. Croix 171N13 thinks Thuc. 75.2 "is very relevant" to the transfer, but doesn't analyse the implications.
 32. Lotze 267N2 thinks the expression of fears of corruption derives from later accusations.
 33. The precise constitutional relationship between the Hellenic League and the Athenian alliance is not important for our purposes.
 34. The verb used in this way needn't always have an implication of deception discovered - see Thuc. 4.81.2. For the idea of observation contained in the primary meaning of perception see Thuc. 8.104.1. The word should be interpreted in the light of the explicit statements at 75.2 and 95.6.

35. Scholars who are prepared to modify Thucydides' statement on the Spartan attitude to the transfer include H.D. Meyer 434-6; Ehrenberg 1) 189; Cawkwell 46; Balcer 1) 111; Lotze 269; Keiggs 40-41; Lazenby 243; Andrewes 2) 95.
36. See e.g. Beloch 61-2; Larsen 1) 184; E. Walker 39; Wolski 1) 92; Cawkwell 46; von Fritz 1) 605-6; Hammond 1) 325N2.
37. von Fritz 1) 606.
38. Of the few scholars who accept Thucydides' statement without modification V. Martin 151 believes the Spartans were aware that they were ill-equipped to lead the war; cf. Brockmeyer 40N13. Wolski 2) 45 accepts but finds the Spartan attitude strange, and goes on to explain it in terms of Leotychides' failure in Thessaly and problems in the Peloponnese. Lippold 323N13 drew the right conclusion on Spartan interest in the leadership of the war after Pausanias' recall.
39. See e.g. H.D. Meyer 435; Kagan 39; Blamire 298; Balcer 1) 111; Lotze 267, 269; Lazenby 241. (Kahrstedt's view (322, 324) that other Spartan commanders were sent out after Dorkis is untenable and has found no support).
40. Unless, of course, we assume a) that the Spartan (and so presumably Peloponnesian, too) forces remained at sea all winter, which is highly unlikely - cf. Hammond 1) 325N1; NN16 and 26 above; or b) that Dorkis was sent out immediately on Pausanias' recall; Thuc. 95.7 suggests to me that it was only after Pausanias' trial that another commander was sent out, and that Thucydides is emphasizing that the Spartans did not send Pausanias - although he left at approximately the same time - but Dorkis. But I would not try to press any arrangement of the

- absolute chronology of 478/7; see Bayer and Heideking 105-6 for a selection of modern opinion on the dates and the references above N16 on the date of Pausanias' recall. (Lang 1) 83 sees the dispatch of Dorkis as a cover-up of attempts to secure a settlement with Persia).
41. The alternative reading found in the Codex Parisinus 1642 gives *συμβουλευέντων* and since Dindorf it has been adopted by most editors. It reduces the emphasis on active support but does not alter the meaning fundamentally.
42. On Hellenotamiai see Woodhead 2).
43. The notice has been neglected; de Ste. Croix dismisses it as of "little value"; Hammond 1) 325N2 minimizes its worth, but Kagan 377 recognizes its value.
44. Sealey 3) 253N8 suggested translating *πρόφασιν* here as "occasion". But see Andrewes 2) 302N3.
45. That the interpretation of the transfer as a clever Athenian ruse was not considered incompatible in the ancient tradition with the fact of Spartan support for it is shown by Plutarch's juxtaposition of both at Ar. 18.1 and 6.
46. Cf. last note.
47. Gomme 272, followed by ATL 192N30; Meiggs 40N2. de Ste. Croix 171N13 thinks he "may be right".
48. Dr. Barron in Ehrenberg 1) 427N8.
49. Hammond 1) 325N2. Others who doubt Gomme's translation include H.D. Meyer 435N61 and, recently, Rhodes 2) 148.
50. See Lotze 269. (On AP 24.1 see below N56).
51. The point is made most clearly by Lotze 268 and de Ste. Croix 171. See too von Fritz 1) 606, 2) 276N78; Andrewes 2) 94.

52. As far as I know this point has not been used as an argument for redating the Hetoimaridas debate.
53. The debate's historicity was generally dismissed by earlier scholars (e.g. Busolt 71N2; E. Meyer 459N1, 483N1; though not exclusively: see Unger 90) but without good reason, (see de Ste. Croix 170); Meiggs 40-41 is still dubious. Wüst 1) 66-7 accepted it in essence before its convincing defence by Kagan 378-9, cf. 51-2, and de Ste. Croix 171, both of whom seized on the 'lame hegemony' image and related it to the quotation from Kimon preserved by Ion fr. 14 (ap. Pl. K. 16.8), which for me is the decisive argument in favour of historicity. I think it is fair to say that today it is orthodox to accept the debate, recognizing that elements have been distorted (notably the unanimity of opinion before Hetoimaridas' speech (50.5)). See Forrest 3) 11 for an attempt to place the debate in the context of Spartan constitutional procedure, and D.M. Lewis 1) 414-15 for the suggestion that this and other elements in Diodoros may be based on Charon.
54. Redating the debate to 478/7 is very common. Scholars usually point out that 50.1 (475/4) could join on to 47.3 (477/6 - Diodoros' date for the transfer - but see Gomme 4-5, 272), that they are separated by western events only, and that Diodoros records nothing else under 475/4 (see e.g. recently Cawkwell 55N14; de Ste. Croix 171; Meiggs 40, 454; Lotze 268N2; Andrewes 2) 94). It may be pointed out that as for positive reasons these scholars can offer only a priori reasons (e.g. Andrewes loc. cit.: "the moment for decision was when the allies rejected Dorkis"). Scholars who retain Diodoros' date include Unger 90; Wüst 66-7; Kagan 51, 52, 378-9; and Lang 1) 83N16 recognizes that there is

- nothing against accepting Diodoros' arrangement.
55. Andrewes 2) 95; similar incredulity among moderns: see references at N35 above. See also chapter nine N21.
56. AP 24.1: Aristides συνεβούλευεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς ἡγεμονίας. Has AP conflated Aristides' attempts to persuade the Athenians to accept the hegemony (not 'take it away' (from the Lakedaimonians) - see Rhodes 2) 148) in 478/7 with what he believed later developments to be?
57. Cf. Cawkwell 46.
58. Plutarch (Th. 20.4) dates the beginning of Spartan support to 478 (see chapter six N99). It is very likely that the first son born to Kimon after the award was Lakedaimonios (cf. e.g. M.B. Wallace 198) and since the unfortunately-named gentleman served as hipparch probably in 446 (IG 1² 400) he can hardly have been born after 476. Evidence for Kimon's proxy: Pl. K. 14.3; Theopompos fr. 88; Aischines 2.172.
59. The fact that πρόσχημα in Thucydides always means "excuse" (see Chambers 31N5; Rawlings 1-4, 8) means, of course, that it was also the 'stated purpose' of the alliance.
60. See Jackson.
61. The oath sworn by the parties involved - and here the spirit and not the letter is important - to have the same friends and enemies (AP 23.5) is evidence of a promise of protection to those who joined. That we should see the oath as more of a commitment on the part of Athens than the allies, is rightly emphasized by Kiechle 270.
62. Compare further the interpretations of Sealey 3) especially 237-42 (similarly French 1) 89) and Balcer 2) 21-2.

63. On the depth of feelings of revenge see Bellen, especially 45-7.
(For archaeological evidence of private reconstruction see Boersma 10, 44).
64. Cf. Kagan 40N38.
65. Podlecki 4) 4 is perhaps a little too cautious when he says "we cannot begin to guess what Themistocles would have said" about the proposed alliance.
66. Though the theme was probably developed and exaggerated; see references at chapter eight N43.
67. That Timokreon (fr. 1) seems to have gloated at Themistokles over the formation of the alliance (see Bowra 353-4) is not evidence that Themistokles had opposed it. Timokreon may simply be delighting in the event which had given an enemy of Themistokles his greatest renown. It is also possible that some of the allies had expressed, between 478/7 and the penning of Timokreon's verse, an aversion to having Themistokles as commander in view of his reputation from 480.

CHAPTER EIGHT

NOTES

1. See e.g. V. Martin 154, 156-9; Larsen 196-7; H. Schaefer 15-16, 126, 132-3; ATL 141, 228N10; H.D. Meyer 437-8, 2) 499-500; Hammond 328, 338-9N3, 339-45; Meiggs 47, 462; Schuller 144; Finley 107.
2. Sources: see Hill, Meiggs and Andrews 397. On the reliability of the scholiast see references at Milton 257N3.
3. A. Schaefer 10-11; Pierson 63; Unger 91-2; Curtius 806N62; Holzapfel 85N1, 167.
4. In which they followed a suggestion originally made by Bentley: see H. Schaefer 10-11; Unger 91; Curtius 807N62; Holzapfel 85N1, 166-7. Blass 283-4 had some wise words to say on the propriety of all this.
5. A. Schaefer 10; Unger 92; Curtius 127. Holzapfel 85N1 was exceptional in denying that such a gap was problematical.
6. Wilamowitz 1) 146N1. Krüger 45, 52, of course, had postulated disconnecting the bones and judgement incidents almost sixty years before Wilamowitz; he did so, however, in the belief that Plutarch had in fact linked the two events and that he had been mistaken (cf. 41, 44-5; Blass 283-4 supported him for different reasons). Hereward 45 has recently adopted Krüger's position, though without justifying her opinion, and Deane 12, 95N10 has just reasserted, unfortunately, the Skyros-judgement connection. Wilamowitz was accepted on this point by e.g. Busolt 103N1, 106N2; Beloch 183 (though without reference to Wilamowitz); E. Meyer 463-4N1, 2) 62N2; Gomme 65N1; Lenardon 37N70; Smart 138N4 (see below N11). Wilamowitz' point, of course, underlies the belief

of those who support present 'orthodox' chronology based on the idea of a connection between Eurymedon and the judgement (see references at Milton 269N65).

7. See Milton 269-70 N65. Beloch 183-4, characteristically, rejected the historicity of the judgement. It must stand since the one element which we can check proves correct (see Marm. Par. 56); cf. Krüger 41; Unger 91; Holzapfel 167.
8. Compare in particular Smart 137 with Curtius 127, 807N62.
9. Smart 136-7 and N1.
10. Cf. chapter six N76 on the date of Leotychides' reign in Diodoros.
11. Smart accepts (138N4) as valid Wilamowitz' denial of the necessity of connecting Skyros and the judgement, but adds that this doesn't mean that there was in fact no connection. That is fair enough, but it cannot provide the basis for the statement that "elsewhere with reference to Skyros Plutarch mentions the archonship of Phaidon, here that of Apsephion" (138).
12. Smart 136.
13. Smart 137-8.
14. These considerations outweigh the casual remark made at 63.1, summarizing the events recorded at 60.1-62.3, that
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐπράχθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν
 Our conclusions on this date in Diodoros will be developed later in this chapter.
15. That Smart's theory would enable us to retain Justin 9.1.3 and AP 26.1 carries hardly any weight in its favour; see chapter seven N30, chapter four N16.
16. Even if we were to accept the incorrect connection between the 'Theseus' oracle, the Skyros affair and the judgement (see above

- N11), making Plutarch also guilty of confusing Phaidon and Apsephion would involve the improbable postulate "that Plutarch moved from one archon list to another without noticing the divergence", as Sealey 2) 265N5 points out.
17. Blass.
 18. Further a priori grounds against accepting Smart's theory have been set out by Hereward 45-6 (though some of her arguments are invalid). I do not consider valid the argument that we would expect the Athenian alliance to begin operations soon after its foundation, not eight years after. We lack sufficiently reliable evidence on attitudes and conflicts in these years to be able to rule out such a delay. In our period the evidence, on the whole, is such that chronological conclusions must be allowed to determine interpretation, and not the reverse.

I know of no scholar who has accepted Smart's theory, but his suggestion deserves more attention than the usually peremptory rejection it receives. (J.W. Cole 47 says Smart's dating would suit his thesis well).
 19. For a selection of modern opinion on the chronology of this period consult Bayer and Heideking 105-8; see too chapter seven NN 16, 30, 40.
 20. See chapter nine N20.
 21. Beloch 182 denies this.
 22. The strategem attributed to Kimon by Paus. 8.8.9 is almost certainly unhistorical: see Wilamowitz 1) 156N59; Busolt 102-3N1; Hereward 47-8 (whose reference to Paus. 8.7.7. is a slip).
 23. The engagement is doubted by e.g. Busolt 101N1 and accepted by

- e.g. E. Meyer 463.
24. Nepos (Cim. 2.2) has obviously confused this defeat with Drabeskos - cf. E. Meyer 2) 62. Wilamowitz 1) 157N61 calls it a "schwere niederlage" which may be correct.
 25. If A. Schaefer were followed in connecting Lykourgos with the family listed under number 9251 in Davies (Davies, page 349 for reference to A. Schaefer) then we should either have to assume an early case of double representation from Oineis for 476/5 or place Kimon's generalship in the previous year. Davies (loc. cit.) does not seem enthusiastic about the connection.
 26. Gomme 391N1 (cf. 281) describes the expedition as a "sortie". Other students usually describe it as an attempt to establish a cleruchy: e.g. Classon-Steup 264; Busolt 102N1, 104; E. Meyer, 463 2) 62; E. Walker 57; Cloché 2) 52 (cautiously). Others do not commit themselves (e.g. Bayer and Heideking 108N32; Kluwe 2) 46; Hammond and Griffith 102).
 27. See above N5. Podlecki 4) 15 also finds a delay uncomfortable in view of Thucydides.
 28. Beloch 183 would.
 29. Busolt 106N2 e.g. cites $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$ as a reason for not setting Skyros immediately after Eion.
 30. Cf. ATL 159-60 e.g.
 31. See Deane's comments 94N10.
 32. Busolt 106-7N2 thought this notice implied Kimon was still in accessible Thracian waters, which is arguable, I suppose. Unlike Busolt, I would suggest still at Eion. Podlecki 3) 142 and N10 finds the whole section suspicious.
 33. See chapter nine N20 and Meiggs 69.

34. Diod. 60.2 is alone in talking of a siege; cf. Busolt 105-6N2.
35. Krüger 42-3 and Oncken (according to Holzapfel 167 who follows him and gives the reference) argued for the need of a close connection between the oracle and its execution; cf. Blass 482; recently Smart 137; Jeffery 45N20. Nonetheless Busolt 106N2 (cf. 103N1) was quite right to deny that, formally, the date of the oracle represented a date for the action against Skyros (he meant to refer to Wilamowitz 2) (299 not 2) 199); he is followed by Podlecki (3) 141-2; cf. Bayer and Heideking 109N35; Deane 95N10.
36. I think our interpretation is more in accord with the sources than Podlecki's (3), summarized as 4) 14-15. He would find a lowering of the date of Skyros closer to 470 satisfying, and he has his own reasons. He suggests that Kimon was having "trouble taking Skyros and solicited a second oracle" - i.e. that found in Pausanias - "to supplement the earlier one of 476/5, one which would meet his own specifications as to where the 'bones' ... were to be found" (3) 142).
37. Cf. e.g. Krüger 45; Busolt 140-41N6 (who supports the implications of Wilamowitz' dating of the beginning of the Karystos war in the year after his date for the capture of Skyros (the correct reference is to Wilamowitz 1) 300, not 2) 300); contrast Deane 111N2.
38. An example of a different interpretative argument leading to the same result at Beloch 185.
39. Our chronological results are fairly conventional, but I felt it worth stating the arguments at this length because recently there has been a tendency to despair of confidence in the

chronology of the 470s (cf. e.g. Balcer 2) 24N14). These results are not beyond doubt, but they are, in fact, fairly reliable, and, most importantly, they are sufficiently reliable, in my opinion, to build further upon.

40. ATL 158N1, 160.

41. If we accept POxy XIII, 1610 as Ephoran, then fr. 7, col. 1 would provide evidence that between Skyros and the beginning of preparations for the eastern campaign Diodoros has made fairly substantial omissions since the fragment, mentioning Lykomedes, probably described the bones of 'Theseus' incident. In Ephoros a gap of six years between Skyros and the eastern campaign may therefore have been more apparent than in Diodoros.

42. See Milton, especially 267-9.

As noted (Milton 275) Westlake's paper 3) (cf. 4) 357) was not taken into consideration. Westlake now believes Thucydides acquired his information on Pausanias and Themistokles from a written source, a view based mainly on certain un-Thucydidean expressions found in the excursus. Yet these Ionicisms can be explained by the fact that if, as seems probable (see Milton 258-9 and further references) Thucydides wrote the excursus early in his career, he probably had not yet developed his later style, and that he himself may have deliberately adopted an Ionic manner, widely felt appropriate to historical writing (Westlake 3) 106). The weight of my arguments at 266-7 is not affected by Westlake's new position.

43. Cf. e.g. H. Schaefer 30-31, 302; Gomme 285-6; Blackman 188N23.

44. See in particular West, especially 271-2; Gomme 285-6, 336-7; ATL 244-52; Blackman 187-90; Meiggs 90-91.

45. Cf. e.g. Gomme 284; ATL 246 and N9, 250N26; Blackman 189.
46. Cf. e.g. ATL 249N20.
47. Cf. e.g. H. Schaefer 30.
48. Cf. ATL 250 and N26; Blackman 189 expresses doubt as to whether this notice derives from a good source; cf. ATL 246N9.
49. The rate of conversion to cash contribution does not affect our argument.
50. See Milton.
51. That we may place the Naxos revolt between the Eurymedon preparations in Lykia/Karia and the Eurymedon battle was shown by Meiggs 73-9.
52. See Milton 267-9.
53. Cf. Milton 267-9. Herodotos (7.106) says of attempts to dislodge Maskames from Doriskos πολλῶν πειρησαμένων, and, pace Gomme 291N1, who fails to paraphrase Herodotos' further comment that no one was able to dislodge Maskames, Herodotos does indeed imply that Maskames' descendents were in control after 465/4 (accession of Artaxerxes). This suggests that attempts on Doriskos were not necessarily made during the 470s. It is also possible to understand Herodotos as referring to attempts from within. A Pindar fragment (fr. 36 (POxy V, 841, II, 39-40, 104-7)) has been taken as referring to actions at Abdera. If this is correct it could be interpreted, like the possibility of operations against Doriskos in the 460s, as also linked with the operations surrounding the Enneahodoi campaign.

Plutarch (14.1), incidentally, does not state that his Chersonese fighting was after Eurymedon, though it is placed after that victory in his narrative order. It is tempting to

- associate it with the Eurymedon preparations proper. But since there are no valid objections to Plutarch's implied context I suppose we should follow him (cf. Milton 267N55); earlier scholars had rejected Plutarch's context but for invalid reasons:
- A. Schaefer 10; Kirchhoff 17; Holzapfel 100 N3.
53. Meiggs 71.
54. Whenever the period referred to, there is very likely to be exaggeration here.
55. See Chambers 27; Rawlings 1-4, 8.
56. See chapter seven N59.
57. The other aim, given undue prominence by modern scholars, is not primary, and may be secondary, since Thucydides describes it as an almost incidental advantage of his narrative:
- ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς
τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οὗτω τρόπῳ κατέστη (97.2).
58. Eion: epigrams (Pl. K. 7. 4-5; cf. Aisch. 3. 183-5) and H. 7.107; Skyros: Pl. Thes. 36. 1-2; K. 8. 3-6 (this tradition must be independent of Thucydides); cf. Paus. 3.3.7; Karystos: H. 9.105; IG 1² 943 = ML nr. 48, 1. 27 (see ML p. 128; Meiggs 161); Naxos: Aristoph. Wasps 354-5.
59. On Kimon's modifications see Gomme 287; Morrison and R.T. Williams 163; Jameson 1) 397-8 (further bibliography for Troizen Decree consult SEG, starting from volume 18, 1962); Jordan 188-94; Meiggs 76.
60. H. Schaefer 28N1 also thinks the offensive against Persia came to a standstill in the mid-470s and was taken up again "um 470"; and Schachermeyr 1) 127 accepts the possibility of a substantial halt in operations.

CHAPTER NINE

NOTES

1. See e.g. Prestel 5 and N11, 19; Reverdin; Burn 260-65; Connor 2) 5-8; de Ste. Croix 169-70; Thomsen 120-22; Gruen 92.
2. Cf. e.g. Prestel 14, 27; Connor 2) 22-4.
3. The most complete, up-to-date list of ostracism candidates can be found in Thomsen 70-80. On the distortions in the literary evidence see further Connor 1) 124-7, 2) 67-8.
4. Of the allies we should perhaps take the professed motives of the Mytilenaians in joining the alliance as typical; they claimed they had joined for the sake of the freedom of the Greeks from Persia (Thuc. 3.10.3). For whatever motives, it is reasonable to suppose that the allies of Athens in the 470s were ready and willing to join an aggressive war against the Persians' land. To explain the fact that during the 470s Eion was the only city controlled by the Persians to be attacked we must turn to Athens.
5. The most recent discussions of the phrase are Andrewes 2) 304-5N11 and Westlake 3) 100-102; see too Rhodes 3) 390N23.
6. Anticipating Kahrstedt 323 and Lang 1) 82-4. Thucydides' insistence (1.28.3) that Pausanias went out privately suggests he is contradicting a different interpretation. If the original accusation were Themistoklean, Timokreon (fr. 1 ap. Pl. Th. 21.2) will certainly have ignored it and have still considered Pausanias praiseworthy in the mid-470s.
7. The case of Nikias later in the century when a general is sent on an expedition, the wisdom of which he was known to doubt, was no doubt exceptional (Thuc. 6.8.4, cf. de Ste. Croix 316) but provides a useful corrective to those who would see e.g. Eion

as substantially the result of Kimon's initiative. The most recent scholars guilty of this approach are Podlecki 4) 8 (who, rather surprisingly, describes the Eion campaign as Kimon's riposte to Themistokles' choregic victory with Phrynichos' *Phoinissai*) and J.W. Cole 45-6. (I do not feel it necessary to speculate on the relationship between a decision of the Athenian Assembly and the opinion of the allied synedrion, for operations of the alliance will not have gone ahead against the wishes of the Athenian Assembly; cf. chapter eight N1).

8. See further chapter thirteen.
9. Makedonian kings' control over timber export: full references at M.B. Wallace 199-200 N13. J.W. Cole has recently argued for the existence of a personal connection between Alexander and Themistokles. With the exception of the "Themistokles Letters" 5 and 20 (J.W. Cole 48), he is unable to cite any evidence which testifies to a direct relationship between the two men. The notices he cites are all interpreted on the basis of the assumption which he has made of a connection (37). See further below chapter thirteen N56. The most plausible element in his argument is perhaps that the award of proxeny and *euergesia* to Alexander by the Athenians should be connected with a postulated supply of timber for Athens' Persian war fleet (J.W. Cole 42; so too Hammond and Griffith 68-9, following Edson). Yet such supplies would certainly have been considered hostile to Persia, and the evidence suggests Alexander was trying to keep on good terms with Xerxes throughout 483-0 (see Hammond and Griffith 64) and after (Hammond and Griffith 99, 101). Such an essential contribution to the Greek victory is very unlikely to have gone

unmentioned by Herodotos. There is evidence that Themistokles had some connections with western Greece (another source of timber) at this period (see chapter six N101). Other occasions can be found when the awards could have been made (see M.B. Wallace loc. cit.). The suggestion that Kimon was unfriendly towards Alexander is in conflict with good evidence (see chapter thirteen N56). See too next note.

10. The political situation in Thessaly after 480 is not clear, and although we cannot make a full analysis of the evidence here, a few points may be noted. It was clearly the Aleuadae who were responsible for the Medism of Thessaly (see Westlake 1) 12-16), and in their early determination to side with the King they seem to have stood alone (see N. Robertson 103 and further references). Leotychides' expedition in 479 may have had some initial success in deposing a local ruler of Pherai and Pagasai (Pl. Th. 20.1 with Mor. 859d and Beloch's references (2) 62-3N3) linking the name Aristomedes with Pherai) but he failed to unseat Aleuad power (Paus. 3.7.9: Cf. Morrison 62) and there is no good reason to assume (as e.g. Westlake 1) 17 does) that they lost their position shortly after Leotychides' expedition.

Hiller von Gaertringen was already on the right track when he doubted the validity of any single dynasty's claim to be ruler of all Thessaly (R.E. VI, A1, col. 1118; followed by Brunt 162) and N. Robertson has recently analysed the evidence for the nature of Thessalian politics at this period. He discerns a plurality of local dynasties of which the Aleuadae were only one, albeit exceptional. He translates Thucydides'

Θεσσαλῶν βασιλεὺς as "Thessalian king" (102-6) which would

make things easier to understand, and which I accept. The available evidence admits, I suggest, of an interpretation of the position of "Thessaly" in the Greek mainland 'international' framework in which the Aleuadae, Themistokles (and his political heirs) and Argos were mutually friendly and were all hostile to another mutually friendly group, comprising the Thessalian enemies of the Aleuadae (for example Menon of Pharsalos), Kimon and his friends, Sparta and Alexander. N. Robertson argues that before 480 the Aleuadae and Alexander were traditional allies. But if the Aleuadae had been induced to Medize by Alexander, and if his message to the Greeks was a warning of Aleuad intentions (both suggested by N. Robertson 119), then relations between the Aleuadae and Alexander may well have suffered as a result.

This scheme fits, of course, with the evidence for Atheno-Thessalian relations between 460 and 454. The alliance between the two powers was, on the Thessalian side, motivated by Aleuad influence. By the time of Tanagra enemies of the Aleuadae had made a compact to desert. Tanagra does not mean cavalry loyal to the Aleuadae deserted. They may have been thrown into confusion and have fled (Thessalians at Tanagra: Thuc. 107.7). That Thessalian action was not uniform at Tanagra is suggested by the fact that while Menon of Pharsalos was dubbed a traitor by the Athenians (see Vanderpool 1) 240-41) by 454 they were seeking to reinstate Orestes son of Echekratidas by attacking Pharsalos. The latter gentleman was an Aleuad, as shown by Morrison (59-63 cf. Jeffery 52N49), which makes it very difficult to believe his family had been implicated in the desertion at Tanagra. We may also have evidence of Aleuad loyalty to the

Athenians in the Thessalian dedication published by Daux which he used as evidence to argue for a Thessalian presence on the Athenian side at Oinophyta (Daux, especially 332-3). See too N13 below.

11. See Bengtson 3).
12. Cf. Wilamowitz 157N61.
13. Raubitschek 4) associates this Menon with Menon Menekleidou Gargettios whose name appears on a number of ostraka (see Thomsen 78N137 for references). I do not accept that it is necessary to assume Menon returned from Eion to Athens with Kimon (pace Raubitschek 4) 287N6). The award of citizenship guaranteed Menon a place of refuge in time of need. This apparently arose at some stage but we do not know exactly when. The remarks in N10 above are relevant here.
14. See e.g. Hignett 2) 443-4; Hands 60-61; but also Lazenby 2) 266-7.
15. Schachermeyr 1) 126 draws some of the connections we have made.
16. Podlecki 4) 17-24.
17. I don't think it is safe to base anything on the garbled account in the scholion to Aelius Aristides 46.3 (Dindorf 446) where 'Skyros' seems to be an error for 'Thasos' (though Podlecki 3) 143 takes it seriously).
18. Cf. e.g. Meiggs 69-70; Wolski 3) 14 (who, according to the French summary of his article in Polish, makes a similar assessment at 4) 426-7).
19. See chapter two.
20. Larsen 1) 191N3, though, thinks the Karystos war was considered legitimate. Pace Rawlings 4 (cf. Finley 105) I do not think we can be confident that Thucydides 98.1 -4 means that the

Athenians alone took Eion etc. He is ambiguous. For Karystos the only evidence we have to supplement Thucydides' ambiguity is the scholion to Aristophanes' Wasps 283 (Koster 52) where the Samian named Karystion may suggest Samians were present (and that at least one allied Greek thought the war nothing to be ashamed of); cf. M.B. Wallace 208 and N28. This is not decisive but it does tilt the balance slightly. Herodotos (9.105) mentions only the Athenians but this is valueless in view of the comparison between his description of the Sestos siege (9.114, 116-17) and Thucydides' (89.2).

21. Diodoros' statement (50.1) that the Spartans διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἀφροσχηκόσιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν Ἑλλήσιν χαλεπῶς ἔχοντες makes it clear that he intended ἠπεύλουν ἐπιθήσειν αὐτοῖς τὴν προσήκουσαν τιμωρίαν in the sense of "threatened them with appropriate punishment" and he presumably reflects Ephoros correctly. But if Ephoros has inferred Spartan attitudes according to what seemed probable to him, it is possible that he has given the words of his source here an interpretation they needn't originally have had: they could have meant the Spartans "promised to bring them appropriate assistance". Were there appeals from Aegean states for Sparta to stem the tide of Athenian imperialism already around 474? In view of Thucydides 101. 1-2 this cannot be dismissed as fanciful; note too the undated Mytilenaiian appeal for assistance to Sparta (Thuc. 3.13.1); cf. Larsen 1) 208.

22. This is only an argument from silence, but the fact that Karystos is omitted by Plutarch in his 'Kimon' and by Diodoros (60. 2-3) in his catalogue of Kimonian exploits makes our assertion fairly

safe.

23. Cf. H. Schaefer 92; French 111-12; Brunt 2) 72; Brockmeyer 41N7.
24. Themistokles' measures to encourage the immigration of metics and craftsmen to Athens recorded by Diodoros (43.3) are usually accepted as historical (by e.g. Hammond 4) 264; French 96; Meiggs 262-3; Boersma 48), and should be seen not only as providing skilled labour for the maintenance of Athens' fleet (see chapter six with N93) but also as encouraging the settlement in Athens of a class of men who would fulfil the import needs of Athens. The quotation from Themistokles (Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.1; cf. Th. 2.3) that he knew how to create abundance (*πλουσίαν*) for the city may point in the same direction. For the evidence of a possible 'western policy' see the references at chapter six N101.
- (The picture of Aristides at AP 24. 1-3, encouraging migration of the population to the city for politico-economic reasons, is anachronistic and "is probably later imagination rather than correct report" (Rhodes 2) 148, 151 (the later page reference applies only to the corrected version, a copy of which the author was kind enough to send me); cf. von Fritz and Kapp 169N67; Day and Chambers 34, cf. 124-5: "one of the least sound chapters in the A.P.").

On the special place protection of vital imports had in policy, in contrast to other 'trading interests', see Hasebroek 139; H. Schaefer 92; Michell 225-6; French 1) 112; de Ste. Croix 214-18; Frost 3) 66; Finley 120-21; contrast Musiolek 305, 316. (For a critical analysis of proffering corn-supply as the

- main explanation of Athenian imperialism see Bloedow; cf. Schuller 187-9).
25. Cf. e.g. E. Meyer 478; Fornara 3) 118, 41; G.M.E. Williams 106.
 26. Cf. Connor 2) 10; G.M.E. Williams 106-7.
 27. On generosity see Connor 2) 18-22.
 28. See Ervin 295, who translates "a present for Themistokles". Mattingly 2) 285 renders it a mark of Themistokles' honour.
 29. See Connor 2) 30-32.
 30. See further Sealey 1) 65-6, 7) 267-9 with Connor's comments at 2) 18-19.
 31. On Peisistratos see e.g. Andrewes 4) 113-14; Ehrenberg 1) 80-83; on Kleisthenes see D.M. Lewis 2); Kagan 2); Bicknell 1) 1-53.
 32. Cf. J.D. Lewis 135.
 33. Raubitschek 1) 164, e.g., after studying the evidence on Leagros has to conclude that we are unable to perceive his relationship to other politicians clearly.
 34. In this section I do not propose to discuss the evidence fully, and shall refer to only a little of the modern work on family backgrounds and relationships. The reader should consult Davies for further references.
 35. Podlecki 2) 1 and Badian 7N15 cast aspersions on the historicity of Themistokles' claim. See Lenardon 1) 224N7 and Connor 7) for the possibility of intragenos rivalry; cf. Frost 2) 25.
 36. Quoted at Bauer-Frost 129.
 37. Cf. Frost 2) 25N18; Sealey 1) 65, 73N42; or among Themistokles' relatives if we followed Schachermeyr 1) 310 N77. There seems to be no evidence for von Stauffenberg's contention (123-5, 138) that the Lykomidai were traditionally 'democratic'.

38. Cf. Davies 213; Connor 7) 573N1; the name Neokles, though, does not necessarily add weight to this impression: see Connor 8) 68; cf. Lenardon 1) 224N11.
39. Cf. Frost 1) 113; evidence at Davies 213-14. It is fanciful to say her Thracian origins are confirmed by the Ostia portrait as Bieber 282-3 e.g. did; though see Paus. 1.18.3.
40. See Davies 213N1; though Raubitschek 5) 500-501 argued the tradition derives from Theopompos and used it to explain the *vóθos* tradition; Frost 2) 24-5 seems to believe, at least, in hostility between father and son.
41. On the location of Phrearrioi see now Vanderpool 3) especially 50-53.
42. Cf. Frost 1) 113.
43. The fact that most voters in the ostrakophoriai give Themistokles' demotic and omit his patronymic may only reflect his father's obscurity; I do not, therefore, think it safe to assume that this peculiarity is the result of a deliberate attempt by Themistokles to cultivate the non-snobbish designation (as Vanderpool 1) 222 does). That the fourteen men who inscribed the 190 ostraka published by Broneer 228-43 tended to give the patronymic is a sign of their social attitudes and was automatic, not calculating.
44. Cf. Usher 286; Davies 213; Podlecki 2) 1-3; Lenardon 1) 18-20; Sealey 1) 65. Earlier modern references describing Themistokles as a *novus homo* at Frost 1) 105N1.
45. See Davies 217.
46. This remains true even if we deny Aristides Lysimachou was eponymous archon in 489/8 as Badian 11-13 and Bicknell 5), cf.

3) 225N2 do, since two men who were probably relatives of our Aristeides are recorded as choregoi in this century (cf. Davies 48, 52-3). The stories of the destitution of Aristeides' descendants are unhistorical: see Davies 49-52.

47. See the acceptable defence of this much factual basis behind Pl.

Ar. 25. 3 -6 by Davies 257; cf. Bicknell 2) 435N62.

48. See Davies 257, 259-61.

49. The firmest is Plutarch's statement (Ar. 2.1; cf. Mor. 790f. - 791a, 805f.) that Aristeides was a hetairos of Kleisthenes (which needn't, of course, imply a family relationship), but this looks like the tendency of later writers to associate great names. Bicknell 1) 66N29, cf. 62, 71, 93, 2) 433-6 has argued for the connection (cf. G.M.E. Williams 107-8), but Davies 48 tends to take the association as "a malicious invention of 483/2".

50. See Shefton 161-2 for the suggestion that the Kallimachos memorial (IG 1² 609 - ML nr. 18) represents an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the circle of Miltiades usurping the lion's share of the glory of Marathon.

51. See e.g. Schachermeyr 1) 80-84 for an account of the recent background to Kimon's immediate family (omitted by Davies 301).

52. Davies 299-300; cf. Bicknell 1) 71N64.

53. See Wade-Gery 164N3; Sealey 37N78; Bicknell 1) 92NN35 and 36; cf. Davies 300.

54. Cf. G.M.E. Williams 106-7. (At any rate Kimon seems not to have been thought of as stupid, but the strategem he narrated to prove his cleverness in fact only illustrated the lack of judgement of Herophytos the Samian, though Ion obviously did not consider Kimon's anecdote failed to illustrate his σοφία). For

possible attempts by Kimon to glorify his father's achievements see Amandry 220-22, 2); Welwei especially 303-4; Podlecki 2) 37, 3) 143, 4) 16.

55. See Davies 303.

56. See Davies 262-3.

57. Some other points, which, if anything, should encourage placing the marriage in the second half of the decade 485-75 at Davies 258.

58. Bicknell 1) 94N48, cf. 62, 71. Davies 258 locates it c.485 and G.M.E. Williams 107-8 has recently objected to Bicknell's date.

59. See Bicknell 1) 64-71; see Davies 232 on the possible relationship that existed between Kimon and Thoukydides Melesiou; cf.

G.M.E. Williams 107 and Bicknell 1) 62 who thinks another sister of Kimon married Thoukydides around 479 (further references at G.M.E. Williams 107N15).

60. On the identity of this Megakles see Davies 376-7; cf. Beloch 31; Bicknell 1) 89-91.

61. Cf. Davies 304; pace Bicknell 1) 89 and N2.

62. Cf. e.g. E. Meyer 2) 48-9; Schachermeyr 1) 316N5, 3) 17.

63. So Wade-Gery 2) 221N21 drawing support from the identity he proposed for Isodike's grandfather (but see references above N60) and dating the second marriage to 451. More recently Connor 3) 71-3, cf. 2) 17, 61 has tried to supplement the case for a late marriage by drawing support from a comment by the scholiast to Aelius Aristides (Dindorf 515) that Kimon's sons Lakedaimonios, Eleios and Thessalos were named after the proxeniai held by their father; combining this with Kimon's statement in 462 (Pl. K. 14.3) that he was not a proxenos of Thessalians Connor claims that the child must have been born, and the proxyeny awarded, after 462.

- Bicknell 1) 92-3 rightly emphasized the weakness of the scholiast's information here, and followed Raubitschek's alternative explanation for the boy's name (4) 288N13), as does Davies 307; M.B. Wallace 205 suspends judgement; see his comments at 195 on the scholiast, also. Schachermeyr 1) 122 has Kimon and the Kleitorian woman split after few years and Kimon marry Isodike (presumably shortly) after 479; cf. Connor 3) 71.
64. Raubitschek R.E. 18, 1, col. 2000; Davies 304; preferable to his suggestion at 2) 260 N13 to amend ΚΛΙΤΟΡΙΑΣ to ΑΛΙΤΗΡΙΑΣ .
65. Differently, Bicknell 1) 90.
66. Cf. Davies 305; de Ste. Croix 172 and N18.
67. Cf. Connor 3) 67-8; Bicknell 1) 95; Davies 305.
68. Cf. Bicknell 1) 93, cf. 62, 87; Hignett 1) 396. It is not necessary to take the marriage back into the 480s as Beloch 40-41 and G.M.E. Williams 107 and N16 would; Davies 305 accepts a late 480s date as possible.
69. See e.g. Davies 368-85.
70. The curse was studied in detail by G.W. Williams 1), 2) and 3).
71. The attempts (possibly by Themistokles - see Zinserling; Forrest 1) 237N4; Podlecki 8), criticism, Pleket 2) 77-8; cf. Ostwald 131-6) to rob the Alkmeonidai of the glory of having expelled the tyrants by emphasizing the role of Harmodios and Aristogeiton prove that the Alkmeonidai enjoyed that glory.
72. See Bicknell 5) 171-2 for the possibility of carrying the connection between Xanthippos' genos and the Alkmeonidai back one generation.

73. I accept the conclusions, though not all the arguments, of Bicknell 1) 73-4, cf. 66; 81-2, 87N2, 2) 434-5N61 against Forrest 1)233. In particular, the existence of an ostrakon describing Themistokles as accursed (see Mattingly 2) 285, 287 and Nil; G.M.E. Williams 109N20) should warn against taking the ostrakon (Agora PA 16673) calling Xanthippos accursed, and indeed any others using this insult which are yet to emerge, as evidence of a connection with the Alkmeonidae.
74. We shall examine this aspect of Kimon further under "personality". On the exploitation of the Theseus legend on this occasion see Podlecki 1) 37, 3) 142-3, 4) 16; and Connor 6) 157; 161-2, 165-6 on the role of myth in Greek politics generally.
75. Cf. Davies 48.
76. Defence of the tradition by Bicknell 2) 433-6, though not all the arguments used are acceptable.
77. But see Badian 11-13; Bicknell 5).
78. *ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καίροις* at AP 22.7 may indicate more than just a temporal connection between Aristides' ostracism and the decision on the fleet. That Aristides' opposition was not to the fleet itself but to the proposed use it should be put to has recently been sensibly emphasized by Frost 1) 118; Bicknell 2) 439; G.M.E. Williams 112; Karavites 2) 135.
- Stesimbrotos (fr. 2 ap. Pl. Th. 4.3) is supposed to have said Themistokles *ἔπραξε δὲ ταῦτα Μιλτιάδου κρατήσας ἀντιλέγοντος* and the context makes it clear that *ταῦτα* refers to the building of the fleet. This is wrong. Miltiades was dead by 488 and although Themistokles might have made a start

- on the Piraeus fortifications (cf. Thuc. 93.3) he certainly did not finish them, nor did he have a fleet built at that time (cf. Lenardon 3) 409). Plutarch clearly thought Themistokles successfully carried out his plans (ἐπραξεν) at a time when Miltiades was opposed to him. E. Meyer 296N1 accused Plutarch of misrepresenting his source because of having drawn on it at second hand. Gruen argues that Plutarch has conflated two traditions, one from Stesimbrotos, referring to conflict between Themistokles and Miltiades in the late 490s and the other, from Herodotos, referring to the decision over the use of the silver in the late 480s (94-5). This is possible, but Plutarch, apart from the fact of an error, does not betray confusion of this sort, and I find it more convincing simply to change 'Miltiades' to Aristides (cf. Burn 258 and N1; Bicknell 2) 438; Podlecki 2) 58, 203; Kinzl 2) 212N73). Lenardon 3) 409 accepts the possibility of some form of opposition by Miltiades, but cf. 411. Some scholars accept as historical the opposition of Miltiades, but fail to recognize the mistake which remains, namely, that Themistokles ἐπραξεν... ταῦτα before 488 (Schachermeyr 3) 13; Schreiner 3) 23-5, 36-7; cf. Meister 283).
79. I doubt whether he believed the Spartans would invade, and suspect that he went along with Themistokles' game because to refuse to do so would have left him open to accusations of disloyalty, as had happened in the 480s (see Raubitschek 6) 240-42).
80. There is good reason to reject as unhistorical the story in Plutarch (Ar. 22.1) about constitutional amendments proposed by Aristides after Plataia; see e.g. Wilamowitz 1) 124N4; Busolt 31-2N4; E. Meyer 453N1; Prestel 21; E. Walker 474; Hignett 1)

174; Knight 32N39. Contrast Hammond 4) 264; Bicknell

5) 164-5N5.

81. Defence of the tradition: Lenardon 3) 409; doubts: Bicknell

2) 437-8 (not all the latter's arguments are valid).

82. According to the usual interpretation of ostraka of Themistokles

which originate from the same pot as those of Megakles; references

to examples of the interpretation at G.M.E. Williams 103N2;

doubts: D.M. Lewis 3); Bicknell 4). (It should be mentioned,

however, that the 'one pot, one ostrakophoria' assumption is

quite a large one. It requires us to believe that all the

potsherds which were available in Athens were used up in a single

ostrakophoria. Ervin 295 thinks it "unlikely, though not

impossible" that sherds from the same pot should be used at

different ostrakophoriai. It is said that when the Kerameikos

ostraka are published we shall have complete vases restored, which

will help to test the extent of the truth of the assumption).

83. See Podlecki 2) 15 and N18.

84. I find the Olympia story at Pl. Th. 17.2 perfectly credible; it

should perhaps be set in 476 (cf. e.g. Podlecki 2) 36).

85. The evidence is collected by Podlecki 2) 49-51, see too 6) and

7) and Bowra 342.

86. See references in last note.

87. On Lenardon 1) 105-6, cf. 38 see chapter three N4.

88. It is fatuous to speculate further on the contents of the play:

see Podlecki 2) 47-8, cf. 36 and the references at 47N4, adding

Freymuth 64-5; cf. Wilamowitz 1) 143-4N36 (whose strictures,

though, do go a bit far - cf. Forrest 235-6N10; Davison 2) 103);

Wardman 50-51. Other conjectures concerning Themistokles and the

theatre building itself can be found at O'Neill; cf. Davison 1) 34-5; cf. Podlecki 1) 158N17, 2) 25N25, 174.

89. Amandry 3) 276, 279 has doubted the historicity of the epithet 'Aristoboule', on which, though, see Kahil 24.
90. See Threpsiades and Vanderpool. Vanderpool was certain of the association; Amandry's remarks (3)) ^{do not} represent serious enough objections to drop the association; at most they introduce an element of doubt: see Wycherley 287-9; Podlecki 2) 175-6. Gauer 140 and N96 seems to minimize the political significance of the temple.
91. This is the opinion of Connor 7) 573 also.
92. Ervin 295.
93. Though his arrogance is attested already in 480 by Herodotos (8.125). There are, of course, many probably unhistorical anecdotes based on the fact of Themistokles' arrogance; see Lenardon 1) 220-22.
94. See the ancient references collected by Méautis 299, and his comments; also, Fornara 4) 72.
95. As may have been the case with what we suggested were the accusations levelled at Themistokles at the time of the Karystian war, 475-4, and followed up by Timokreon's accusations. Diodoros (54. 1-5) professes to know of a first trial of Themistokles at Athens, instigated by the Spartans, accusing him of complicity in the plots of Pausanias, who had been convicted. Barrett has recently defended Diodoros' account. But he is wrong to try to claim that Plutarch supports the idea of a first trial. He would associate the indictment of Leobotes (Krateros fr. 11; cf. Pl. Th. 23. 1-2) with an unsuccessful first trial (cf. Lenardon

1) 119) and take the second, successful action of the Lakedaimonians as referred to in Pl. Th. 23.3-4. Barrett (292-3) draws support for this from Plutarch's reference (23.3) to *προτέρας κατηγορίας*, which he correctly renders as "other charges" on page 293. On the next page, however, he apparently changes this: "Plutarch states that his defense consisted largely of the same arguments he had used successfully against Leobotes' indictment". No, he doesn't; he only says he used *ταῖς προτέρας κατηγορίας* - i.e. earlier accusations, not defence. Plutarch immediately explains what they were and how he was able to use them. Themistokles wrote that if, as his enemies had said of him, he *ἀρχεῖν μὲν ἀεὶ ζητῶν, ἀρχεσθαι δὲ μὴ πεφυκῶς μηδὲ βουλόμενος* (23.4), he would be unlikely to submit himself to the rule of the Barbarians. Podlecki 1) 54 also thinks this implies an earlier trial. To me it obviously refers to (some of) the attacks made on Themistokles which contributed to his ostracism. Furthermore, Plutarch (Mor. 855f., not mentioned by Barrett) seems to reject Ephoros' version; the account probably existed only in Ephoros.

Is there any reason, though, to reject the Diodoran account? It is consistent (cf. Podlecki 2) 98), and the chronology of Pausanias' troubles (cited by Lenardon 1) 116 as a difficulty) is perhaps not decisive (cf. references at Milton 263N37). It is easy to think up reasons why Ephoros, or perhaps someone else, might have invented a trial (cf. e.g. Lenardon 1) 117; Barrett has a full bibliography on earlier modern attitudes). I am willing to dismiss Ephoros, though, because for the time being

I am prepared to accept that some of the new Kerameikos ostraka belong to the 470s (cf. Mattingly 2) 284 and N9, 285). None of the Themistokles' ostraka mentions treachery or Medism. Ephoros might have known of a trial and acquittal at Athens before Themistokles' ostracism, but I cannot believe Medism was even indirectly involved. Some trial concerning financial irregularities in 480, perhaps stemming from our postulated Karystian accusations, might well have involved the Spartans. Internally, too, Diodoros' account betrays signs of fabrication; the Spartans bribed Themistokles' enemies (54.4), which would hardly have been necessary. The convoluted irony which pervades Diodoros' account has been given a further twist than is found in the perhaps historical account of Plutarch, who has Themistokles use earlier accusations in his own unsuccessful defence; Diodoros has the enemies use Themistokles' earlier successful defence in successfully condemning him. Kagan 52-3 also accepts a first trial for Medism.

96. See Lenardon's chapter 1) 214-22 subtitled "A Hero's Wit" where the anecdotes (including some not in Plutarch) are collected.
97. On the predominance of demotic and rarity of patronymic on the Themistokles' ostraka see above N43.
98. See Gauer's comments 136.
99. The passage is discussed by Meister 278-9; cf. the comment of von Fritz and Kapp on AP 26.1 (170-71 N76).
100. For a more extensive, and idealized portrait of Kimon's character see Schachermeyr 1) 121-5.
101. A possible exception to this could be seen in the suppliant's ostrakon (see Raubitschek 6) 240-42) which was perhaps the reaction

of a man who felt Aristides' justice had not been tempered with mercy, and had himself suffered as a result.

I can think of no useful evidence to illustrate Xanthippos' character.

102. Bicknell 1) Preface.

103. Sealey 1) 66.

104. Bicknell 1) 87, cf. 94. See too Davies' comments 305; cf. E. Walker 48; Hignett 1) 190; Meiggs 86-7.

105. Cf. the comments of Day and Chambers 132-3; J. Martin 41-2.

106. I take this date for Themistokles' ostracism as virtually certain.

It is Diodoros' date for Themistokles' post-war career (54.1 - 58.5). That he has preserved the correct date of some central event in Themistokles' career has been widely, and not unreasonably, assumed (by e.g. Beloch 192-3; Wilamowitz 1) 144; Busolt 112N2; E. Walker 62; Cary 1) 162; Highby 82-3; E. Meyer 486N2; Lenardon 2) 24 and N6, 25 and N12; Cawkwell 47; Fornara 2) 271; Tomlinson 104; Barrett 304). If it be accepted that the event can not have been Themistokles' flight from Hellas or his exile (see Milton) there is a prima facie case for accepting it as the ostracism date. And if it be further accepted that there is no good evidence to contradict this belief (see the references at Milton 271NN70 and 71) then it would be tendentious not to accept Diodoros' date as the correct date of Themistokles' ostracism. (There is sometimes a surprising confusion in modern accounts about the precise date within the archon year. It is not possible to cite Diodoros for Themistokles' ostracism being "in 471" (as Podlecki 1) 52 with 165N23; cf. Pierson 59). The evidence leaves no doubt that an ostracism took place in the second half

of an archon year: AP 43-5 says the decision on whether to hold an ostracism was made in the sixth prytany. Philochoros (fr. 30) places it before the eighth. Carcopino 62 and N4, followed by Hignett 165, argued that Philochoros probably meant the final vote. So the preliminary vote took place, most probably, roughly in January and the final vote towards spring. An ostracism in 471/0 was therefore in spring 470. Correctly now, Podlecki 4) 20.

107. Davies 305. The implications we have drawn from Themistokles' non-ostracism would be forcefully underlined if it could be confidently accepted that Megakles was ostracized a second time soon after 479, as D.M. Lewis 3) 3-4 and Bicknell 4) 174-5 suggest. I see no reason to differentiate between the ability to muster support on the question of an ostracism and on questions of policy facing the Assembly in the regular course of political life.

CHAPTER TEN

NOTES

1. Pl. Mor. 859 a-d gives a list of tyrants expelled by the Spartans; only the last two, Aristodemus and Angelos, from Thessaly, are specified as being at the hands of Leotychides. Thus neither Aristogenes from Miletos nor Aulis from Phokis was expelled by Leotychides. Burn 557 thinks Aulis was expelled by Leotychides and dates the event shortly after 479.
2. See, above all W.P. Wallace 2); criticism and further references at Roy 336.
3. Andrewes 1) 2.
4. Huxley 2), apparently accepted by Wolski 3) 14 in the text, but treated with scepticism in 14N45.
5. See Hahn for Spartan approaches to security. If the xenagoi system were introduced in our period and not considerably earlier then it would be as likely to have originated immediately after the Persian war as after Dipaia, when Busolt 124 (with the ancient references) would place it, followed by E. Meyer 484N2; E. Walker 67 and N1.
6. See chapter six N76.
7. Contrast Forrest 3) 11N3.
8. Cf. Rhodes 3) 391.
9. See chapter seven.
10. The objection of Barber 90 that the motion must be exaggerated because "they had no navy" is pertinent, though not conclusive. Had the motion been carried the proposals would have been put to the Peloponnesian League which could have put up some kind of challenge at sea, though admittedly not an adequate one.

- Furthermore, there may have been the possibility of revolt from some of Athens' allies (see chapter nine N21). And the motion was, after all, defeated.
11. E. Meyer 483-4N1 thought that the evidence of the battles of Tegea and Dipaia proved the debate unhistorical.
 12. I find the solution to the problem proposed by Hammond 2) 371-81, 399-40 the most satisfactory, and I accept his main conclusions; cf. Scharf 2) for similar conclusions. None of the objections raised by Reece 115-16 is conclusive. The modifications offered by Sealey 5) are not preferable (see Hammond's reply 3) cf. Reece 116-17). See also Papantoniou and French 2) especially 112-15. Lang 2) 270-71 appears to accept Hammond's conclusions on the early date for the beginning of the revolt. As well as the modern works cited in the above mentioned articles see also the earlier references at Busolt 260-61N3; and P.K. Walker 37-8; van Rooy; Huxley 1) 33 and N21; Ruschenbusch 375N36; McNeal; J.R. Cole 374-6; Deane 16-32, 46-52, 59-62; Schreiner 1) 48-9, 2) 27; cf. the bibliographical review at Bayer and Heideking 131-2. See too chapter fourteen. It is worth mentioning that Thuc. 128.1, narrating how the Spartans believed that the 'Great Earthquake' was caused by the tricking of suppliant helots at Tainaron, suggests that a revolt had been going on before the earthquake. Their seizure would mark a considerable step forward in suppressing the revolt. I assume, of course, that the sacrilege occurred shortly before the Great Earthquake. Lazenby's suggestion (246) that we should associate this sacrilege with the framing of Pausanias at Tainaron is attractive.

13. E.g. Beloch 2) 190; Andrewes 1) 5; Forrest 1) 229-32
14. (followed by Lazenby 246); Scharf 2) 161; Bayer and Heideking 117, and 117-18N22, citing Callmer and Will for the same low dating.
15. On the date see chapter thirteen.
16. See Andrewes 1) 4N12; cf. Beloch 189; E. Walker 66; page E. Meyer 484N1 (following Busolt).
17. See chapter six N76.
18. *ἐπὶ μιᾷ ἀσπίδι* they fought *πολλὰν* *μυριάδων* - this is his rhetorical, exaggerated way of expressing the fact; cf. Hammond 2) 380 and N3.
19. Wade-Gery 84 and N3, followed by Andrewes 1) 4; cf. Forrest 1) 229; Lazenby 246N49.
20. Cf. Hammond 2) 380; Scharf 2) 161. Gomme 409 wanted to divorce the Messenian war from Dipaia (and Tegea) because he felt they could not have been won while it was at its height.
21. Forrest 1) 230-32 suggests that the 'Sons of the Slain' were in control of Argos at this time. I cannot believe that they would be any the less hostile to Sparta than the 'douloi'; cf. Sealey 2) 254. I am doubtful whether the complete chronology of Argos' expansion in the Argolid, or of her internal developments are recoverable: on Forrest see Podlecki 1) 168NN42, 43, 44; cf. Kelly 83N7, 84N14; Lloyd-Jones 1) 358-60; but see Kiechle 2) especially 197-200; Jeffery 54 and N55; see also chapter thirteen. Unfortunately the excavations at Halieis have not produced any usable chronological evidence: see Jameson 2) 321.
22. Cf. Kolbe 260; Tomlinson 105; Forrest 1) 231; page Beloch

- 189-90; E. Walker 66.
22. Andrewes 1) 3, 5; Podlecki 1) 168N43. See Hammond 2) 380 and N1.
23. See above N12.
24. By E. Walker 66; Andrewes 1) 5. See further Forrest 1) 231-2; Bayer and Heideking 117N22. Kelly 83N9 wasn't impressed with this (or other) suggestion(s).
25. Diodoros (65.3) says the Argives attacked Mykenai because they saw the Spartans had been humbled (*τεταπεινωμένους*). I believe this refers to the recent Pausanias affair, for Diodoros uses the same word earlier to describe the effect it had on the Spartans (54.2: *ταπεινώσας*). Pausanias' death should not be dated earlier than 468 (see Milton 263, though note the arguments used by scholars referred to at 263N36, adding Barrett 304 and N29).
26. See Forrest 1) 231 for a different version. Sealey 2) 256 objects that the Arkadian revolt should be over before the beginning of the Messenian war since such a complication should have been reported in the sources. The argument is questionable, but, in any case, the complication probably was reflected in Ephoros' account, if our interpretation of *ιδίους πολέμους* is correct.
27. Sealey 5) 369 (among others: see references at Cloché 35-6, adding J.R. Cole 381; Schreiner 1) 37) doubted the historicity of the promise, which, in my view, is methodologically unacceptable (see the comments of Gomme 407; Kagan 61N5 (with further references); de Ste. Croix 179). Sealey 2) 257 has recently reasserted his doubts.

28. Andrewes 1) 4; Busolt 121N1, followed by Kagan 55N21; cf. Highby 87.
29. See Milton, especially 263N36. I assume the western part of the flight must have taken at least three months.
30. Busolt 121N1 (following Beloch). See, correctly, Forrest 1) 229-30. Bengtson 1) 197 is inclined to date both battles in the 470s; (he is wrong to describe Hammond's view as 'similar' to those who date both battles in the 460s).
31. Against Bergk see Busolt 121N1; cf. E. Meyer 483N1; Forrest 1) 229-30N1; Andrewes 1) 1, 4. Pausanias (9.2.5) makes it unlikely that the Tegeans had a separate monument at Plataia (cf. Edmonds 359N4). Simonides' authorship, incidentally, provides a terminus ante quem of 468/7 for the battle of Tegea (Karm. Par. 57); cf. Forrest 1) 229-30N12.
32. Busolt 121N1.
33. Cf. Andrewes 1) 4; but note too Forrest 1) 229N8.
34. On the date of his flight to Tegea, 476/5, see chapter six N76.
35. See cross reference in last note.
36. See R.T. Williams 16-18 for a different suggestion.
37. The synoikism was probably accompanied by further constitutional rearrangements: see ancient references at E. Meyer 485N1 or Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes 358. The ten phylai had already been instituted by summer 472 (Paus. 5.9.5; cf. Busolt 118N5). There is no evidence to suggest the Mantineians synoikized (Strabo 8.3.2, p. 377) at this period, though scholars often locate it about now (e.g. Busolt 118; Andrewes 1) 2; Podlecki 1) 55); correctly: E. Meyer 485N1; Roy 338 and N20; cf. Sealey 2) 255. Mantinea appears to have been pro-Spartan (or

probably more accurately, anti-Tegean) throughout the 470s and 460s, in view of her assistance to Sparta in (probably the third) Messenian war (Xen. Hell. 5.2.3) and her absence from the battles of Tegea and Dipaia. The date of the synoikism of Tegea (Strabo 8.3.2, p.377; cf. Paus. 8.45.1) is also unknown; cf. Huxley 2) 30; see too Forrest 1) 229N8.

38. See R.T. Williams 15-26; responses at Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 485; Roy 335-6.
39. Roy 341, cf. 336.
40. See, generally, W.P. Wallace 2); R.T. Williams.
41. See Roy; cf. Sealey 2) 253-4.
42. See above N20.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

NOTES

1. I consider Diodoros' statement (50.8) that the Athenians had been expecting a war with the Spartans before the outcome of the debate became known to be invalid because the implication that the hostility originated from the transfer of hegemony contradicts good evidence and is most probably based on nothing more than a retrojection of the implication of the motion of the debate; see chapter seven.
2. See chapter six.
3. Cf. the suggestion in chapter six that Themistokles had been alleging that the Spartans, through Pausanias' agency, were arranging a deal with the Persians. The incorrect association (see Neiggs 509 for evidence and further references at chapter twelve N35) of Themistokles with the condemnation of Arthmios as *ἀτιμος καὶ τοκέμιος* for having brought Persian gold to the Peloponnese found in Aelius Aristides 46.303 (Dindorf II p.392) and Plutarch (Th. 6.3) may be based on the knowledge that Themistokles had noted the danger to Athens of Persian support for the Peloponnesians.
4. See Berthold for justification of this assertion.
5. On the relationship of Themistokles' post-war maritime strategy towards the Peloponnese with Perikles' see Brockmeyer 37-41, 61.
6. Andrewes 1) 4, e.g. takes it as an error - "at any rate, a reconstruction which works the Athenians into Teisamenos' battle of Tegea will have to alter a good deal that we are otherwise agreed on". Forrest's appreciation of the significance of the evidence (1) 235N8) is just and exceptional.
7. It is noteworthy that, if our interpretation is accepted, it would represent a further refutation (cf. chapters five and thirteen) of the theory of socio-political alignments which identifies

Themistokles' supporters as mainly of lower class background.

The ardent volunteers at Tegea must have been wealthy men.

8. Kolbe 255-63 finally established the individual identity of a fifth century battle of Oinoe in the Argolid. See further

Jeffery; Meiggs 96-7, 469-72.

9. See Thomsen 328; Meiggs 2) 44 (cf. "The Athenian Empire" 471), followed by Jeffery 41 (but Meiggs' argument concerning post-Ephialtic naming of buildings cannot be taken as a formal terminus ante quem, as Bicknell 2) 429N19 seems to take it); L.S. Meritt 256-7; Boersma 55.
10. See Jeffery 42N10; Meiggs 471-2 and the references they cite.
11. See chapter thirteen.
12. Andrewes 3) 10-12, 15.
13. Cf. Schachermeyr 2) 36, 46, 241N25. The Athenians at both Tegea and Oinoe are unlikely to have been mercenaries.
14. Cf. chapter nine N21.
15. See the comments of French 1) 96. It is against this background that we should understand the meagreness of temple rebuilding activity (see chapter five), as well as the failure to complete the Piraeus walls to the height originally intended (Thuc. 93.5). The lack of manpower in these years is testified to by Themistokles' measure to encourage the immigration of metics and craftsmen (Diod. 43.3: modern references at chapter nine N24).
16. I think it is fair to interpret Kimon's words in this way even though Stesimbrotos took his words as intending a comparison between the Spartans and Athenians, unfavourable to the latter. This may have been merely Stesimbrotos' interpretation and Kimon's words needn't be taken only in this way. Nor do I think it

improper to suggest Kimon's defence or praise of the Lakedaimonians in this form may have been as early as the late 470s, even though Plutarch mentions it in the prelude to his ostracism.

17. The references are collected and discussed by Podlecki 1) 15-25. (I do not accept, though, his interpretation (19-21) of Themistokles' attitudes towards the Ionians: see chapter 3).
18. The danger Hellas might be in from a smaller land force is not treated so rationally (803-22), but the benefit of hindsight and depth of religious feeling prevented this element spoiling the general effect of security created by the whole tenor of the play. The superiority of the Greek (or rather Athenian) naval arm is presupposed: 728, 1037; cf. Themistokles' reflections on the strategic situation after Plataia (Thuc. 93.7).
19. The phrase was used by Kimon in the second half of 464 (Ion fr. 14 ap. Pl. K. 16.8: on the date see Hammond 2) 374-7), but the oracle (see the reference at chapter thirteen N11) upon which it was based was being used in Sparta to support an analysis of the 'international' situation in 475/4 (Diod. 50.4: on the Hetoimaridas debate see chapter seven).
20. See Podlecki 1) 17-18.
21. Podlecki 1) 19-21 offers a different explanation, taking the devices as an expression of a putative "Ionian policy" (the phrase is used by Podlecki at 2) 29 and 4) 4-5), the existence of which I cannot accept: see chapter three.
22. If, as we wondered, Themistokles had been pointing to the presence of Pausanias in Kolonai as evidence of joint Spartan-Persian plans aimed at Athens, the recall and imprisonment of

- Pausanias, perhaps in the late 470s, may have been seen as a gesture to alleviate Athenian fears.
23. Cf. French 1) 117.
 24. The case against accepting the implications of Persai 890-95 as to the membership of the Kyprian cities of the alliance at the time of the production of the Persai (see ATL 207-9), though accepted by Podlecki 1) 159N28, is not good enough: see Meiggs 57-8. Kypros was a Persian base by the time of Eurymedon (Pl. K. 12.4: on the date see Milton, especially 267-8).
 25. See Ehrenberg 4) and Wade-Gery 265-6 on Athenian polypragmosyne.
 26. Cf. Diod. 54.5; Aristodemos 6.1; Cicero de Amic. 12.42. Raubitschek 7) 109 defends as contemporary the attribution of jealousy as a cause of ostracism, referring to Pindar (Pyth. 7, 1. 19 (on Megakles)) and Sophokles (Ajax 154-63 which he takes as certainly referring to Themistokles).
 27. See chapter nine N95. The other two fragments, accusing Themistokles of Medism, are expressly located by Plutarch (Th. 21.4) as having been composed μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν of Themistokles. I do not believe allegations of Medism played any part in the pre-ostracism slanders because of the silence of the ostraka on this point: see chapter two and chapter nine N95, pace e.g. Forrest 1) 236-7; Gülke 61; Knight 43; Barrett 303. For the possibility of Lykomid slanders see Connor 7) especially 574.
 28. Carcopino 188 thinks the alienation caused by Themistokles' self-advertisement is sufficient in itself to explain his ostracism. See chapter nine.
 29. Diod. 54.5 lists as a motive for ostracism the desire
τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινόν.

30. Cf. chapter nine N95; cf. Diod. 54.5: one group who worked for Themistokles' downfall were οἱ μὲν φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν.
31. Demosthenes (23.205) would also appear to support this assessment of the causes of Themistokles' ostracism.
32. Cf. the comments of Hignett 1) 339 on the purpose of ostracism; cf. J.R. Cole 377.
33. None of Themistokles' philoi, of course, will have been foolish enough to have attempted to carry on the anti-Spartan cause; they will have had no reason to hope for success where Themistokles had failed. To this extent Connor 2) 74; cf. 63N55 is right to underline the importance of the personal leadership of a philia group, as testified by the institution of ostracism. But this does not imply that similarity of policy was not an important element in philia groups. A new leader, Ephialtes, did in fact arise to take up some of Themistokles' ideas, but only when the political situation had changed. I suspect that some of Themistokles' erstwhile philoi supported Ephialtes (see too Connor 2) 75-6N68; Karavites 1) 334 and chapter fourteen).
34. See chapter thirteen.

1. On the date of strategia elections see B.D. Meritt; on the date of ostrakophoriai within the archon year and the 471/0 date for Themistokles' ostracism see chapter nine N106.
2. See chapter eight and Milton 267-9. It is unnecessary for our purposes to choose between the alternative reconstructions I proposed at the latter reference. At 263N35 I objected to Ehrenberg's reliance on a priori arguments in the face of an analysis of the ancient evidence, but also claimed "that it would be no difficult task to demonstrate that the Thasos revolt is as 'likely' straight after Eurymedon as four or five years after". Perhaps I should substantiate this claim. Ehrenberg says "it is unlikely" that the Thasos revolt "followed so closely the victory which made any Persian offensive impossible, and, in fact, opened the door to a more tyrannical rule by Athens" (3) 671). But the strength of the Thasian fleet, the duration of the siege, the events and situation on the mainland opposite Thasos, and the attitude of Sparta make it unnecessary for us to assume that Thasos would look to a Persian offensive as the moment to revolt. If Thasos, like Naxos, became dissatisfied with Athenian behaviour during the preparations for Eurymedon, believing in the probability of a Greek victory, she may have decided to wait until after the defeat of the Persians in order to avoid being dubbed a Medizer (as Naxos probably was - cf. e.g. H. Schaefer 114; Cawkwell 48), thereby keeping the sympathy of the other allies, and, more importantly, of Sparta. But as soon as her loyalty to the Greek cause had been demonstrated at

- Eurymedon, and as soon as, arguably, the Athenians' excuse for their uncompromising treatment of their allies had been removed, the Thasians need postpone revolt no longer.
3. Cf. chapter eleven N33.
 4. See further chapters thirteen and fourteen. AP 25. 3 -4 perhaps reflects a tradition which reported a political association between Ephialtes and Themistokles which would, therefore, be located before Themistokles' ostracism in 471/0, and not, as the AP story requires, in the late 460s. I am, though, less confident than Lang 2) 273.
 5. See Davies 455, 457.
 6. The figure of forty years may be a round one: cf. Wade-Gery 240; see too Hignett 1) 253; and it probably derives from Theopompos: see Connor 1) 167-8N8 (cf. 4) 33) and reference to Weizsäcker; cf. E. Walker 69 and N1; Raubitschek 10)83, 93-4.
 7. Podlecki 1) 29.
 8. Eurymedon was early in 465 (see Milton, especially 267-8) and Cawkwell 47-8 has shown that news of the preparations will have reached Athens a good two years before, possibly more; cf. von Domaszewski 10.
 9. I do not find persuasive the tentative suggestion of Davison 2) 104 that the play may reflect talk in the early 460s of a reconciliation with Thebes to balance Sparta's land power.
 10. Correctly, Forrest 1) 240.
 11. The subtle methods - manipulation of constitutional machinery by means of his philoi connections within the Areopagos - will be discussed in the next chapter.

12. αὐτοῦ... τὴν τῶν τραγῳδῶν κρίσιν;
cf. Wilamowitz 1) 146N41; Milton 270 N65.
13. See Forrest 1) 238.
14. Forrest 1) 238; cf. Petre 54; Zinserling 102N2 is less sure. Cavaignac 1) 105 suspected resentment on Kimon's part, but associated it with what he believed to be the recent production of Aischylos' Suppliants with its sympathy for Themistokles and Argos. (He corrected the date of the Suppliants in accordance with the new evidence, (see chapter thirteen N21) at 2) 123).
15. See Milton especially 203 and N36.
16. See Cawkwell 53; Lotze 273-5; Lazenby 246-7, 250.
17. Contrast Podlecki 2) 38, 5) 307-8 who suggests that the Spartan action against Pausanias was motivated primarily by the desire to do away with Themistokles.
18. Pace Barrett, especially 293; cf. Lenardon 1) 119, I am confident that Leobotes' action is directly related to the accusation of complicity in Pausanias' Medism, not with some putative, unsuccessful earlier action: see chapter nine N95 and
19. Rhodes 1) 200-201.
19. On his possible identity see Bicknell 1) 54-8.
20. Cf. Podlecki 1) 165-6N24; ἐν αἰτίᾳ γενόμενος πρὸς τὴν πόλιν suggests a specific accusation such as the Medism charge, and not, for example, the earlier informal accusations which culminated in Themistokles' ostracism, as Curtius 132 had it; Kiechle 294 appears to relate this to the ostracism slanders, though he doesn't specify.
21. Plutarch's confident assertion (Ar. 25.7) of Aristides' absence from identifiable accusers of Themistokles sounds as though he has looked for his name, so I prefer to accept it in

preference to the opposite notice in Lucian (Calumn. 27). His absence is to be explained by the fact that he was either dead or moribund. Raubitschek 10) 93-4 takes the 469/8 date for the beginning of Perikles' ascendancy (cf. above N6) as marking also the death - at least in the tradition based on Theopompos - of Aristides. However, if Nepos' notice (Ar. 3.2) that he died four years after Themistokles "erat expulsus" is also based on Theopompos, it casts serious doubt on the correctness of the tradition, for it would mean an ostracism date for Themistokles, at the latest, of 472/1 (i.e. 'in the fourth year') and so most probably (see chapter nine N106) a 471/0 flight date, which conflicts with better evidence (see Milton 257-67).

22. Knight's disagreement (43-4N59) with Hignett's view (2) 37N3) that "the fall of Themistokles may have been largely brought about by Kimon" on the basis of the tradition of Leobotes' role is unwarranted: the two are by no means incompatible: see e.g. Lazenby's comment (248N54). Kimon's involvement is also supported by his treatment of Epikrates (see text below).
23. Diodoros (54.4) asserts that the Spartans διελέγοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἔχθροῖς of Themistokles, but in the context of the apocryphal first Kedism trial (see chapter nine N95), with the implausible and damaging detail that Themistokles' enemies were bribed to bring charges against him; the evidence is thus worthless. Modern scholars who have suspected collusion between Themistokles' enemies and the Spartans include Wilamowitz 1) 144N37, who seems aware that contact with Kimon is probable, but doesn't seem to like the idea; Podlecki 2) 38, 5) 311; Smart (in Knight 43N58), followed by de Ste. Croix 178N40;

Lazenby 248N54.

24. By Tomlinson 104.
25. Thucydides was probably prevented from expressing what may have been his inclination to reject the idea of Themistokles' guilt by the reasons mentioned at Milton 264-5N46.
26. Cawkwell, especially 48.
27. Cawkwell 45, cf. 48, 53.
28. Thus it is necessary to shift the emphasis of Cawkwell's and others' explanation (see references at chapter three N19) of Athenian willingness to believe the charges in terms of Themistokles' lack of zeal for the Persian war, in order to take account of the sudden awareness of the implications of his earlier policies; I feel this suddenness makes their reaction considerably more easy to understand. Cawkwell 47 was right to note that with the news of the Persian build-up Themistokles "was proved wrong, or so it appeared, about Persia" (cf. chapter eleven). de Ste. Croix 175-6N29 objected that Themistokles (we should say his friends: de Ste. Croix (175N28) is applying the argument to before Themistokles' ostracism) "could have turned any such news to his own advantage, by pointing out that the Persians had been needlessly provoked, against his advice!" The fact that neither he (ostracism) nor his friends (Themistokles' exile) were able to turn the news to advantage should, rather, suggest, as we have maintained, that Themistokles did not, in fact, advise the Athenians to refrain from provoking the King.

de Ste. Croix 178 himself draws attention to another, more rational aspect which helps explain Athenian reaction: their desire to show their regard for the Spartans (cf. Diod. 55.5).

This no doubt played a part, and it will have contributed to their anxiety, Spartan enmity being the last thing they needed in 467-6; but it does not fully explain the vigour with which they hounded Themistokles, which seems to have been motivated by genuine anger.

29. Wilamowitz 1) 144N37 is mistaken to turn Themistokles' family into his treasures.
30. By e.g. Wilamowitz 1) 147N43; Busolt 110-11N5, 130; Flacelière 10 and N1; Schachermeyr 3) 17; Podlecki 2) 41 (suggesting the official indictment document may be the ultimate source); Meister 281.
31. Cf. Forrest 1) 238, followed by M.B. Wallace 202N17. Wade-Gery's date in 450 (2) 222N22; cf. ATL 171N42) has very little to recommend it.
32. Cf. Milton 261 and NN26 and 27.
33. Schachermeyr 3) 17.
34. See the evidence at Meiggs 509-10.
35. See von Domaszewski 10N1; Cary 2); Forrest 1) 238-9, 239N1; M.B. Wallace 200-202; but also Gomme 327N1; Wade-Gery 2) 222N22; cf. ATL 171N42; H. Schaefer 25-8; Schachermeyr 1) 318N60 with further references.
36. M.B. Wallace 202.
37. Schachermeyr 1) 124. Our sketch of the Kimonian era is deliberately one-sided. For the rosy view see e.g. Schachermeyr 1) 120-38.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

NOTES

1. See Milton 268-9 for references.
2. Hammond 5) 107 seems to imply that the move should be connected with the election of Ephialtes and Perikles to the strategia in this period.
3. On the Thasos revolt, and its background, see in particular ATL 258-9; Pouilloux 107-10; Pleket 1); Kagan 47-8; Blackman 200; Meiggs 83-6, 90.
4. Kagan 47 (cf. Hammond and Griffith 103) believes Makedonia was a target as early as this.

The friction between Kimon and the Korinthian Lachartos (Pl. K. 17.1) should perhaps not be over-interpreted. It may represent nothing more than Korinthian indignation at Athenian lack of propriety and Kimon's impatience (though Raubitschek's claim (12) 269) that "there was no change" in the Korinthians' friendly attitude to Athens on this occasion requires more comment than his reference (269N4) to de Ste. Croix 78N34 (which is irrelevant: de Ste. Croix refers us to Jacoby's suggestion that the story derives from Ion) and to J.R. Cole 374-8 who does not (seek to) elucidate Atheno-Korinthian relations). It is not impossible, though, that Korinthian suspicion was aroused by Athenian ambitions at Enneahodoi and the area, posing a potential threat to the well-established Korinthian interests in the area (Podeidaia). This needn't imply the existence of the more ambitious goal of annexing part of Makedonia. Korinthian hostility might also be explained by the natural fear of too close a co-operation developing between Athens and Sparta (cf.

H. 5. 75, 92). Huxley 1) 31-3 and N21 has rendered convincing Jacoby's suggestion (2) 7-9) that Ion was with Kimon on this expedition and so is probably Plutarch's source. See also Sealey's remarks (2) 263-4).

5. E.g. Jacoby 1) 51; Hignett 1) 193; Forrest 1) 240, 2) 213; Meiggs 88; cf. J.R. Cole 377.
6. Cf. Gomme 296; Papantoniou 181.
7. See Hammond 2) especially 376-8.
8. This is brought out most graphically by French 2) 112-15 and Deane 19-20.
9. Even with the revolt of Thasos such a Peloponnesian war would still have been practicable. Pace E. Walker 71, the Athenians were probably not bound by the alliance against the Persians to render Sparta support: see Gomme 300.
10. E.g. "antagonistic" (de Ste. Croix 182); "a dangerous rival" (Hignett 1) 196); "Gegner" (Schachermeyr 2) 32); "natural enemy" (Meiggs 89).
11. Parke and Wormell 50, nr. 112.
12. See Milton 257-8 and N5, 267-9. (As far as I know Schreiner 2) 27 is alone in keeping to the scholiast's 453/2 date for Drabeskos).

Because of the nature of the arguments used, discussion of the chronology of the post-465/4 period will be integrated into the main narrative and not contained in a separate chapter as was preferable for the period 478/7-465/4.

13. Cf. e.g. Hammond 2) 397-9.
14. It is this fact, mainly, which vitiates the explanation of the Spartan dismissal of the Athenian contingent proposed by Lang

2) 268-9 (that the fall of Thasos rendered the presence of the Athenians in the Peloponnese unnecessary, since they had been requested primarily to distract the Athenians from Thasos) and by Deane 18, 21 (that news of the fall of Thasos brought with it Athenian knowledge of the prior Spartan promise to invade Attika); cf. French 2) 116. Second Spartan appeal, see chapter ten N12.

15. The most important, in my view, is the following. The reforms of Ephialtes are dated to 462/1 (AP 25.2). Plutarch (K. 15.1), immediately after his account of Kimon's return from the successful siege of Thasos and consequent trial (14. 2 -4), says that the reforms were carried out while Kimon was away on a campaign, and that Kimon went by sea (ἐξέπλευσε). Scholars have not liked the idea that Kimon should proceed to Lakonia by sea ("eine seltsame Vorstellung" wrote von Domaszewski 11N3, sniffily, of Busolt's suggestion (258, cf. Judeich 14N1)). Some take ἐξέπλευσε as a slip by Plutarch (e.g. E. Meyer 2) 52; Meiggs 89N3). E. Walker's argument (468) that the tradition of Kimon's absence on the occasion of the reforms was an inference of Theopompos is arbitrary, and stimulated by what I believe to be his mistaken conception of the circumstances surrounding the reforms. Beloch 198 related Kimon's setting sail to the expedition against Thasos, and, going against Plutarch's plain meaning, refers the attack on the Areopagos (Pl. K. 15. 1 -2) not to the final reform but to a long process of agitation. Jacoby 2) 2N6 (cf. 1) 51, 3) 369N17) would like to have the trial of Kimon (Pl. K. 14. 2 -4) after Drabeskos, and not, as Plutarch clearly implies, after the capitulation

of Thasos, and have Kimon return after the trial, to Thasos, relating this putative embarkation to $\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\epsilon}\tilde{\epsilon}\pi\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon$. Barns 167, 170 has tried to relate it to a putative separate Kimonian expedition to Kypros in 462, which has little to recommend it (cf. E. Meyer 2) 52; Scharf 1) 311N2). To avoid chronological difficulties in the mid 450s he has to include this alleged expedition in the six years of the Egyptian expedition, even though he believes the supposed Kypros expedition was in progress before the start of the Egyptian campaign (Barns 175; Thuc. 110.1); Thucydides, though, is clearly referring to involvement in Egypt as lasting six years. (Sealey 5) 370, cf. 1) 68, 74N65, has accepted his conclusions, qualified by "perhaps" at 2) 258). Others relate it to the Kypros-Egyptian expedition (von Domaszewski 11; Scharf 1) 315; Raubitschek 11) 38). See also chapter fourteen and N17 and Hignett's discussion (1) 337-41). Hammond 2) 400 has provided a perfectly adequate explanation of why Kimon should have gone to Lakonia this second time by sea. In fact, it is now widely accepted that Kimon went with aid to Lakonia in the same archon year as the reforms were effected: "it may be taken as accepted" says J.R. Cole 373, cf. 374-8; cf. Fornara 3) 44; see too Hammond 2) 378. While the first half of 461 would not be impossible for the request for assistance (so, e.g. Busolt 258N1) the second half of 462 is far preferable.

16. I do not believe, as Hammond 2) 401N1 does, that the Athenians fought the Aiginetans in this period. Thucydides (105.2) would seem not to refer to a conflict with one of Athens' allies, pace MacDowell (see Reece 118N32 (11), ((1) is not valid); Deane

109N1).

17. Though some scholars took the assumption too far: see Gomme's discussion (307) of Beloch 205, 2) 151-2 and others, adding Pierson 69; von Domaszewski 11; Taeger 17-18. Schachermeyr 2) 34 fails to distinguish between Kimon's attitude to a Persian offensive immediately after Eurymedon and one after the capitulation of Thasos, and is mistaken in lumping the question of a Persian offensive together with a war against Makedonia; thus he arrives at the notion that there was dissatisfaction with Kimon's "zurückhaltende Politik", an expression which Schachermeyr appears to apply to Kimon's attitude to the prospect of a renewed offensive against the Persians, also.
18. Cf. E. Meyer 2) 3N2.
19. Though it is true that the order, Perikles - Ephialtes, may be simply rhetorical and not necessarily chronological (see Wade-Gery 203N2); yet Perikles' expedition would be pointless after the beginning of the Kypros-Egyptian expedition, in 460 (see chapter fourteen), and there is no reason to believe that the Periklean expedition was connected with reinforcements for the Egyptian campaign as von Domaszewski 13 suggested (his reasons for postulating this (13N3) are invalid). Perikles' expedition cannot be associated with that in Thucydides 116.3 (pace Wade-Gery loc. cit. and Fornara 3) 46N24; see correctly Meiggs 79N1). Most scholars date both Ephialtes' and Perikles' expedition in the late 460s (e.g. Judeich 12-13N2; Gomme 295; Burn 2) 55; Schachermeyr 2) 34; R.W. Wallace 263 and N17 (who puts both in the same campaign season); Hammond 5) 107).
20. Cf. e.g. Jacoby 1) 51; Kagan 83; Schachermeyr 2) 34; Sealey 1) 68.

21. I am not convinced that Aischylos' Suppliants is evidence for a debate on the possibility of involvement in Egypt at Athens in 464; (the production of the play was in 464/3, about which there should no longer be any doubt: POxy XX, 2256, fr. 3; see the bibliography by Lloyd-Jones 2) 595, and, in particular, Lesky, especially 1-7; Lloyd-Jones himself 2) 596; Forrest 1) 236N3 (the reference to POxy 2265 on page 239 is a slip); Podlecki 1) 163-4N2); Gülke dates the composition of the play to a time when the Egyptian expedition "schon eingeleitet ist" and the Argive alliance "gerade geschlossen ist oder zumindest ... unmittelbar bevorsteht" (60, cf. 65) and she believes Aischylos is supporting those who were urging alliance with Argos (70-73). Merkelbach 101 thinks the Athenians may even have been supporting the Egyptian revolt from its inception. The Egypt motif was, after all, required by the myth, despite Podlecki 1) 174N48; (his remark presupposes that the main motivation in writing the Danaid trilogy was to comment on contemporary political issues; this, especially if we bear in mind, as far as we can, the whole trilogy, is not likely to have been the case).
22. Originally A. Boeckh and K.O. Müller (see Podlecki 1) 167N39 and the references at Lloyd-Jones 1) 357N2 (who does not deny "that the ode" (l. 625f.) "may be intended to allude to the alliance"); Forrest 1) 240; Podlecki 1) 60-62.
23. Modern references on the *δίκη* theme at Winnington-Ingram 144N16; see too H.G. Robertson, especially 107.
24. See Podlecki 1) 45-8, 51-2.
25. See Winnington-Ingram, especially 142, 145-6, against whose

reconstruction of the Aigyptioi and Danaides Podlecki 1)

165N13 has no objections to register.

26. See the discussion of, and evidence for Athenian suspicions at Quincey 198. (See Kelly 84-6 for some possible reasons why the Atheno-Argive alliance in fact proved less productive than we might have expected).
27. Cavaignac 1); Forrest 1) 239-40; Podlecki 1) 52-62; Gülke 73N1.
28. Respectively, Podlecki 1) 62; Forrest 1) 240.
29. See further text below on the Themistokles parallel.
30. By e.g. Diamantopoulos 224; Podlecki 1) 50, 56, 58.
31. See Debrunner on the peculiarity of the word, and the references at Kinzl 3) 321N25.
32. See especially Ehrenberg's detailed analysis 2) 518-24 (with 1) 432-3N44). Sealey 8) has recently argued that "decision by a majority vote in a primary assembly does not distinguish city constitutions called demokratia from city constitutions called oligarchia" (272). But the awareness of this right as something to be defended against the incursions of magistrates is a feature of a developing consciousness of democracy which this play, seen in its Athenian historical context (see text below) may be taken as testifying to.
33. Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1) 358-60.
34. Forrest 1) 222N4 seems to recognize this.
35. Forrest 1) 221-32, 240; Podlecki 1) 50, 57-8, 61-2; cf. Gülke 63; K.O. Müller (see Lloyd-Jones 357, 360).
36. "The praise of democratic Argos" is "completely relevant in the sixties ... The note is one of assurance; Argos ... had the right

constitution" (Forrest 1) 240); Podlecki 1) 62 believes Ephialtes may have spoken of "a turning away from Cimon and his Spartan friends ... to our real friends, the Argives, "democratic like ourselves"; cf. Gülke 69-70.

37. Cf. Gomme 318; ATL 151; for two recent assessments of the date of the composition of Ps. Xenophon's pamphlet, see Bowersock 33-5 and de Ste. Croix 307-10. (Sparta used the same guiding principle in forming her attitude to foreign constitutional forms; cf. e.g. J.R. Cole 380; J. Martin 37).
38. See chapter ten N20.
39. Ehrenberg 2) 517. See too Lloyd-Jones 359 (and Diamantopoulos 224-5).
40. Podlecki 1) 58.
41. On the background to Aischylos' anti-Spartan feelings see Quincey 205-6.
42. Cf. Gomme 302; Forrest 1) 240 N3; Reece 119; de Ste. Croix 181.
43. See further chapter ten N12. One wonders whether the murder of Pausanias, later, at least, considered a sacrilege (Thuc. 134.4), was already suspected of being such.
44. See French 2) 115-17.
45. See Diamantopoulos 221; Podlecki 1) 60; Gülke 69 denies this (see further text below). Aischylos elaborated Argive claims in the Oresteia: see Quincey 201-2; Dover 1) 236; de Ste. Croix 184.
46. Gülke 69. Podlecki 168N46 explains the claim away by saying Aischylos "puts forward, in the grand manner, claims to Argive hegemony over "all Greece"". Diamantopoulos 221 uses this

feature to cast doubt on the belief that the play was written shortly before its production in 464/3.

47. Hammond and Griffith 103 postulate a visit to Argos by Alexander, for which there is no evidence.
48. So, Hammond and Griffith 103; J.R. Cole 47, e.g.
49. Forrest 1) 230-31.
50. This, at any rate, seems to me to be in part what Aischylos was celebrating in the Eumenides: see further Quincey 203-5 (critical, Podlecki 1) 174N50), though, admittedly, the strategic situation was radically different in 458 to that in 464.
51. Cf. chapter nine N10, and see also Jeffery 52N49.
52. Sealey 2) 261 argues that "since prosecutors were elected by the public assembly" (Pl. Per. 10.5) "the trial was of the type called eisangelia". Unless this is nothing more than an assumption by Plutarch (helped by his democratic interpretation of Perikles' early career), Sealey may be right, and, he goes on, his accusers "must have thought that Cimon ought to have been condemned in the previous procedure of euthynai" (loc. cit., cf. 1) 51,54); either way it was most probably the Areopagos which judged the trial: on 'euthynai' see Sealey 1) 52-4 (accepted by Rhodes 1) 201) and Hignett 1) 203-5 (further references at 1) 195N3); on 'eisangelia' see now Rhodes 200-201 (pace Busolt 125-6N4; cf. Hignett 1) 200; Sealey 1) 51); cf. R.W. Wallace 261-3; Barrett 295 and N12; J. Martin 33; see further Busolt 245N3. It is not impossible that Kimon was suspended from office by (the forerunner of ?) the process described at AP 61.2, cf. 43.4, comparable to Perikles' fate in 430 (Thuc. 8. 54. 3; cf.

Busolt 245N3; Wilamowitz 2) 249N56), but I doubt it. It is probably no longer possible to reconstruct the exact nature of the action(s) against Kimon. In what follows I refer to it/them as $\epsilon\upsilon\theta\upsilon\nu\alpha\iota$, recognizing that in so doing the term may have to cover more than is usually understood by it, and to that extent may be inaccurate. (For the possible procedure at normal pre-Ephialtic 'euthynai' see Hignett 1) 203-5). None of these uncertainties affects the date very much; the trial was after the collapse of Thasos (it is tendentious to deny this as Jacoby (see above N15) and Barnes 172 do), which was in 462, and most probably began at the end of Kimon's strategía term of office, most likely the end of the 463/2 office. The trial will, therefore, have been around mid to late summer (pace E. Walker 68 and Sealey 5) 370, who place it in winter).

53. In discussing the trial I shall assume that Stesimbrotos is the source for Plutarch's whole account, and not only the Elpinike episode. While there is some doubt there is no good reason to dismiss the account of Kimon's defence as "späte Rhetorenerfindung" (E. Meyer 2) 49N1); Schreiner 2) 26-7 has recently argued that Kallisthenes was Plutarch's source; Jacoby 2) 2N6 and Jeffery 52N49 are cautious.
54. See below N77.
55. Recent scholars have accepted the usually ignored notice in Ps. Demosth. 12.21 that Alexander was the first to control the region of later Amphipolis - N. Robertson 118; Hammond and Griffith 102, the latter scholars dating Alexander's activity to between 478 and 476/5 (the reference to Herodotos in N1 should be to book eight). I distrust the notice; for more reliable

evidence of Alexander's expansion see H. 5.17; Thuc. 2.99.

56. Pace E. Walker 58 and Cloché 2) 53-4 who argue the proposed expedition was punitive, believing Alexander was in fact implicated in causing the Drabeskos disaster, of which there is no hint in the sources. Dusolt 245 and N3 believes, and Meiggs 88 wonders whether Alexander was "suspected of active sympathy with Thasos". J.W. Cole 49N26 suggests that the reason for Athenian hostility was that it "had to do with the flight of Themistokles", who, he argues (47-9), was received by Alexander. Despite a judicious assessment of Thucydides' evidence ("no hint here of any collaboration") and an awareness of the value of the 'Themistokles Letters' (48; cf. his reference (48N24) to Podlecki 2) 129-32), J.W. Cole is prepared to rely on the coincidence of name between the Makedonian Aigai and the Aiolian town allegedly visited by Themistokles in the non-Thucydidean version of Themistokles' flight itinerary given by Plutarch (see references at Milton 270 N66) and on probability, dependent, note, on a reconstruction for which there is hardly any evidence (see chapter nine N9), to suggest that Themistokles in fact visited Alexander on his flight (cf. Hammond and Griffith 102 - without discussion). The sources, however, give the impression that after leaving Admetos' Kingdom Themistokles did not let up until he was at Ephesos (cf. Diod. 56. 3 -4; and see Milton 260). Had Themistokles and Alexander been friends "seeking to create a third force in the Greek world" it would be incredible that Kimon should refuse to attack Alexander's kingdom; (see further chapter nine NN9 and 10). The idea that the Athenians should wish to invade Makedonia (and not also Argos, Kerkyra and Admetos'

kingdom) because of Alexander's reception of Themistokles is, in any case, highly implausible.

57. For the evidence of Kimon's pro-Spartan policy generally, see Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes 348.
58. See, correctly, Rhodes 2) 149.
59. So, Sealey 1) 53. It is possible that the 'euthynai' in question were of ex-archons about to join the Areopagos, as Wade-Gery 177, followed by Rhodes 1) 204N2, suggested. See too Burn 2) 52-3; Day and Chambers 185; Kagan 71; J. Martin 35. (Does AP 25. 3 -4 reflect some action taken by Ephialtes against Areopagites who had been involved in the 'eisangelia' of Themistokles?).
60. A unilateral withdrawal from Paros may have been part of the charge against Kimon's father; but see further Kinzl 1).
61. Failure to carry out orders was less serious than corruption: see Kinzl 1) 288.
62. Most probably Aleuadais: see chapter nine N10.
63. Kimon was obviously unaware of the strength and extent of Spartan feeling against Athens' tightening of control over the northern Aegean and the settlement at Drabeskos (Thuc. 101. 1 -2), but he may have been informed during the first relief expedition in 464 that the Spartans would be unhappy to see Athenian influence expand beyond Thrace. I doubt, anyway, whether Kimon had envisaged expansion into Makedonia (cf. text above), and I suspect Alexander and he were friends (cf. chapter nine NN9 and 10; von Domaszewski 12; Meiggs 88).
64. Kagan 63 notes the importance of family feuds as a possible contributing factor (as do Adcock and Mosley 31), but at 67-8 he is mistaken to deny that we have good reason to believe Perikles

opposed Kimon's foreign policy, drawing attention only to the lack of evidence directly associating Perikles with the anti-Spartan movement in the late 460s, and failing to use the important evidence provided by the trial.

65. Sealey 1) 62-4, cf. 70, 2) 258.

66. Sealey 1) 62-3.

67. See Meister 276-8 for the evidence and for references to modern work; Schachermeyr 3) 10 e.g. would date the publication to around 420.

68. For a study of the ancient tradition of Perikles' oratory see Connor 4) with further references.

69. Cf. E. Walker 68; Kagan 67.

70. Sealey 2) 258 has recently agreed that Perikles' age may be an explanation of the minor role he played in the trial but he clearly still prefers his earlier 'collusion' theory.

71. Sealey 1) 65 castigates this element on different grounds.

72. I have given Stesimbrotos the benefit of the doubt in arguing that his misinterpretation was based on his well-attested lack of historical sense; it is possible that he has deliberately misrepresented Perikles' role in order to enable him to invent a (pornographic - cf. Athenaios 13.589 d -e?) story.

Others who believe Perikles was in fact unduly unenthusiastic at the trial include Burn 2) 55-6; Day and Chambers 144N25; J.W. Cole 49N26.

73. Cf. e.g. Burn 2) 55; Schachermeyr 2) 32, 47; Sealey 1) 53-4.

74. See above N52.

75. See above N59.

76. Winnington-Ingram 148 in his attempt to reconstruct the trilogy

writes, "Did Danaus" (now King of Argos - see Winnington Ingram 145-6) "refer the case of Hypermestra to the sovereign people? Or did he seek to act under his own powers, and did the people intervene?" The latter suggestion would support our interpretation, but, as Winnington-Ingram 148 says, the question is "perhaps unanswerable". Petre 54 sees evidence of 'democratic propaganda' regarding the responsibility of magistrates in the Suppliants.

77. Raubitschek 7) 91N7 has applied to our trial a notice in Demosthenes (23.205) to the effect that Kimon once escaped the death penalty by only three votes and was fined fifty talents, and so must have been found guilty. It is true that this information could be combined without formal conflict with Plutarch (K. 15.1) if we interpret the latter's remark that Kimon ἀπέφυκε τὴν δίκην as referring only to the death penalty which he mentions in a different context (Per. 10.5). As a supplementary argument Raubitschek says that Perikles could not have distinguished himself at the trial had Kimon been completely acquitted. The last point has no validity; as a junior speaker he would not have been held primarily responsible for the failure of the prosecution in normal circumstances. In fact, though, if our interpretation of the trial is accepted Kimon's acquittal will have reflected the partiality of the Areopagos, not the incompetence of the prosecution. Furthermore, it is very doubtful whether Demosthenes' remarks should be applied to the trial of Kimon in 462. He says the charge was ὅτι τὴν Παρίων μετεκίνησε πολιτείαν ἑφ' ἑαυτοῦ. As a description of Kimon's trial in 462 this is wrong. The

simplest explanation might be to take Kimon as a slip for Miltiades son of Kimon and refer it to the trial shortly after Miltiades' Parian expedition in 489 (so Busolt 255N1). But even so, Miltiades did not change the constitution at Paros (see Kinzl 1) for an analysis of the ancient tradition). Did Kimon in reality become involved in Parian politics during preparations for Eurymedon, perhaps in connection with the Naxos revolt, with or without criticism at Athens, and has Demosthenes imported this memory into an equally vague recollection of Kimon's trial in 462? If these questions be answered positively - and some explanation is required - Demosthenes is as likely to have confused the fine of Miltiades with the acquittal of Kimon. Demosthenes' evidence, then, is highly suspicious, while Plutarch clearly implies that Kimon was completely acquitted. (The parallel to Miltiades which such a fine of Kimon would have provided would have been so striking as to make it surprising that we hear nothing else of it).

I do not believe it is safe to follow the 'corrected' MSS which give *πάτριον* in place of *παρίων* (as does schol. Ael. Arist. (Dindorf 515)) though most editors do (though not Dindorf or Fuhr-Sykutris). But if we could accept it paleographically and historically, and apply it to 462, it would be highly interesting, and would confirm our interpretation of the constitutional background to the trial, as well as require some modifications in the details. E. Meyer 2) 25N2 seemed to accept it only because of the difficulties involved in reading 'Paros'. Raubitschek's point has received little attention: Connor 1) 154N6, 5) 109 is convinced; Kiechle 293N95 is non-committal.

78. See Hignett 1) 204-5; Sealey 1) 52-3.
79. See above N52.
80. R.W. Wallace 263.
81. See above N59.
82. See above N52.
83. Cf. Hignett 1) 195 and the references at 195N7.
84. See too Sealey 1) 54. I am not prepared, however, to try to support any of this with AP's idea (25.1. cf. 41.2) of a *πολιτεία ... τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν* between 480/79 and 463/2, which has no independent weight as evidence: see Busolt 27N2; E. Walker 472-4; Hignett 1) 147-8; Day and Chambers 9-10, 23, 120-24, 126-8, 135. Contrast Giffler 225; Kiechle 281-93 (especially 292-3); Schuller 178; and see J. Martin 28-9. R.W. Wallace 260 and Kinzl 2) 220 and N13, while recognizing the valuelessness of the evidence, nonetheless use it implicitly as support for their reconstructions.
85. Generally see Connor 2).
86. If we could accept Stesimbrotos' evidence that Perikles held back in the trial (see text above and N65) then a better explanation than either his affection for Elpinike or for Kimon would be that he and his more senior friends in fact wanted the acquittal because of the disgrace it would bring on the Areopagos.
87. Among recent scholars see Hignett 1) 203-5; Sealey 1) 53, 2) 261; Forrest 2) 209; Rhodes 1) 200-201, 204-5, 209-10; Ruschenbusch 373-4 and N34; R.W. Wallace; J. Martin 32-3. Day and Chambers 185 are less confident than most.
88. The most comprehensive review is to be found in Hignett's chapter on 'The Revolution of 462', 1) 193-213. I do not, in fact, believe

the reforms included more than those elements I shall be referring to.

89. The same purpose would be served by transferring now the responsibility of conducting certain dokimasiai which the Areopagos probably had (though perhaps only of archons) to the Boule and dikasterion (see Rhodes 1) 176-8, 205, 210; Ruschenbusch 373-4N34; R.W. Wallace 261, 266. But see also Hignett 1) 205-8).
90. Rhodes 1) 199-201, 205.
91. The point has been argued by Sealey 1) 46-52 against both Wade-Gery and Hignett. Rhodes 1) 204 accepts this and has added some points (1) 204N1). See too Forrest 2) 217-18. Sealey 8) 266-7 has interpreted the predicament facing Pelasgos in Aischylos' Suppliants, and his solution, in terms of the decisions facing archons.
92. R.W. Wallace 268; Rhodes 204N1 thinks there may have been "a law at some point, possibly enforcing a change but more probably confirming an evolution that had already taken place"; c.f. Day and Chambers 181-5.
93. See, conveniently, the collection of quotations of this view at Ruschenbusch 369-70, adding Schachermeyr 2) 26-33.
94. Sealey 1) 53-4, cf. 2) 261.
95. Rhodes 1) 200-201; Sealey, at 2) 258, 261, 267N7.
96. Thus Sealey's interpretation leads to the paradox that although Kimon's prior acquittal at the hands of the Areopagos in his 'euthynai' was considered unjust, he was nonetheless acquitted again by the popular court judging the 'eisangelia', yet at (nearly) the same time Ephialtes was able to muster sufficient

popular support against the "particular abuse" which was being perpetrated in the unjust Areopagos 'euthynai' hearings.

97. J. Martin 37-9.
98. Ruschenbusch 375.
99. R.W. Wallace 264.
100. R.W. Wallace 263.
101. R.W. Wallace 264.
102. See too J. Martin's comments 34 ("3").
103. R.W. Wallace 264.
104. R.W. Wallace 264, cf. 263.
105. R.W. Wallace 262, cf. 264.
106. See Frost 1); Kluwe 2) 54-5, 57 goes further.
107. Many members of the Areopagos, no doubt, supported Kimon's pro-Spartan policies with conviction as well as out of personal regard for Kimon.
108. I believe this was considered a more strict control over magistrates, pace J. Martin 35, who thinks this not the case because the popular jury's were more susceptible to demagogy than the Areopagos. Nonetheless, the reduction of the possibility of partiality based on personal connections will have been considered a more strict supervision of magistrates' activities.
109. On Sealey's interpretation of the relationship between democracy and sovereignty of an assembly see above N32. Further references on the early history of the word 'demokratia' are listed in Sealey's article. See too Kinzl 3). For the correct interpretation of the (possible) Spartan reaction to the reforms see J. Martin 37, and on Thucydides' description of the Spartan view of the Athenians in 462 as νεωτεροποιῶν (102.3) see

J.R. Cole 379.

110. It is probable that when the vote on aid to Sparta was taken the full significance of Kimon's behaviour and acquittal and probably the necessity for reform had already been recognized. The possibility that Kimon had had no good reason not to invade must have been considered as soon as news arrived that the forces were returning to Athens, and so the Athenians had had several months to ponder the issues of sovereignty involved. Also, attention may have been focused on Kimon's 'euthynai' because Ephialtes' attacks on Areopagites had perhaps illustrated the partiality of the Areopagos. When Kimon was sent to Sparta reform was probably in the air because to judge by Thucydides' account (102.3) Kimon and his men did not remain long in Lakonia, and by the time they returned the reforms had been passed (Pl. K. 15.1 does refer to Kimon's absence at Ithome - see above N15; Pl. K. 15.2 says Kimon tried to repeal the laws - and this notice therefore prohibits the idea (based only on modern conceptions) that Kimon had been ostracized before the reforms were effected: see J.R. Cole 374-8 (though not all his arguments are valid); of the finer chronological point of whether the dismissal or reform came first I agree with Deane 20 that "we simply do not know").

111. See J. Martin 34 ("2"); Forrest 2) 21-8, 216.

112. Scholars who give credence to the theory include Cloché 34N1; Kagan 73; Hignett 1) 193, 196-7, 341; J.R. Cole 378; J.D. Lewis 138-9. We do not know the composition of the force sent, by sea, on this second relief expedition, for Aristophanes' four thousand hoplites (Lys. 1143-4) belong to the first expedition;

there were, however, presumably many hoplites among this "not inconsiderable" (Thuc. 102.1) force.

113. Plutarch (K. 15.2-3) creates the impression that Kimon's ostracism followed swiftly upon the dismissal from Lakonia (in 462) and his attempts to repeal the reforms (of 462/1), and so we should date his ostracism to 462/1. I am not prepared, incidentally, to base any chronological deductions on Theopompos fr. 88, as is commonly done: e.g. by Wilamowitz 2) 293-4; Beloch 197; ATL 172; Raubitschek 3) 379; see Connor 1) 27-30, 103-6; cf. Schachermeyr 2) 241N32; cf. below N 116.

(Deane's analysis of Plutarch's evidence for the date of Kimon's ostracism (57-8) is unsatisfactory and unconvincing (the reference to Pl. K. 9.4. on page 58 is a slip for Per. 9.4)).

114. Between his return from Lakonia and ostracism day Kimon probably had something approaching six months in which to demonstrate his obstinacy, which, pace Deane 57, was long enough.

The word *μισόδημος* is not attested until later in the fifth century (see Connor 2) 101-2) though Plutarch's perhaps anachronistic terminology does not mean that the attacks on Kimon's negative attitude to the demos which Plutarch describes are unhistorical. *φιλόδημος* is attested as a name in the first half of the fifth century (see Connor 2) 101N20).

115. See also Barns 172-3; Day and Chambers 134, 144N25; J.R. Cole 377.

116. See the analyses of Beloch 210-11; E. Walker 468-9; contrast Kagan 91-4; Meiggs 111, 422-3; further references at Bayer and Heideking 137; cf. N113 above.

117. Though see the reflections of Jacoby 2) 13-14 and N9.

118. See Beloch 2) 153 followed by e.g. Kagan 74 and N58; cf. Vanderpool 2), 1) 238; cf. Bicknell 4) 175.
119. See chapter eleven N9. On the 'Kimonian' character of at least four of the paintings see Jeffery 42-6; Bicknell 2) 429. On the relationship of Peisianax to Kimon see Davies 376-8.
120. On the question of aristocratic patriotism, though, see the analyses of the evidence by Pusey; Chroust.
121. The divorce is a deduction of E. Meyer's (2) 27), based on Plutarch Kimon 4.2 and interpreted as the result of political conflict between Kallias and Kimon. Davies 259 accepts, though Beloch 45 rejected the deduction.
122. Despite Bicknell's acceptance (1) 77 and N1) of Plutarch's statement (Per. 24.5) that this woman was married first to Hipponikos and then to Perikles, I still find the traditional correction of Plutarch, on the evidence of the woman's children, more persuasive; see Beloch 35; Davies 262-3. Sealey 1) 37N78, 64 emphasizes the good relations between Kallias and Perikles but draws a different conclusion.

1. I exclude from this statement two recent articles by Schreiner (1) and 2)). He has proposed a complete revision of several aspects of the chronology of the Pentekontaetia. But his reconstruction is, in my view, completely vitiated not so much because it is based on a willingness to reject Thucydides' evidence, nor even because he makes the ancient historian out to be a monster of deception, but because it requires us to believe Thucydides was prepared to make a fool of himself by publishing the historical collage which Schreiner's reconstruction would make Thucydides' excursus on the Pentekontaetia. Because our basic principles of source criticism are so divergent, it is perhaps permissible to forgo discussing individual differences between our views. (Though for a discussion of Schreiner's approach to the date of the Naxos revolt see Milton 272-3).
2. See e.g. Busolt 422N1; Beloch 213-14.
3. Though Deane 68-71 has argued that the invasion should be in winter 446/5. Meiggs 181 dates the invasion to May, primarily to enable the Spartans to destroy the corn most effectively, but the Truce may have held them back till later in the year.
4. Pace Gomme 413.
5. I do not find attractive Gomme's suggestion (325,328) that this notice has been misplaced in Thucydides' text, and that it should come after, not before, the notice of the Truce. Gomme did not press it, and I think Bengtson 1) 212 and N2 is alone in having taken it up. Beloch 202 miscalculated. See Nesselhauf (at Cloché 29N5) on Taeger. On Raubitschek's interpretation of

1. διαλκόντων ἑτῶν τριῶν. see Connor 1) 150 N17 (2). I do not know of any scholar who has accepted his conclusions on the date of the Five Years' Truce (though Schachermeyr 2) 141N32 thinks his conclusions are 'possible'). Will (see Bayer and Heideking 138 and N55) relies on Diodoros (86.1) to date the Truce in 454/3, as does Schreiner 1) 28, 56N17. I am not prepared, as Meiggs 125 is, to date the treaty early in 451 because of the tradition linking the recalled Kimon with it. Even if Kimon was recalled (and Andokides' *καταδεξάμεθα* (3.3) does not say, and needn't imply that he was recalled, pace Connor 1) 104-5; Meiggs 423; Schreiner 1) 28) shortly before his period of ostracism expired it would not be safe to assume that the Truce was, therefore, concluded in 452/1.
6. ATL 173; cf. Beloch 202-3; Bayer and Heideking 135N48.
7. Contrast Gomme 325-6, 409-13.
8. ATL 173, 178 (so too Schreiner 1) 36-7); Cloché 29 (so too Meiggs 110-11 and N1; cf. Kagan 97N57).
9. W.P. Wallace 258 dates the Thessalian expedition and Perikles' operations correctly, but is prepared to accept that Thucydides placed the end of the Egyptian campaign before these two enterprises only for effect. Meritt retracted his advocacy of a 453/2 date for the end of the Egyptian campaign at ATL 169; cf. Gomme 412N2. References to earlier work on the chronology of the Egyptian expedition at Busolt 304-5N1.
10. ATL's attack on this date (169-70) has been almost universally rejected. Deane 55 accepted it; in my view the scholiast's evidence is the conclusive objection to his proposed 454 date for Tanagra (46-62). On Raubitschek see below N14.

11. Nesselhauf, followed by Cloché 29, insisted that the 'decisive event' of the final Egyptian narrative must be subsequent to Tolmides' expedition (cf. Gomme 320; Meiggs 111N1). But since 109. 1-2 is clearly recapping, we are not on firm ground when we argue that any particular point before the end of the expedition must be in its proper chronological position in the narrative order, and not also recapping. (In fact I agree with their conclusions though I prefer to arrive by another route); see, more carefully, Bayer and Heideking 133. Contrast McNeal's suggestion (315) on the location of chapter 109, (but with 318-19).
12. See e.g. Busolt 328N3; Kolbe 266.
13. Gomme 410 adds the return of the survivors and surrender of Inaros as possible ends for the expedition, which I doubt was in fact the case.
14. See Beloch 204; von Domaszewski 14N2 (though in the text he implies Tolmides' periplous was after knowledge of the defeat in Egypt, which is impossible); Barnes 175 (presumably followed on this point by Scharf 1) 316); Raubitschek's date for the end of the expedition ignores the terminus post quem provided by the periplous of Tolmides (11) 38); Judeich 14 dates the end in 455, which (with his "Anfang 461" alternative for the beginning (5N1)) is possible. I have seen no convincing argument, independent of other chronological conclusions, in favour of dating the periplous to one or other half of 456/5.
15. ἔτι μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα
ἐφ' ἑξ ἔτη πολεμήσαντα this
must mean six (roughly) full years, pace, e.g., Kolbe 266, and most commentators take it so. W.P. Wallace 258N16 thinks it more

likely to mean 'in the seventh year'; if so, I think only just. Caspari miscalculated. Barns 175 would start these six years with his putative Kyprian campaign, in 463/2, believing (170-71) the involvement in Egypt to have begun only in 461. This is an unacceptable interpretation of Thucydides, not because he would be giving a duration at the end of operations whose beginning he has omitted (which is what he did for the Messenian war), but because it is unlikely that he should lump operations in Kypros together with ones in Egypt as a "Levantine war".

16. Barns 171 is certainly right to insist on the natural meaning of ἐτιυχόν γὰρ εἰς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι (Thuc. 104.2), i.e. they were 'on their way' or 'about to go'; cf. Raubitschek 11) 38. Contrast e.g. ATL 260 N79.
17. One of the main reasons why scholars have been attracted to this possible but improbable early date for the Egyptian expedition is to enable them to associate it with Plutarch's notice (K. 15.1) that the reforms of Ephialtes (effected in 462/1: AP 25.2) were carried out after Kimon had ἐξέπλευσε - but this is not a necessary association (cf. chapter thirteen N15); see von Domaszewski 11; Barns 167, 170, 172, who is well aware of the danger to his thesis presented by the necessity of fitting the end of the Thasos revolt, trial, aid to Sparta and an expedition to Kypros into the period required, resorts to dating the trial of Kimon before the end of the Thasos revolt (dated by Barns to 463/2) which conflicts with Plutarch (cf. chapter thirteen N15). Scharf 1) 313-15 has no problem because he is working in the untenable belief that the capitulation of Thasos, as well as

- Kimón's trial, were completed before the end of 464/3. Judeich 4-5N1, 13-14, 13-14N1 argues the possibility that the Kypros-Egyptian expedition began in 462, (see reference at N14 above, however), though not with Kimon, whom he correctly has sailing off to Lakonia in 462. Raubitschek 11) 38 does not explain how Kimon should lead the Kypros-Egyptian campaign "during the summer of 462 B.C. at the same time as the Athenian second auxiliary expedition to Messene". Beloch 205, 2) 151-2; (cf. Taeger 18) did not believe $\xi\zeta\epsilon\pi\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon$ referred to the Kypros-Egyptian expedition, but nonetheless believed it left in 462 and that Kimon would have led it had it not been for the Spartan appeal. His main reason for dating it early was that it seemed to fit Kimon's policies so well (see Gomme 307).
18. E.g. Busolt 347; E. Meyer 2) 75.
19. E. Walker 470, cf. 75-6.
20. Though his argument for placing the Argive embassy after the alliance with Athens was misplaced: "Argos was in danger of being attacked" and Walker thinks this situation obtained after her alliance with Athens. But she was $\pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\mu\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ to Sparta before her alliance with Athens, and so already in danger of being attacked (Thuc. 102.4). The reason why the Argive embassy should be dated after the alliance with Athens is because it was obviously a joint embassy. A moment's reflection on the nature of approaching great kings will confirm that it is inconceivable that the Athenian envoys should be loitering around, able to overhear official embassies. This means the Athenians were also enquiring about $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\eta$ which is no doubt why Herodotos' source sought to separate the two embassies.

21. Hignett 1) 194N4; Sealey 1) 99N7, 4) 332 and N1 and Barns 173N2 follow E. Walker explicitly, and Meiggs 92-3, 145 and Schreiner 2) 35 come to the same conclusion as E. Walker. Ehrenberg 1) 431N29, 437N74 places the embassy at some time after the Thasos revolt. Wade-Gery 228-9 (a weak argument against E. Walker's view at 229N2); cf. ATL 304 and Gülke 63 keep to the traditional view.
22. I am not prepared to support this date with Kolbe's argument (265; cf. E. Meyer 568N1) concerning a possible connection between the beginning of the 'Tribute Lists', removal of the alliance's treasury from Delos to Athens, and the collapse of the Egyptian campaign - cf. e.g. Cloché 28; Gomme 410; Gülke 65N2 (apparently); ML p.75; there are too many insecure inferences for it to be of much value: (see Scharf 1) 312-13; cf. Barns 176; Pritchett 2) especially 19 (criticism at Meiggs 421); and the reference to Will at Bayer and Heideking 134 and N44.
23. See the references at chapter ten N12, and on method especially McNeal.
24. See chapter ten N12.
25. See the references at McNeal 308N5, adding E. Meyer 502-3N1 and Deane 19-30, 48-50 (the latter dating the capture of Naupaktos after Oinophyta (30) which he dates in 454 (47-62)).
26. I note, in passing, though, that the argument that we should believe in a siege of Ithome continuing into the 450s in order to render Spartan inactivity in the First Peloponnesian War "reasonable" (so recently Reece 118-19; Deane 38-42) is not valid. The supposed end of the siege in the mid-450s effected no change in Spartan behaviour. (Even if it were possible to

date Tanagra after the end of the revolt, as Deane does, the operation was hardly the action of men itching to get at the Athenians). Furthermore, we hardly need to seek an external reason for Spartan *ἡσυχία* (cf. e.g. Thuc. 68.1 - 71.7).

If Spartan behaviour concerning the second request for assistance and the dismissal of the Athenians is anything to go by, we might well be misguided in trying to find reasons which render Spartan actions "reasonable".

27. See e.g. Beloch 2) 165N2; Scharf 2) 155-6 and 156N1, 159-60.
28. Cf. e.g. ATL 167; Gomme 405;pace Hammond 2) 402-3.
29. Reece 117.
30. See chapter thirteen N4.
31. The Corinthians will, of course, have regarded the alliance as an unfortunate realignment, for Korinth did not enjoy good relations with Argos in this period: see Strabo 8.6.19 (p.377) and Plutarch Kimon 17.1. There is no reason, however, to believe that Argos and Korinth were enemies in the strict sense of the word, as Argos and Sparta probably were, for the inscription on a helmet concerning an Argive victory over Korinth (Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes B110 (p.322)) seems to come from a later period, "about the middle of the fifth century" epigraphically, according to Hicks and Hill 46; see too Jeffery 53N50.
32. Cf. Kagan 79.
33. See further de Ste. Croix 214-18.
34. The Megarians were at war with the Corinthians: Thuc. 103. 4; see the references below N51 for those who recognize the fact that the alliance with Megara meant war.
35. Hammond 2) 403 and N1.

36. Hammond 2) 463N1; Reece 119-20
37. If accepted, this argument also precludes dating the capture of Naupaktos before the Spartan insult, which would otherwise not be impossible, and in view of the public debate of 464-2 would not have been intrinsically improbable.
38. Hammond 2) 379-81, 400.
39. For two possible reasons why the expedition to Kypros seems to have been later than we should expect in getting started, see below N47.
40. Thucydides (102.4) makes it fairly clear that the Athenians felt the Spartan suspicions of sympathy with the helots were unjustified, and I think we should believe them; E. Walker 71; Burn 2) 56-7 and Schachermeyr 2) 33 e.g. do not; Lang 2) 269 isn't impressed with the evidence for feelings at Ithome; see too Scott.
41. See N50 below.
42. See too chapter thirteen N50.
43. Cf. Cloché 2) 54.
44. This may be the same man who as Spartan proxenos (Xen. Hell. 6.3.4) played a part in the negotiations with Sparta over the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/5 (Diod. 12.7); this is Davies' opinion (258), while Beloch 44-5 thought the ambassador to Sparta was the nephew of the one who went to Sousa. If the two are the same man it suggests Kallias did not express the wisdom of negotiating with Artaxerxes in terms which were explicitly anti-Spartan.
45. Demosthenes 19.273 might reflect anger at Kallias for having proposed the embassy.
46. Cf. the attractive suggestion at ML p.76 that the use of the singular $\epsilon\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota$ at IG 1² 928 = ML nr. 33 reflects

the idea that the war in Hellas was the same as that against the Persians.

47. On Hammond's chronology (2) 379-81, 400) the end of the Messenian war was not until 460/59, and so the dispatch of aid to Inaros, in summer 460, as we saw, since it comes after the end of the Messenian war in Thucydides' narrative (Thuc. 103.1, 104.1) must also have been in the second half of 460; as the Kyprian expedition had only just begun, or was about to begin (see N16 above), at that time, it seems to have got off to a later than usual start. Perhaps preparations, mustering and training occupied the earlier part of the sailing season; and/or perhaps the Athenians were anxious not to leave before their crops' most vulnerable months had passed without any invasion by their enemies.
48. As Cloché 214-16 seems to.
49. See de Ste. Croix 186-7 for a recent appraisal of the strategic usefulness.
50. As de Ste. Croix 181-2 has argued.
51. See e.g. Burn 2) 74; Jeffery 52; Kagan 80-81; Usher 404; de Ste. Croix 182, 187-8; Meiggs 92; Sealey 1) 61, 2) 261-2; Deane 32; J.R. Cole 371. (Almost all: contrast Salmon 128-9).
52. I do not believe (as e.g. Caspari 199; W.P. Wallace 256; Kolbe 266-7; ATL 174 and N53; ML p.75; Meiggs 101; Bayer and Heideking 124N4 do) that IG 1² 928 = ML nr. 33 can only, or is very likely to, belong to the first year of the Egyptian campaign; see Gomme 311, 412N2; Barnes 167; Scharf 1) 317, 2) 157 and N1; Westlake 2) 65; McNeal 320; Fornara 3) 45-6; Deane 35-8, 109N14; Kypros had to a large extent been lost to the Persians before Eurymedon and so far it had not been fully recovered. Since the Athenians and their allies must have been using some

part of the island as a way station (this is intimated by Thucydides' ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον (104.2; differently: Wade-Gery in Barns 171)) they will have encountered attacks; this is also an adequate explanation of the casualties in Phoenicia, probably Doros: see ATL 9-11, 260-61; cf. Schachermeyr 2) 35; see too Libourel 606. On the other hand, I would not rule out as impossible the idea that the Egyptian campaign was begun in the same campaign season in which the fighting at Halieis, Kekryphaleia, Aigina and Megara (IG I² 928 - ML nr. 33; Thuc. 104.2-106.2) took place (cf. e.g. E. Walker 76; Cloché 30, 216, 222). It is unsafe to believe that the casualty lists cover only one archon year, as Fornara 3) 44 unconvincingly argues, in contrast to the now orthodox view.

There is, of course, every reason to follow Thucydides' narrative order (103.4 - 104.1) in taking the Megarian alliance as prior to the request by Inaros: see e.g. Cloché 29-30.

53. The traditional unwillingness to accept Thucydides' implications concerning the numbers committed to Egypt throughout the six years has been expressed with variations, some drawing support from that inaccurate scribbler (see ancient castigation at W.P. Wallace 254N3 and the assessments of Meiggs 107, 475 and Bigwood), Ktesias (in particular Caspari; W.P. Wallace; Adcock; Cloché 219-20; Scharf 1) 321N3; Schreiner 1) 35-6; see also Westlake 2) 63-5 and the references at 63N19; Barns 170, 175N3, 176; and most fully, Salmon 90-192). The most common view is that after the initial victory the bulk of the fleet returned home, and this is held to explain events in Hellas (see Caspari 200; W.P. Wallace 259-60; Adcock 4-5; Gomme 321-2; Westlake 2) 66;

- ATL 177N61; Deane 35-7; cf. Scharf 1) 324). Recently, however, scholars have not only been more willing to accept Thucydides' implications (see Meiggs 106-8, 472-6; cf. Sealey 2) 272, 295N2) but it has also been shown by Libourel 607-9 that the Peloponnesians could hardly have dared face the Athenians in the Saronic Gulf unless many more than fifty or so ships were away in Egypt (the fact that Libourel 609 mistakenly believes the Spartans were still engaged at Ithome does not much alter the weight of his argument). On the *τρίηρεις διάδοχοι* see now Libourel 612-13. The difference in Athenian manpower between the occasion when Myronides led the oldest and the youngest (Thuc. 105.4) and the *πανδημεῖς* forces of Tanagra (Thuc. 107.5) will, then, have been the result of a new stage in the siege of Aigina, as E. Walker 81 and Gomme 315 suggested.
54. Beloch 205; Burn 2) 73.
55. Cf. Gomme 306-7 and N1; "virtually total": Ktesias (fr. 14) says the otherwise unknown Chari(s)timides was one of the Athenian generals, and so presumably not opposed to the expedition. See Busolt 306N2.
56. Beloch 205, 2) 151-2. (I have referred to the modified proposals of von Domaszewski, Taeger, Barns, Scharf and Raubitschek above in discussing the chronology).
57. Cloché 217; Dienelt, referred to by Kagan 82 and N15; cf. E. Meyer 549, who portrays the offensive against the Persians as not motivated originally by the "radikale Partei"; Burn 1) 52 considers but rejects the idea of a compromise; see further references at Salmon 125N7.
58. There has, in my view, been a tendency to over-interpret his death.

59. See Sealey 1) 62, 68-9; Kagan 83.
60. He may have been general at Tanagra, but Plutarch (Per. 10. 1 -2) cannot be trusted. Thucydides chose to mention five generalships of the First Peloponnesian War, two of Myronides (105.4, 108.2 -3), one of Tolmides (108.5), one of Leokrates (105.2) and one of Perikles (111.2). This may roughly reflect the relative importance and activeness of these four leaders during the war.

- 2) 302.
61. See Sealey 1) 68, The fact that Perikles "seems to have had friendly relations with some leading men at Sparta" (Sealey loc. cit.), of course, provides no reason against believing he was anti-Spartan at this or a later stage.

The anecdote at Plutarch Per. 18.2 -3 of Perikles' cautionary remarks to Tolmides before marching to Koroneia looks like rhetorical invention. If it has any basis in fact it merely reflects a difference in tactics, not in wider, strategic aims.

See de Ste. Croix 316.

62. Kagan 79 thinks Perikles had to go along with the war out of respect for Ephialtes' memory, with an eye to his erstwhile supporters, but that he was in fact unenthusiastic (cf. 67, 68N40, 93, 95-6; see further below N65); similarly, Schachermeyr 2) 33, 46, 51-2. de Ste. Croix 315-17 doubts Perikles' enthusiasm for Athenian attempts to establish a land empire in central Greece, though he is less confident (316) about Perikles' attitude to the Megara alliance; cf. Meiggs 185.

63. See above N60.

64. Frankly recognized by only a few, including Gomme 306 and Westlake 2) 73N42.

65. See e.g. Cloché 216-25; E. Walker 74, 77, cf. 79; Burn 52;

Barns 170, 173-4; Ehrenberg 1) 208; Usher 405; Salmon 126-9 (with many further references); Knight 2-3. Kagan has a different approach, which leads, however, to the same result. He believes "Pericles played a leading role in the decision" (84N20) to assist Inaros. He tries to modify the implied stupidity of Perikles by postulating that he "may not have approved of a policy of war with Sparta, but it had been the policy of the martyred Ephialtes, and Pericles had no choice but to pursue it" because he needed "to win the confidence of the party he led" (79). In other words Perikles did not make a large error of misjudgement but knowingly advocated a "foolishly optimistic" course, "reckless and ill-conceived". Kagan's final conclusion, though, is that Perikles was "perhaps intoxicated with a bright new ideology whose glitter had not yet been tarnished by war and corruption" (83).

66. Cf. above N60; cf. also Plut. Per. 16.2 -3. Thukydides Milesiou was probably not yet influential: see Raubitschek 10) 87.
67. See, correctly, Schachermeyr 2) 46. It is very unlikely that Perikles enjoyed a particularly prominent position in 460. He was only in his early thirties, and had come to serious public attention, albeit creditably, a mere two years earlier. So far as we know, he had one uneventful strategía to his name. His family background was an asset, especially since he had kept his distance from the "grand coalition", though our analysis of the 470s should warn us against over-emphasizing this source of influence. Like many scholars I do not believe the tradition attributing an active role to Perikles in the reforms of Ephialtes (Aristotle Pol. 1274 a 7; AP 27.1) deserves credence;

see e.g. Hignett 1) 197; Sealey 1) 69-70; Day and Chambers 143 N19; Schachermeyr 2) 47; Connor 1) 183N21; Rhodes 1) 202N3, 2) 151; it may reflect the recognizable political association between the two men in the 460s, or is perhaps a retrojection based on Perikles' later introduction of jury pay (Aristotle Pol. 1274 a 7-9; AP 27. 3 -4; Plut. Per. 9.2 -3; Plato Georgias 515 e); but see further Gomme 327, 329; Wade-Gery 235-8; Hignett 1) 342-3; Connor 1) 32-6, 43-4; Day and Chambers 35N45, 143 and N21; Podlecki 1) 97-8, 175NN 54-6.

The necessity of payment for jurors is more likely to have become apparent only with experience; cf. Sealey 1) 70; pace Meiggs 94N4. Scholars who emphasize Perikles' junior status in this period include E. Walker 69; Hignett 1) 254; Burn 2) 47; Schachermeyr 2) 47, 242N34; Sealey 1) 61, ^{2) 301;} Will (see Bayer and Heideking 128); Kagan 68, 79, 96. Kagan believes, nonetheless, that on Ephialtes' death Perikles "assumed the leadership of the democratic faction and of the state" (78); similarly, Hammond 5) 106-7; Usher 404-5; Knight 1-3, 6 portrays Perikles in what appears to be single combat against the Peloponnesian League and the Persians in Egypt.

Another possible friend of Ephialtes who may have been active now is the Arcestratos mentioned at AP 35.2 (cf. e.g. Hignett 1) 196; Schachermeyr 2) 33; J.D. Lewis 138; and, less confidently, Connor 1) 125-6; the historicity of Arcestratos as a prominent political friend of Ephialtes needn't be doubted even if the historicity of the events described by AP 35.2 is questioned, as Day and Chambers 129N108 and Ruschenbusch 372 have done). We know nothing about him, though. (Since "the

- positive case" for identifying him with Arcestratos Lykomidous (see Wilamowitz 1) 68N40; Busolt 27ON1) "is substantially political" (Davies 346-7) it would be circular to base any conclusions on a possible connection with Themistokles).
68. See text below on the analysis of the events of the year for an explanation of how this feature could have manifested itself in practice.
69. See Kolbe's comments (269) on the effect opposition to the Egyptian campaign would have had on Perikles' political standing.
70. Ehrenberg 1) 208.
71. Cloché 218; Thucydides 104.1.
72. See J.D. Lewis.
73. See Rhodes 1) 53 and the references at 53N2, 57-60 and 58N1. Kluwe 1) 302, 2) 65, 73, 80 stresses that a high degree of education was necessary in making the decisions facing the Athenians in the decades after 480. He deduces that the bulk of the demos, therefore, can have made no serious contribution to the formation of policy. 460 was an example of the need for a complex assessment of the situation facing the Athenians. The results indicate, I think, that the decisions were not taken by a small group of highly knowledgeable men to be rubber-stamped by an Assembly of citizens who were, in Kluwe's view (2) 65) "dumm, leicht lenk- und ausnutzbar".
74. I believe the primary motive in the Egyptian campaign was to damage the king's interests, and would rank as secondary the commonly emphasized economic benefits (see Salmon 129-33 with further references). Kolbe 269 and Cloché 225 think that the Athenians may have had their eyes on the possibility of dis-

content among their allies, which sounds plausible.

75. The importance of a new generation is noted by Schachermeyr

2) 26, although he interprets the effects differently.

76. The reader would gain a false impression if he or she were to

take my recognition of the apparent mistakes of 461-0 as a

general comment on the viability of Athenian democracy.

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Abbreviations of the titles of periodicals:

AAASH	Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae.
AC	L'Antiquité Classique.
AJA	American Journal of Archaeology.
AJP	American Journal of Philology.
Arch. Delt.	ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΙΚΟΝ ΔΕΛΤΙΟΝ
BSA	Annual of the British School at Athens.
Class. et Med.	Classica et Mediaevalia.
CJ	Classical Journal.
CPh	Classical Philology.
CQ	Classical Quarterly.
CR	Classical Review.
CSCA	California Studies in Classical Antiquity.
GR	Greece and Rome.
GRBS	Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies.
HSCPh	Harvard Studies in Classical Philology.
HZ	Historische Zeitschrift.
JHS	Journal of Hellenic Studies.
PCPhS	Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society.
REA	Revue des études anciennes.
RhMus	Rheinisches Museum für Philologie.
Riv. di fil.	Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica.
SO	Symbolae Osloenses.
TAPhA	Transactions of the American Philological Association.
ZPE	Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik.

In the notes I have referred to the following pieces of work by author's name and page reference only. When an author has more than one piece listed I have numbered them. In some cases, a piece of work by an author who has more than one work listed will nonetheless be referred to by author's name and page number alone (though when clarity required it I have occasionally mentioned the title of the piece). The work will always be the one listed first among the author's pieces in the Bibliography; for example, "Amandry 199" would refer to Amandry, P., 'Athènes au lendemain des guerres médiques', *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* 13, 1960-61, 198-223, page 199, while "Amandry 2) 2" would refer to Amandry, P., 'Sur les Epigrammes de Marathon', in *Θεωρία*, Festschrift for W.-H. Schuchhardt, Baden-Baden, 1960, 1-8, page 2. References to R.E. (see 'Abbreviations and Explanations', 2) are given in the notes and not repeated in the following list. (Many of the following titles include italicized forms which I have not given).

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